









Towards the design of a Reflexive Regulatory Framework to “Reduce and Control Emissions 
from Land Deforestation and Degradation and Enhancing Carbon Stocks” (REDD+): 
A perspective from Select Developing Countries 
By: 
Ngaya Anael Munuo
(BA, BA (Hons), MPhil (Law) UWC)
A thesis submitted in the Department of Public Law University of Cape Town in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisor:
Prof. Jan Glazewski, Institute of Marine and Environmental Law, University of Cape Town
31 December 2015 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 













-i -  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2   The Problem ................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3  The Research Question................................................................................................ 7 
1.4   Aim and Objectives ..................................................................................................... 9 
1.5      Research Methodology ................................................................................................ 9 
1.6      The Domestic Application of the Study .................................................................... 10 
1.7      Contribution of this Study ......................................................................................... 12 
1.8      Structure of the Study ................................................................................................ 13 
 
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY  
DESIGN FOR REDD+ 
 
2.1      Introduction ............................................................................................................... 15 
2.2      Sustainable Development .......................................................................................... 15 
2.2.1   General Meaning ............................................................................................... 15 
2.2.2   Application in the Climate Change Regime ..................................................... 17 
2.3      Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities .............. 18 
2.3.1   Respective Capabilities ..................................................................................... 18 
2.3.2   Common Responsibilities ................................................................................. 20 
2.3.3   Differentiated Responsibilities and Treatment ................................................. 20 
2.4      Equity ........................................................................................................................ 21 
2.4.1   Legitimacy ........................................................................................................ 23 
2.4.2   Procedural Equity.............................................................................................. 24 
2.4.3   Distributive Justice............................................................................................ 25 
2.4.4   Contextual Equity ............................................................................................. 31 
2.4.5  Equity in relation to Rights ............................................................................... 32 
2.5      Environmental-Effectiveness .................................................................................... 35 
2.6      Cost-Effectiveness ..................................................................................................... 40 
2.7      Are the 3Es Synergetic or Contradicting? ................................................................. 45 
2.7.1   Environmental-Effectiveness, Cost-Effectiveness and Equity? ....................... 46 
2.7.2   Cost-Effective but Inequitable? ........................................................................ 47 
2.7.3   Cost-Ineffective but Equitable? ........................................................................ 48 
2.8      Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 48 
CHAPTER 3: PLACING REDD+ IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
LAW NEGOTIATIONS 
3.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................... 50 
3.2  Negotiations of Climate Change Regime: The Rio Earth Summit ........................... 51 
3.2.1   Mitigation of Desertification as a Priority for Developing Countries .............. 52 
3.2.2   Climate Change Mitigation as a Priority for Developed Countries .................. 53 
3.2.3   Objections to Legal Regulatory Framework for Forests................................... 56 
3.2.4   The Outcomes and Implications for Climate Change Mitigation ..................... 58 
3.3   The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ........................... 61 
3.4  Negotiations of the 1st Commitment Period: Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) ............ 64 
3.5  Implementing the 1st Commitment Period: Flexible Mechanisms .......................... 69 
3.5.1  Emission Trading (ET) ..................................................................................... 69 




-ii -  
 
3.5.3 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) ........................................................... 70 
3.5.4  COP-7 (Marrakesh Accords): Operational Details for CDM ............................ 72 
3.5.5  Exclusion of Avoiding Deforestation and Degradation ..................................... 74 
3.6  Genesis and Development of REDD+ in the Negotiations of the 2nd Commitment 
Period: Post Kyoto Protocol ................................................................................................. 75 
3.6.1  Conference of the Parties (COPs) on Climate Change ...................................... 75 
3.6.2 Conference of the Parties (COPs) on Biodiversity ............................................ 88 
3.7  The place of REDD+ in the International Climate Change Regime ........................ 90 
3.8  Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 92 
 
CHAPTER 4: REDD+ AS SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM 
 
4.1     Introduction ................................................................................................................ 94 
4.2     Self-Regulation........................................................................................................... 96 
4.2.1   Introduction ....................................................................................................... 96 
4.2.2   Understanding Self-Regulation ......................................................................... 97 
4.3     REDD+ within the UNFCCC Process ..................................................................... 100 
4.3.1   What is being Regulated? ............................................................................... 100 
4.3.2   Regulating REDD+ Objectives ....................................................................... 105 
4.3.3   Incentives to Self-Regulate ............................................................................. 108 
4.4     REDD+ outside the UNFCCC Process .................................................................... 113 
4.4.1   What is being Regulated? ............................................................................... 114 
4.4.2   Regulating REDD+ Objectives: Standards and Principles ............................. 114 
4.4.3   Incentives to Self-Regulate ............................................................................. 122 
4.5     The Aspect of Self-Regulation ................................................................................. 125 
4.5.1   Introduction ..................................................................................................... 125 
4.5.2   Voluntary and Coerced Self-Regulation ......................................................... 126 
4.5.3   Verified Self-Regulation ................................................................................. 128 
4.5.4   Rule Making with Actors ................................................................................ 129 
4.5.5   Markets for Intervention Right ....................................................................... 131 
4.5.6   Accredited Self-Regulation ............................................................................. 131 
4.5.7   Under which Category of Self-Regulation does REDD+ fit? ......................... 131 
4.5.8   Potential Prospects for the 3Es Outcomes ...................................................... 132 
4.6     Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 135 
CHAPTER 5: CARBON RIGHTS: DEVELOPING A PROPERTY LAW FRAMEWORK 
AND A SELF-REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGIME 
5.1    Introduction ............................................................................................................... 137 
5.2    Conceptualising Carbon Rights ................................................................................. 139 
5.2.1   Carbon “Stock”, “Sink”, “Reservoir” and “Sequestration” ............................ 139 
5.2.2   Approaches to Creating New Property Rights ................................................ 141 
5.2.3   Property and Property Rights .......................................................................... 145 
5.2.4   Potential Verification of Carbon Rights ......................................................... 146 
5.2.5   Carbon Rights, Carbon Credits and Benefit Sharing ...................................... 150 
5.2.6   Scope of Carbon Rights .................................................................................. 153 
5.3    Ownership ................................................................................................................. 155 
5.3.1  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 155 




-iii -  
 
5.3.3  Should Carbon Property Rights be a Separate Property Right? ..................... 157 
5.3.4  Legitimate Claim to Benefit from Carbon Credits ......................................... 161 
5.4   Potential Perils: Private Sector Finance ..................................................................... 166 
5.5   Potential Promise: Public Sector Finance .................................................................. 171 
5.6   Implications of Carbon Rights for Self-Regulatory System: Two Possible Futures.. 172 
5.7   Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 174 
 
CHAPTER 6: GOVERNANCE IN TANZANIA AND INDONESIA 
6.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 176 
6.2  United Republic of Tanzania.................................................................................. 177 
6.2.1  The Legal System ........................................................................................... 179 
6.2.2  The Roles of Central, Regional and Local Government ................................. 180 
6.2.2.1  Co-operation and Co-ordination .............................................................. 182 
6.2.3  Forest and Land Tenure and Forest Categories .............................................. 183 
6.2.3.1  General (State) and Village Land ............................................................ 183 
6.2.3.2  Reserved Land ......................................................................................... 185 
6.2.3.3  Participatory Forest Management ............................................................ 185 
6.2.3.4  Implications for REDD+ ......................................................................... 186 
6.2.4  Enforcement of and Compliance with Forestry Regulatory Framework ........ 187 
6.2.4.1   Command and Control Approach ........................................................... 188 
6.2.4.2   Forest Certification Schemes .................................................................. 190 
6.2.4.3   Implications of the Governance Approach to REDD+ ........................... 191 
6.3  Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia .................................................................. 191 
6.3.1  The Legal System ........................................................................................... 192 
6.3.2  The Roles of Central, Regional and Local Government ................................. 194 
6.3.2.1  Co-operation and Co-ordination .............................................................. 196 
6.3.3  Forest and Land Tenure and Forest Categories .............................................. 197 
6.3.3.1   Forest Tenure/Property Status ................................................................ 197 
6.3.3.2   Categories of Forest ................................................................................ 199 
6.3.3.3   Participatory Forest Management (PFM) ............................................... 199 
6.3.3.4   Implications for REDD+ ........................................................................ 200 
6.3.4  Enforcement of and Compliance with Forestry Regulatory Framework ........ 200 
6.3.4.1  Command and Control Approach ............................................................ 200 
6.3.4.2  Forest Certification Schemes ................................................................... 202 
6.3.4.3  Implications of the Governance Approach to REDD+ ............................ 203 
6.4  Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 203 
 
CHAPTER 7: ASPIRING TO ACHIEVE EQUITY, ENVIRONMENTALEFFECTIVENESS 
AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS OUTCOMES (3ES) 
 
7.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 205 
7.2  Tanzanian Approach to Climate Change Mitigation.............................................. 206 
7.2.1  Distribution of Costs and Benefits .................................................................. 207 
7.2.1.1  Institutional Arrangements ...................................................................... 207 
7.2.1.2  Authority with Jurisdiction to Distribute Costs and Benefits .................. 208 
7.2.1.3  Eligible Emission Reductions Activities and/or Factors ......................... 209 
7.2.1.4  Determining the Source and Object of Distribution ................................ 210 




-iv -  
 
7.2.1.6  Identifying Distributive Equity ................................................................ 211 
7.2.2  Determining Regulatory Approach ................................................................. 212 
7.2.3  Determining Compliance and Enforcement .................................................... 214 
7.3  Indonesian Approach to Climate Change Mitigation ............................................. 214 
7.3.1  Distribution of Costs and Benefits .................................................................. 215 
7.3.1.1  Institutional Arrangements ...................................................................... 215 
7.3.1.2  Authority with Jurisdiction to Distribute Costs and Benefits .................. 216 
7.3.1.3  Eligible Emission Reductions Activities and/or Factors ......................... 217 
7.3.1.4  Determining the Source and Object of Distribution ................................ 217 
7.3.1.5  Determining REDD+ Beneficiaries ......................................................... 218 
7.3.1.6  Identifying Distributive Equity ................................................................ 219 
7.3.2  Determining Regulatory Approach ................................................................. 223 
7.3.3  Determining Compliance and Enforcement .................................................... 224 
7.4  Comparative Analysis ............................................................................................ 225 
7.4.1  Benefits Comparison ....................................................................................... 225 
7.4.2  Compliance and Enforcement Approach Comparison ................................... 228 
7.4.3  Implications for Achieving the 3Es Outcome ................................................. 230 
7.5  Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 231 
 
CHAPTER 8: REFLEXIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 FOR ACHIEVING EQUITY, ENVIRONMENTAL-EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS OUTCOMES (3ES) 
 
8.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 233 
8.2  Reflexive Law ........................................................................................................ 234 
8.3  The Emergence of Reflexive Elements in the Existing Regulatory Framework ... 239 
8.3.1  Information System and Disclosure ................................................................ 239 
8.3.2  Environmental Self-audits .............................................................................. 242 
8.3.3  Market Based Regulation ................................................................................ 243 
8.4  Determining the Optimal and Feasible Regulatory Instrument ............................. 245 
8.4.1  Equity Concerns .............................................................................................. 245 
8.4.2  Environmental-Effectiveness Concerns .......................................................... 247 
8.4.3  Cost-Effectiveness .......................................................................................... 248 
8.4.4  The Optimal and Feasible Regulatory Instrument .......................................... 249 
8.5  Some of the Impediments to Using Reflexive Law ............................................... 251 
8.5.1  Economic and Institutional Impediments ....................................................... 251 
8.5.2  Legal Impediments.......................................................................................... 251 
8.6   Reflexive Legal Framework for REDD+ .............................................................. 252 
8.6.1  Incentives to Participate .................................................................................. 252 
8.6.2  Public Information Disclosure and Dissemination ......................................... 253 
8.6.2.1  Determining the Scope and Contents of Disclosed Information ............. 255 
8.6.2.2  Determining the Information Discloser and Periodicity .......................... 258 
8.6.2.3  Challenges of Devising Effective Disclosure Regulation ....................... 260 
8.6.3   Communication-Based Regulation ................................................................ 261 
8.6.4   Decentred Experimentalism ........................................................................... 261 






-v -  
 
CHAPTER 9: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1  Overview ................................................................................................................ 264 
9.2  Towards a Reflexive Regulatory Framework to give Effect to REDD+ ............... 266 
9.2.1  The goals and scope of a REDD+ mechanism................................................ 266 
9.2.2  Definitions....................................................................................................... 266 
9.2.3  The Legal Nature ............................................................................................ 267 
9.2.4  Determining the Sources of Positive Incentives ............................................. 267 
9.2.5  Determining Beneficiaries, Benefits and Eligibility Criteria .......................... 268 
9.2.6  Institutions and Administrative Aspects ......................................................... 271 
9.2.7  Compliance and Enforcement ......................................................................... 271 
9.3  Concluding remarks ............................................................................................... 272 
9.4  Contribution of the thesis ....................................................................................... 273 
9.4.1  Contribution to Climate Change Governance Scholarship ............................. 273 
9.4.2  Contribution to Foreign Direct Investment Scholarship ................................. 274 
9.4.3  Contribution to the REDD+ Debate ................................................................ 274 





CONFERENCES OF PARTIES (COPS) ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2005-2015 
 
COP-11 in Montreal, 2005: REDD+ Proposal .............................................................................. 75 
COP-13 in Bali, 2007 and COP-14 in Poznan, 2008: Negotiations for a Post-2012 Agreement .. 78 
COP-15 in Copenhagen, 2009: A Non-Binding Agreement Outcome .......................................... 80 
COP-16 in Cancun, 2010: Flexible Bottom-Up Approach and Establishment of MRV System .. 82 
COP-17 in Durban, 2011: Negotiations for a Post-2020 Agreement ............................................ 84 
COP-18 in Doha, 2012, COP-19: Warsaw 2013, and COP-20: Lima 2014: Flexible Bottom-Up 
Approach and Top-Down Approach ...................................................................................... 85 






-vi -  
 
Abstract   
 
REDD+ has emerged as one of the governance approaches to address climate change. It calls 
for developing countries to take part in a second commitment period for a post-2020 climate 
change regime under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and outside the UNFCCC. The goal of REDD+ is that host countries will 
receive, inter alia, financial compensation if they choose to conserve their forests rather than 
convert them to non-forest land use. Such compensation is for significant emission reductions 
which are reasonably attributable to human activities. This implies that REDD+ 
implementation at a domestic level will require allocation of burdens and benefits. In light of 
this implication, many scholars suggest that the design of the policy and legal framework to 
this effect must strike a balance between equity, environmental effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness (commonly referred to as the 3Es) to be deemed successful.  
Against this background, this thesis questions: what is the optimal (and feasible) model 
legislative framework sufficient to implement REDD+? It argues that REDD+ should be 
defined as a self-regulatory system. This view directs attention toward a distinctive regulatory 
framework. Thus the thesis suggests that one possible legal framework that holds that 
potential in Tanzania and Indonesia is reflexive law. The research draws on international best 
practice and numerous innovative governance models from different fields and proposes 
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Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction 
In an effort to address climate change in a post-2020 climate change regime under the 
auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
outside the UNFCCC regime,1 parties are encouraged to inter alia take action to implement
and support policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to “reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” (REDD+) in developing 
countries.2 According to the UN REDD+ programme:3
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is an effort 
to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for 
developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-
carbon paths to sustainable development. "REDD+" goes beyond deforestation and 
forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. 
The emphasis raised by the above view is a response to the demand for compensation 
advocated by developing countries in exchange for allowing their forests to be treated as a 
climate mitigation issue. In this vein, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia (Mahathir bin 
Mohamad) shortly before the 1995 Earth Summit asserted: 
 if it is in the interests of the rich that we do not cut down our trees then they must 
compensate us for the loss of income.4
It follows that the goal of REDD+ is that its host countries will receive “positive incentives” 
if they choose to conserve their forests thereby reducing carbon emissions rather than 
1 Article 9 (1)-(2) read together with article 5 (2) of the UNFCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (hereinafter the Paris 
Agreement). 
2 Article 5 (2) of the the Paris Agreement. 
3 The UN-REDD Programme. Available: http://www.un-redd.org/aboutredd [accessed 1 February 2013]. 
4 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 436 citing Mahathir, B.M., (1992). 
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converting them to non-forest land use which emits carbon. 5  Such compensation is for 
significant emission reductions which are reasonably attributable to human interventions.6 
For REDD+ to receive such incentives, particularly under the UNFCCC process, they must 
be “results-based” and be fully measured, reported and verified.7 
However, REDD+ is a phenomenon.8 Its definition is fluid and therefore it means different 
things to different countries, organisations and individuals. 9  Some have defined it as an 
objective rather than a clearly delineated set of activities or actions. 10  The lack of clear 
definition of REDD+ compounded by multi-dimensional aspects of causes of deforestation 
and degradation raise a problem for decision-makers to devise regulatory rules to govern the 
implementation of such a fuzzy concept. The leading scholars in the field of climate change 
argue that the implementation of REDD+ at a domestic level implies that the mechanism 
requires allocation of burdens and benefits by a means of a regulatory framework.11 In order 
for REDD+ to be considered successful, the design of its regulatory framework should strike 
a balance between equity, environmental-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, commonly 
known as the 3Es.12  
In order to devise regulatory rules to govern the implementation of a REDD+ mechanism, 
this thesis defines REDD+ as a self-regulatory system (elaborated on in chapter 4). This view 
arises out of the core idea that REDD+ is based on incentives. The manner in which such 
incentives are entrenched and regulated reveals characteristics similar to “self-regulation”. 
The concept of a self-regulatory system directs attention toward the distinct policy 
implications as discussed in chapter 8. The main argument is that reflexive law holds 
potential to become the optimal and feasible legislative framework sufficient to give effect to 
REDD+. 
                                                 
5 Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental 
Science at 3 and 24. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Decision 1/CP.16 para 73. 
8 Voigt C., Introduction: The Kaleidoscopic World of REDD. University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series No. 2015-22. (2015) at 1. 
9 Angelsen A. (ed), Realising REDD+National Strategy and Policy Options. (2009) at 2. 
10 Angelsen A. (ed), Moving Ahead with REDD Issues, Options and Implications. (2008) at 11. 
11 Angelsen A. (ed)., Realising REDD+ National Strategy and Policy Options. (2009). See also Luttrell, C., L. 
et al., Who should benefit and why: Discourses on REDD+ benefit sharing. In Angelsen A., et al. (eds.), 
Analysing REDD+: Challenges and Choices. (2012) at 141. 
12 Ibid. See also Visseren-Hamakers I.J. et. Al., Interdisciplinary perspectives on REDD+. (2012) 4: Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 587–589. 
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Gunther Teubner pioneered the concept of reflexive law as a response to the problem of 
“regulatory trilemma”. The concept of regulatory trilemma is formulated by observations of 
the interactions and inappropriate relation between the political system (political decision), 
the legal system (legal norm-making), and the social area of life (social guidance).13 The 
author explains regulatory trilemma by asserting that every regulatory intervention which 
goes beyond the limits of the respective self-regulation is either irrelevant or produces 
collapsing effects on the social area of life or else disintegrating effects on regulatory law 
itself. 14 As noted by Black, the failure of command and control regulation (the main 
regulatory approach to forestry and currently considered for REDD+ in the two case study 
countries of this thesis),15 is precisely because it disregards the limits of self-reproduction of 
the involved sub-systems.16 Reflexive law seeks to structure bargaining relations so as to 
equalise bargaining power, and at the same time seeks to subject contracting parties to 
mechanisms of “public responsibility”. In this way, reflexive law opens vital new 
perspectives on the role of law.17 The point of departure however, is to know who or what  
needs to be regulated where and when. These elements have a direct bearing on the 
distribution of costs and benefits. These elements are discussed in chapter 4. These factors 
may vary in each country and therefore it is imperative to discuss them case by case as 
illustrated in chapters 6 and 7. In what follows, the chapter briefly discuses the general bio-
physical considerations, causes of forest deforestation and degradation and policy responses, 
followed by potential problems likely to be caused by the implementation of a REDD+ 
mechanism. 
Bio-physical Considerations, Causes of Forest Deforestation and Degradation and Policy 
Responses 
The burning of fossil fuel and land use changes have emitted, and are continuing to emit, 
significant quantities of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) gases (hereinafter carbon) into the 
atmosphere.18 The contribution from fuel burning was estimated to be 26.4 billion metric tons 
per year in 2000-2005, and the contribution from land use change was estimated at 5.9 billion 
                                                 
13 Teubner G., “Juridification”, in G. Teubner (ed.), Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in 
the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law, (1987), 3-48 at 21.   
14 Teubner G., Juridification of Social Spheres, A Comparative Analysis in the Area of Labor, Corporate, 
Antitrust and Social Welfare Law, Series A Law, European University Institute (1987) at 21.   
15 See chapters 6 and 7. 
16 Black J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 26.  
17 Gaines S.E., Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development. (2002-2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal  1 at 3. 
18 UNFCCC, Climate Change: Impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries, (2007) at 8. 
Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
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metric tons per year during the 1990s.19 As a result, carbon emissions have caused a rise in 
the amount of heat from the sun and is attributed to climate change. The main attributes of 
climate change are increases in average global temperature (global warming); changes in 
cloud cover and precipitation particularly over land; melting of ice caps and glaciers and 
reduced snow cover; and increases in ocean temperatures and ocean acidity. 20 Carbon is 
directly emitted from land-use (mainly from terrestrial deforestation and forest degradation) 
when forest biomass is burned and indirectly after land-use change takes place, resulting in 
further decomposition of organic matter, soil respiration and soil degradation and erosion 
processes. 21 The third Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) study 
estimates that tropical deforestation and forest degradation contribute approximately 17 per 
cent of global anthropogenic carbon emissions each year.22 This contribution is more than the 
emissions from all cars, trains and planes in the world combined.23 But a more recent study 
has lowered that share to about 12 per cent relative to the year 2008.24 
 
Conversely, avoiding deforestation and degradation as well as sustainable management of 
forest activities increases the sequestration of carbon both in the forests and soil. It is 
estimated that the world’s forests store more than 650 billion tonnes of carbon, 44 per cent in 
the biomass, 11 per cent in dead wood and litter, and 45 per cent in the soil.25 This is the 
reason why REDD+ is increasingly being considered a critical mitigation measure within the 
negotiations of a second commitment period for a post-2020 climate regime. This is 
particularly so as it has become increasingly clear that developed countries’ mitigation 
actions alone are not sufficient to meet the overall objective of mitigating climate change 
                                                 
19 Solomon S. et al. (eds.), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2–3 (2007). 
20 Ibid., UNFCCC, Climate Change: Impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries, (2007) at 8. 
21 Schulze et al., “Human influence on carbon balance and significance for global climate”, in (2002)  Plant 
Ecology, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 641–648. 
22 Parry M. et., (eds), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third Assessment Report. Climate Change: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, (2007) at 213. 
23 Department of Energy and Climate Change, “Fast start climate change finance”. (2010) London: Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, at. 5. 
24 Arcidiacono-Bársony C. et. al., REDD Mitigation. 6 Procedia Environmental Science, (2011), 50-59. Also 
see Le Quéré, C. et al., “Trends in the sources and sinks of carbon dioxide”, (2009) 2 Nature Geoscience 831-
836. 
25 FAO., Global Forest Resources Assessment (2010) 163-Main report FAO Forestry Paper, Rome Italy at 11. 
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provided by the UNFCCC.26 Therefore the trading of this carbon value represents some 
economic opportunities for developing countries with terrestrial forest resources.27 
1.2   The Problem 
The international negotiations of a second commitment period for a post-2020 climate regime 
(elaborated on in chapters 3 and 4), have expanded to include consideration of policies and 
legislative frameworks that would support REDD+ activities.28 But there are diverse views on 
what the key problems are and how to realise the goals of REDD+.29 Many scholars suggest 
that key issues with legal implications to be addressed are the possible risks of REDD+ not 
achieving emission reductions, potential human rights violations, and the possible risks of 
REDD+ for biodiversity (the next sections elaborate on these key issues).30 The addressing of 
these issues under REDD+ will be likely mostly a nationally-driven exercise.31 To this end, 
this study examines the case studies of Tanzania and Indonesia (elaborated on in section 1.6). 
                                                 
26 Henry M. et. al., Implementation of REDD+ in sub-Saharan Africa: state of knowledge, challenges and 
opportunities. (2011) 16: 04 Environment and Development Economics 381-404 at 382.  
27 Apart from local and global climate regulation, other roles of forests are well known. Forests ameliorate 
weather events, regulate the hydrological cycle, provide a habitat for biodiversity, protect watersheds and their 
vegetation, water flows and soils, and provide a vast store of genetic information much of which has yet to be 
revealed. The value of forests can also be discerned from socio-economic analysis. For example, on average, 
forestry contributes to about 6 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Africa but in tropical African 
countries, such contribution is 13 per cent. There is also increasing empirical evidence that non-market forest 
use values play a particularly important role for poorer and more vulnerable sectors of the population. See 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. the value of forest ecosystems. Montreal, SCBD, 67p. 
(CBD Technical Series no. 4) (2001). Angelsen A. et. al., Counting on the environment forest incomes and the 
rural poor. Environmental Economics Series, Paper No.98, World Bank Environmental Department, World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. (2004). Emerton L.,Tropical forest valuation: has it all been a futile exercise? A paper 
submitted to the XII World Forestry Congress, Quebec City, Cananda (2003). Available: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/ARTICLE/WFC/XII/MS3-E.HTM [accessed 2 March 2013]. 
28 FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8, Negotiating Text. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/08.pdf [accessed 10 April 2013], also see Decision 1 CP.16, in 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 
December 2010. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. and  Convington  & Burling LLP, Baker & McKenzie. Background 
analysis of REDD regulatory frameworks. A report prepared for The Terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-REDD 
Programme (2009). 
29 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 5. 
30 Cotula L. and Mayers J., Tenure in REDD-Start-point or afterthought? International Institute for Environment 
and Development (2009). Also see Angelsen A. (ed), Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and 
Implications; (2008). Sunderlin W.D., How are REDD+ Proponents addressing tenure problems? Evidence from 
Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam. World Development (2013).  Lyster R, et al., Law, 
Tropical Forests and Carbon: The Case of REDD+. (2013). Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges 
and choices. (2012). Pistorius T. et. al., Greening REDD+: Challenges and opportunities for forest biodiversity 
conservation. Policy Paper, University of Freiburg German (2011). Tyrrell T.D and Alcorn J.B., Analysis of 
possible indicators to measure impacts of REDD+ on biodiversity and on indigenous and local communities. A 
report to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Tentera, Montreal, Canada (2011). 
31 Boyle J. and Murphy D., Designing Effective REDD+ Safeguard Information Systems: Building on existing 
systems and country experiences, IISD, (2012) Available: http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1699, 
[accessed 10 April 2013] as cited by IISD Reporting Services. Available: http://forests-l.iisd.org/policy-
updates/reddy-to-put-the-jigsaw-together/ [accessed 10 April 2013]. 
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Potential Human Rights Violations 
 
As REDD+ revenues become increasingly likely, government and non-government actors 
alike may have strong incentives to passively ignore or actively deny the land and resource 
rights of indigenous, traditional, and/or poor forest users in order to position themselves to 
claim compensation for REDD+ related activities.32  It is reported that “some indigenous 
communities have been strongly opposed to REDD+ from the outset.”33 They (in their view), 
consider it as the latest form of western imperialism and the “commodification of nature” 
which will only restrict their freedom to continue traditional forest practices and lead to “land 
grabbing” by “carbon cowboys” who are eager to capitalise on REDD+ revenues.34 
A second human rights concern raised by REDD+ implementation is the prospect of 
increased law enforcement efforts to deal with illegal logging.35 High profile “crackdowns” 
to deal with forest crime tend to discriminate in favor of those with the means to pay off law 
enforcement and judicial officials.36 Subsequently, REDD+ inspired law enforcement efforts 
could lead to an increase in arbitrary arrest and detention.37 
Possible Risks of REDD+ not achieving Emission Reductions 
A set of difficult issues must be addressed in order to achieve emission reductions. These are 
(1) additionality concerns; i.e. how to ensure that any credited emission reductions are real, 
that is, additional to what would happen without REDD+, (2) permanence of the offset; i.e. 
how to ensure that any emission reductions are permanent – that trees saved this year will not 
be felled in the following year(s), (3) leakage concerns; i.e. how to avoid leakage – that trees 
saved within a country or project area do not lead to more trees being chopped down 
elsewhere, (4) Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) concerns; i.e. how are 
emission reductions to be monitored, reported and verified (particularly if forest data are poor 
or do not exist)? (5) double-counting concerns, i.e. internationally-funded demonstration 
projects not connected to a national REDD+ accounting scheme are allowed at sub-national 
                                                 
32 Seymour  F., Forests, Climate Change, and Human Rights: Managing Risks and Trade-offs. CIFOR Bogor, 
Indonesia (2008) at 11. Available: http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/tk/redd-ilc-01/other/redd-ilc-01-cifor-en.pdf 
[accessed 15 April 2013]. 
33 Lyster R, et al., Law, Tropical Forests and Carbon:The Case of REDD+, (2013). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Tacconi, L.(ed), Illegal Logging: Law Enforcement, Livelihoods, and the Timber Trade. (2007). 
36 Larson A. and Ribot, J., “The poverty of forestry policy: double standards on an uneven playing field”, 
Sustainability Science (2007)  at 8. Available: http://www.springerlink.com. [accessed 15 April 2013]. 
37 Ibid., Seymour  F., (2008) at 11. 
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levels only on a short-term basis, if not “nested” into national REDD+ frameworks, current 
REDD+ projects and sub-national demonstrations may not be accepted as part of the national 
REDD (since Phase 3 will require MRV for emission reductions), 38 in the current form. If 
accepted, they could potentially generate large-scale mismatches, accompanied by risks of 
double counting of emission reductions, leakage, conflicts with national rules on benefit 
sharing, reference levels and risks of lack of integrity in general,39(6) baselines and national 
reference levels: i.e. the levels at which a country should start being credited for emission 
reductions or penalised for emissions increase, based on the interpretation of principles such 
as “common but differentiated responsibilities” and “relevant national circumstances”. The 
reference levels will have a major impact on (financial and/or technology) benefits and thus 
be a political issue, and (7) compliance and enforcement40 which relates to the challenges of 
conceptualising carbon rights as property rights and forest law matters.41 
 
Possible risks of REDD+ for biodiversity   
 
While REDD+ offers powerful synergies for complementing the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (hereinafter CBD) goals, it also presents potential problems that could undermine 
CBD goals.42 These include (a) the conversion of natural forests to plantations and other land 
uses of low biodiversity value and the introduction of the growing of biofuel crops; (b) the 
displacement of deforestation and forest degradation to areas of lower carbon value and high 
biodiversity value; (c) increased pressure on non-forest ecosystems with high biodiversity 
value; and (d) afforestation in areas of high biodiversity value.43 
1.3   The Research Question 
The central question to be answered by this thesis is: what is the optimal and feasible model 
legislative framework sufficient to implement REDD+ in developing countries? Following on 
this overarching question, a number of sub-questions arise: 
                                                 
38 UNFCCC Decisions 4/CP.15 and 1/CP.16. 
39 Minang P.A. and Noordwijk M., Design challenges for achieving reduced emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation through conservation: Leveraging multiple paradigms at the tropical forest margins. (2013) 
31 Land Use Policy 61–70 at 64. 
40 Angelsen A.(ed), Moving Ahead with REDD Issues, Options and Implications. (2008) at 2. 
41 Robles F.F., Forest Carbon Tenure in Asia-Pacific:  A comparative analysis of legal trends to define carbon 
rights in Asia-Pacific. (2012)  FAO Legal Papers Online 89 at 8. 
42 Tyrrell T.D and Alcorn J.B., Analysis of possible indicators to measure impacts of REDD+ on biodiversity 
and on indigenous and local communities. A report to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Tentera, 
Montreal, Canada (2011) at IV. 
43 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)., REDD-plus and Biodiversity. CBD Technical 
Series No. 59 (2011) at 12. 
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1. What is REDD+? This question is addressed in chapter 4. This is instructive in deciding 
the building blocks for the optimal and feasible legislative framework sufficient to 
implement REDD+ which is discussed in chapter 8 
 
2. Which principles of equity should be applied in distribution of costs and benefits? Are 
concepts of equity, environmental-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness contradictory? 
Furthermore, will the implementation of REDD+ which is equitable, environmentally-
effective and cost-effective require trade-offs? To this end chapter 2 provides analysis 
of the principles of equity for designing a regulatory framework for REDD+. Chapter 7 
in turn discusses these principles and the extent to which they are applied or proposed in 
the REDD+ regulatory frameworks for Tanzania and Indonesia 
 
3. What is the place of REDD+ within international climate law and policy? This is the 
subject of chapter 3 which traces the history of international negotiations which gave 
rise to REDD+ with the view to understanding the intentions/interests of both 
developing and developed countries. In addition, this chapter establishes the legal 
relevance of REDD+. This is instructive in deciding the legal nature of the domestic 
regulatory framework for REDD+ in chapters 8 and 9 
 
4. What is the property nature of carbon rights and what are the implications for the 
governance of REDD+? This question is the subject of chapter 5 
 
5. What are the existing forest governance, compliance and enforcement of forest 
approaches in the case studies? This aspect is addressed in chapter 6 
 
6. What regulatory nuts and bolts are envisaged in the case studies’ regulatory legal 
frameworks for REDD+? This aspect is addressed in chapter 7 
 
7. Should the REDD+ mechanism in Tanzania and Indonesia be regulated by the 
regulatory approach envisaged in point 6 above? If not, what other regulatory 
framework would be optimal and feasible? What might this new regulatory framework 
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1.4   Aim and Objectives 
All of the above questions revolve around one basic issue: the distribution of costs and 
benefits in REDD+ activities. Thus the aim of this study is to compare international best 
practices and make recommendations for the optimal and feasible model legislative 
framework sufficient to give effect to REDD+ in two case study countries. The objectives are 
to: 
1. Identify principles of equity that may give guidance to implementation of REDD+ 
activities 
2. Identify the legal relevance of REDD+ 
 
3. Investigate the key governance architecture of REDD+  that reveals its definition  
 
4. Discuss the property nature of carbon rights and implications for the governance of 
REDD+ 
 
5. Describe forest governance in Tanzania and Indonesia 
 
6. Establish the regulatory approach taken or envisaged for REDD+ in each case study 
 
7. Use the results of the above objectives to further the understanding of the limitations 
of the past/existing policy and laws to have sustainable management of forests and in 
the area of REDD+ and suggest innovative regulatory frameworks to give effect to 
REDD+ that holds the potential of balancing the 3E outcomes 
 
1.5   Research Methodology 
The methodology for this research was a comparative approach in a desk-based context. This 
entailed plurality-focused legal analysis where the concept of “law” was reconsidered from 
both the state and non-state actors. This entailed analysis of principles, concepts, policies, 
legislative provisions and regulations, international instruments, 44 interdisciplinary and 
institutional approaches45 that countries have already implemented or begun implementing in 
                                                 
44 The list of such instruments include: Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro) 5 June 1992, in 
force 29 December 1993, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 9 May 1992, 
in force 24 March 1994, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 
in force 3 January 1976, and the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN 
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/40/Rev.1. 
45  This includes bilateral and multilateral initiatives such as the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, the UNREDD Programme, Australia's International Forest Carbon Initiative, and the Norwegian 
Government's International Climate and Forestry Initiative and the approaches to develop an early voluntary 
carbon market.  
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REDD+ activities in selected REDD+ pilot projects. This analysis allows development of a 
conceptual framework in chapter 2. Thus chapter 7 assesses the domestic legal and policy 
approaches to REDD+ against a conceptual framework set out in chapter 2 in order to judge 
whether such regulatory framework can be an optimal and feasible model legislative 
framework sufficient to implement REDD+ in developing countries. The conceptual 
framework is also used in the assessment of how the 3Es can be assessed in the new model 
discussed in chapter 8, and how 3Es can be incorporated in model REDD+ law in chapter 9. 
The reasons for choosing this approach were motivated by the well-known view that the 
state-centric governance model has been inadequate and it is now well established that 
governance studies must constitute a plural approach.46 Thus it was anticipated that through 
this approach, this study can assist the design of the optimal and feasible model legislative 
framework sufficient to implement REDD+. To this end, all efforts were employed to 
establish and maintain a neutral position for academic debate.  
1.6   The Domestic Application of the Study 
At present, REDD+ is being piloted in a number of developing countries on a voluntary 
basis.47 However, until 2013, only Brazil, Indonesia, Tanzania and Vietnam had national 
REDD+ programmes/strategies that regulate the distribution of REDD+ finance. 48  This 
influenced the study to focus on Tanzania and Indonesia. The emphasis on Tanzania was 
because of the two main reasons (elaborated on in chapter 7). First, it received technical and 
financial support to prepare national REDD+ strategies and to pilot REDD+ activities. 
Secondly, Tanzania had already approved a national REDD+ strategy (in comparison to other 
African countries under the REDD Programme) 49  which is the main framework for 
implementing REDD+ activities. 50  Indonesia was selected because it had developed a 
national REDD+ strategy and sub-national regulations (issued by different government 
departments) for implementation of the REDD+ mechanism. Thus the Indonesian case study 
                                                 
46  See different academic literature on: reflexive law, polycentric systems, network governance, nodal 
governance, responsive regulation and smart regulation in chapter 8. 
47 The UN-REDD Programme. Available: www.un-redd.org [accessed 21 April 2013]. 
48  Thuy P.T. et.al., Approaches to Benefit Sharing: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of 13 REDD+ 
Countries (2013) at 6. Available: http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/wpapers/wp108pham.pdf 
[accessed 21 April 2013]. Convington & Burling LLP, Baker & McKenzie. Background analysis of REDD 
regulatory frameworks. A report prepared for The Terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-REDD Programme (2009) 
at 11. 
49 At the time of selection, the other countries were Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Zambia and  Nigeria. Ibid fn 47.  
50 Tanzanian REDD reading progress fact sheet. October (2012) at 4. National REDD+ Strategy Development 
and Implementation Process in Tanzania. Mid Term Review, Final Report. April, (2013) at v.  
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reflects a dichotomy of domestic applications of regulations (elaborated on in chapter 7).  
Arguably, such a focus was expected to broaden the scope of inquiry in demonstrating how 
the country is envisioning the practical applications of such regulations at different levels. 
 
A question might be asked about the title of the study: Why “a” perspective from select 
“developing countries” as they are equal partners and in line with the concept of “CBDR”?51 
Historically the debate over legal frameworks for climate change mitigation has been 
dominated by views from developed countries. This is partly so because developed countries 
have largely been implementing climate change mitigation projects as part of their 
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. Thus the involvements of developing countries have 
been minimal and deployed at point sources as part of the Clean Development Mechanism.52 
Indeed, the views of developed countries and developing countries must be borne in mind in 
climate change mitigation. One author who recognises this distinction is Mumma. He notes 
that developed countries have predominantly seen climate change as an environmental issue 
while the South presents it as a development issue.53 Developing countries, speaking through 
the G77 and China grouping, have maintained that international climate change mitigation 
efforts must not hinder their ability to develop.54 In noting the paper indicating the African 
position in climate change negotiation, it was noted that "objectives of reducing or avoiding 
emissions should be understood to mean slowing the rate of growth in emissions from 
developing countries, not as achieving reductions in absolute terms from current levels."55The 
author argues that this position could have been strengthened by providing the reasons as to 
why this is important. Mumma goes on to explain in separate paragraphs that: 
[carbon emissions] are strongly related to economic growth and standards of living. 
Indeed, in the context of the global warming debate, they have become a proxy for 
living standards: the higher a country's living standards, the higher its emissions tend 
to be, and vice versa. 56  […] Africa is therefore not in a position to benefit 
significantly from [climate change mitigation] projects unless ‘additionality’ is 
interpreted so as to include the avoidance of future emissions.57 
Arguably the above revelations should be viewed as the core elements that form the 
perspective of developing countries and should inform the type of regulatory framework for 
                                                 
51 This concept is elaborated on in chapter 2. 
52 For more discussion on climate change mitigation see chapter 3. 
53 Mumma A., The Poverty of Africa's Position at the Climate Change Convention Negotiations. (2000) 19:1 
UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, at 187. 
54 Ibid at 187. 
55 Ibid at 200. 
56 Ibid at 204. 
57 Ibid at 207. 
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REDD+. This pespective can help to predict how the law will work in practice.58 Thus it is 
the view of this study that transplanting the legal architecture for climate mitigation from 
developed countries may fail to take into account the unique circumstances that face 
developing countries. 
 
The use of the indefinite article, i.e. “a” perspective […] instead of “the” perspective […], is 
a conscious one. While the latter seems to imply that there is a monolithic developing 
countries’ perspective when it comes to climate change mitigation, the former approach 
(which is adopted by this thesis) implies a more narrow scope of generalisation which is 
mainly (but, of course not completely) applicable to all developing countries. For instance, in 
the context of African states, Scholtz and others argue that member states have different 
interests, which may hinder the development of a “common interest”.59  Likewise, Hoste 
noted that a political agreement reached at COP-15 between the USA, China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa created another division because the rest of the countries simply "took note 
of it", most with resignation, many with anger.60 The lack of opportunity for the rest of 
developing countries to express their unique circumstances in this context is an indication of 
the lack of common interest. 
1.7   Contribution of this Study 
There are numerous publications on legal and policy issues for REDD+. What would be the 
contribution of this thesis? First, the thesis comprehensively covers all the major issues under 
the UNFCCC negotiations relevant for REDD+. Second, following from the first, it analyses 
such issues (see section 1.2 of the statement of the problem) and proposes a regulatory policy 
and legal framework option(s) for implementing REDD+ activities in developing countries. 
To the best of the writer’s knowledge, no detailed evaluations of these issues have been 
undertaken with the view to proposing a policy and legislative framework for the 
implementation of the REDD+ mechanism at a domestic level particularly from developing 
                                                 
58 Contextual circumstances has been widely cited as indicators as to how law is expected to work in practice. 
See for instance Habemas J., Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. (1998) at 221. 
59 Scholtz W., The promotion of regional environmental security and Africa's common position on climate 
change. (2010) 10:12 African Human Rights Law Journal 1-25 at 18. Ibid Mumma A., (2000) at 205. Also see 
Ruppel O.C. and Ruppel-Schlichting K., The BRICS Partnership: Development and Climate Change Policy 
from an African Perspective. In Ruppel O.C. et. al., Climate Change: International Law and Global 
Governance. Volume II: Policy, Diplomacy and Governance in a Changing Environment. (2013) at 99. 
60 Hoste J., Where was united Africa in the climate change negotiations? Available: 
http://www.edc2020.eu/fileadmin/Textdateien/post_COP_15_briefing/Jean_Christophe_Hoste_-
_Where_was_united_Africa_in_the_climate_change_negotiations_-_EDC_2020.pdf [accessed 1 May 2013]. 
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countries’ perspective. Therefore, the contribution of this thesis has been ultimately to 
identify essential elements of an optimal and feasible model legislative framework sufficient 
to implement REDD+ at a domestic level. Specific contributions to support this overall 
objective are discussed in chapter 9. 
1.8   Structure of the Study 
Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual framework for the study. It reviews, examines and defines 
REDD+ related principles and concepts necessary for allocation of costs and benefits. This 
chapter seeks to answer two questions. First, it inquires whether equity, environmental-
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness are contradictory principles. Secondly, it investigates 
whether or not the implementation of REDD+ which is equitable, environmentally effective 
and cost-effective will require trade-offs. It begins by identifying principles and concepts that 
could apply to REDD+ and uses them to develop the conceptual foundations for a policy and 
legal framework. Further, the chapter points out the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
principles and concepts without necessarily taking a position on which of the principles 
should be adopted when one is dealing with the question of allocating burdens and benefits in 
the context of the REDD+ mechanism. The chapter concludes by raising practical questions 
regarding these principles. Having analysed the conceptual framework, chapter 3 explores 
historical developments of international negotiations which gave rise to REDD+ with the 
view to understanding the legal relevance of REDD+. Chapter 4 seeks to define what is 
meant by a REDD+ mechanism. In response to this question, this chapter explores the 
concept of REDD+ by discussing the technical and regulatory-related aspects of preparing, 
consulting and standard setting, and communicating these contributions. The chapter argues 
that REDD+ should be seen as a “self-regulation system”. The argument advanced arises out 
of the core idea that REDD+ is based on incentives. The chapter also notes that such 
incentives will come from both public and private sectors. To this end, one of the crucial 
issues relevant to the debate of the distribution of costs and benefits is the issue of property 
rights. Thus, chapter 5 explores the property nature of carbon rights and does with a view to 
suggesting a self-regulatory system for the governance. Chapter 6 discusses the governance 
aspect in Tanzania and Indonesia. Against this background chapter 7 examines Tanzanian 
and Indonesian case studies to provide insights into the conditions under which the 3Es are 
being envisaged in the domestic regulatory frameworks for REDD+. The chapter argues that the 
overall implementation of REDD+ in both countries is based on command and control with 
limited decentred governance systems. In light of this conclusion, chapter 8 addresses how 
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the inadequacy of the command and control approach can be addressed by a reflexive 
approach. Thus, chapter 9 proceeds with the proposition of initial building blocks to be 
considered for a regulatory framework for REDD+. The task before such proposal is to 
indicate inter alia how such framework can take into account the principles discussed in 




Conceptual Foundations for Law and Policy Design for REDD+ 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter provides a conceptual framework for an understanding of what and how 
different principles and concepts influence the design of a legal and policy framework. The 
principles (the three Es) discussed here are used to determine whether a certain regulatory 
approach is "optimal". Thus the chapter links such framework to the main research question 
in section 1.3. Further, the chapter points out the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
principles and concepts without necessarily taking a position on which is to be adopted when 
one is dealing with the question of allocating burdens and benefits in the context of the 
REDD+ mechanism. This is because each principle comes with its own unique set of 
challenges and its application requires a consideration of the specific context. The chapter 
seeks to answer the questions of whether equity, environmental-effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness are contradictory principles and whether these can be reconciled. More specific 
is the question of whether equity, environmental-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness will 
require trade-offs in REDD+ implementation.1
2.2      Sustainable Development 
2.2.1 General Meaning 
The climate and environmental law and policy globally are based on the notion of sustainable 
development. The point of departure has been pioneered by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission), organised by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1983 in response to rising global environmental problems. The 
report defines sustainable development as: 
“…development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 
1 There is a genera l  consensus in the literature that successful climate change mitigation will have to be 
environmentally effective and cost-effective and equitable. See Gupta S., et. al., Policies, instruments and co-
operative arrangements. In Metz B. et.al. (eds.), Climate change: Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of 
Working Group III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007) at 
748. 
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– the concept of “needs”, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and 
– the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on 
the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.”2 
Following the Brundtland report, numerous studies3 have further analysed the concept of 
sustainable development. Perhaps the most coherent and well-explored concept of sustainable 
development is the one which identifies the constitutional elements of strong development 
and indicates its presence in domestic and international law.4 In this case, Bosselmann asks 
the following questions:5 
 How do the rights to a clean and healthy environment, to economic and social 
benefits, relate to each other?  
 And how do all these human rights relate to the “right” and need of the 
environment to sustain itself?  
 Is environmental justice merely an issue of distributive justice among people, 
or should the environment itself be part of environmental justice? 
To answer the above questions, Bosselmann argues that the meaning of sustainable 
development should expand to consist of three equally important elements: intergenerational 
(within the existing generation), intragenerational (between generations) and interspecies 
justice (between human and non-human species).6 This is known as the “ecocentric”7 (strong) 
approach.8  The ecocentric approach goes beyond the traditional conception of justice (i.e. 
justice within existing generations and between generations).9 A discussion which focuses 
exclusively on any of two among the mentioned elements is said to embody a “weak” 
conception of sustainable development (i.e. anthropocentric, an approach which favours 
market-based instruments). In order to migrate to the “strong” conception of sustainable 
                                                 
2 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (the Brundtland Report) (1987) at 
43. Also see Glazewski J., The Nature and Scope of Environmental Law, in, Glazewski J., Environmental Law in 
South Africa. 3rd ed. (2013) at 15. 
3   For example, authors have concluded that it is unclear that “sustainable development” as such can be 
precisely defined as a distinct principle of international law, or even a customary norm, which is accepted as 
binding on all countries. Segger M.C. and Hhalfan A., Sustainable development law: Principles, Practices, & 
Prospects, (2006) at 45. See also Takacs D., Forest carbon offsets and International law: A deep equity legal 
analysis (2010) 22 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 521.  
4   Bosselmann K., “Strong and Weak Sustainable Development: Making the Difference in the Design of Law”, 
(2006) 13 South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 14-23 at 41. 
5  Ibid. Bosselmann K., (2006) at 41. 
6  Ibid at 47. 
7   The ecocentric approach advocates for conservation of threatened populations, species, habitats, and 
ecosystems wherever situated and irrespective of their use value or importance to humans. See Eckersley R., 
Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. (1992) at 46. 
8   Ibid. Bosselmann K., (2006) at 47. 
9   Ibid at 47. 
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development, discussion must include interspecies equity (between human and non-human 
species).10 This movement can only be facilitated by an ecocentric approach.11 The crucial 
issue is to establish how these factors are to be integrated. 12  This means pursuing 
compromises and trade-offs13 with the view to securing a balanced approach.  
2.2.2   Application in the Climate Change Regime 
 
The concept of sustainable development is repeatedly referred to in the climate change 
regime. First the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC requires the mitigation of climate change 
to be “within a timeframe sufficient to allow […] economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.”14 Second, and more explicitly, the UNFCCC provides that “[p]arties 
have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development.” 15  Therefore such parties 
should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would 
lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all parties.16 
The Kyoto Protocol like the UNFCCC contains provisions with reference to sustainable 
development.17 It provides that achieving carbon emission reductions of at least 5 per cent 
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012 leads to promotion of sustainable 
development.18 But the term “sustainable development” is not defined. In the context of 
climate change, efforts to define the term under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
by providing comprehensive indicators of sustainable development were also 
unsuccessful.19Consequently, Decision 11/CP.7 widely known as the “Marrakesh Accords”20 
characterised sustainable development as a host country “prerogative”.21 In attempts to assist 
the host countries in defining sustainable development, some have argued that the UNDP’s 
Human Development Index could be useful in providing economic and social indicators that 
                                                 
10  Ibid.   
11  Ibid.   
12  Ibid. Tladi D., (2006) at 79. 
13  Ibid. Bosselmann K., (2006) at 16. 
14  Article 2. 
15  Article 3 (4). 
16  Article 3 (5). 
17  Murase S. et. al., The legal principles relating to climate change first report, International Law Association 
The Hague Conference (2010) at 25. 
18  Article 2 (1) read together with Article 3 (1). 
19  Murase S. et. al., The legal principles relating to climate change first report, International Law Association 
The Hague Conference (2010) at 25. 
20  FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, Decision 11/CP.7. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf#page=54 [accessed 15 June 2013]. 
21   Murase S. et. al., The legal principles relating to climate change first report, International Law Association 
The Hague Conference (2010) at 25. 
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would guide the CDM to a more sustainable development path.22 In the post-Kyoto climate 
change negotiations, the Cancun Agreement23 encourages developing countries to develop 
low-carbon development strategies in the context of sustainable development.24 Furthermore, 
the Cancun Agreement requires that the REDD+ mechanism be implemented in the context 
of sustainable development and reducing poverty, while responding to climate change.25 The 
Cancun Agreement like its predecessors avoids the definition of sustainable development but 
it provides safeguards and some criteria which can facilitate a sustainable development 
path.26 
2.3      Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
2.3.1   Respective Capabilities 
 
This background places the term “respective capabilities” within the context of “common but 
differentiated responsibility” (hereinafter CBDR). It is to this position that we must turn to 
understand the evolving and taking in a more nuanced form of CBDR that came to favour the 
particular notions of equity and fairness within the current climate change negotiations. 
Accordingly, the UNFCCC is underpinned by five principles which guide measures on how 
to achieve its ultimate objective. Among these principles is the fundamental subtle principle, 
which has resulted in the seemingly ongoing intractable negotiation process, that of CBDR.
27
 
This is particularly so because observations over the years have concluded that the stalemate 
of climate change negotiations has been caused primarily by the dispute of the scope of the 
CBDR.
28
 This provision is found in article 3.1 of the UNFCCC that the parties “should 
                                                 
22  Huq S., Applying Sustainable Development Criteria to CDM Projects: PCF Experience at 8 Washington, DC: 
Prototype Carbon Fund, World Bank, PCF Report 10, (2002). Available: 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/SD_Criteria_and_CDM.pdf [accessed 5 June 2013]. 
23  Decision 1/CP.16, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention. 
24  Ibid, Decision 1/CP.16, para 65. 
25  Appendix I 1(g). 
26  Appendix I of the Cancun Agreement. See Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention in Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010 
Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011). See also CCBA and ClimateCARE, REDD+ Social and 
Environmental Standards (2010).  Available: http://www.redd-standards.org/ [accessed 5 June 2013]. 
27  Glazewski J. and du Toit L., International Climate Change Law, in, Glazewski J., Environmental Law in   
South Africa.  3rd ed. (2013) at 13. 
28  Rajamani L., The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international environmental 
law. (2012) 88:3 International Affairs 605–623 at 615. See also Stone C., Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in International Law. (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law, 276 at 280. It has been 
noted that, at COP-8, the head of the European Union delegation said that “[w]e cannot just sit here through 
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protect the climate system […] in accordance with their [CBDR] and respective capabilities.” 
It should be noted at the outset that CBDR has taken on different meanings at different stages 
in the climate change negotiations.
29
 
The UNFCCC does not completely incorporate the principle of CBDR as it is reflected in its 
founding Rio Declaration. 30  Whereas the Rio Declaration clearly refers to historical 
contributions of developed countries to environmental degradation, the UNFCCC mentions 
these contributions in its preamble.31 This is because at the time of drafting, developing 
countries had argued that developed “countries should take the lead in combating climate 
change because they – through their high per capita energy consumption – historically bear 
the main responsibility for the rising concentrations of GHGs.”32 However, the attempt to 
include language to this effect was unsuccessful, and the reference to “respective 
capabilities” was inserted to underline those capabilities – rather than the differential 
contribution to global emissions.33 The proposal that developed countries should take the lead 
in combating climate change was supported by both developing and developed countries. But 
they disagreed on why developed countries should assume that role. Developing countries 
cited “main responsibility” for the climate change problem as the reason why developed 
countries should take the lead. Developed countries (in particular, the United States) opposed 
this reasoning, and instead agreed to take the lead because of their greater financial and 
technical capabilities.34 Consequently, the wording indicating “take the lead in combating 
climate change” was adapted to refer directly to “respective capabilities”, not the historically 
unequal share of carbon emissions.35 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
meeting after meeting, year after year, with one side of the room saying we cannot act alone, and the other side 
saying we cannot accept obligations." Declaration Emphasizes Development Plan, Urges Swift Ratification of 
Kyoto Protocol, 25 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 1055 (2002). 
29  Bushey D. and Jinnah S., Evolving Responsibility? The Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility in the UNFCCC. (2010) 6  Berkeley Journal of International Law (Publicist) at 2. 
30  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, found in Report of the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992). 
31  Deleuil T., The Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Principle: Changes in Continuity after the 
Durban Conference of the Parties. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law. (2012) 
21:3 at 272. See also Rajamani L., Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law. (2006) at 10. 
32  Bodansky D., The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, (1993) 18 
Yale Journal of International Law 451, 498. See also Soltau F., Fairness in International Climate Change Law 
and Policy (2009) at 191. 
33  Ibid Bodansky D., (1993) at 503. See also Ibid Soltau F., (2009) at 191. 
34  Ibid Bodansky D., (1993) at 503. 
35  Ibid Soltau F., (2009) at 191. 
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2.3.2   Common Responsibilities 
 
It follows from the above that both developed and developing countries have to deal with the 
issue of common responsibilities. The notions of the CBDR in the UNFCCC are to address 
the persistent challenge of how countries should share the global commons. It recognises that 
there are global resources, such as the atmosphere, which human society has a common 
interest in protecting, but for which the obligation to protect will vary in accordance with a 
country's level of development, resources, and institutional capabilities.36 Therefore the term 
“common” suggests that certain risks affect and are affected by every country. 37  These 
include not only the climate and the ozone shield, but all risk-related global public goods, 
including peace, public health, and terrorism. In reducing the mutual risks, all countries 
should therefore “cooperate in a spirit of global partnership.”38 
2.3.3   Differentiated Responsibilities and Treatment 
 
As a way of reflecting the common responsibilities discussed above, the UNFCCC provides 
for differentiated responsibilities. The word “responsibilities” as phrased in the CBDR 
implies a moral duty and not the legal consequences that flow from an internationally 
wrongful act.39 The CBDR principle finds expression in the differentiation into three broad 
categories. First, is the differentiation in commitments between Annex I, or developed 
country parties (but differentiated within the Annex), and non–Annex I or developing country 
parties.
40
 Differentiation is between countries, and not just broadly between developed and 
developing but between various groups of countries.
41
 Second, differentiation exists with 
respect to Annex I parties’ non-binding goal to return their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000; 
more stringent and frequent reporting obligations of Annex I parties; and third, provisions 
                                                 
36  Mumma A. and Hodas D., Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human 
Development. (2007-2008) 20:4 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 619 at 628. 
37  Ibid Stone C., (2004) at 277. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Murase S. et. al., The legal principles relating to climate change first report, International Law Association 
The Hague Conference (2010) at 11. 
40  Rajamani L., Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law. (2006) at 191. See also Rajamani 
L., The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international environmental law.(2012) 
88:3 International Affairs 605–623 at 611. 
41  As observed by Rajamani L., The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international 
environmental law. (2012) 88:3 International Affairs 605–623 at 617, these are: “developed countries”, 
“developing countries”, “least-developed countries”, “small island developing States”, “countries with 
economies in transition”, “developing countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel 
production”, “low-lying and other small island countries”, “countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid 
areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification” and “developing countries with fragile mountainous 
ecosystems”. 
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concerning the granting of assistance, which may be financial or technological.
42
 It is useful 
to discern the meaning from each category and therefore these provisions are elaborated on in 
chapter 3. 
2.4      Equity 
The issue of particular importance for purposes of this thesis is the question of distribution of 
costs and benefits at a domestic level. Therefore the concept of equity which is regularly 
invoked in the climate change context becomes pertinent to provide criteria on “who gets 
rewarded, why and in what proportions”.43 This is because such concept is deep-rooted in 
human relations and in that case plays an important role in the “decisions with far-reaching 
social, economic, and environmental consequences”. 44 At the international level, Soltau 
concludes that the differentiated responsibilities and treatment in the climate law and policy 
give effect to conceptions of equity.45 The issues of equity have become prominent in the 
international environmental instruments for two main reasons: (1) the scarce or threatened 
shared resources and public goods such as fish stocks have compelled such instruments to put 
limits on the use of such resources, and subsequently (2) impose burdens and costs as it seeks 
to reduce environmental degradation.46 One aspect of the article 3.1 of the UNFCCC is that 
parties should protect the climate system on the basis of equity. The subjects of equity 
according to this provision are the present and future generations. This provision plays an 
important role in benefit distributions in domestic law since it appears to link equity and 
sustainable development. Further, Annex I parties are required to take into account the need 
for “equitable and appropriate contributions” by each of them in their effort to achieve its 
ultimate objective.47 It is notable that the concept of equity in the UNFCCC is connected with 
other concepts: CBDR and “respective capabilities”. An expansion of the equity criterion is 
                                                 
42 Rajamani L., Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law. (2006) at 191. See also Rajamani 
L., The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international environmental law. (2012)  
88:3 International Affairs 605–623 at 611. 
43  Badgery-Parker I., Design benefit-sharing carefully, or risk undermining REDD+, researchers warn. 
Thomson Reuters Foundation (2013). Available: http://www.trust.org/item/20130812025730-y9npk/ [accessed 
24 January 2014]. Thuy P.T. et. al., Approaches to benefit sharing: A preliminary comparative analysis of 13 
REDD+ countries. Working Paper 108, CIFOR (2013) at 3. Available: 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP108Pham.pdf [accessed 3 March 2014]. 
44 Soltau F., Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (2009) at 2, 3-5. 
45 Ibid at 187 and 224.  It is observed that in international law, equity is used as a synonym for fairness or 
justice. See Shelton D., Equity, in Bodansky D. et. al. (eds)., The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (2007) 639-662 at 640. 
46  Shelton D., Equity, in Bodansky D. et. al. (eds)., The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(2007) 639-662 at 652. 
47   Article 4 (2) (a). 
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provided in the Cancun Agreements as it reflects a growing concern for the differences and 
inequalities within countries by referring to the interests of vulnerable populations such as 
women, indigenous peoples, youths and persons with disabilities.48 In this sense, the subjects 
of equity are identified as indigenous peoples and members of local communities.49 
Equity has many different meanings and the exact nature of this concept is obscure 
particularly in the climate change context.50 Some regard equity as “an ideal, or a set of ideals 
that shapes our views of what is fair, right or just.”51 Sands argues that treaties rarely provide 
a working definition of equity, and therefore countries, international organisations and 
international courts and tribunals may, ultimately, have to refer back to the general concept as 
interpreted and applied by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international 
tribunals. 52  Franck distinguishes between two main elements of equity as legitimacy 
(procedural) and distributive justice (substantive) (elaborated on in the next sections).53 With 
that observation, others have added the third component of equity as contextual equity in the 
REDD+ debate.54 A point of departure in this context is then to ask what kind of inequity is 
present at the starting point of a REDD+ project.55 This is to say that the substantive content 
of equity depends on the specific circumstance in which it is sought to be applied.56 
It is also useful to conceptualise equity in parallel with interest.57 While interest represents 
what is best or suitable for an individual, equity represents the common good. Competing 
versions of what is perceived as equitable are aligned with the interests of individuals who 
                                                 
48 Decision 1/CP.16 Part I para 7. Also see Sharma A (ed).,Climate Law In Brief : A brief summary of key legal 
issues relevant to Durban and beyond. Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development 
(FIELD), (undated). See also Murase S. et. al., The legal principles relating to climate change first report, 
International Law Association. The Hague Conference (2010) at 15. 
49 Decision 1 CP. 16. Appendix 1. Also see Ituarte-Lima C. and McDermott C., Operationalising equity in 
national legal frameworks for REDD+: the case of Indonesia. 23 March 2012, Beyond Carbon Conference, 
University of Oxford. 
50 Shelton D., Equity, in Bodansky D. et. al. (eds)., The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(2007), 639-662 at 640. 
51  Heyward M., Equity and international climate change negotiations: a matter of perspective, (2007)  7 Climate 
Policy 518–534 at 519. 
52  Sands at 152. 
53  Franck T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), at 7-9. 
54  McDermott, M. et.al., Examining equity: a multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for 
ecosystem services. (2012) 33 Environmental Science and Policy  416-427 at 419. 
55 Ibid at 420. 
56 Murase S. et. al., The legal principles relating to climate change first report, International Law Association. 
The Hague Conference (2010) at 16. 
57  Ashton, J. and Wang, X., “Equity and climate: in principle and practice”, in: Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the 
International Effort against Climate Change, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Washington, DC. (2003). 
Available: http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/EquityandClimate.pdf [accessed 3 
March 2013]. See also Soltau F., Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (2009) at 138-140. 
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support them. This explains why submissions advanced by countries for climate change 
negotiations based on equity are usually connected with interest.58 "Claims about justice by 
stakeholders are likely tainted by self-interest."59 In addition, the “meaning of equity and 
fairness are not only specific to each society but also change over time.” 60  This is an 
important issue given evidence that what is “fair” may differ from what is “good” or what 
people prefer.61  Therefore, a benefit outcome can be labelled only “just”62  because it is 
“good”.63 
2.4.1   Legitimacy 
 
The term “legitimacy” is mostly used to refer to the justification of authority. 64  This 
conception is understood as the equivalent of having the power to adopt and enforce binding 
decisions or to prescribe binding rules.65 There are several approaches which can induce 
legitimacy into an authority. 66  These include, inter alia: source; procedure-oriented and 
result-oriented or a combination of both.67Authority can also be legitimised if the decisions in 
question are taken in the course of procedures considered to be appropriate, transparent, 
adequate and fair.68 Procedure or obeying to a pre-agreed procedure has a legitimising effect 
in international law as it has in national law. 69  Such effect can be created or enhanced 
depending on who participates in the decision-making process.70 It is also helpful to clarify 
who perceives such decision to be legitimate, because it matters whether members or non-
members of an institution or community perceive the rules or authority as legitimate.71 The 
                                                 
58 Heyward M., Equity and international climate change negotiations: a matter of perspective, (2007) 7 Climate 
Policy 518–534 at 519. 
59 Konow J., Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice. (2001) 46:2, Journal of Economic Behaviour 
and Organization 137–164 at 162. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Konow J., Which is the fairest one of all?: a positive analysis of justice theories. (2003) 41, Journal of 
Economic Literature  1188–1239 at 1193. 
62 In the generic sense. 
63 Konow J., Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice. (2001) 46:2, Journal of Economic Behaviour 
and Organization 137–164 at 156. 
64   Wolfrum R., Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations, 
in Rüdiger Wolfrum· Volker Röben (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law, (2008) at 6. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Cited by ibid Wolfrum R., (2008) at 6. 
68 Ibid Franck T., highlighting the “right process” at 91. 
69 Ibid Wolfrum R. (2008) at 6 citing Luhmann N., Legitimation durchVerfahren, 2nd ed., (1989). Also see 
Habermas J., Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. (1996). 
70 Ibid.,Wolfrum R. (2008) at 6. 
71 Cited in Lederer M., From CDM to REDD+: What do we know for setting up effective and legitimate carbon 
governance? (2011) 70 Ecological Economics  1900–1907 at 1901. 
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legitimacy of the rules or authority relating to REDD+ can therefore be induced by 
procedure-oriented and result-oriented approaches or a combination of both. 
2.4.2   Procedural Equity 
 
Legitimacy is strengthened by procedural equity. To be legitimate, a system must be 
justifiable, according to given moral principles and social norms.72 Procedural justice relates 
to the transparency of the processes by which decisions are made. Transparency and fair 
processes are closely associated with the equitable outcomes (distributive justice) in the sense 
that securing the former can be seen as a way of attaining the latter.73 The goal of procedural 
justice is therefore to identify the elements of social institutions that lead to a fair distribution 
of burdens and benefits in a manner that is impartial with regards to any individual’s class or 
role in society.74 The emphasis is on the process and rules (rather than on the outcome of the 
distribution) that decide the allocation.75 In the context of REDD+, procedural justice within 
a country would involve inter alia  the right of indigenous and local communities to 
participate in decision making and to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) with regard to 
any REDD+ activities that affect them.76 Prior  to  identifying  beneficiaries,  it  is  necessary  
to  develop  a  tentative  understanding  of  what “legitimacy” means in a given context.77 The 
objective is to provide a framework for consultations and negotiations with the various 
actors.78 For this thesis, the conception of legitimacy is tied to recognising and addressing 
claims and rights in line with incentives provided. It is argued that an interpretation of the 
existing legal framework (customary law and non-customary law) can provide legitimacy in 
identifying legitimate beneficiaries. This would take into account legal pluralism (including 
in the context of land tenure and resource tenure).  
 
 
                                                 
72  Luttrell C. et. al., Who Should Benefit from REDD+? Rationales and Realities. (2013) 18:4 Ecology and 
Society 52. 
73  Bone R., Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 
(2003) 83 Boston University Law Review 485. 
74  Gaba J.M., Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings Clause, (2006-7) 40 
Creighton  Law Review 569-594 at14. 
75  Ibid.   
76  Skutsch M., Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits (2012). 
77  Bruce J.W. Identifying and Working with Beneficiaries When Rights Are Unclear: Insights for REDD+ 
Initiatives. Washington, DC: Program on Forests (PROFOR) (2012) at 15. 
78 Ibid. 
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2.4.3   Distributive Justice 
 
The primary objective of the concept of distributive justice is the fair or equitable distribution 
of burdens and benefits among members of a particular society or group,79 individual, or 
household, along a “value chain”, ecosystem, and intergenerationally.80  The benefits and 
burdens are diverse. The benefits relating to REDD+ span all dimensions of social life such 
as inter alia: financial income, political power, education, shelter, health care, ability to 
participate in cultural practices, religious activities,81 strengthening of tenure rights, forest 
products, ability to participate in decision-making, infrastructure provision, ecosystem 
benefits such as biodiversity protection, protection of water and soil quality,82 and liberty 
(both negative and positive).83 The burdens related to REDD+ are forest protection costs, 
opportunity costs, transaction costs84 and social costs (elaborated on in section 2.6). The 
difficult questions relating to this endeavour are: “[w]hat is a just distribution and what are 
the qualities that entitle an individual [a country, or others] to claim a just share?”85 This 
question raises the issue about the connection between equity and rights (see the equity in 
relation to rights section below).  
 
A number of principles are found within the dimension of distributive equity. These can be 
“traced back to different rules-based theories related to distributive justice”.86 Sen points out 
that decision-makers rely on different principles of justice to justify calls for equity and the 
choice of such principles are likely to lead to different policy solutions.87 It is also being 
stated that the “applications of those principles will have different implications depending on 
objectives of the project at hand.”88 This raises a question of what principles are relevant for 
distribution of costs and benefits in the REDD+ mechanism. This chapter discusses the 
                                                 
79  Franck T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) at 8. 
80  McDermott M. et al., Examining equity: A multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for 
ecosystem services. (2012) Environmental Science & Policy at 7. 
81 Distributive Justice. Available: http://myweb.lmu.edu/jkonow/distributive%20justice.pdf [accessed 17 March 
2014]. 
82   Luttrell, C., L. et al., Who should benefit and why: discourses on REDD+ benefit sharing. In Angelsen A. et. 
al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 134. 
83    For a discussion on liberty see Isaiah B., Two Concepts of Liberty. (1959).  
84   A widely accepted definition refers to the costs of setting up and running a REDD+ governance system. See 
Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental 
Science at 3. 
85  Gaba J.M., Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings Clause. (2006-7) 40 
Creighton Law Review  569-594 at 8. 
86  Luttrell  C. et.al.,  Who Should Benefit from REDD+? Rationales and Realities. (2013) 18:4 Ecology and 
Society 52. 
87  Sen A., The Idea of Justice. (2009) at 13. 
88  McDermott, M. et.al., Examining equity: a multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for 
ecosystem services. (2012) 33 Environmental Science and Policy 416-427 at 424. 
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following principles: utilitarianism (maximisation of social utility); egalitarianism (equal 
shares of the object of distribution to all members of society); the need principle (which 
justifies different treatment of individuals); the compensation principle; and the 
accountability principle. All of these principles focus on the fairness of the outcome rather 
than the process.89Akanle noted that there are many other theories of distributive justice but 
the utilitarianism, egalitarianism and need principles form the basis of the introduction and 
development of new ones.90 
Utilitarianism Principle 
The goal of utilitarianism advocates for the (re)distribution of burdens and benefits to secure 
the maximum overall utility to society as a whole.91 This outcome (maximum overall utility) 
is the only just distribution.92 Utility is defined as a property in an object whereby it “tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness” (all these come to the same 
thing).93To achieve the maximum utility, utilitarianism requires laws and social arrangements 
to harmonise the happiness or interest of every individual with that of the whole, and inform 
them that their interests are closely associated with the good of the whole.94 In this way, it is 
expected that individuals would be motivated in their actions.95 
 
The main criticism of utilitarianism is that the principle ignores the concerns of the 
distribution of utility within a society.96 For instance, it is argued that the utilitarian approach 
implies that resources be allocated first to those who derive the greater marginal utility.97 
Accepting this line of argument means that the utilitarianism approach sanctions unequal 
allocation of costs to some people as long as the overall utility is advanced.98 Therefore, it is 
                                                 
89 Akanle O., Distributive justice in International Law CDM geographic distribution. PhD Thesis University of 
Dundee (2011) at 78. 
90  Ibid. 
91 Bentham J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Warnock M., (ed.,) Utilitarianism 
and On Liberty, 2nd ed., (2003). 
92   Harris J.W., Legal Philosophies 2nd ed. (1997) at 41. 
93   Ibid Bentham J.,(2003) at 7. 
94   Ibid at 194. 
95   Ibid.  
96   Frankena W.K., Ethics 2nd ed. (1973) Englewood Cliffs, N.J. See also Kelman S., Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
An Ethical Critique, (1981) 5:1 Regulation 33-40 at 33. 
97   Konow, J., Which is the fairest one of all?: a positive analysis of justice theories. (2003) 41 Journal of 
Economic Literature, 1188–1239 at 1200. 
98  Gaba J.M., Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings Clause. (2006-7) 40 
Creighton Law Review 569-594 at 10. 
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a dangerous principle on certain occasions to consult it.99 This conclusion therefore means the 




In order to address potential bias arising from the utilitarianism approach, a question may be 
asked on what concept of equality should be adopted in implementation of REDD+ activities. 
Responding to this question, egalitarianism seems to be a suitable candidate as it advocates 
for the allocation of equal shares of the object of distribution (e.g. benefits or resources) to all 
members of society.100 The key points to keep in mind are that a distinction is made between 
approaches to equality of opportunity and equality of result. 101  On the equality of 
opportunity, the issue is limited simply to removing formal obstacles to competition between 
the participants in the distribution.102 On the equality of result, the effort focuses on ensuring 
that a distributive scheme allows participants to receive the equal amount of the entitlement 
distributed as a final result. 103  This also means that all people should receive the same 
benefits at some initial point.104 Thereafter everyone is free to use their benefits in whatever 
way they prefer, even if the consequences of the outcome in the future are bound to be 
unequal.105 Following from this, advocates of egalitarianism disagree about what should be 
the object of equal distribution or what form of equality is just.106 
 
There are merits and demerits to an egalitarian approach. Among the advantages of using the 
egalitarian approach is the consideration for the poor who are unable to seek relief from 
courts due to financial constraints. The case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom and Others, 107  illustrates this point. The applicants, including a number of 
children, were evicted from the private land that they were unlawfully occupying. Following 
the eviction, the applicants applied to the Cape High Court for an order demanding the 
                                                 
99   Bentham J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Warnock M., (ed.,) 
Utilitarianism and On Liberty, 2nd ed., (2003) at 20. 
100  Oppenheim F. E., “Egalitarianism as a descriptive concept” in Pojman P.L. and Westmoreland R. (eds.), 
Equality: Selected Readings. (1997) at 56. 
101  Keren-Paz T., Torts, egalitarianism and distributive justice, (2007) at 9. 
102  Ibid.  
103  Ibid.   
104  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/#Strict 
[accessed 17 September 2015]. 
105  Ibid. 
106   Akanle O., Distributive justice in International Law CDM geographic distribution. PhD Thesis University 
of Dundee (2011) at 78. 
107   Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) 
SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom case). 
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government to provide them with adequate basic shelter until they obtained permanent 
accommodation. The Court held that the state was obliged to take positive action to meet the 
needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable 
housing.108 The Government of the Republic of South Africa responded by developing an 
emergency housing policy.109 The said Cape High Court decision is instructive in the  context 
of REDD+. It shows how such approach can be adopted to cater for people who may be in 
positions similar to that of the Grootboom community. The egalitarian approach is also 
demonstrated in Hoffman v South African Airways.110  The case was an appeal from the 
Witwatersrand High Court concerning the constitutionality of South African Airways’ (SAA) 
policy of refusing to hire people living with HIV as cabin attendants. The person in question 
was Hoffmann who challenged the constitutionality of the policy in the High Court. He 
argued that he had been unfairly discriminated against on the ground of disability, because of 
him being HIV positive. The High Court upheld SAA’s defence. In the proceedings before 
the Constitutional Court, the Court indicated that HIV was not a “disability”. The Court then 
held that the policy was unfair as it constituted an infringement of dignity, as it was 
discrimination based on a person's medical health.111 Though the remedy appeared to be 
directed at the individual victim, the Constitutional Court was convinced that the approach 
would assist people who are confronted with a similar challenge.112  Both cases may be 
helpful to local people who may be at risk of evictions due to government decisions or other 
agencies in implementations of REDD+ activities. Critics of egalitarianism argue that if 
benefits are “perfectly equal and everyone is guaranteed the same income level, then what is 
the incentive to work? Too much equality may reduce work effort (and investment) and 
thereby the total product of society.”113 
 
                                                 
108  The UWC’s Community Law Centre: Available:  http://communitylawcentre.org.za/projects/socio-
economic-rights/Cases/South%20African%20Cases/Constitutional%20Court%20Cases/summary-of-cases 
[accessed 12 September 2014]. Also see Budlender G., “Justiciability of socio-economic rights: Some South 
African experiences” in Y Ghai and J Cottrell (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2004) 41. 
109  National Department of Housing Part 3: National Housing Programme: Housing Assistance in Emergency 
Circumstances April 2. As cited by Mbazira C., Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa: A choice 
between corrective and distributive justice. (2009) at 141. 
110  Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) (Hoffman case). 
111 Hoffmann v South African Airways (CCT17/00) [2000] ZACC 17; 2001 (1) SA 1; 2000 (11) BCLR 1235; 
2000 (12) BLLR 1365 (CC) (28 September 2000). Available: 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/17.html [accessed 17 July 2015]. 
112   Ibid. Mbazira C., (2009) at 141 fn 107 above. 
113 Ramirez S.A., Bearing the Costs of Racial Inequality: Brown and the Myth of the Equality/Efficiency Trade-
Of, (2004) 44 Washburn Law Journal 84.   
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The Need Principle (Justifiable Inequality) 
 
A departure from the egalitarian approach is justified by the introduction of “needs”. The 
purpose is to justify different treatment of individuals.114 Rawls proposes the principle of 
need to determine how rights and duties in society are to be assigned, and how benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation should be distributed.115 The author stresses that to decide 
about the distribution of benefits, the principle of need along with fair equality of opportunity 
should be chosen.116 The argument here is that social and economic inequalities are only just 
if they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.117 The goal of the principle of need 
is not to define the elements of equality. Rather the goal is to define the elements that justify 
unequal treatment among individuals.118 Put differently, the principle of need requires equal 
treatment of all individuals unless there is a “material principle” that justifies unequal and 
differential treatment.119 Therefore, a redistribution of benefits from “haves” to “have nots” is 
regarded as just.120 
The problem arising from the above exposition relates to the devising provisions specifying 
the just distribution of benefits and burdens in a manner that everyone receives their due.121 A 
starting point is usually that everyone should be treated equally, except reasons for inequality 
exist.122 A difficult step that follows includes the identification of reasons that justify the 
departure from “all”-equality, the role of the government in rectifying inequality, and the link 
between a distributive system and the maximisation of well-being.123 Regarding the reasons 
that justify the departure from “all”-equality, Rawls proposes that one choose a particular 
social position (such as that of the unskilled worker) and all those with the average income of 
this position or less. Also, he advocates “classify[ing] persons according to their relative 
                                                 
114   Pascual U. et. al., Exploring the links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental 
services: A conceptual approach. (2010) 69 Ecological Economics  1237–1244 at 1239. See also Konow, J., Fair 
and square: the four sides of distributive justice. (2001) 46:2 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 
137–164 at 141. 
115   Rawls J., A Theory of Justice, at 4, 11 and 54. 
116   Ibid at 61. 
117   Ibid at 75. 
118   Ibid. 
119  Gaba J.M., Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings Clause, (2006-7) 
40 Creighton Law Review  569-594 at 13. 
120   Ibid. 
121   Ibid. 
122   Ibid. 
123   Blackburn S., The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1996) at 248. 
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income and wealth, and so for example, all those with less than half of the medium income 
and wealth can be regarded as the worst off in society”.124 
Compensation Principle 
The compensation principle deals with the compensation of benefits to those who are made 
worse off due to the allocation of costs and benefits of a particular activity.125 To illustrate 
this point, the egalitarian approach would allow the policy and legal framework to decide the 
“thing” to be distributed. Second, utilitarianism as argued by Louka represents effectiveness 
if legislation secures: (a) win-win (or Pareto optimal) situations126 or (b) situations in which 
losers would be compensated whereas winners would still remain better off (Kaldor-Hicks 
optimal situations).127 Viewed another way, a pursuit of a global wealth maximizing decision 
has in it distributive elements, at least, in terms of compensation of those who are to lose the 
most from the welfare maximising outcome.128  If the members are not compensated for 
concessions they make, it is expected that they will sabotage solutions that would 
disadvantage them.129 
Accountability Principle 
This principle provides that rewards (and/or “punishments”) should be distributed in 
accordance with a recipient's inputs or contributions (e.g. level of production) and that merit 
or desert determines equity. 130  Put differently, individuals through their effort or other 
morally creditable behaviour are entitled to a greater share of benefits.131 The application of 
this principle in the REDD+ mechanism has some challenges. This is because payment by 
performance to individual communities or forest owners is technically almost impossible for 
reduction in deforestation and degradation because these activities can only be measured 
                                                 
124   Rawls J., A Theory of Justice, (1999)at 98. 
125   Konow, J., Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice. (2001) 46:2 Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organization, 137–164 at 148. 
126  Posner, supra note 39, at 13. “A Pareto-superior transaction is one that makes at least one person in the 
world better off and no one worse off.” As cited by Louka E., at 72. 
127   According to the Kaldor-Hicks principle of optimality, a change is identified as wealth maximising if those 
who gain from the change could, in principle, compensate the losers and still be better off. But “criterion does 
not provide a clear guidance about the level of compensation that is considered satisfactory to the losers, 
because this would vary according to individual circumstances and situations, but it does provide a more 
organized framework.” As cited by Louka E., at 72, 74-75. 
128  Ibid, Louka E., (2006) at 72. 
129  Ibid.  
130  Konow, J., Which is the fairest one of all?: a positive analysis of justice theories. (2003) 41 Journal of 
Economic Literature 1188–1239. Also see Konow, J., Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice. 
(2001) 46:2 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 137–164 at 138. 
131  Gaba J.M., Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings Clause, (2006-7) 
40 Creighton Law Review 569-594 at 14. 
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against a forecasted baseline.132 Usually such a baseline would be constructed at regional 
level, reflecting the probability that any one forest parcel will become deforested in a given 
period.133 Therefore, within independent project activities, benefits are not usually distributed 
on the basis of achievements of the individual members but use a flat rate system.134 So the 
rewards are based on inputs (improved forest management or continued use of sustainable 
practices) instead of outputs (emission reductions). 135  The challenge for rewarding the 
benefits is in regard to the identifying of criteria for opportunity costs as discussed in section 
2.6. 
2.4.4   Contextual Equity 
 
The principle of contextual equity focuses on establishment of a context specific meaning of 
equity. 136  This requirement is informed by the realisation that the distributional and 
procedural elements of a policy fall within the scope and control (at least initially) of its 
proponents. 137  However, the ability to attain distributional and procedural equity is 
conditioned by context.138  It is argued that “what is perceived as equitable is not universal 
but rather depends on the specific context in which decisions about the distribution of 
resources are made.”139 For example, contextual factors such as capacity, power, cultural 
values, social capital, and the level of dependence on forests have important effects on the 
equity of distribution. In this sense, some “indirect benefits” such as tenure reform, capacity 
building, or improved governance could also be categorised as “contextual” features, in that 
                                                 
132 Torres B. A. and Skutsch M., Splitting the difference: a proposal for benefit sharing in reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). (2012) 3:1 Forests, 137-154. Skutsch M. and Torres A.B., 
Challenges for pro-poor benefit sharing schemes in the implementation of REDD+ in Mexico. Scoping paper 
prepared for The Forest Dialogue (TFD) on REDD+ Benefit Sharing Chetumal, Mexico 2-5 June 2014 at 12. 
133 Skutsch M., Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits 2012. Also see Skutsch 
M. and Torres A.B., Splitting the Difference: A Proposal for Benefit Sharing in Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). (2012) 3:1 Forests 137-154 at 144. 
134  Skutsch M.,Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits 2012. 
135  Ibid. 
136 McDermott, M. et al., Examining equity: A multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services, (2012) Environmental Science & Policy at 421. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. Also see Suiseeya K.R.M., A Retreat from Justice in Global Forest Governance: REDD+ and the “Do 
No Harm” Principle. A paper presented at the 3rd Annual UCSB Environmental Politics Conference UC Santa 
Barbara June 5, (2015) at 9. Available: 
http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/~sanderson/Suiseeya%20(UCSB2015)%20REDD%20Status%20Quo_052215.pdf 
[accessed 10 September 2015]. 
139 Ibid fn 134. 
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they constitute the necessary pre-conditions for benefiting from the implementation of 
REDD+.140 
2.4.5   Equity in relation to Rights 
 
The focus of this section is on the theoretical background for discussions on the question of 
why and how carbon rights issues arise (discussed in chapter 5). Essentially, the assertion of 
carbon rights has its foundations in the concept of the libertarian principle. This principle 
provides that property rights should be the basis for distribution of benefits.141 For example, 
right-libertarians are advocating for private rights and argue that natural resources should be 
appropriated by those who claim them, discover them, or provide labour inputs.142 On the 
other hand, left-libertarians advocate for common ownership and that those who claim rights 
should pay others for the value of those rights.143 The discussion of carbon rights is set aside 
until later in chapter 5. For now, the focus is to explore the connection between equity and 
“rights”.144 This connection is informed by the general view that rights are closely associated 
with equity, in the sense that securing the former can be seen as a means of attaining the 
latter.145 
There exists a classification of human rights as follows: “First-generation” rights stress the 
civil and political rights such as rights to life, privacy and liberty. Usually these are given 
priority in implementation.146 “Second-generation” rights lay emphasis on economic, social 
                                                 
140 Cited in Luttrell  C. et.al.,  Who Should Benefit from REDD+? Rationales and Realities. 18:4 Ecology and 
Society (2013) 52. 
141 Boaz D., Libetarianism a primer (1997) at 17.  
142 Luttrell C. et. al., Who Should Benefit from REDD+? Rationales and Realities. (2013) 18:4  Ecology and 
Society 52. Available: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art52/#Theoretical [accessed 20 September 
2015]. 
143 Ibid. Also see Boaz D., Libetarianism a primer (1997) at 16. 
144 “Rights” is a slippery term as there are different conceptions of “rights”. Takacs discusses “first generation” 
rights, “second generation rights” and “third generation rights”. See Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, 
environmental human rights, and the future of private property. (2008) 16 New York University Environmental 
Law Journal 711 at 7. “Rights” are legal privileges that may be temporary or fungible. For example rights to 
water is a limited “right” in the sense that it can easily (at least when compared with rights or rights) be revoked 
or made conditional. These rights correspond to what Sax refers to as usufructary, a “right” that incorporates the 
interests of others and thus a “right” that one does not own “in the same way he owns his watch or his shoes”. 
Takas citing Sax J., Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, (1970) 68 
Michigan Law Review471, 476. This distinction has implications for the “carbon rights” discussed in chapter 5. 
“A further distinction is between “positive” and “negative” rights. The former are associated with claims of a 
holder to a certain performance (act or acquiescence) of another subject, while the latter imply that one's rights 
are respected and not infringed or violated.” Schrijver N., Sovereignty over natural resources: Balancing rights 
and duties. (1997) at 259-260. 
145  McDermott M. et al., Examining equity: A multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services, (2012) Environmental Science & Policy at 423. 
146 Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of private property, (2008) 
16 New York University Environmental Law Journal 711 at 7. 
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and cultural rights such as rights to education, work and health. Demands are put on the 
state’s positive duties to realise these rights progressively as resources allow. “Third-
generation” rights focus on the generic heading of collective rights where people are taken as 
a whole. Examples include the right to development, the right to peace, the right to 
environment, the right to the ownership of the common heritage of humankind.147 It is noted 
that controversies exist as to whether third-generation rights are rights in the sense that they 
pose legal obligations. It is also noted that some scholars argue that all rights should be given 
equal weight because as human rights they all are “universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated”.148 Following from this, Takacs discerns three types of rights, namely: (1) 
“rights”, (2) rights and (3) rights. This thesis adopts this approach because of its practical 
relevance as elaborated below. 
“Rights” are legal privileges that may be temporary or fungible. With reference to the 
California Constitution Takacs indicates that “rights to water” is a limited “right” in the sense 
that it can easily (at least when compared with (2) rights or (3) rights) be revoked or made 
conditional.149 He further points out that these rights correspond to what Sax refers to as a 
usufructary, a “right” that incorporates the interests of others and thus a “right” that one does 
not own “in the same way he owns his watch or his shoes”.150 
With regards to (2) rights, the author argues that these are fundamental guarantees in a sense 
that they are enshrined in constitutions. These include environmental rights such as those 
contained in section 24 of South African Constitution and Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution.151 These are not absolute, and in some cases limitations may be imposed on the 
subjects in a reasonable and justifiable manner.152 Despite this possibility, these rights confer 
considerable power on the rights holders. Once codified, they are usually enforced through 
legislation, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and through mobilising venues to shame those 
who violate them.153 An example of enforcement through judicial and quasi-judicial bodies 
                                                 
147 Tseng C.Y., On People’s Human Rights:From a Taiwanese Perspective. Yu Da College of Business (2003) 
165-196 at 169-170. Available: http://ir.ydu.edu.tw/handle/310997200/281 [accessed 6 August 2015]. 
148 Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of private property, (2008) 
16 New York University Environmental Law Journal 711  at 7. 
149 Ibid at 7. 
150 Ibid citing Sax J., Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, (1970) 68 
Michigan Law Review 471 at 476.  
151 Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of private property, (2008) 
16 New York University Environmental Law Journal 711 at 9. 
152 Ibid citing Razzque J., Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 85 (2004). 
153 Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of private property, (2008) 
16 New York University Environmental Law Journal 711 at 9. 
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includes a court order requiring the party at fault to execute, or refrain from, a particular 
course of action, usually when they had a duty to do, or to refrain from doing something.154 
With regards to the issue of fairness, a set of questions arises as follows: “[w]hat set of 
fundamental rights is adequate to ensure justice in REDD+ implementation? Who holds these 
rights, and who bears the duty to enforce them?”155 Advocates have contended that “there 
should be “gender equality” to imply equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of 
women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will 
become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will 
not depend on whether they are born male or female.”156 In addition, some advocates have 
contended that warranting clear property rights will complement implementation of REDD+ 
which is fair.157 But defining costs and equitable distributions on the grounds of property 
rights raises problems in specifying the target group of concern (who), and the content of the 
right (such as forest, timber or carbon; non/commercial use; and non/consumptive use).158 
With reference to Sikor and Stahl, McDermott, et al., ask by what authority, or grounds, were 
such rights conferred?159 The fact that carbon rights are not yet legally defined in most 
countries160 places this latter issue at the forefront.161 
The (3) rights are procedurally and substantively inviolable. These are supreme to any 
national laws. This means they provide absolute privileges to the subjects and violations 
thereof may be prohibited in all circumstances.162 These are widely known as jus cogens 
                                                 
154  Zalta E. (ed)., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010). Available: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/ [accessed 15 July 2014]. 
155   McDermott, M. et al., Examining equity: A multi-dimensional framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services, (2012) Environmental Science & Policy at 423. 
156 UNREDD, 2013 cited in Skutsch M. and Torres A.B., Challenges for pro-poor benefit sharing schemes in the 
implementation of REDD+ in Mexico. Scoping paper prepared for The Forest Dialogue (TFD) on REDD+ 
Benefit Sharing Chetumal, Mexico 2-5 June 2014 at 18. 
157 McDermott M. et al., Examining equity: A multi-dimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for 
ecosystem services, (2012) Environmental Science & Policy at 423 citing Larson A.M., Forest tenure reform 
in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+. (2011)  21:2 Global Environmental Change 540-549. 
158  Sikor T. and Stahl J. (eds.)., Forests and People: Property, Governance and Human Rights. Earthscan, 
London (2011). 
159    Sikor T., and Lund C., Access and property: A question of power and authority. (2009) 40:1, Development 
and Change 1–22 at 10. 
160  Mahanty S. et. al., The social Life of forest carbon: property and politics in the production of a new 
commodity. (2012)  40:5 Human Ecology, 661-664. 
161   McDermott M. et al., Examining equity: A multi-dimensional framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services, (2012) Environmental Science and Policy at 423. 
162 Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of private property. (2008) 
16 New York University Environmental Law Journal 711 at 9. 
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rights.163 This distinction of rights is helpful when one is discussing the question of why 
anyone can claim carbon rights but such explanation is not discussed here. To this end, it is 
then sufficient to point out that the legal basis for a benefit claim for REDD+ can be derived 
from the existing legal frameworks such as the constitution, a statute or contract.164 
2.5      Environmental-Effectiveness 
The UNFCCC obliges countries to enact effective legislation and to formulate, implement, 
publish and update national and regional programs to achieve its objectives.165 It should also 
be noted that Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration requires all countries to enact “effective 
environmental legislation”, and recommends that the standards, objectives and priorities 
“reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply”.166  The term 
“effective” as applied in the context of climate legislation and policy is subject to multiple 
interpretations. Before embarking on the conception of effectiveness, it is helpful to give a 
brief discussion to illustrate how such concept relates to law.  
The goal of rules of law is to serve justice and establish (minimum) order. Such rules are 
invented to address issues as they transpire from technological, social, and other changes.167 
It is also argued that a legal system is unable to initiate and monitor social change on its own. 
To have the said effects, it must devise some clear parameters for the direction and extent of 
social change. Such parameters must also be reflective of what society feels strongly about 
and in that way such law will be effective. On the contrary, if they are unclear or ignore the 
social realities, they will have little or no impact.168 It should be noted that law is a “product 
of struggle, negotiation, compromise and power dynamics, and may represent the dominant 
views or social compromise”.169 Therefore, it is clear that legislation may not be reflective of 
                                                 
163 This principle is codified in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 344. See also Takacs D., The public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of 
private property. (2008) 16 New York University Environmental Law Journal 711 at 9. 
164 Ituarte-Lima C. et. al., Assessing equity in national legal frameworks for REDD+: The case of Indonesia. 
(2014) xxx Environmental Science and Policy 1-10 at 292. Chapman S. and Wilder M., Defining the legal 
elements of benefit sharing in the context of REDD+. REDD+ Law Project - Working Paper (2014) at 16. 
165   The preamble read together with Article 4.1 (b). 
166   Principle 11. Also see Sands P., (2003) at 56. 
167   Louka E., International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order. (2006) at 71. 
McGrath C. J., How to evaluate the effectiveness of an environmental legal system. PhD Thesis, Queensland 
University of Technology (2007) at 50. 
168   Bosselmann K., The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance, (2008) at 43. 
169   Redclift (1992) cited in Katerere J. M., “Participatory natural resources management in the communal lands 
of Zimbabwe: What role for customary law?” (2001) African Studies Quarterly 5. 
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a society at large. If this is the outcome, then securing rights with the view to attaining 
fairness cannot be expected. 
This brings us to the issue of effectiveness. A general test of the effectiveness of a law or a 
particular provision of a legal system is to see how far it realises its objectives, i.e. fulfills its 
purposes.170 Because climate law and environmental law have been adopted to deal with 
environmental problems, it is not surprising that when such law is appraised from the 
perspective of effectiveness, it is judged based on whether it has resolved the environmental 
problem in question with some measure of success.171 This is the popular conception of 
effectiveness. It follows that the conception of effectiveness of climate law requires more 
investigations since the quantity of carbon reduction in REDD+ occurs over time.172 In this 
case, its effectiveness is determined by the extent to which REDD+ actions reduce and 
control emissions from avoiding deforestation and degradation and/or increase carbon 
sequestration as a result of sustainable forest management173 within a defined period of time. 
Some have concluded that the effectiveness of REDD+ will vary depending on the particular 
objectives it holds for diverse actors, across countries and localities.174 The impact thereof 
will depend “on a whole host of interacting political and economic dynamics within and 
outside the control of any particular group of actors.”175 With that understanding together 
with the conception of equity in mind, it is therefore, plausible to argue that the effectiveness 
of climate change mitigation responds to the question whether the legislation or policy leads 
to a reduction in and control of emissions compared to a reference level within a defined 
timeframe in a fair manner. The effectiveness of climate change mitigation should address 
three concerns: (i) additionality: the emission reductions must be additional to what would 
have occurred without mitigation interventions; (ii) permanence: the emission reductions 
                                                 
170    IPCC, Working Group III Chapter 3: Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and Methods. Final Draft as 
distributed to governments on 17 December (2013) at 43 also emphasises that “ambition levels, enforcement 
and compliance” are important in determining the effectiveness of a policy or law. Also see Allott A., The 
effectiveness of laws. (2011) 15:2 Valparaiso University Law Review, 229-242 at 233. 
171 Louka E., International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order. (2006) at 72. See 
also Skutsch M. and Torres A.B., Challenges for pro-poor benefit sharing schemes in the implementation of 
REDD+ in Mexico. Scoping paper prepared for The Forest Dialogue (TFD) on REDD+ Benefit Sharing 
Chetumal, Mexico 2-5 June 2014 at 17. 
172 Emissions reduction below the baseline is expected only at the third phase implementation of REDD+ 
activities. Therefore, the further along the results chain one wishes to measure performance, the more time needs 
to pass. In order to measure whether the desired impact has been achieved one has to wait until some years 
(estimated from 10-15) have passed. Angelsen A.et. al., Analysing REDD+:Challenges and choices (2012) at 
235. 
173 Skutsch M., Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits. Review (Undated ). 
174 Angelsen A. et. al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 235. 
175 McDermott C.L., REDDuced: From sustainability to legality to units of carbon-The search for common 
interests in international forest governance. Environmental Science and Policy (2012) at 7. 
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must be permanent and (iii) leakage: mitigation interventions in one area must not lead to a 
shift of emissions elsewhere.176 It can be concluded therefore that the effectiveness of climate 
change mitigation should be assessed against technologies, what aspects of REDD+ are 
included (i.e. reduced deforestation, reduced degradation/disturbances, forest 
enhancement/increased sequestration, conservation), 177  materials, intent and impacts 
(environmental impacts, cost-effectiveness, cultural, equity, potential human rights 
violations, all of which are relevant elements of such mitigation intervention). 178  This 
understanding is in line with the requirement for establishing reference levels or a baseline as 
the basis for payments or punishment.179 
 
Apart from the above understanding, there is another way of defining effectiveness. This 
arises from the understanding that some environmental regimes are effective in the sense that 
they make a difference (sometimes sizable) not only in terms of outputs and outcomes but 
also in terms of inducing their subjects to comply with systems of rules and regulations.180 
However, it should be noted that success on this approach does not guarantee progress in 
solving the relevant problems.181 In contrast, compliance effectiveness is the extent to which 
an agreement has an adequate and effective institutional framework such as monitoring 
procedures and implementation review, which in turn is largely considered as a precondition 
of reaching desired environmental outcomes. 182  In addition, the effectiveness of 
environmental regimes might be strengthened or reduced when such regime interacts with 
other regimes operating in other areas like trade and finance.183 Louka contends that for 
                                                 
176 Resosudarmo I.A.P.et. al., Does Tenure Security Lead to REDD+ Project Effectiveness? Reflections from 
Five Emerging Sites in Indonesia. World Development (2013) at 3-4. Also see Angelsen A. and Wertz-
Kanounnikoff S., Chapter 2: What are the key design issues for REDD and the criteria for assessing options? in 
Angelsen, A. (ed.), Moving Ahead with REDD. (2008) at 19. 
177  Louka E., International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order (2006) at 72. See 
also Skutsch M. and Torres A.B., Challenges for pro-poor benefit sharing schemes in the implementation of 
REDD+ in Mexico. Scoping paper prepared for The Forest Dialogue (TFD) on REDD+ Benefit Sharing 
Chetumal, Mexico 2-5 June 2014 at 17. 
178  This line of thinking is drawn from the Regulatory Framework of Climate-related Geo-engineering Relevant 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity Study carried out in line with CBD Decision X/33 Second Draft 23 
January 2012. Available: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1741cbd.pdf [accessed 15 
July 2015]. 
179 For a discussion of REDD+ payments and reference levels see Chapter 6 in Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing 
REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 53-63. 
180  Young O.R., Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, cutting-edge 
themes, and research strategies. (2011) 108:50 PNAS, 19853-19860 at 19855. 
181  Ibid at 19854. 
182  Bäckstrand, K., Democratizing global environmental governance? Stakeholder democracy after the world 
summit on sustainable development. (2006) 12 European Journal of International Relations  467–498 at 479. 
183  Young O.R., Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, cutting-edge 
themes, and research strategies. (2011) 108:50 PNAS, 19853-19860 at 19855. 
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environmental legislation to be called effective, it must address successfully the distributional 
justice issues among others. 184  Only after it addresses and balances minimum order, 
distributive justice and interspecies equity with some success, then it could be claimed that 
the legislation has begun to mitigate the environmental problem effectively 185  (emphasis 
added). The exposition therefore implies that costs and benefits can be distributed based on 
inputs and outputs.186 
Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
What can and should be measured? an agreed definition of “measurement” does not exist in 
international law. 187  But some researchers have attempted to define the concept of 
measurement in terms of its function. They indicate that the “function of measurement is to 
describe a phenomenon in reasonably precise, objective terms-that is, in terms of an 
established standard or “unit of measurement”.” 188  The authors draw on international 
environmental law to show that “measurement” is not only connected with quantifiable 
attributes (such as volume or area), but that, in principle, almost any phenomenon can be 
measured. They added that the more precise and certain the description, the better the 
measurement. 189  But “measurement” is often used interchangeably with the term 
“monitoring”. However, the two do not mean the same thing and are not equally feasible in 
all contexts. To distinguish the two one has to understand that all that can be measured can 
also be monitored; but not all monitored elements can be necessarily measured 
quantitatively.190 Generally, monitoring is defined as the “repeated measurement” of three 
separate, but related factors as follows:191 
(1) “the quality of the… environment and each of its compartments…, 
(2) activities or natural and anthropogenic inputs which may affect the quality of the 
…environment, and 
                                                 
184   Ibid  Louka E., (2006) at 72. 
185  Ibid. See also Young O.R., Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, 
cutting-edge themes, and research strategies. (2011) 108:50 PNAS at 19855. 
186 Skutsch M. and Torres A.B., Challenges for pro-poor benefit sharing schemes in the implementation of 
REDD+ in Mexico. Scoping paper prepared for The Forest Dialogue (TFD) on REDD+ Benefit Sharing 
Chetumal, Mexico 2-5 June 2014 at 14. 
187Clare B. and Bodansky D., “Measurement, reporting and verification in a post-2012 climate agreement”. Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change (2009) at 3. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. Also see Saunders J. and Reeve R., (2010) at 19. 
190  Hinostroza M (ed)., Measuring Reporting Verifying: A Primer on MRV for Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions. UNEP Risø Centre (2012) at 7. Available: 
http://orbit.dtu.dk/fedora/objects/orbit:112215/datastreams/file_8167750/content [accessed 13 July 2015]. 
191   1992 OSPAR Convention, Annex IV, Art. 1. Also see Ibid Sands (2003) at 848. 
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(3) the effects of such activities”.  
 
Reporting is broadly described as a part of a broader system designed to ensure compliance 
with international obligations. It can be distinguished from reporting within countries for 
domestic use in developing policies and measures. In the context of international 
environmental instruments the UNEP Guidelines define reporting as the provision by parties 
of: “Regular, timely reports on compliance, using an appropriate common format.”192 In the 
context of the REDD+ mechanism this definition may be somewhat restrictive. This is 
because when one considers reporting on performance-based mitigation actions to 
international institutions, the focus does not only concern compliance with agreed 
benchmarks but also the extent to which payments deliver results. 193  Unlike other 
instruments, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol provide that the responsibility for reporting be 
undertaken by parties only.194 
Verification refers to the process of independently checking the accuracy and reliability of 
reported information or the procedures used to generate reported information. 195  In the 
context of international environmental instruments, it is broadly defined as a process of 
testing the accuracy of data or information.196 Such a process (usually undertaken by a third 
party) may involve verification of data and technical information in order to assist in 
ascertaining whether a party is in compliance.197  Verification is not the same as review 
although sometimes the two overlap. The former generally means a technical and non-
judgmental process and is carried out by a wide variety of actors both at international and 
national levels. The latter means an evaluation of performance or an assessment of the 
adequacy of commitments. An example cited is the expert review under the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol.198 Given the difference between the two, it should be added that verification 
also is distinct from the issue of compliance. It involves an assessment of the factual accuracy 
of information rather than a legal judgment as to whether a country is in compliance with its 
obligations. However, verification is usually closely related to compliance and sometimes the 
                                                 
192  UNEP Governing Council Decision SS.VII/4, Compliance with and enforcement of multilateral 
environmental agreements”, UNEP(DEPI)/MEAs/WG.1/3, annex II (Feb 2002). As highlighted by Saunders J. 
and Reeve R., (2010) at 19. 
193  Ibid Saunders J. and Reeve R., (2010) at 19. 
194  Ibid at 20, citing Brack D, personal communication in Reeve, 2002. 
195  Reeve R., Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, (2002). 
As highlighted by Saunders J. and Reeve R., (2010) at 20. 
196   Compliance Mechanisms under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, UNEP, Nairobi, 2007. As 
highlighted by Saunders J. and Reeve R., (2010) at 20. 
197  Ibid. 
198  Ibid at 21. 
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two blend together. It follows that in regard to agreements with compliance procedures, 
verification usually has a preliminary role for providing the accurate ground for later legal 
determinations.199 
A common understanding of the purpose and functions of the MRV regime remains to be 
clearly articulated.200 At the moment there is limited guidance on “reporting” on developing 
country mitigation actions and no precedent on “verification” under the UNFCCC or Kyoto 
Protocol.201 A plausible explanation as to why this is the case is offered by Dutschke. The 
author argues that the verification debate recalls the issue of aid conditionality and in so 
doing it raises old sensitivities in recipient countries. Aid conditionality has been used to link 
aid to the acquisition of goods and services from the donor country.202 
This chapter argues that the subject of MRV should be the 3Es and related benefits such as 
financial rewards. However this is a broad assertion in response to a very complex issue. For 
example, when addressing MRV for equity the immediate question which arises is “at what 
social and temporal scale should equity be assessed?”203 Is it practically possible to address 
this at inter alia individual, household, community, ecosystems, and intergenerational levels 
as discussed by some scholars?204 
2.6      Cost-Effectiveness 
 
The UNFCCC provides that legal and policy measures to address climate change “should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”205 The term “cost-
effective” is not unique in the climate change regime but also in other environmental 
legislation.206 It should be noted that the UNFCCC does not mention efficiency. With this 
                                                 
199 Clare B. and Bodansky D., Measurement, reporting and verification in a post-2012 climate agreement. Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change (2009) at 7. 
200   Ibid. Saunders J. and Reeve R., (2010) at 19. 
201   Ibid. 
202  Dutschke M., Key issues in REDD+ verification. Occasional Paper 88. Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) (2013). Available: http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-88.pdf 
[accessed 5 July 2014]. 
203 McDermott, M. et. al., Examining equity: a multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services. (2012) 33 Environmental Science and Policy  416-427 at 422. 
204 Ibid. 
205  Article 3.3 of UNFCCC. 
206 Interwies E. et. al., Evaluating the cost-Effectiveness of Environmental Policies: Theoretical Aspirations and 
Lessons from European Practice for Global Conference. Paper presented at the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on 
the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (24-26 May 2007): “Earth System Governance: 
Theories and Strategies for Sustainability”. Theme 2: Architectures of Earth System Governance, Panel 3: 
Regional Governance Architectures. Available: 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Foundations for Law and Policy Design for REDD+ 
 
 
-41 -  
 
observation in mind, Soltau contends that cost-effectiveness should be distinguished from 
efficiency.207 It follows that, once the distinction is obtained, one can understand the reasons 
for the choice of the principle in question. However, the principle of cost-effectiveness in the 
UNFCCC is not defined. Thus efforts have been undertaken (although not exhaustive as far as 
this thesis is concerned) to show how the principle is aimed as guiding decision-making with 
the view to giving effect to sustainable development while mitigating climate change.208 
To understand the meaning of cost-effectiveness in climate change regime, it is helpful to 
understand its origin and what it aims to serve. In terms of the origin, the available literature 
suggests that the concept is connected to or originates from the cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) which was introduced for the first time by the United States of America (USA) 
Department of Defense in 1950s.  The department sought a device to assist them in judging 
among the demands of the various branches of the armed services for increasingly costly 
weapons systems with different levels of performance and overlapping missions. Since the 
1960s, CEA has been widely used as a means to analyse the efficiency of alternative 
government programs outside of the military.209 Until recently, CEA is dealt with to a greater 
extent in the military, health and education sectors than in environmental sector.210 In all 
these sectors, the objective of CEA has been to compare alternatives for the irrelative costs 
and results. In its most basic form CEA asks: “which program or intervention provides the 
most effectiveness (on a single criterion measure) at the lowest cost?”211 Thus, it is possible 
to judge the most cost-effective options for achieving a particular objective.212 However, 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.2007amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/AC2007_InterwiesGoerlachNewcombe.pdf [accessed 5 
July 2014]. 
207   Soltau F., Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (2009) at 3 and 234. 
208Appropriate economic instruments may offer the potential for achieving environmental improvements in 
a cost-effective manner. The adoption of any form of economic or regulatory measures would require 
careful and substantive analysis. Cited in Sands P., Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd ed., 
(2003) at 8 and 154. 
209 Levin H.M., Cost-effectiveness Analysis,  in International Encyclopedia of Economics of Education,2ed, 
(1995) 381-386 at 381. 
210 Interwies E. et. al., Evaluating the cost-Effectiveness of Environmental Policies: Theoretical Aspirations and 
Lessons from European Practice for Global Conference. Paper presented at the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on 
the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (24-26 May 2007): “Earth System Governance: 
Theories and Strategies for Sustainability”. Theme 2: Architectures of Earth System Governance, Panel 3: 
Regional Governance Architectures. Available: 
http://www.2007amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/AC2007_InterwiesGoerlachNewcombe.pdf [accessed 16 
July 2014]. 
211  White J.L. et. al., Cost Analysis in Educational Decision Making: Approaches, Procedures, and Case 
Examples. Working Paper No. 2005-1. Wisconsin Center for Education Research (NJ3) at 5. 
212 Levin H.M.,Waiting for Godot: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Education. New Directions for Evaluation, 
90, John Wiley & Sons, Inc (2001) at 56. Macintosh A. et. al., Limp, Leap or Learn? Developing legal 
frameworks for climate change adaptation planning in Australia. National Climate Change Adaptation 
Research Facility. Gold Coast, Final Project Report (2013) 277 at 27. 
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sometimes the most cost-effective strategy is not the cheapest. 213  Taking these issues 
together, cost-effectiveness is defined as the “extent to which the programme has achieved 
or is expected to achieve its results at a lower cost compared with alternatives.”214 CEA only 
requires the costs to be calculated in monetary terms. 215  On the other end, benefits are 
quantified as incremental effects expressed in any unit other than monetary terms.216 CEA 
differs from its close relation, cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which requires monetary 
measures of impact relative to costs.217 A discussion on CBA is different in focus from 
the present task and will not be discussed further.218 
CEA consists of three components: (a) the costs of alternatives must be carefully measured, 
(b) the outcomes or effectiveness of the alternatives must be measured, and finally (c) costs 
and effectiveness measures are combined to calculate a cost-effectiveness ratio, for instance 
by dividing the effectiveness of each alternative by its cost to show the unit cost of achieving 
a particular objective. Such a rational is known as “the achievement gain per dollar spent.”219 
It is at this point where the most cost-effective alternative can be established.220 It should also 
be noted that the distinction between outputs and outcomes is sometimes blurred (for 
instance by referring to both as “results”) in determining the cost-effectiveness of a 
programme. CEA links the level of outcomes to the costs involved. Technically, services 
may be delivered efficiently in terms of number of services provided per dollar spent 
(output), but the impact of the service may be negligible when measured against the 
stated objectives (outcome), making it very cost-ineffective. Decision-makers are in a 
                                                 
213  Bray M., Double-shift schooling design and operation for cost-effectiveness. Fundamentals of Educational 
Planning, 3rd ed. (2008)  at 34. 
214  “Value-for-money is a related concept. This assesses the extent to which the program has obtained the 
maximum benefit from the outputs and out-comes it has produced within the resources available to it.” 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOREGPARPROG/Resources/grpp_sourcebook_chap11.pdf 
[accessed 5 July 2014]. See also Markandya A., Dictionary of Environmental Economics (2003) at 50. 
215  Bray M., Double-shift schooling design and operation for cost-effectiveness. Fundamentals of Educational 
Planning, 3rd ed. (2008) at 31. McEwan P.J., Cost-effectiveness analysis of education and health interventions in 
developing countries. (2012) 4:2 Journal of Development Effectiveness. 189–213 at 190. 
216  Bray M., Double-shift schooling design and operation for cost-effectiveness. Fundamentals of Educational 
Planning, 3rd ed. (2008) at 31. 
217 Levin H. M., Waiting for Godot: Cost-EffectivenessAnalysis in Education. New Directions for Evaluation, 
90, John Wiley & Sons, Inc (2001) at 56. 
218 “Grabosky has pointed out that efficiency and effectiveness are not inextricably linked. A policing action 
may be inefficient but effective, or it may be efficient but ineffective, or it may be neither, or both.” Cited in 
Ayling J. et. al., Lengthening the Arm of the Law:  Enhancing Police Resources in the Twenty-First Century. 
(2008) at 45. For a critique of Cost-Benefit Analysis see Kysar D.A., Climate change, cultural transformation, 
and comprehensive rationality. (2004) 31 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 555 in Wold C. et. 
al., Climate Change and the Law, (2009) 87-93. 
219  Harbison R.W. and Hanushek E.A., Educational performance of the poor: lessons from rural northeast 
Brazil. (1992) at 140. 
220  Woodhall M., Cost-benefit analysis in educational planning. 4th ed (2004) at 26. 
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better position to make informed decisions when they have information relating to the 
level and worth of outcomes relative to their costs as well as the programme’s technical 
efficiency and effectiveness.221 
CEA can be applied both as an ex-ante appraisal and ex-post evaluation tool.222 In ex-ante 
application, CEA helps to determine the most cost-effective way of achieving a given target 
thereby assisting decision-makers to allocate resources efficiently to realise policy 
objective. 223  If applied ex-post, CEA assists in determining whether the aforementioned 
policy has been effective in addressing the problem it was designed for and at what cost. In 
some cases such application may require an ex-ante/ex-post comparison to assess whether 
expected effects were realised in a projected cost. Therefore, carrying out an ex-ante 
assessment presents an opportunity to formulate at an early stage the questions that should 
later be addressed in the post-ante CEA.224 This analysis can inform the MRV requirements 
accordingly. As indicated earlier, the objective of CEA is usually to inform choices about the 
allocation of society’s scarce resources for the betterment of society’s outcomes. The question 
that follows is “whose costs and outcomes”? Arguably, costs and, if possible, effects should be 
measured from multiple standpoints: host governments, including agencies directly and 
indirectly involved in implementing the intervention, communities and investors who 
nonetheless receive benefits or effects. 225 
With regard to the application of CEA in the climate change context with reference to the 
question of cost of REDD+ implementation, two types of costs are discussed in the 
literature.226 The first one requires the financing of upfront capacity-building as countries are 
required to fulfil minimum readiness requirements. These include establishing infrastructure 
for monitoring emissions reduction, addressing land tenure and strengthening institutional 
                                                 
221 Common wealth of Australia, Introduction to Cost-Benefit Analysis and Alternative Evaluation  
Methodologies, January (2006) at 30. 
222 Interwies E. et. al., Evaluating the Cost-Effectiveness of Environmental Policies: Theoretical Aspirations and 
Lessons from European Practice for Global Conference. Paper presented at the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on 
the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (24-26 May 2007): “Earth System Governance: 
Theories and Strategies for Sustainability”. Theme 2: Architectures of Earth System Governance, Panel 3: 
Regional Governance Architectures. Available: 
http://www.2007amsterdamconference.org/Downloads/AC2007_InterwiesGoerlachNewcombe.pdf [accessed 5 
June 2014]. 
223 Ibid.  
224 Ibid. 
225  McEwan P.J. Cost-effectiveness analysis of education and health interventions in developing 
countries.(2012) 4:2 Journal of Development Effectiveness, 189–213 at 194-95. 
226   Dutschke M. et. al., How do we match country needs with financing sources? In Angelsen, A. (ed.), Moving 
Ahead with REDD. (2008), at 42. See also Luttrell C. et. al., Who should benefit from REDD+? Rationales and 
realities. (2013) 18:4 Ecology and Society 52. 
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capacities for law enforcement. The second cost requires the financing of ongoing emission 
reduction. In the current context, this is broken down into two aspects: (1) sustainable forest 
management costs and (2) opportunity costs. The costs (interms of finances) for forest 
protection both inside and outside the forest sector which have implications for carbon 
reduction. Examples cited include “forest monitoring, reforming tenure, law enforcement, 
taxation of forestland, restrictions on road building and agricultural zoning.”227 Other costs 
could relate to the setting and operating of the MRV. Opportunity costs occur due to foregone 
profits from deforestation and agricultural commodity sales or the costs of implementing 
sustainable forest use.228 “Opportunity costs are higher where markets are accessible and 
where expanding forest protection (e.g. REDD+) intensifies agriculture.” 229  REDD+ 
activities can be implemented at a low cost when opportunity costs are lower but this is 
unlikely in cases where there are the greatest challenges in administration and monitoring 
REDD+ legislation and policy.230 In addition to the opportunity costs, there is a transaction 
cost for participating in a REDD+ scheme which must be addressed.231 As it has been seen, 
the REDD+ mechanism has some upfront costs, but the cost may be subject to change 
depending on different circumstances such as natural disasters or fire which are beyond the 
control of the forest manager. It is also conceivable that the cost of the REDD+ mechanism 
will also change in the future due to different factors. Therefore, the overall cost and overall 
effectiveness of any given alternative strategy are not often apparent on first glance. This is 
perhaps the reason why cost effective analysis has to be taken together with a precautionary 
approach. 
To integrate cost in cost-effective analysis, one could ascertain the lower cost by assessing 
the cost of:  introducing incentives for community-based monitoring against that of command 
and control; direct payments in achieving conservation objectives compared to indirect 
strategies such as the promotion of commercial enterprises with the view to generating local 
incentives for conservation.232 Another way of looking at cost-effectiveness is through the 
lens of activities to be implemented. It can also mean that “the choice that a country makes 
                                                 
227   Ibid. Dutschke M. et. al., (2008) at 42. 
228   Ibid.  
229   Ibid.  
230   Ibid citing Eliasch (2008). 
231  Angelsen A. and Wertz-Kanounnikoff. S., What are the key design issues for REDD and the criteria for 
assessing options? In: Angelsen, A. (ed.), Moving Ahead with REDD, (2008) at 19. 
232   Wünscher T. et.al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Combining Reforestation Auctions with Performance Based 
Payments – A Field Trial in Rural Kenya (Undated). Available: http://www.isee2012.org/anais/pdf/592.pdf 
[accessed 5 July 2015]. 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Foundations for Law and Policy Design for REDD+ 
 
 
-45 -  
 
between different domestic instruments to implement REDD+ (such as payments for 
ecosystem services, participatory forest management and forest concession revenue sharing) 
may lead to differences” in cost-effectiveness. In this case, the one which is least costly 
would be preferred. 
 
With regards to the issue of effectiveness, the first word of caution is that a cost-effectiveness 
provision is not self-standing, but read together with reference to a precautionary approach.233 
Some of the key issues to consider in the context of climate change relates to the issues of 
uncertainty and irreversibility. Regarding the former, Beder contends that it is impossible to 
identify all the consequences of a particular project or policy option. To do so would require 
one to predict the future and deal with the uncertain interactions between human activities 
and the ecosystems in which they take place. 234  “The first challenge in assessing 
‘effectiveness’ is that uncertainty prevails in climate change’s impact on humans and 
ecosystems at the regional and local level.”235 Concerning the latter, there is provision in the 
cost-benefit analysis for the significance of keeping options open for the future in case of 
irreversibility due to harmful practices.236 The fact that a REDD+ project takes at least 15 
years for the emission reductions to be measured, 237 brings this issue to the fore. Another 
issue is that a decision to plant trees may have irreversible ecosystem damage. 
 
Why cost-effectiveness? It is observed that efficiency analysis may have the result of 
displacing fairness issues in the process of defining the goal. The distinction between cost-
effectiveness and efficiency is relevant to fairness, policy analysis, and legal grounds.238 
Having analysed such a distinction, it seems to the writer that cost-effectiveness overlaps 
with procedural equity in the sense that the cost-effectiveness approach accommodates the 
requirement for public participation to allow other related issues (e.g. culture) to be 
considered.  
2.7      Are the 3Es Synergetic or Contradicting?  
The need to establish whether there is a contradiction among the principles in this chapter is 
borne out of the assertation by scholars such as Sen who point out that decision makers rely 
                                                 
233 Soltau at 235. 
234 Beder S., Environmental Principles and Policies: An Interdisciplinary Approach. (2006) at 152. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices, (2012) at 235. 
238 Soltau at 235. 
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on different principles of justice to justify calls for equity.239 The author adds that the choice 
of “principles” 240  are likely to lead to different policy solutions. 241  Accordingly, it is 
concluded that there is “no rational way to prefer, a priori, one fairness criterion over another 
because all of them are equally justifiable both in ethical and operative terms.”242 
2.7.1   Environmental-Effectiveness, Cost-Effectiveness and Equity? 
 
The inclusion of equity usually arises after the cost-effectiveness calculations have been 
finalised.243 One of the reasons for advocating the use of cost-effectiveness is its appeal to 
justice.244 This arises since it minimises total costs so that, in principle, everyone can be made 
better off (although this is usually not the case). 245  In healthcare systems, the terms 
“effectiveness”, “efficiency”, and “equity” are often complementary. 246  This is because 
improving health care effectiveness while holding resources constant increases efficiency.247 
Increases in efficiency create opportunities for improved effectiveness and equity.248 Thus, 
applying this line of thinking in the climate change context, the following must be correct. 
Since climate change will erode nations’ capacities to achieve the “sustainable development 
goals” 249  and “Millennium Development Goals” particularly in Africa,250  it follows that 
mitigating climate change (environmental-effectiveness) at least cost would enhance 
efficiency. Similarly, increases in efficiency create opportunities for improved effectiveness 
and equity. However, the objectives may also be in conflict. In healthcare system, 
“maximizing effectiveness by allocating additional resources to improve health may conflict 
                                                 
239 Sen A., The idea of justice. (2009) at 13.  See also Pascual U. et. al., Exploring the links between equity and 
efficiency in payments for environmental services: A conceptual approach. (2010) 69 Ecological Economics 
1237–1244 at 1239. 
240 Such as discussed in section 2.4. 
241 Ibid. 
242  Pascual U. et. al., Exploring the links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: 
A conceptual approach. (2010) 69 Ecological Economics  1237–1244 at 1239. 
243 IPCC, Working Group III: Mitigation. Available: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=51#fig12 [accessed 19 July 2013]. 
244  Tol R.S.J., Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies. (2001) 36 Ecological Economics 71–
85 at 72. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Aday L. A. et. al., Evaluating the Healthcare System: Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Equity 3rd ed. (2004) at 3. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 These are successors to the Millennium Development Goals. UN GA/RES/66/288: The future we want. 
Available: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E [accessed 15 July 
2013]. 
250 Climate Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M. L. Parry, O. F. Canziani, J. P. 
Palutikof, P. J. Van der Linden, and C. E. Hanson (eds.). 717-43 at 75. In addition, climate change “invokes 
additional inequities, as its impacts are unevenly distributed and disproportionally affect the poor.” Tol R.S.J., 
Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies. (2001) 36 Ecological Economics 71–85 at 78. 
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with efficiency if the cost of the resources is high relative to their effectiveness.” 251 
Maximising effectiveness and efficiency by distributing resources to persons who would gain 
the most may be deemed unfair in terms of procedural equity if the policy leads to a very 
uneven distribution of these resources.”252 This is also true for the climate change mitigation. 
2.7.2   Cost-Effective but Inequitable? 
 
An example of the cost-effective approach which seems to be inequitable is illustrated by the 
following reference applicable to the REDD+ mechanism:253 
…payments need to be applied strategically so that additionality can be demonstrated 
clearly. Only in this manner can users’ willingness to pay overtime be enhanced. Yet 
this also means people already living in approximate harmony with nature without 
any credible internal or external threat to service provision will generally not qualify 
as Payment for Environmental Services (PES) recipients. 
Such a recommendation is challengeable from the equity stance. Many researchers seem to 
agree that those who conserve their forests, and therefore deliver an environmental service, 
should be rewarded regardless of their opportunity cost for REDD+ activities.254 Elsewhere, 
Wonder argues that:255 
To reward, in the name of fairness, anybody who delivers an environmental service 
seems a dangerous avenue. … Across-the-board entitlements to PES could endorse 
blackmail by anybody owning an unthreatened environmental asset, from 
Scandinavian forest owners menacing to cut down their trees for receiving carbon 
credits, to upland settlers threatening to deliberately pollute a river to receive 
watershed payments. It seems crucial not to take the PES- underlying victim pays 
principle to such absurd extremes. 
In responding to the above extracts, Karsenty is of the view that it is probably too ambitious, 
and somehow dangerous, to anticipate economic instruments designed to address 
environmental problems to also be levers for social justice and poverty alleviation, especially 
                                                 
251 Aday L. A. et.al., Evaluating the Healthcare System: Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Equity. 3rd ed. (2004) at 3. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Wunder, S., The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation. (2007) 21:1 
Conservation Biology 48–58. In addition, “[t]he effectiveness–equity dilemma is that in many of these low-
emission situations, additionality cannot be proven because there are no emissions to reduce in the first place.” 
See Angelsen A. et. al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) CIFOR, Indonesia at 146. 
254  Karsenty A. at. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) xxx 
Environmental Science and Policy xxx-xxx at 6. 
255  Wunder, S., The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation. 21:1 
Conservation Biology (2007) at 56. 
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when those instruments are market-based. 256  In this context, the choice between cost-
effectiveness and cost-efficiency becomes crucial as discussed in section 2.6 above. 
2.7.3   Cost-Ineffective but Equitable? 
 
Equity and cost-effectiveness are not always compatible.257 An example cited to illustrate a 
potential outcome of cost-ineffectiveness in REDD+ activities is the use of the egalitarianism 
approach in Costa Rica's, Ecuador's and Mexico’s PES. The approach used uniform payment 
rates per hectare.
258
 This move was motivated by administrative ease and equity grounds.
259
 
The problem is that this approach resulted in cost-ineffectiveness.
260
 Evidence shows that 
cost-effectiveness depends on targeting spatial heterogeneities in “(i) environmental service 
provision (benefits), (ii) risk of environmental service loss (e.g. through deforestation), and 
(iii) landowner's participation cost (sum of opportunity, transaction, and protection costs, 
which jointly determine the minimum payment required for the landowner to participate).”
261
 
2.8      Conclusion 
The above discussion has surveyed not only the meaning of various principles and concepts 
applicable to international climate and domestic law and policy, but also their objectives 
which each have a direct bearing on climate law and policy. In attempting to assess the 
synergies or contradictions among equity, environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, 
the chapter concludes that conceptions of equity are not always compatible with 
environmental-effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness depending on the choice of theory of 
distributive justice deployed. Therefore, underlying such links lies the notion of trade-offs.262 
These principles and concepts should form part of the criteria for identifying legitimate 
REDD+ beneficiaries and distribution of costs and benefits. However, the discussion above 
has indicated that decision-makers rely on different principles of justice to justify calls for 
equity and the choice of such principles is likely to lead to different policy solutions. Thus, it 
is  expected that actors such as investors, governments and local communities will be 
                                                 
256  Karsenty A. at.al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) xxx 
Environmental Science and Policy xxx-xxx at 6-7. 
257   Börner, J., S. et.al., Direct Conservation Payments in the Braxilian Amazon: Scope and Equity Implications. 
(2010) 69 Ecological Economics 1272-82 at 1280. 
258  Wunder S. et. al., Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in 
developed and developing countries. (2008) 65 Ecological Economics 834–852 at 841. 
259  Ibid at 841. 
260  Ibid at 831. 
261  Ibid at 822. 
262  Ibid Pascual U. et. al., (2010) at 1240. 
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confronted by the following questions: to what extent should one goal or principle be 
sacrificed to achieve the others? What are the trades-offs? How does one reconcile different 
views that may arise? These and other questions are useful in deciding the choice of 
regulatory framework for REDD+. Having analysed the conceptual framework for the legal 
and policy design the next chapter turns to examining the evolution of REDD+ and 
presenting its legal relevance. This discussion is particularly pertinent to the legal nature of 
the domestic law for REDD+. 
-50 - 
Chapter Three: 
Placing REDD+ in the Context of International Climate Law 
Negotiations 
3.1 Introduction 
It is well known that deforestation and climate change have been among the central concerns 
in international environmental negotiations for decades. However, until recently they have 
been treated largely as separate and distinct, with only limited attention to deforestation’s role 
in climate change.1 Prior to the REDD+ negotiations, the preceding international efforts to
reduce deforestation focused on biodiversity conservation, and unsustainable consumption 
practices, with minimal outcomes in reducing deforestation on any significant scale.2 Taking
this historical account into perspective, this chapter investigates why that has been the case 
and discusses the legal relevance of REDD+ in developing countries. The chapter achieves 
this objective by discussing the place of REDD+ within the framework of the international 
climate change regime. The argument advanced here is that the place of the REDD+ 
mechanism must be considered within the said framework which allows a host country to 
define its own mitigation activities and obliges that country to report on such activities as 
well as technology and capacity building support needed and received.3 This is the outcome
of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) (hereinafter the Paris Agreement) where countries
agreed that the breach of reducing emissions pledges does not give rise to international legal 
responsibility. 4  This focus is instructive in deciding the legal nature of the domestic
regulatory framework for REDD+. 
1 Boyd W., Ways of seeing in environmental law: how deforestation became an object of climate governance. 
(2010) 37 Ecology Law Quarterly 843-916 at 844. 
2 Ibid. 
3 These two aspects are also known as a “bottom up approach” and a “top down approach”. 
4 UNFCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. 
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3.2  Negotiations of the Climate Change Regime: The Rio Earth Summit 
 
The momentum to negotiate a top-down climate change regime began to build with the 
release of the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990. 
The IPCC was created in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The purpose of the IPCC is to inform the 
governments of the world with a clear scientific view of what is happening to the world’s 
climate. 5  Thus the IPCC seeks to provide on a “comprehensive, objective, open and 
transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to 
understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential 
impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.”6 
In 1990, the General Assembly passed a resolution to initiate negotiations for the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and other related 
instruments containing appropriate commitments for action to combat climate change and its 
adverse effects to be ready for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) also known as the Rio Earth Summit. 7  The 
objective of the Earth Summit can be categorised in two aspects. First, it focused on 
negotiations of environmental instruments with a view to addressing longer-term, 
irreversible, global threats, such as greenhouse warming, loss of biological diversity, and 
drought and desertification. Second, it focused on the more general economic and social 
policies needed to achieve sustainable development.8 Subsequently, the outcome of the Earth 
Summit was hailed as representing a “paradigm shift” from international environmental law 
to a new (but yet to be defined) international law of sustainable development.9 The Earth 
Summit led to the adoption of the UNFCCC, the CBD, Agenda 21 (a blueprint on how to 
make development socially, economically and environmentally sustainable), the Rio 
                                                 
5  IPCC. Available: http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml#.UTuboFvsaCc [accessed 15 
July 2014]. 
6  Principles Governing IPPC Work. Available: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml#.UTuboFvsaCc [accessed 15 July 2014]. 
7  United Nations, “Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind”, General 
Assembly Resolution 45/212, 71st plenary meeting 21 December (1990) paras 1 and 7. 
8 Bodansky D., “History of the Global Climate Change Regime” in Luterbacher U. and Sprinz D.F. (eds)., 
International Relations and Global Climate Change.  (2001) at 23. 
9  Peter H. S., “Kaleidoscope: International environmental law after Rio”, (1993) European Journal of 
International Law 377-389. Available: http://ejil.org/pdfs/4/1/1209.pdf [accessed 15 July 2014]. 
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Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) 10  (containing 27 
fundamental principles for sustainable development) and the Statement of Principles for a 
Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All 
Types of Forests (Forest Principle).11 The UNFCCC and CBD “were negotiated separately 
from but parallel to preparations for the Earth Summit.”12 Agenda 21 was instrumental in 
highlighting the issue of drought and desertification and proposed a Convention to Combat 
Desertification. 13  Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly established an 
“Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the elaboration of an international convention 
to combat desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought and/or 
desertification, particularly in Africa” (UNCCD). 14  It is during the negotiations and 
subsequent developments of these instruments where one can trace the origin of REDD+. 
3.2.1   Mitigation of Desertification as a Priority for Developing Countries 
 
From an African perspective, (at least from the 1970s to the 1990s) the main environmental 
problem was desertification.15 Although the problem in question was not limited to Africa, it 
was the drought in Africa that became the focus for concern and inspired the United Nations 
to initiate early international action. 16 After failed international attempts to address 
desertification, the issue was finally placed on the agenda of the Earth Summit.17 During the 
preparations for the Earth Summit, the African Group felt that the interests of other regions of 
the world were being met either by the biodiversity or climate convention and in this context 
Africa needed a convention to combat desertification in exchange.18 This meant that African 
countries needed to address some of the immediate adverse impacts of climate change 
(desertification) by undertaking what is now known as adaptation. African demands became 
politically linked to the issue of deforestation and industrialised countries were pressing for a 
                                                 
10 The Declaration failed to obtain its intended title (Earth Charter) due to resistance of developing countries. It 
“bears little resemblance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Sands P., (2003) at 54. 
11  International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Available: 
http://www.iisd.org/rio+5/agenda/riodocs.htm [accessed 15 March 2015]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 UNGA Res. 47/188 (1992). Available: http://habitat.igc.org/open-gates/a47r188.htm. [accessed 1 June 2015]. 
Also see Sands P., (2003) at 556-557. 
14 The UNCCD was signed in 1994 entered into force on 26 December 1996. Available: http://www.doe-
bd.org/UNCCD.pdf [accessed 14 June 2015]. 
15 Corell E., Dryland degradation-Africa’s main environmental challenge: International activities from 1970s to 
the 1990s and the futures of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, at 1. In Chaytor B. and 
Gray K.R. (Eds.), International environmental law and policy in Africa, (2003). 
16 Ibid Corell E., at 6. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid at 9. 
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convention on forests instead.19 Later on, it became clear (section 3.2.2 below) that developed 
countries wanted to compel developing countries to allow their forest resources as a  climate 
change mitigation measure. The objection to a convention on desertification by most 
developed countries may be attributed to the early definition of desertification which placed 
all the responsibility on human activities. 20  This definition was used by industrialised 
countries to demand that the remedies for mitigation of desertification to a large extent lay in 
how human organised their lives rather than which technology was used.21 A solution to the 
dilemma was proposed in a package deal: developing countries would agree to a forests 
convention while industrialised countries would support the UNCCD.  However, it was not 
possible to agree on a forest convention (see sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 below). 
3.2.2   Climate Change Mitigation as a Priority for Developed Countries 
 
Later during the preparations for the Earth Summit, a number of proposals for a legally 
binding instrument on forests were submitted. 22 Taken together, these proposals represent the 
intent of the developed countries to use a forest convention for climate change mitigation. 
Most governments in favour of such proposals argued that a legally binding instrument is the 
most appropriate mechanism to ensure sustainable forest management. Humphreys doubts 
whether this was their sole motive.23 The following sections describe such proposals. 
3.2.2.1     Forest Protocol Proposals 
The first forest protocol proposal emerged from a declaration which was agreed upon at 
the IPCC workshop on Agriculture, Forestry and Other Human Activities (AFOS) in São 
Paulo in 1990. The workshop recommended that the IPCC should support the development of 
a forestry protocol in the context of a climate convention process and should also address 
energy supply and use. The workshop concluded that the specific elements of such a protocol 
were a matter of international negotiations. These elements could comprise: fundamental 
                                                 
19 Ibid Corell E., at 10. 
20  Corell observed that the scientists who were involved in developing the early 1990s definition of 
desertification indicated that the issues in question resulted from “mainly adverse human impact”, which in their 
view also led to climatic factors as causes of desertification. However, the legally binding CCD definition 
included both the human and climatic factors. The author argues that, this was aimed at softening the political 
ramifications by not placing all the responsibility on human activities and underlying socio-economic causes. 
Ibid Corell E., at 4 and 16. 
21 Cited in ibid Corell E., at 10. 
22  Humphreys D., The Elusive Quest for a Global Forests Convention. (2005) 14:1 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law at 4. 
23 Ibid. 
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research, tropical forest planning, measures to use, protect, and reforest, international trade, 
financial assistance, and the advantages and disadvantages of national and international 
targets.24 The declaration provides that: “Although forests can assist in mitigating the effects 
of atmospheric carbon build-up, the problem is essentially a fossil fuel one and must be 
addressed as such.”25 The declaration further noted that:  
Forests cannot be considered in isolation, and solutions must be based on an 
integrated approach which links forestry to other policies, such as those concerned 
with poverty and landlessness. The forest crisis is rooted in the agricultural sector and 
in people's needs for employment and income. Deforestation will be stopped only 
when the natural forest is economically more valuable than alternative uses for the 
same land.26 
 
The above debate is relevant to the genesis of REDD+. The origin of REDD+ can be traced 
back to the forest protocol proposal because the forest proposal was advocating an approach 
to forest and carbon sink conservation that fits into the logic of environmental economics: 
“deforestation takes place because the public goods that forests provide are undervalued in 
markets.”27 Apart from that, another forest protocol proposal was advocated by Declaration 
by the European Council on the Environmental Imperative in 1990.28 The European Council 
(EC): 
[U]rged all countries to introduce extensive energy efficiency and conservation 
measures and to adopt as soon as possible targets and strategies for limiting emissions 
of greenhouse gases. [The EC] called on the [European] Commission to expedite its 
proposals for concrete action and, in particular, measures relating to carbon dioxide 
emissions, with a view to establishing a strong […] position in preparation for the 
Second World Climate Conference. [The Declaration aimed to] take all possible steps 
to promote the early adoption of a Climate Convention and associated protocols, 
including one on tropical forest protection. 
 
The above proposal was influenced by the continuing and rapid destruction of the tropical 
forests, soil erosion, desertification and other environmental problems of the developing 
                                                 
24 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 1991. Climate change: The IPCC response strategies, 
77-84. Available:  http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/docs/002-166/002-166.html [accessed 18 September 2015]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 435. 
28 Declaration by the European Council on the Environmental Imperative, (1990) 6 Bull. Eur. Comm., at 17. 
Available: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/environmentaldeclaration.html [accessed 4 September 2015]. 
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countries. The Declaration asserted that these concerns can be fully addressed only in the 
context of North-South relationships generally.29  Lastly, the last proposal on forests was 
adopted by the 18th IUCN General Assembly at Perth, Australia in 1990. A resolution 18.30 
called the parties of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to 
“negotiate [...] protocols to a Framework Convention on Climate Change, on the subjects of 
forest protection and the reduction of those greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol.”30 
3.2.2.2          Forest Convention Proposals 
The first proposal to recommend a Forest Convention originated during the Independent 
Review of Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) in May 1990.31 The Review (led by the 
Swedish Ambassador Ola Ullstein) analysed among others the causes and the global 
implications of the deforestation and degradation since 1980. 32  The review noted that 
although the international conventions on biodiversity and climate change were under 
consideration, neither of them would directly address the issue of conservation and 
sustainable use of forest resources for the benefit of mankind. Therefore, the review proposed 
a comprehensive global Forest Convention which covered all forests with a view to 
addressing all aspects of forest management, conservation and management (which included 
biodiversity and climate change).33 The second proposal emerged from the review of the 
same TFAP by the World Resources Institute (WRI) in May 1990. In particular the WRI 
recommended a similar establishment of a global Forest Convention but not under TFAP 
auspices.34 
The last proposal was put forward on 11 July 1990 at the 16 Houston Summit, in Texas, 
USA. At this summit, the Heads of state and government declared inter alia that they “are 
                                                 
29 The Seven Major Industrial Countries (G7), Declaration by the European Council on the Environmental  
Imperative, (1990) 6 Bull. Eur. Comm., at 17. Available: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/environmentaldeclaration.html [accessed 4 September 2015]. 
30  18th Session of the General Assembly of IUCN - The World Conservation Union Perth, Australia 28 
November-5 December 1990 at 79. Available; http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/GA-18th-014.pdf [accessed 
10 September 2015]. Also see, Kristin R.G., “The Forest Issue in Post-UNCED Negotiations: Conflicting 
Interests and Fora for Reconciliation”, (1995) 4 Biodiversity and Conservation, 91–107 at 93. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Tropical Forestry Action Plan, Report of the Independ Review, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, May 1990 at 5-12. 
Available: http://homepage2.nifty.com/fujiwara_studyroom/kokusai/kosai3/independent_review_tfap.pdf 
[accessed 4 September 2015]. 
33 Ibid. 
34  Kristin R.G., “The Forest Issue in Post-UNCED Negotiations: Conflicting Interests and Fora for 
Reconciliation”, (1995) 4 Biodiversity and Conservation, 91–107 at 92. 
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ready to begin negotiations, […] on a global forest convention or agreement, which is needed 
to curb deforestation, protect biodiversity, stimulate positive forestry actions, and address 
threats to the world's forests”. It was argued that a convention or agreement would be 
completed as soon as possible, but no later than 1992.35 
 
3.2.2.3 Forest Instrument Proposal 
The proposal for a Forest Instrument emerged from the Second World Climate Conference 
(SWCC) in Geneva, 1990. The SWCC was organised by a consortium of UN agencies 
(UNEP, WMO, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)), together with the International Council of Scientific 
Unions. The conference attracted several world leaders including the United Kingdom (UK) 
and France.36 It was noted that the conference statement supported the development of an 
international forest instrument linked with the Climate Change and Biodiversity 
Conventions.37 
3.2.3   Objections to Legal Regulatory Framework for Forests 
 
The proposals exposed above were met with strong resentment among developing countries 
especially those with rich forest resources.38 Developing countries contended that “since the 
industrialized countries are the ones responsible for the emissions of industrial waste into the 
atmosphere, the poor countries should have nothing to do with the solution of the problem.”39 
This argument echoed the statement of Malaysia’s prime minister (Mahathir bin Mohamad) 
shortly before the Earth Summit: “if it is in the interests of the rich that we do not cut down 
our trees then they must compensate us for the loss of income.”40 Therefore they pushed for 
financial commitment from developed countries, and for some developing countries, finance 
                                                 
35 Economic Declaration July 11, 1990, Article 67 of the Economic Declaration. Available: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/past_summit/16/e16_a.html [accessed 25 September 
2015]. 
36 Kenneth Hare, F. Review of Jager, J. and Ferguson, H.L., “Climate Change: Science, Impacts and Policy” 
(1992) Environmental Conservation, 19, 189-189.  Available: 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=A7A57FBC7FA74FE2B10C76FE4AA76569.jo
urnals?fromPage=online&aid=5957284 [accessed 22 September 2015]. 
37 Kristin R.G.,  “The Forest Issue in Post-UNCED Negotiations: Conflicting Interests and Fora for 
Reconciliation”, (1995) 4 Biodiversity and Conservation, 91–107. 
38 Ibid at 92. 
39 Ibid at 96. 
40 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 436 citing Mahathir, B.M., (1992). 
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was the only theme where they really wanted the instrument to have added value.41 Contrary 
to this demand, developing countries contended that the proposed forest instruments would 
only diminish their potential for economic development.42 
Developing countries therefore asserted that all issues should be settled in a comprehensive 
package as a prerequisite for agreeing to the proposed forest instrument.43 This approach 
should be done by devising a global forest fund and providing technology transfers on 
concessional terms and external debt relief to help developing countries achieve sustainable 
forest management. 44  Developing countries also invoked two concepts. The first is the 
concept of “compensation for opportunity cost foregone”45 and the second is the concept of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities”.46 The latter concept argued that the onus of 
tropical forest conservation should not lie exclusively with the South, but also with the North 
which has historical responsibility for much tropical deforestation through its unsustainable 
consumption of tropical forest products.47 In addition, they felt that the negotiations had 
focused entirely on tropical forests.48  The key point to be noted here is that developed 
countries should commit to similar standards in forest conservation which they extend to the 
tropical countries.  
 
However, most developed countries were not prepared to agree on any strong financial 
mechanism which would be new and additional. 49  They also disagreed on technology 
transfer, as well as on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.50 This aspect 
has led to some scholarly discussion on the possible explanations of this disagreement. 
Accordingly, the prevailing argument seems to be that developing countries were so single-
                                                 
41 Ibid., Kunzmann K., (2008) at 986. 
42 Will countries create a binding international accord on forests? United Nations Panel on Forests to Hold Final 
Session from 11-21 February, Special Session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the 
Implementation of Agenda 21, New York, 23-27 (1997). Available: 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/forests.htm [accessed 3 September 2015]. 
43 Humphreys D., Forest negotiations at the United Nations: explaining cooperation and discord, (2001) 3 Forest 
Policy and Economics 125-135, at 436. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Humphreys D.,Forest negotiations at the United Nations: explaining cooperation and discord, (2001) 3 Forest 
Policy and Economics 125-135, at 436. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Will countries create a binding international accord on forests? United Nations Panel on Forests to Hold Final 
Session from 11-21 February, Special Session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the 
Implementation of Agenda 21, New York, 23-27 (1997). Available: 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/forests.htm [accessed 3 September 2015]. 
49 Ibid., Kunzmann K., (2008) at 986. 
50 Ibid. 
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minded about maintaining sovereign rights over their natural resources and this precluded 
agreement on any legal instrument. 51  However, other factors seem to play a significant 
contribution to the said prevailing argument. Dimitrov et al point to the absence of reliable 
information on key aspects of deforestation and degradation,52 while Lipschutz concludes that 
in large part this could be attributed to the fact that forests are different from other natural 
resources whose role is directly related to international trade. This means that forests can be 
addressed through instruments that regulate trade.53 Beyond such explanations, Davenport 
contends that the benefits of such instrument did not outweigh the potential economic costs to 
the USA at the domestic level. 54  That being said, critics argue that deforestation in 
developing countries will not be curbed unless poverty is also addressed, something which is 
not proposed for the proposed forest instruments. 55  To address poverty in developing 
countries will require a bold commitment similar to that proposed by Secretary of State 
General George Marshall (1947) to help rebuild Europe after World War II (in which the 
USA pledged 2-3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in economic aid over 5 years).56 
3.2.4   The Outcomes and Implications for Climate Change Mitigation 
 
Since the demands of developing countries were not fulfilled,57 they declared: (i) that they 
would continue to oppose a forest convention (ii) that developed countries should take a 
leading role in the formulation of forest principles and (iii) developed countries should ensure 
the transfer of financial resources and technology for implementing such forest principles in 
                                                 
51  Humphreys D., The Elusive Quest for a Global Forests Convention. (2005) 14:1 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law at 1. Humphreys D., The Politics of Avoided Deforestation 
Historical Context and Contemporary Issues, (2008) 10:3 International Forestry Review, 433-442 at 439. 
Humphreys D., Forest negotiations at the United Nations: explaining cooperation and discord, (2001) 3 Forest 
Policy and Economics  125-135 at 127. Also see Gareth, P. and Brown J.W., Global Environmental Politics, 2nd 
ed. (1996)  Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Holmgren P. and Marklund, L.G., 2007. National Forest Monitoring 
Systems - purposes, options and status. In: Forestry & Climate Change edited in Lynch J.M. et al., 163-173. 
CAB International. Available: http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/k1276e/K1276E04.htm [accessed 2 October 
2015]. 
52 Dimitrov R.S. et. al., International Non-regimes: A research agenda. (2007) 9  International Studies Review 
230-258 at 244. 
53 Lipschutz R.D., Why Is There No International Forestry Law?: An Examination of International Forestry 
Regulation, Both Public and Private. (2000/2001), 19 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 153-180. 
54 Davenport D.S., An alternative explanation for the failure of the UNCED forest negotiations. (2005) 5:1 
Global Environmental Politics, 105-130. 
55Vanclay J.K. et. al., What would a Global Forest Convention mean for tropical forests and for timber 
consumers? (2005) 103:3 Journal of Forestry, 120-125.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 437. 
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developing countries.58 Therefore, negotiations on forest instruments at the Earth Summit in 
1992 resulted in the  adoption of two instruments. The first59  was the Forest Principles 
Instrument60 and the second was Chapter 11 of Agenda 21: “Combating Deforestation”.61The 
former suggests the indecisiveness of the international community on forest issues. This 
suggestion is drawn from the title “(non-legally binding but authoritative; a statement, not 
principles, but: a statement of principles)”.62 The latter became a new international forum (the 
United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF)) which gave international policy new momentum 
by adopting the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all Types of Forests (NLBI) in 2007.63 
The Forest Principles require the sustainable management of forest resources and forest lands 
so as to ensure carbon sinks and reservoirs for sustainable development.64 Among the key 
principles reflected in the Forest Principles Instrument as highlighted by Humphrey include 
“the importance of redressing external indebtedness, particularly where aggravated by the net 
transfer of resources to developed countries” (para. 9(a)), “new and additional financial 
resources” (para. 10), the “transfer of environmentally sound technologies” (para. 11), and 
the “agreed full incremental cost of achieving benefits associated with forest conservation 
[…] should be equitably shared by the international community” (para. 1(b)).65 The omitted 
key principles are “compensation for opportunity cost foregone” and “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”.66 
                                                 
58  Kristin R.G., “The Forest Issue in Post-UNCED Negotiations: Conflicting Interests and Fora for 
Reconciliation”, (1995) 4 Biodiversity and Conservation,  91–107 at 103. 
59 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 436. 
59  Kristin R.G., “The Forest Issue in Post-UNCED Negotiations: Conflicting Interests and Fora for 
Reconciliation”, (1995) 4 Biodiversity and Conservation, 91–107 at 92. 
60 United Nations General Assembly (1992) A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), [hereafter Forest Principles]. Available: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-3annex3.htm [accessed 10 October 2015]. The main 
objective of the principles is to “contribute to the management, conservation and sustainable development of 
forests and to provide for their multiple and complementary functions and uses, preamble (b). 
61 About UNFF, History and Milestones of International Forest Policy see http://www.un.org/esa/forests/about-
history.html. Also see Kunzmann K., The Non-legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable Management of All 
Types of Forests - Towards a Legal Regime for Sustainable Forest Management? (2008) 09:08 German Law 
Journal  981.  
62 Max-Planck-Institut: Available: http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/henne_fakir_3.pdf [accessed 
21 February 2015]. 
63 United Nations General Assembly (2007) A/C.2/62/L.5 “Non-legally binding instrument on all types of 
forests”. Available: 
http://www.fordaq.com/www/news/2007/UN_Instrument%20on%20all%20types%20of%20forests.pdf 
[accessed 12 October 2015]. 
64 Para 2 (b) of Forest Principles. 
65 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 437. 
66 Ibid. 
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Like the Forest Principles, the NLBI excludes the concept of “compensation for opportunity 
cost foregone” but included the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle. The 
purpose of NLBI includes inter alia to “strengthen political commitment and action at all 
levels to implement effectively sustainable management of all types of forests and to achieve 
the shared global objectives on forests.”67 One of the objectives is to “[r]everse the decline in 
official development assistance for sustainable forest management and mobilize significantly 
increased, new and additional financial resources from all sources for the implementation of 
sustainable forest management.68 Regarding the NLBI the European Union and some other 
countries “wanted to have some more and stronger commitments on the protection of forests 
and regarding the sustainability of forest management.”69 In their proposal they wanted:   
 
(a) a full definition of sustainable forest management to be included in a universally 
accepted and applicable document for the first time; (b) the commitment of states to 
identify quantifiable and time-bound targets in their national forest programmes, 
which would make it possible to assess progress and setbacks in the implementation 
of this [i]nstrument; and (c) the clear commitment towards good governance and 
legality in the forest sector.70 
 
The above proposal was rejected mainly by Brazil, the USA and some developing countries. 
At the same time other countries, especially countries with economies in transition, tried to 
make commitments towards sustainable forest management as minimal as possible and the 
nature of the instrument as vague and non-binding as possible. In doing so they blocked 
anything which could evolve into a new rule of customary international law, such as 
promoting good governance or legality in the forest sector and thereby affect national 
sovereignty.71 Subsequently, the failure to devise a legally binding forest instrument meant 
that the aims and objectives of the UNFCCC had to be weakened.72 
 
                                                 
67 Para 1 (b) of the Non-legally Binding Instrument on all Types of Forests. 
68 Para 5 of the Non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests. 
69 Kunzmann K.,The Non-legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable Management of All Types of Forests - 
Towards a Legal Regime for Sustainable Forest Management? (2008) 09:08 German Law Journal  981 at 987.  
70 Ibid Kunzmann K., (2008) at 986. 
71 Ibid at 986. 
72  Humphreys D., The Elusive Quest for a Global Forests Convention. (2005) 14:1 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law at 2. 
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In 1993, several NGOs and a collection of timber buyers and retailers launched voluntary 
certification schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).73  This is a market-
driven instrument designed to incentivise sustainable forest production through the green 
labelling of timber products.74 
3.3   The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC75 is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.76 The precise legal status of this objective is not entirely clear.77 Soltau argues that 
while the objective is not phrased as an obligation, it is similar to a collective commitment, as 
it encapsulates the rationale of the UNFCCC as a whole.78 Thus it is argued that the wording 
“stabilization” of atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is not the same as 
stabilisation of the climate.79  The former means that GHGs have nil effect because are 
balanced by removal processes while the latter means the removal of GHGs could take much 
longer to achieve due to the long lifetimes of such gases and the inertia of the climate system 
particularly the ocean. 80  Thus “stabilization” is linked to the prevention of dangerous 
interference with the climate system which suggests that the actual objective of the UNFCCC 
is the stabilisation of the climate itself at safe levels.81 
The origins and development of Article 2 and evolution of the concept of “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference” appear to take place without the active participation of 
                                                 
73 FSC. Available: https://ic.fsc.org/ [accessed 21 October 2015]. 
74 McDermott C.L. et. al., Chapter 5 Governance for REDD+, forest management and biodiversity: Existing 
approaches and future options in, Parrotta, J. et.al. (eds.) Understanding relationships between biodiversity, 
carbon, forests and people. IUFRO, Vienna. Commissioned by Global Forest Expert Panel, The Collaborative 
Partnership on Forests. (2012) at 118. Buizer M. et.al., Climate change and deforestation: The evolution of an 
intersecting policy domain. (2014) 35 Environmental Science and Policy, 1–11 at 5. Humphreys D., Logjam: 
Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance(2006) at xviii.    
75 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, (1992). 
76 Article 2. 
77 Soltau F., Fairness in international climate change law and policy, (2009) citing Bodansky at 55. 
78 Ibid. 
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developing countries. 82  This evolution might be attributed to the lack of interest of 
developing countries since “until 1990, the governments interested in climate change were 
primarily those of Western industrialized countries.”83 Even so, more concerns were raised 
because such initiatives paid attention to physical and biological vulnerability as sources of 
danger and less attention has been paid to economic, ethical and cultural considerations.84 A 
number of questions which are also vital to the development of policy for implementation of 
REDD+ mechanism were raised. Such questions include: what generic risks, and what 
specific impacts, should guide long-term policy? What geographic scope is important? 
Populations of what size should be of concern? In what way should the distribution of 
impacts geographically, or among socioeconomic or cultural groups, be taken into account, as 
opposed to total human welfare? And should costs and benefits be weighed quantitatively to 
define “dangerous” or should environmental criteria supplemented by bounds on 
implementation costs be employed, as in the tolerable window approach?85 
 
Unlike in the Forest Principles,86 the UNFCCC provides for “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”.87 This principle requires developed countries to take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof since they are responsible for most of the 
carbon emissions.88  The principle finds expression in the differentiation in commitments 
between developed country and developing country parties. Differentiation can be observed 
in developed country parties’ non-binding goal to return their emissions to 1990 levels by 
2000; in the more stringent and frequent reporting obligations of Annex I parties; as well as 
in provisions concerning the granting of assistance.89 In the context of forest protocol and 
convention negotiations, developing forest countries invoked the principle of “common but 
                                                 
82 Oppenheimer M. and Petsonk A., Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations, 
Climatic Change (2004) at 38. Available: http://www.princeton.edu/step/people/faculty/michael-
oppenheimer/recent-publications/Article-2-of-the-UN-Framework-Convention-on-Climate-Change.pdf 
[accessed 10 October 2015]. 
83Bodansky D., “History of the Global Climate Change Regime” in Luterbacher U. and Sprinz D.F. (eds)., 
International Relations and Global Climate Change.  (2001) at 23. 
84 Oppenheimer M. and Petsonk A., Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations, 
Climatic Change (2004) at 38. Available: http://www.princeton.edu/step/people/faculty/michael-
oppenheimer/recent-publications/Article-2-of-the-UN-Framework-Convention-on-Climate-Change.pdf 
[accessed 10 October 2015]. 
85 Ibid., Oppenheimer M. and Petsonk A., (2004) at 38. 
86 Humphreys D., The politics of “Avoided Deforestation”: Historical context and contemporary issues, (2008) 
at 437. 
87 Articles 3.1 and 4.1. 
88 Article 3.1. 
89 Soltau F., Fairness in international climate change law and policy, (2009) at 56. 
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differentiated responsibilities” to require that the burden of tropical forest conservation 
should not lie exclusively with the South, but also with the North which has historical 
responsibility for much tropical deforestation through its unsustainable consumption of 
tropical forest products.  
 
Specific Commitments for Developed Countries are provided in article 4 (2) which reflect a 
top-down model.90 In particular each developed state party and other parties included in 
Annex I are required to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the 
mitigation of climate change, by limiting their anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
and protecting and enhancing their greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.91 “These Parties may 
implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties 
in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention.”92 This commitment is 
followed by a top-down model, setting forth a non-binding aim for developed countries to 
return their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.93 However, when Article 4(2) (a) and 
Article 4(2) (b) are read together, they do not reflect a clear commitment for developed 
countries and the European Commission (EC) to stabilise carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases by the year 2000 at 1990 levels as advocated by some parties during 
negotiations.94 This is because Article 4(2) (a) requires only each developed country to limit 
its emissions instead of stabilisation at a particular level or reduction.95 These are thus soft 
targets obligations.96 
The UNFCCC also provides that the COP shall review the adequacy of Article 4 (2) (a) and 
Article 4 (2) (b) at its first session.97 This review shall be carried out in the light of the best 
available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as 
relevant technical, social and economic information. Based on this review, the COP is 
mandated to take appropriate action, which may include the adoption of amendments to the 
                                                 
90 Bodanski D., “A tale of two architectures the once and future U.N. climate change regime” (2011) Arizona 
State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at 6. 
91 Article 4 (2). 
92 Article 4 (2) (a). 
93 Article 4 (2) (b). Also see Bodanski D., “A tale of two architectures the once and future U.N. climate change 
regime” (2011) Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at 6. 
94 Sands P., (2003) at 365. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Article 4 (2) (b) of the UNFCCC. 
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commitments in aforementioned articles. 98  The COP, at its first session, shall also take 
decisions regarding criteria.99 However, this requirement remains subject to competing views 
as to whether the review extends to the commitments of developing states or is limited to 
those of Annex I parties.100 
 
General commitments applicable to all countries are also provided. The UNFCCC established 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” 
(CBDR), 101 but did not draw an absolute separation between developed and developing 
states.102 However, it is observed that the UNFCCC contemplated that this division of the 
world into developed and developing countries could evolve over time. 103  Under the 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” and “specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances”, developing countries are obliged by the UNFCCC 
to inter alia “promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the 
conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases 
[…] including biomass and forests […].” 104  But there are no specific greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets related to such obligation. The UNFCCC does not mandate any 
binding action as to how to achieve its ultimate objective.105 
3.4  Negotiations of the 1st Commitment Period: Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) 
 
In 1995, at the UNFCCC COP 1, countries began a new round of negotiations, aimed at 
defining quantitative emission limitation and reduction objectives (emission targets) for 
                                                 
98 Article 4(2) (d) of the UNFCCC. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Sands P., (2003) at 365. 
101 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
102 Bodanski D., “A tale of two architectures the once and futre U.N. climate change regime” (2011) Arizona 
State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at 2. 
103 The authors substantiate their argument by citing Article 4.2(f) of the UNFCCC which provides that the 
parties shall review the lists of parties in Annexes I and II with a view to making amendments. They also cite 
Article 4.2(g) which further allows non-Annex I countries to opt in to the hortatory target and timetable 
established by Article 4.2(a) and (b). See Bodansky D. and Diringer E., The Evolution of International Regimes: 
Implications for Climate Change, Pew Center on Global Climate Change Report, (2010) at 14. Available: 
SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773828 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773828 
104 Article 4(1) (d) of the UNFCCC. 
105 Streck C. and Scholz S.M., The role of forests in global climate change: whence we come and where we go. 
International AffairsVolume 82, Issue 5, Article first published online: 4 OCT 2006. 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/19664/1/The%20role%20of%20forests%20in%20global
%20climate%20change%20whence%20we%20come%20and%20where%20we%20go.pdf?1 [accessed 10 
October 2014]. 
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developed countries.106 The Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted at the COP 3 in December 
1997 in Kyoto, Japan and entered into force in 2005.107 The Kyoto Protocol (KP) has two 
objectives which are provided in Article 12(2). The first is to “assist Parties not included in 
Annex I in achieving sustainable development” and to assist Annex I parties in achieving 
their emission limitation and reduction commitments. Article 3(1) of the KP establishes basic 
obligations for the Annex I parties. In particular the parties are required to “individually or 
jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts […] with a view to 
reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the 
commitment period 2008 to 2012.”108 Thus article 3.1 obliges developed countries to reduce 
their net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels from 2008 to 2012. No 
comparable commitment is provided for developing countries. 109  The Kyoto Protocol 
provides different emission reduction targets for different states110 and regional economic 
organisations.111 Furthermore, the Protocol applies to six greenhouse gases which are: carbon 
dioxide, hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).112 
In sharp contrast to the UNFCCC, the meaning attributed to the obligation expression 
changed dramatically compared to the Kyoto Protocol. The change was from a concept that 
started with a duty on all countries to protect common resources to the concept which 
imposes no responsibility on developing countries.113 However, the nature and extent of each 
country's obligations was proposed to be equitably allocated.114 Mumma and Hodas argue 
that this elimination of duty or responsibility undermines the foundation principles of 
sustainable development articulated in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 and renders the 
                                                 
106 Berlin Mandate: Review of the Adequacy of Article 4(2) (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC, Dec. 1/CP.1, in COP-1 
Report, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, at 4. Also see Bodanski D., “A tale of two architectures the once 
and futre U.N. climate change regime” (2011) Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law 
at 7. 
107  UNFCCC. Available: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php [accessed 10 
October 2014]. 
108 Article 3 (1) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
109 Dernbach J.C. and Kakade, S., Climate Change Law: An Introduction, (2008) 29 Energy L. J. 1 at 10. 
110 Ibid. 
111 See annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
112  Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. Also see Dernbach J.C. and Kakade, S., Climate Change Law: An 
Introduction, (2008) 29 Energy L. J. 1 at 10. 
113 Mumma A. and Hodas D., Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human 
Development. (2007-2008) 20:4 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 619 at 628.   
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Kyoto Protocol fatally flawed. To substantiate this argument, the scholars point out that in the 
Kyoto Protocol CBDR was based on a “business-as-usual” mindset served to justify 
continued reliance by the developing countries on the old fossil fuel intensive development 
paradigm. In this case they contended that CBDR lost its original meaning as articulated in 
the UNFCCC.  
The CBDR as initially envisaged in the UNFCCC which subsequently dominated the views 
of most negotiators from 1992 to 2002, with the exception of the USA negotiators, accepted 
as a matter of course that CBDR meant that only industrialised countries would assume 
reduction obligations under the UNFCCC and subsequent protocols.  On the other hand, the 
“developing country view would appear to be that CBDR implies that developing countries 
must not assume emission reductions commitments under even a post Kyoto climate change 
regime.”115 The US view of the CBDR is that every country make a commitment, but the 
"level and timing of each country's commitments must be commensurate with its national 
abilities and level of development. Balance and fairness must be maintained.”116 Developing 
countries have submitted their views of the concept of CBDR in the context of REDD+. For 
example, Colombia submitted that CBDR means that REDD+ “be included as an eligible 
[CDM] activity and that Annex I commitments in the second and subsequent commitment 
periods should be strong enough to accommodate the new supply of emission reductions 
arising from this and other new options.”117 Brazil’s conception of CBDR advocates that 
developing countries should not “have quantified commitments to reduce or limit their 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.”118 In addition, Brazil submits that there “are 
many programs being implemented on a national basis by developing countries that result in 
a considerable reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions.”119 Meanwhile, in the context of 
the Cancun agreements and Durban platform, the least developed countries and small-island 
developing countries demanded stronger binding commitments from both developed and 
                                                 
115 Ibid at 8.   
116 Ibid at 10.   
117 Submission by Colombia on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries. (Undated) at 2. 
Available: http://unfccc.int/files/land_use_and_climate_change/lulucf/application/pdf/colombia.pdf [accessed 
10 October 2014]. 
118 Submission from Brazil. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Dialogue on long-term 
cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention Second workshop 
Nairobi, 15–16 November 2006. Dialogue working paper 21 (2006) at 3. Available: 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/dialogue/application/pdf/wp_21_braz.pdf [accessed 10 October 2014]. 
119 Ibid. 
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emerging economies. This suggests that their understanding of the CBDR implies 
“differentiation” in terms of stronger mitigation targets for both developed and emerging 
economies. But it is unclear to this writer whether they implicitly imply that they should be 
exempted from committing to any binding commitments, or they should undertake weak 
binding targets. 
The tensions reflected in the above exposition have seen a new meaning or forms of CBDR 
evolving in the second post-Kyoto negotiations. Developed countries agreed in their 
insistence that any reference to CBDR must be qualified with a provision that the CBDR 
principle must be interpreted in the light of “contemporary economic realities”. They also 
insisted that the future regime must be “applicable to all” countries. Rajamani concluded that 
any international instrument that emerges from these negotiations is likely to have a 
fundamentally different character from that of the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, the 
instrument will likely “reflect a regulatory approach based on self-selection of mitigation 
commitments and actions (rather than prescription), enhanced parity between the obligations 
placed on developed and developing countries (rather than differentiation), and enhanced 
information flow relating to commitments/actions (rather than a compliance system).”120 This 
type of instrument will have a direct bearing on the legal aspect of reflexive law discussed in 
chapters 8 and 9. 
In addition, all references to differentiation – except one in the Cancun decisions – were 
expressed under the wording of Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective 
Capabilities (CBDRRC) which combines CBDR and respective capabilities (RC) as used in 
the UNFCCC. In this case it remains uncertain how this abbreviation should be understood. 
The abbreviation CBDRRC with reference to formulations such as “taking into account”, 
“recognizing” or “guided by” tends to confirm the status of the CBDR as a philosophical 
basis for other differentiated obligations rather than signifying a change in its nature or scope. 
In their submission, Mumma and Hodas argue that CBDR can mean that developing 
countries have a cap (i.e. emissions avoidance obligations different from that of developed 
countries i.e. emissions reduction obligations), one that is adequate for their sustainable 
                                                 
120 Rajamani L., Differentiation in the Emerging Climate Regime. (2013) 14:1 Theoretical Inquiries  in Law 
151- 171 at 168.  




-68 -  
 
development.121 In this case, they stress that all developing countries must commit to moving 
to a new, low-carbon and energy future that bypasses the old low-cost fossil fuel paradigm.122 
However, other scholars have doubts about whether such an approach is practical, and it is 
becoming increasingly likely that other approaches will be used-for example, a cap-and-trade 
system in the developed countries combined with technical and financial assistance and 
general targets for developing countries. This approach provides a broad meaning of fairness 
with respect to the central objective of the post-Kyoto Protocol climate change agreements. 
This differentiation then means that CBDR gives effect to conceptions of fairness in emission 
limitation and reduction commitments which should have been reflected under the Kyoto 
Protocol and post-Kyoto. 123  This will also depend on the issue of implementation and 
assistance as deconstructed in the next sections below. 
The application of CBDR in the UNFCCC takes different forms as reflected in provisions 
which differentiate between developed and developing countries with regards to their 
implementation. These provisions include different compliance schedules, permission to 
adopt subsequent base years, delayed reporting schedules, and softer approaches to non-
compliance.124  However, since the Cancun Agreements, the international community has 
moved towards a uniformity in the context of information demands-measurement, reporting 
and verification (MRV) in the developed and developing countries. This means the 
“differentiation” formerly understood in the context of CBDR has disappeared and 
uniformity emerged. In this case some demands were observed such as an increase in the 
frequency, rigour and review of national communications for developing countries.125 
The CBDR can be viewed from two different perspectives with respect to assistance. For 
developing countries sustainable development through CBDR has made the duty to cooperate 
conditional upon the receipt of financial and technological assistance. For developed 
countries, it has broadened the duty to cooperate to include the commitment to transfer 
financial and technological assistance. In securing the provision of a global public good, 
countries that are most able, in terms of technological, financial, and human capacities, are 
                                                 
121 Mumma A. and Hodas D., Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human 
Development. (2007-2008) 20:4 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 619 at 14.   
122 Ibid. 
123 Soltau F., Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy. (2009) at 187.   
124 Rajamani L., The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international environmental 
law. (2012) 88:3 International Affairs 605–623 at 611.   
125 Ibid.   
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expected to contribute more than countries that are less able. A combination of need and 
capability provides the ethically relevant grounds on which to justify differential treatment. A 
commonly cited standard for assistance is income per capita, or gross domestic product 
(GDP). In addition to that standard, there are attempts to widen the scope to include “health 
and education, enjoyment of economic and social security, and the freedom to engage in 
economic interchange and social decision making”.126 Overall, developed countries recently 
submitted that the CBDR principle should mean mitigation actions applicable to all and 
thereby eliminated the no differentiation as it was previously formulated under the UNFCCC. 
However, this does not mean that is a symmetrical application. 127  On the other hand, 
developing countries maintain that the CBDR principle is resting on the argument that 
developing countries’ economic and technological capacity are insufficient to combat climate 
change and achieve sustainable development goals.128 
3.5  Implementing the 1st Commitment Period: Flexible Mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol established Joint Implementation (JI), 129 the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)130 and Emission Trading (ET).131 
3.5.1  Emission Trading (ET) 
 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for Emission Trading (ET). The ET allows 
countries with commitments under the Protocol (Annex B Parties) to purchase and sell parts 
of each country’s carbon credits known as Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Those countries 
with spare AAUs permitted but not used, can sell their excess capacity to countries that are 
over their targets.132 
3.5.2  Joint Implementation (JI) 
 
Joint Implementation (JI) is the mechanism that entails full or partial financial support from 
an investor country, which subsequently receives carbon credits known as Emission 
                                                 
126 Cited in Soltau F., Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy. (2009) at 161.  
127 Rajamani L., “The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international environmental 
law”, (2012) 88:3 International Affairs 605–623 at 618.   
128 Nasir S., Climate Change Negotiations and Third World Countries: (Past, Present and Future). Master of 
Laws, The University of Waikato, (2014) at 142. 
129 Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
130 Ibid Article 12. 
131 Ibid Article 17. 
132  International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Available: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/international_carbon_market_mechanisms.pdf [accessed 20 October 2013]. 
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Reduction Units (ERUs) for the carbon emissions reduced by projects it undertakes in a 
recipient country. The credits are to meet part of their emission reduction commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol.133 JI has been promoted as potentially serving three related purposes as 
follows: “(1)  a  first  step  toward  establishing  an  international  tradable permit  system;  
(2)  a  cost-effective  option  for  industrialized  countries  to  finance  emission  reductions  in 
[other industrialized countries or in] the developing  countries;  and (3)  an  activity  to  
identify  when  it  is  cost  effective  to  bring  new emissions  sources  or  sinks  into  an  
existing  international  greenhouse  management  scheme.”134 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the JI is mainly open to Annex I Parties.135 JI has its roots in 
Article 4(2) (a) and (d) of UNFCCC.136 Under the UNFCCC the COP established a pilot 
phase for activities implemented jointly (AIJ) where developed countries (Annex I) could 
implement projects reducing emissions of GHGs or enhancing their removal through sinks in 
other countries, both developed and developing.137 The purpose of the AIJ was to enable 
countries to gain experience with a project-based mechanism, such as an approximation of 
emissions reduction potential, costs, and likely barriers138 from the 1995 to 1999 period.139 
3.5.3 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
 
The CDM has its roots in a proposal for a Clean Development Fund (CDF) advanced by 
Brazil, to be financed from fines levied on Annex I parties for non-compliance.140 The key 
element of the fund was the introduction of a “compulsory contribution” or a financial 
penalty for non-compliance, to be assessed against each developed country that had exceeded 
its effective emissions ceiling at the end of its budget period. The penalty was to be used for 
                                                 
133 Article 6, Kyoto Protocol. Also see UNFCCC: Available: http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html [accessed 17 October 
2013] and Sathaye J.A et.al., Concerns About Climate Change Mitigation Projects: Summary of Findings from 
Case Studies in Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa,(1998) Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory. Available: http://ies.lbl.gov/iespubs/41403.pdf [accessed 20 October 2013]. 
134 Stavins R.N., Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global 
Problem? (1997) The University of Chicago Law School  at 16. Available: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/Papers/Policy%20Instruments%20for%20Climate%20Change.pdf 
[accessed 20 October 2013]. 
135 Available: http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html [accessed 20 October 2013]. 
136 Soltau F., Fairness in international climate change law and policy, (2009), at 75. 
137 Decision 5/CP.1, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
Taken by the Parties, FCCC/1995/7/Add.1 (1995). Also see ibid., Soltau F., (2009) at 75. 
138 Cited by ibid., Soltau F., (2009) at 75. 
139 Working Group on Trade & Environment The First Meeting of the Second Phase CCICED The First Meeting 
of the Second Phase of The China Council for International Cooperation On Environment and Development: 
China’s Strategies for Implementation of Activities Implemented Jointly: Analysis on Advantages and 
Disadvantages, (1997). Available: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/aij.pdf [accessed 17 October 2013]. 
140 Ibid. Soltau F., (2009) at 79. 
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funding climate change projects in developing countries under the Clean Development 
Fund.141 The funds would be provided in developing countries in response to “voluntary” 
projects subject to the approved regulation by the COP.142 However, negotiations were later 
dominated by developed countries and it became apparent that it would not be possible to 
agree on specific binding consequences which would flow from a determination of non-
compliance. Therefore the direct link between compliance and the fund was dissolved.143 
Therefore, the basic principles and design features for the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) were agreed144 and finally provided in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The CDM is a project-based mechanism which allows a project or program of activities to 
mitigate climate change in a developing country. The project can generate carbon credits 
known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) which can be used by an Annex I Party to 
help meet its carbon emissions reduction commitment.145 In addition, the CDM is currently 
the only mechanism that provides for emission reduction projects which generate CERs in 
developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM has two objectives: the first is to 
assist developed countries with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments; the second is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable 
development.146 CDM GHG emission reduction projects earn CERs.147 
There were several factors which lead to the establishment of the CDM. The first factor 
relates to the General Assembly’s recognition of the need for international cooperation and 
for addressing climate change within a global framework, taking account of the needs and 
development priorities of developing countries.148 The second factor was an attempt to reduce 
developing countries’ carbon emissions. This is because the aforementioned emissions are 
                                                 
141Cameron J. and Werksman J., The Clean Development Mechanism: The “Kyoto Surprise” (1998) at 9. 
Available: 
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WirthChair/Publications/Docume
nts/The%20Clean%20Development%20Mechanism.pdf [accessed 17 June 2014]. 
142 Ibid., Cameron J. and Werksman J., (1998). 
143 Werksman J., The Clean Development Mechanism: Unwrapping the “Kyoto Surprise” (1998) 7:2 Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law at 152. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Murphy D. et.al., International Carbon Market Mechanisms in a Post-2012 Climate Change Agreement, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2009) at 6.  
146 Article 12 (2) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
147 Ibid Murphy D. et.al., (2009). 
148  UNGA Resolution 44/207, Preamble, paragraph 9 and Paragraph 12, and UNGA Resolution 45/212, 
Preamble, paragraph 1 and Paragraph 8 as cited by Akanle O., Distributive justice in international law: can the 
CDM regime support an equitable geographic distribution of projects? PHD thesis, University of Dundee (2011) 
at 5. 
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expected to grow as a result of growing energy needs.149 The need for developing countries’ 
energy increase and subsequent carbon emissions increase has also been recognised in the 
preamble of the UNFCCC. In addition the UNFCCC acknowledges that the achievement of 
sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty are priority needs of developing 
countries.150 Consequently there was a need for a mechanism that would serve the interest of 
developing countries (i.e. sustainable development) and interest of developed countries (i.e. 
acquire CERs and use them to meet part of their emission reduction target at a reduced 
cost).151 
3.5.4  COP-7 (Marrakesh Accords): Operational Details for CDM 
Although Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol provided guiding principles for the CDM, the 
operational details of the CDM were agreed upon only in 2001, as part of the Marrakesh 
Accords.152 The process was complete in 2003 with the agreement over the rules governing 
forestry-related CDM projects. These rules were titled Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) projects.153 LULUCF activities are provided under Articles 3(3) and (4), 
6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and include afforestation, reforestation, deforestation, forest 
degradation and additional activities such as soil carbon management in agriculture, 
restoration of wetlands, cropland management and grazing land management.154 It should be 
noted that LULUCF excludes parts of GHG emissions from the agricultural sector. 155 
However, in 2006, the IPCC introduced the concept of “Agriculture, Forestry and other Land 
Uses” (AFOLU) which combines direct GHG emissions of all land-based activities. 156 
                                                 
149 International Energy Agency, in the absence of new government action (that is, following a business as usual 
pattern), global primary energy demand is set to increase at an annual rate of 1.6% between now and 2030, with 
over 70% of this increase coming from developing countries. Fossil fuels (one of the main sources of GHG 
emissions) will remain the dominant source of energy up to 2030, accounting for 83% of this increased demand, 
cited by Akanle O., (2011) at 5. 
150 UNFCCC preamble. 
151 Article 12 (2)-(3) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
152 Lecocq F. and Ambrosi P., The Clean Development Mechanism: History, Status, and Prospects, (2007) 1:1 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 134–151. It should also be noted that the Marrakech Accords 
provided modalities and guidelines for each of flexibility mechanisms. See Sands P., (2003) at 379. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid Murphy D. et.al., (2009).  
155 Gardi O., Climate Change: Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land-Use (AFOLU) for Addressing Climate 
Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the Latin American and Caribbean Region, Inter-American Development 
Bank (2010) at 6. 
156 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Inventories (IPCC 2006). 
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Therefore a reference to LULUCF in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
might be expanded and become the AFOLU in a post-2012 agreement.157 
 
The emerged rules of the LULUCF were strict in a sense that eligible activities under the 
CDM in the Marrakesh Accords were only afforestation and reforestation.158 The largest 
source of emissions in the developing countries (emissions from deforestation) 159  was 
excluded160 for the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012.161 Instead, these activities 
were regarded as priority projects to be funded under the adaptation fund with a view to 
addressing drought, desertification and watershed protection, forest conservation, restoration 
of native forest ecosystems, restoration of salinised soils. 162  In addition, LULUCF rules 
limited the total amount of LULUCF CERs that could be obtained in developing countries.163 
In particular, such credits could be used to meet only 1 per cent of a developed country’s 
emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.164 
 
Finally, countries adopted the technical rules for afforestation and reforestation projects under 
the CDM, and thereby completed the last item on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action in the 
Milan meeting.165 The agreement gave developing countries, in particular African nations, 
                                                 
157 Gardi O., Climate Change: Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land-Use (AFOLU) for Addressing Climate 
Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the Latin American and Caribbean Region, Inter-American Development 
Bank (2010) at 35. 
158 UNFCCC Decision 17/CP.7: Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, at paragraph 7(a), reprinted in report of the Conference Of the Parties on its 
seventh session, held at Marrakesh From 29 October To 10 November 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, 21 
January 2002, at 22 para 7 (a). Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf. [accessed 22 June 
2014]. Also see Petsonk A., “Compensated reduction: rewarding the role of forests in climate protection”, 
Climate Change Law and Policy.  
159 Ibid., Petsonk A. 
160 Instead, deforestation and land degradation activities were regarded as priority projects to be funded under 
the adaptation fund with a view to addressing drought, desertification and watershed protection, forest 
conservation, restoration of native forest ecosystems, restoration of salinised soils. See Decision 1/CP.6 (2000), 
Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6/dec1-
cp6.pdf [accessed 1 June 2014]. 
161 Lecocq F. and Ambrosi P., The Clean Development Mechanism: History, Status, and Prospects, (2007) 1:1 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 134–151 at 145.  
162 Decision 1/CP.6 (2000), Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6/dec1-cp6.pdf [accessed 1 June 2014]. 
163 Ibid Lecocq F. and Ambrosi P., (2007), at 146. 
164 Decision 17/CP.7 on “Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism”, FCCC/CP/2001/13/ 
Add.2, paras 7(a) and (b). 
165 Decision 19/CP.9, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, Addendum, Part II: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. II, 13, FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2 (2004). Available: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop9/06a02.pdf [accessed 10 June 2014]. The decision addresses complex issues 
relating to the permanence of sinks by providing for two types of CERs for an afforestation or reforestation 
project activity under the CDM: a temporary CER (tCER), which expires five years after its issue, and a long-
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hope that they could profit from significant forestry opportunities under the CDM. In 
particular, they had been assured that the complicated rules would address the concerns 
relating to monitoring and permanence, and that these rules would allow market access for 
CDM forestry projects. 166  Sadly, the LULUCF activities were de facto barred from the 
market because of their exclusion from the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS).167 This reduced their demand from European firms as well as from non-European 
buyers who feared that LULUCF credits have a lower resale value on the secondary 
market.168 
3.5.5  Exclusion of Avoiding Deforestation and Degradation169 
 
The first reason commonly cited is the high risk of leakage.170 Many environmental groups, 
mainly in Europe, opposed the idea by arguing that that wealthy nations like the USA might 
attempt to “buy their way out” of part of their international obligations to control  the 
growing of inter alia industrial, fossil fuel and automobile emissions, instead of making 
substantial and permanent emission reductions. 171  At the same time, some opponents 
contended that forest conservation was a risky strategy for battling greenhouse gases. This is 
because emission reductions as a result of forest conservation such as a national park could 
lead to a shift of deforestation agents elsewhere and thereby cause leakage.172 The second 
reason related to leakage relates to the difficulties associated with monitoring and 
measurement of carbon emissions from forests with associated baselines establishment, 
                                                                                                                                                        
term CER (lCER), which expires at the end of the crediting period of the project activity. Also see ibid., Soltau 
F., (2009) at 104. 
166 Streck et al., “The role of forests in global climate change: whence we come and where we go” (2006) 82:5 
International Affairs at 871. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid Lecocq F. and Ambrosi P., (2007), at 146.  
169 It should be known upfront that developed contries are obliged to curb deforestation that occurs within their 
territories under the Kyoto Protocol. In particular Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol obliges developed countries 
to include deforestation activities when accounting for emissions and removals from land use, land use change 
and forestry (LULUCF). Also see Stockwell C. et. al., Design a REDD mechanism: the TDERM triptych, 151-
177 at 173 in Benjamin J. et.al., (eds) Climate law and developing countries: Legal and policy challenges for 
the world economy. (2009).  
170 The concept of leakage has been discussed in chapter 2. 
171Laurance W.F., A New Initiative to Use Carbon Trading for Tropical Forest Conservation, (2007) 39:1 
Biotropica, 20–24 at 20-21. Also see Streck et al., The role of forests in global climate change: whence we come 
and where we go” (2006)   82:5 International Affairs at 866. Also see Petsonk A., Compensated Reduction: 
Rewarding the role of forests in climate protection, Legal Working Paper Series on Climate Change Law and 
Policy, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law. Available: 
http://cisdl.org/public/docs/legal/Petsonk%20-%20Compensated%20Reduction.pdf [accessed 1 June 2014]. 
172 Laurance W.F., A New Initiative to Use Carbon Trading for Tropical Forest Conservation, (2007) 39:1 
Biotropica, 20–24 at 21. 
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additionality and non-permanence.173 The final reason cited by Laurance relates to the issue 
of sovereignty. While the USA, Japan, and Canada supported a decision on Article 3.3 
(afforestation, reforestation, deforestation) and 3.4 (agricultural soils and the land-use change 
and forestry categories) as a package critical to the success of the Kyoto Protocol,174 Brazil 
which contains 40 percent of the world’s remaining tropical rain forest, adamantly opposed 
carbon trading to reduce deforestation, and lobbied other developing countries to do the 
same. This opposition as argued indicated that accepting reduced deforestation funds from 
industrial countries could potentially limit their future development options.175 The idea of 
reducing deforestation was proposed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 where some developed 
countries delegates claimed that “forests are, in some respects, a global common; all peoples 
and states have a stake in them.”176 This claim according to Humphreys has no standing in 
international law. 177  In contrast, the principle of sovereignty as invoked by developing 
countries that forests are a sovereign national resource is the strongest claim in international 
law and this was “affirmed in the 1992 Forest Principles, para 1(a))” and 2007 “Non-legally 
binding instrument on all types of forests”.178 
3.6  Genesis and Development of REDD+ in the Negotiations of the 2nd 
Commitment Period: Post-Kyoto Protocol 
3.6.1  Conference of the Parties (COPs) on Climate Change 
COP-11 in Montreal, 2005: REDD+ Proposal  
 
The discussions on how to structure the climate regime after 2012 commenced at COP 11.179 
Subsequently, two separate negotiation processes were therefore established: an Ad Hoc 
                                                 
173 The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories – Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land 
Use, available at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.htm (viewed 30 January 2008) and 
GOFG-GOLD REDD Sourcebook which uses remote sensing to monitor and measure greenhouse gas emissions 
from forests, available at http://www.gofc-gold.uni-jena.de/redd/, cited by Lyster R., The New Frontier of 
Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, (2009) 26:6 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal, 417-456, at 423.  For a discussion on non-permanence, baselines and additionality see 
chapter 2. 
174  International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Available: 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12163e.html [accessed 1 June 2014]. 
175Laurance W.F., A New Initiative to Use Carbon Trading for Tropical Forest Conservation, (2007) 39:1 
Biotropica, 20–24 at 21. 




179 Bodansky D. and Rajamani L., The Evolution and Governance Architecture of the Climate Change Regime. 
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2nd ed, (2016) Forthcoming at 15. 
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open-ended Working Group to consider further commitments for the developed countries 
beyond 2012 under the Kyoto Protocol and a “Dialogue on long-term cooperative action” 
under the FCCC.180 Extensive negotiation, however, began at COP 13 as discussed in the 
next section.181 That said, the point of departure for the REDD+ mechanism was presented at 
COP 9.182 At this time the concept only refered to reducing deforestation (RED), however, 
the scope of the concept was broadened to REDD at COP 13 and REDD+ at COP 15.183 That 
said, the objective of COP 13 was to highlight lessons learned during the intense discussions 
that took place before and during COP 6. It concluded by rejecting project-based 
conservation schemes to climate change mitigation and introduced the concept of 
“compensated reductions”, explicitly referred to a national crediting scheme, with the view to 
reducing the problem of leakage.184 The idea began to gain momentum at COP 11 where 
Papua New Guinea, and the Coalition for Rainforest countries proposed to take part in post-
2012 agreement by undertaking voluntary carbon emission reduction targets to avoid 
deforestation.185 The influence to include REDD+ mechanism in the post-Kyoto agreement 
grew as a growing number of scientists and experts warned that “the time window for 
meeting the objective of the UNFCCC [...] was narrowing, and that [deep] emissions cuts 
were urgently needed.”186 This changed the position of some environmental NGOs who had 
opposed project-based crediting. They realised that if the world is to avert dangerous climate 
change, it would be necessary to figure out a way to address deforestation rather that to 
                                                 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 At this point the focus was to reduce deforestation only. See Santilli M.P. et al., Tropical deforestation and 
the Kyoto protocol. An editorial essay. Climatic Change 71, (2005) 267. Santilli M.P. et al., Tropical 
Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: A New Proposal. Paper Presented at COP 9, UNFCCC, December 2003, 
Milan, Italy. 
183 For an extensive discussion on the development of REDD+ see Pistorius T., From RED to REDD+: the 
evolution of a forest-based mitigation approach for developing countries. (2012) 4:6  Current Opinion in 
Environmental Sustainability, 638. 
184 Karsenty A. et al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental 
Science & Policy at 2. 
185 Holloway A. and Giandomenico E.,Carbon Planet White Paper: The History of REDD Policy, Carbon Planet 
(2009). Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/methods_science/redd/application/pdf/the_history_of_redd_carbon_planet.pdf [accessed 5 
July 2014]. Also see CD REDD Capacity Development for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/methods_science/redd/technical_assistance/training_activities/application/pdf/cd_redd_co
ncept_note.pdf [accessed 5 July 2014]. 
186 Oppenheimer M and. Petsonk A., “Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical origins, recent interpretations,” 
(2005) 73 Climatic Change 195-226, cited by Petsonk A., “Compensated reduction: rewarding the role of 
forests in climate protection”, (2005) Climate Change Law and Policy. 
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continue wrangling over denying credits to small-scale forest conservation projects.187 This 
was complemented by a Brazilian pledge to cut the deforestation rate in the Amazon by more 
than half within a decade.188 Subsequently, this development was welcomed by a number of 
countries, including representatives from the USA legislative branch who were observing the 
talks.189 An observation made here is that Brazil embarked on a new position as it was 
objecting to deforestation during CDM negotiations.  
The change of position by Brazil was largely influenced by Marina Silva who was the 
Brazil's Environment Minister from 2003 to 2008. She was instrumental in reducing 
deforestation in the Amazon to historically low levels – by 60% from 2004 to 2007. 
Subsequently, the earth avoided emissions of 520 million tons of CO2, or ten times Norway’s 
annual emissions.190 This was mainly due to (1) creation of a new protected area which is 
equal to the size of Australia and (2) addressing the concerns of indigenous peoples (this was 
an achievement which was not addressed over thirty (30) years). Subsequently, indigenous 
people’s rights were enshrined within the constitution and empowered indigenous peoples to 
exercise their rights over about 20 percent of Amazon.191 This initiative gave an idea to the 
Brazilian government that it was possible to combat deforestation and continue to develop. 
For reasons explained, Brazil became in favour of including avoiding deforestation towards 
the post-2012 climate change regime.192 Subsequently, the rainforest countries met with a 
member of the USA senate, who informed them that a bipartisan majority of the senate had 
resolved that Congress should enact a program of mandatory, market-based limits and 
incentives to slow, stop and reverse the growth of America’s carbon emissions, and to do so 
in a way that would encourage “comparable action” by developing nations.193 Following this 
stage, the proposal was forwarded to the Subsidiary Body of Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC for further exploration to see how deforestation in 
                                                 
187 Petsonk A., “Compensated reduction: rewarding the role of forests in climate protection”, Climate Change 
Law and Policy. (2005). Available: http://cisdl.org/public/docs/legal/Petsonk%20-
%20Compensated%20Reduction.pdf [accessed 16 July 2014]. 
188 Partlow J., Brazil’s Decision on Deforestation Draws Praise, Washington Post, December 6, (2008), at A09, 
cited by ibid., Soltau F., (2009) at 124. 
189 Ibid Petsonk A., (2005). 
190 The Sophie prize 2009. Available: http://www.sofieprisen.no/Prize_Winners/2009/index.html [accessed 25 
July 2014]. 
191 NepstadD., presentation New America Foundation (2009). 
192 Ibid. 
193 Petsonk A., “Compensated reduction: rewarding the role of forests in climate protection”, Climate Change 
Law and Policy at 8. Available: http://cisdl.org/public/docs/legal/Petsonk%20-
%20Compensated%20Reduction.pdf [accessed 12 July 2014]. 
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developing countries could be incorporated into the climate change negotiations. 194 
Following consideration by the SBSTA and several workshops to address issues in greater 
depth, the idea of reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches 
to stimulate action, was adopted as part of the Bali Action Plan 195  at the UNFCCC 
Conference (COP-13/MOP-3) in Bali, Indonesia.196 
COP-13 in Bali 2007 and COP-14 in Poznan, 2008: Negotiations for a Post-2012 Agreement 
 
The Bali Action Plan launched a parallel track under the UNFCCC to address the post-2012 
period, encompassing all aspects of the climate change issue: mitigation, adaptation, finance 
and technology197 and involved the other big emitters such as the United States, India and 
China. It is well known that these countries do not have emission reduction commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol. However, unlike the previous Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which 
targeted only carbon emission reductions from developed countries, the Bali Action Plan 
focuses on emission reductions from both developed and developing countries. 198  This 
marked the first time developing countries were fully engaged in the climate mitigation 
debate.199 The Bali Action Plan committed both developed and developing countries to begin 
a negotiation process immediately to allow them to adopt a decision at COP 15 on a shared 
vision for long-term cooperative action on climate change. 200  It committed developed 
countries to negotiate a post-Kyoto agreement with “[m]easurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions including quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives,”201 and developing countries to negotiate the Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).202 Finally, the Bali Action Plan committed both 
                                                 
194 Ibid., Holloway A. and Giandomenico E., (2009). 
195 Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held 
in Bali from 3 to 15 December (2007), Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at 
its thirteenth session, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 Mar. 14, (2008). 
196 Ibid., Holloway A. and Giandomenico E., (2009). 
197 Bali Action Plan,Dec.1/CP.13,Dec.14-15, 2007, in COP-13 Report, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, at 3. 
198 Some estimates indicate that developing country carbon emissions will grow so rapidly over the next 20 
years that, even if developed countries were to phase out their greenhouse gas emissions completely, global 
emissions would still be higher in 2030 than today. Project Catalyst, “Limiting Atmospheric CO2e to 450 ppm - 
The Mitigation Challenge,” at 13 (2009) as cited by Bodanski D., W[i]ther the Kyoto Protocol Durban and 
Beyond (2011) at 3. 
199  Willem den Besten J. et. al., The evolution of REDD+: An analysis of discursive institutional dynamics. 
(2014) 35 Environmental Science and Policy 40–48 at 46. 
200 Para 1. Also see Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation. (2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-456 at 4. 
201 Para 1(b) (i). 
202 Para 1(b) (ii). 
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developed and developing countries to negotiate the “[p]olicy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”.203 
NAMAs and REDD+ developments are heralded as a radical shift of developing countries’ 
position as they moved from qualitative commitments under Article 4 (1) of the UNFCCC to 
potentially quantifiable “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” that are “measurable, 
reportable and verifiable”, or MRV. 204  In addition, the Bali Action Plan encourages 
developing countries to undertake a range of actions including REDD+ demonstration 
activities relevant to their national circumstances. At the same time it requested the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to undertake a 
programme of works on methodological issues related to REDD+. The survey of some of the 
key provisions of the Bali Action Plan show how a basis for subsequent negotiations for 
REDD+ and other post-Kyoto commitments was established.  
Parties at the Poznań negotiations endorsed an intensified negotiating schedule for COP 15 
and agreed that the first draft of a negotiating text for a post-2012 agreement would be 
available at a UNFCCC gathering in Bonn in 2009. 205  One of the hallmarks of these 
negotiations in Bali and Poznań was  the addition of degradation, conservation of forest 
carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of carbon stocks 
(collectively referred to as “+”) as a climate change mitigation focus. This expansion of 
activities was initiated by Vanuatu and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. Their argument 
was that such inclusion would allow a more comprehensive coverage of emission reductions 
from the forest sector since degradation is more significant than deforestation in some 
countries.206 However, at the negotiations, it was the Congo Basin countries which were 
vocal and fought successfully for the inclusion of the degradation.207 India pushed for the 
                                                 
203 Para 1(b) (iii). 
204 Ibid., Winkler H., (2008) at 535. Emphasis is mine. 
205 UNFCCC. Available: https://unfccc.int/meetings/poznan_dec_2008/meeting/6314.php, 
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206 Freestone D. and Streck C., Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond. (2009) at 
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negotiation of the conservation, sustainable development of forests, and the enhancement of 
carbon stocks in the Bali negotiations.208 
COP-15 in Copenhagen, 2009: A Non-Binding Agreement Outcome 
 
The COP 15 held in December 2009 in Copenhagen, was initially intended as the end point 
of the said parallel negotiating tracks. Thus many scholarly publications indicated the 
possibility of a new legal agreement (or agreements) at this stage to address the post-2012 
period.209  
A point of departure for the negotiations in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a 
decision at COP 15 began with the negotiation text which was released by the UNFCCC 
secretariat on 19 May 2009. 210  The text proposed a post-2012 agreement legal form to 
consider various options such as a set of COP decisions that would be legally binding 
emanating from the obligations and commitments of the parties under the UNFCCC, a new 
legal instrument or instruments within the framework of the UNFCCC, and a new protocol to 
the UNFCCC for adoption at COP 15.211 Despite these options parties failed to reach a new 
legal agreement at COP 15 and instead agreed on a political agreement named the 
Copenhagen Accord as provided by decision 2/CP.15.212 
One of the striking aspects of the Copenhagen Accord is the bottom-up approach to the 
negotiation of climate change which is fundamentally different architecture than the Kyoto 
Protocol as observed by Bodansky. The author observes that rather than defining emissions 
targets from the top down through international negotiations, the Copenhagen Accord 
establishes a process that allows each party to define its own commitments and actions 
unilaterally.213 This allowed a number of countries to define eligible activities for REDD+. 
Thus, this stage marked the beginning of a flexible and bottom-up approach which was 
followed up in the subsequent COPs. 
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210 FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8 19 May 2009. Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/08.pdf 
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Regarding the issues of distribution of benefits and costs, debates which took place at COP-
15 focused on the issue of Reference Emissions Levels/Reference Levels (REL/RL). Scholars 
such as Angelsen have pointed out that the choice of REL/RL has profound implications for 
both the incentives to participate and distribution of benefits and costs at the international 
level. 214  As countries increased the scope of mitigation of climate change to include 
conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of carbon stocks, the 
issue of reference continued to be debated. The question was whether to use reference levels, 
reference emission levels or both. The final decision that emerged from COP 15 at 
Copenhagen decided to include both phrases.215 Regarding the starting date or period for 
reference emissions, a group of developed countries stressed the role of historical emissions 
from deforestation while many parties stressed the importance of flexibility. 216  A strong 
argument advocating flexibility came from Suriname. In its submission to the UNFCCC on 
technical and institutional capacity-building needs it explained that: 217 
“Simple historical base-lines are not adequate, because they characterize a different 
economic and social dynamic that led to low rates of deforestation; Suriname is now 
embarking on a more dynamic development trajectory and a deliberate strategy to 
increase the exploitation of its natural resources including expansion of agriculture. 
Therefore, Suriname’s reference scenario must be based on a modeled future 
economy and the projected emissions that would occur under a business as usual 
assumption that would normally accompany changes in land-use allocations, 
infrastructure investments, demographic and socio-economic trends, policy and 
enforcement, and any other causal or correlative factors that can be used to infer 
forest cover change with known levels of certainty.”218 
 
With respect to the above issues, a report prepared by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice indicated that REL/RL will entail historical data and if necessary 
adjustments for expected future emission trends in square brackets, indicating that this matter 
                                                 
214  Angelsen A., REDD models and baselines.  (2008) 10:3 International Forestry Review 465 at 471. 
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215 Cited by Wiersema A., Climate Change, Forests, and International Law: REDD’s Descent into Irrelevance. 
(2014) 47:1 Vanderbilt Journal Transnational Law 1 at 50. 
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Technological Advice, Information on Experiences and Views on Needs for Technical and Institutional 
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2009). Cited in Wiersema A., Climate Change, Forests, and International Law: REDD’s Descent into 
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218 UNFCCC: Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbsta/eng/misc02.pdf [accessed 2 July 2013]. 
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was still subject to disagreement among the parties.219 This leaves interpretation of REL/RL 
to be “based on national circumstances and include historical data, socio‐economic factors, 
drivers of deforestation and the national policy context.” 220  The term “national 
circumstances” is not defined and  countries are only just beginning to explore what “national 
circumstances” means for their specific contexts (such as high forest, low deforestation and 
drivers of deforestation).221 All of the subsequent subsections discussing how MRV should 
function and what they should provide have some kind of modifier that maintains a lot of 
flexibility for the developing countries, “although one of these leaves open the possibility of 
more or less oversight by the COP, depending on what the parties agree on in subsequent 
decisions.”222 
 
COP-16: Cancun, 2010: Flexible Bottom-Up Approach and Establishment of MRV System 
 
At COP 16 in Cancun, parties agreed to incorporate the core elements contained in the 
Copenhagen Accord into the official UNFCCC process.223 The Cancun Agreements224 neither 
prescribed the type, nature nor stringency of commitments or contributions to be taken by 
parties nor imposed any informational requirements in relation to these commitments and 
contributions. 225  In this case, Cancun reinforced the paradigm shift (flexible bottom-up 
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approach) which began at COP 15. The challenge for the negotiators is to establish the 
“pillars from which a diversity of bottom-up initiatives can join together and converge 
towards an ever more efficient, fair and self-reinforcing climate regime.”226 
In the context of REDD+, Decision 1/CP.16 incorporated REDD+ activities227 which were 
provided in the draft text on REDD.228 The vital progress made at Cancun relates to the 
substance of and complements the Bali Action Plan. According to the Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin,229 positive outcomes include the establishment of the Green Climate Fund,230 the 
Technology Mechanism 231 and the Cancun Adaptation Framework. 232  The COP 16 also 
agreed upon a phased approach, starting with the development of national strategies.233 The 
REDD+ activities are required to be “[r]esults-based demonstration activities, and evolving 
into results-based actions that should be full measured, reported and verified” in phase 3.234 
However, a number of open questions related to REDD+ were left to be resolved, one of 
them being the respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.235 Other 
unresolved issues include methodological modalities related to the MRV of carbon stocks, 
the monitoring of forests, and the identification of the drivers of deforestation, much of which 
have been tasked to the SBSTA. 236  The legal and institutional arrangement for the 
establishment and operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund has in the meantime been 
finalised and was recommended for approval at COP 17.237 
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COP-17 in Durban, 2011: Negotiations for a Post-2020 Agreement 
 
The Durban Platform, “…decide[d] to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all 
Parties…”.238 This outcome “represents a finely balanced compromise among the principal 
negotiating groups in the UN climate change process.” 239  The European Union (EU), 
supported by least-developed countries and small-island developing countries, demanded a 
fast-start mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument engaging all parties, as a 
condition for its agreement to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.240 The 
USA insisted that it would accept a mandate to negotiate such instrument only if the mandate 
was "symmetrical" in its application to all parties.241 Similarly, China and India also made 
their demands. China said that it would not accept legal commitments before 2020 while 
India resisted the EU's demands for a new legally-binding instrument.242 
Accordingly, the Durban Platform made no reference to developed, developing, Annex I, or 
non-Annex I parties. Instead, it established a uniform single negotiation category which 
addresses developed and developing parties together, rather than dividing the negotiations 
into two categories, as established by the Bali Action Plan.243 The implication of the Durban 
Platform for the REDD+ mechanism is the departure from the conception of REDD+ as 
“policy approaches and positive incentives …” as stressed by the Bali Action Plan.244 The 
wording “positive incentives” has been interpreted by many parties to imply a full 
compensation to developing countries.245 Thus REDD+ is no longer perceived predominantly 
as a system of payments from developed to developing countries for reduced forest 
emissions. Instead it is perceived as a shared responsibility to some extent.246 At least two 
factors define the change: the pledges made by many middle income countries and their 
national low-carbon strategies (which also incorporate REDD+) are currently being 
developed for reducing emissions as compared to a business as usual scenario, and the 
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concern that international mechanisms are unlikely to be able to fully compensate developing 
countries for REDD+ costs.247 
COP-18 in Doha, 2012, COP-19 in Warsaw 2013, and COP-20 in Lima, 2014: Flexible 
Bottom-Up Approach and Top-Down Approach 
 
Parties chose not to address the legal aspect of the 2015 agreement at subsequent COPs in 
Doha, Warsaw and Lima.248 However, preparations to achieve such objective began at COP 
19 where parties created the building blocks of the post-2020 agreement. 249  Indeed, the 
Warsaw decision includes a strong bottom-up element, inviting parties to communicate their 
“Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs) before the COP 21 in Paris.250 The 
term “contributions” in this call has been a subject of intense debate both at a scholarly level 
and at UN negotiations. Some scholars argue that “since the term ‘contributions’ is not 
qualified by ‘mitigation,’ contributions could take the form of adaptation, finance, technology 
transfer or capacity building contributions.”251 At the UN negotiations, the authors note that 
the COP 19 decision does not resolve this issue and by default leaves the scope of 
contributions to be a subject of national determination.252 The only attempt made by the COP 
19 decision to resolve this issue is the encouragement of parties to consider including an 
adaptation component in their contributions and a call to specify the information about their 
contributions to ensure “clarity, transparency, and understanding.”253 The authors consider 
this call to be the beginning of a top-down component to balance the bottom-up element.254 
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In the context of REDD+, COP 19 produced a series of decisions on REDD+ collectively 
known as the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. These decisions provided the basic blueprint 
for the progress of REDD+ in seven areas namely: finance, coordination of financial 
arrangements, forest reference emission levels, national forest monitoring systems, 
verification, transparency and safeguards, and drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. 
However, significant progress is still needed in all of these areas specifically a clear 
articulation of sources of funding for REDD+.255 At COP 20, debate in the context of NDCs 
did not resolve the question on whether and how forestry and land use will be part of the 
post-2020 climate regime.256 This is perhaps because the COP 20 was intended to prepare a 
draft text to be used as a basis for negotiations leading up to the COP 21 in Paris.257 
COP-21 in Paris, 2015: The Paris Agreement with a Hybrid Governance Approach 
 
Pursuant to the Durban Platform, the parties to the UNFCCC reached an agreement 
(hereinwith the Paris Agreement) with legal force under the UNFCCC and applicable to all 
parties. 258  The Paris Agreement obliges parties to prepare, communicate and maintain 
successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) with the aim of achieving the 
objectives of the UNFCCC.259 The contents of NDCs are expressed in various articles as 
follows: mitigation actions, the global goal on adaptation, financial resources for both 
mitigation and adaptation, technology development and transfer, capacity-building activities 
and an enhanced transparency framework for action and support.260 
The mitigation actions and financial resources provisions are further elaborated here as they 
have direct bearing on REDD+. Thus in the context of mitigation actions, the Paris 
Agreement calls for developed countries’ NDCs to be “economy-wide absolute emission 
reduction targets.”261 At the same time, it encourages developing countries’ NDCs to “move 
over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of 
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different national circumstances.”262 The REDD+ mechanism which is already agreed in the 
COP decisions discussed above is repeated in the Paris Agreement.263 This repetition means 
REDD+ activities can be accounted for in the NDCs. The Paris Agreement also obliges 
developed country parties to provide financial and other assistance to developing countries.264 
Such resources can arise from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels. 265 
Likewise, other parties are encouraged to provide such support on a voluntary basis.266 These 
provisions can be seen as a platform for financing REDD+ mechanism.  
In addition, the Paris Agreement provides advancement of the already legal requirement to 
report by specifying the details on what has to be reported after “every five years”.267 With 
regards to “mitigation actions” expressed above, parties are obliged to provide the following 
information:268 
(a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice methodologies accepted 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement; 
(b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its 
nationally determined contribution under Article 4.269 
Likewise, the obligation to provide information on the NDCs is inscribed. In particular, 
developed country parties are obliged to provide quantitative and qualitative information on 
financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing 
countries, 270  while other parties that provide support are encouraged to provide such 
information.271 Such information must be in accordance with the modalities, procedures and 
guidelines to be adopted by the COP.272 In the same breath, developing country parties are 
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required to provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building 
support needed and received.273 
The Agreement also establishes an enhanced transparency framework for action and support 
with built-in flexibility which takes into account parties’ different capacities.274 The purpose 
of such framework is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action in the light of 
the objective of the UNFCCC, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving 
parties’ individual NDCs.275 The framework will be “implemented in a facilitative, non-
intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue 
burden on [p]arties.”276 To this end, the Paris Agreement can be seen to establish both the 
bottom-up governance approach to determine the NDCs and a “top-down MRV 
governance”.277  
3.6.2  Conference of the Parties (COPs) on Biodiversity 
 
The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
hereinafter (CBD COP) like the UNFCCC COP/MOP is empowered to “[c]ontact, through 
the Secretariat, the executive bodies of conventions dealing with matters covered by [the 
CBD] with a view to establishing appropriate forms of cooperation with them.”278 Pursuant to 
this mandate, the CBD COP adopted a number of decisions on biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable use and climate change and adaptation and mitigation.279 These decisions have 
been instrumental in highlighting biodiversity concerns in UNFCCC COP decisions,280 but 
have not yet led to strong references to biodiversity in the climate regime’s decisions on 
forests.281 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to survey some of the attempts to include forests in 
climate change mitigation. 
In 2008, the CBD COP officially sanctioned climate change as a cross-cutting issue within 
the convention and subsequently requested that climate change considerations be integrated 
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into each CBD program of work, where relevant and appropriate.282And the CBD COP 9 
encouraged the continuation of “activities that were already ongoing or had been called for by 
parties in the framework of the Rio Conventions”, and provided an “indicative list of 
activities by parties to promote synergies among the Rio Conventions”. 283A particularly 
divisive issue in the context of CBD COP 10’s decision on biodiversity and climate change 
was the call for an increased and more programmatic institutional interaction among the Rio 
Conventions, and mainly between the CBD and the UNFCCC, given that the CBD already 
has a joint work programme with the UNCCD.284 
 
Certain CBD parties, however, objected to the proposed joint work programme and in 
particular the proposal to establish a clear substantive mandate for the CBD on biodiversity-
related climate change issues.285 In their view, this approach would compromise the delicate 
bargaining for a post-2012 international climate change regime by exporting issues which are 
still under negotiation at the UNFCCC to a setting where other substantive elements of the 
climate change negotiations are not addressed at all. 286  Subsequently, CBD state parties 
decided to abandon substantive discussions on a proposed joint work programme among the 
Rio Conventions, and instead focus on the procedural steps towards ensuring that the 
governing bodies of each of the three conventions agreed to such an approach.287 
 
Eventually, the CBD COP requested the CBD Secretariat to develop a “proposal to develop 
joint activities between the Rio Conventions to their Secretariats.”288 At this point COP 10 
began to develop procedural steps towards the further discussion of possible joint 
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activities.289 It called upon the COPs of the UNFCCC and UNCCD to collaborate with the 
CBD Secretariat, through the Joint Liaison Group, by considering the proposed elements on 
joint activities on climate change, biodiversity, land degradation, and ecosystem-based 
approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation. 290  The collaboration was also 
intended to explore the possibility of convening a joint preparatory meeting among the Rio 
Conventions on possible joint activities.291 The decision also points towards the discussion of 
the joint activities in the context of the preparatory process leading to the Rio+20 Summit.292 
3.7  The place of REDD+ in the International Climate Change Regime 
The provision to repeat REDD+ in the Paris Agreement (see the COP 21 discussion above) 
resolves the question of the place of the REDD+ mechanism in the post-2020 climate change 
regime.293 This is so because REDD+ can be incorporated in the NDCs activities.294 Before 
expounding on the importance and implications of this interpretation, the reader is directed to 
Lyster’s observation. She noted that most countries have been waiting to see how the REDD+ 
mechanism is incorporated in the overall climate change agreement before deciding whether 
to incorporate REDD offsets in their emissions trading schemes.295 The unavoidable question 
has been when to classify REDD+ as either an offset or non-offset mechanism and the 
conditions attached to either classification. The Paris Agreement provides part of the answer 
to this question with regards to implementation of NDCs. In particular, it provides that parties 
can choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their NDCs.296 To do so, 
the agreement establishes a mechanism which is to be supervised by a body designated by the 
COP. Such mechanism aims:297 
a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable 
development;  
b) To incentivise and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions by public and private entities authorised by a Party;  
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c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit 
from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by 
another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and  
d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions. 
 
Article 6 (5) of the Paris Agreement further provides that emission reductions resulting from 
the above aims can “not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host party’s [NDC] if 
used by another party to demonstrate achievement of its [NDC].”298 It follows that, in the 
event that a REDD+ mechanism is implemented under these conditions, it means that 
REDD+ is an offset mechanism similar to the CDM mechanism (CDM is discussed in section 
3.5.3 above). The extent to which REDD+ can be used by another party to demonstrate 
achievement of its NDC is yet to be determined. This aspect is likely to be determined by the 
upcoming COP sessions, parties concerned or the body which will oversee the voluntary 
cooperation with the view to generating emission reductions for the offset purpose. Another 
interpretation implicitly suggested by article 6 (5) of the Paris Agreement is that if REDD+ is 
implemented outside these conditions, it means that REDD+ is a non-offset mechanism.  
Given the above context, the legal nature of the Paris Agreement both for developed and 
developing countries draws from the UNFCCC rather than from the Kyoto Protocol. Under 
the UNFCCC, all countries have a general obligation to mitigate climate change. In the 
context of the CDM the UNFCCC provides a legal obligation for Annex I parties to provide 
“information necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments…” under the 
guidance of COP.299 In the context of developing countries, the UNFCCC’s core obligation is 
to  provide information on a general description of the national circumstances and 
institutional arrangements; emissions and removals of GHGs through the national inventory; 
steps taken or envisaged by the non-Annex I party to mitigate climate change and any other 
additional information relevant to the achievement of the objective of the Convention.300 As 
alluded to above, the Paris Agreement does not establish a new legal obligation to report. 
However, the legal point made here is that the Paris Agreement goes beyond the UNFCCC by 
providing more specific aspects to be reported by its signatories. These elements relate to 
                                                 
298Article 6 (5) of the Paris Agreement. 
299 Article 7. 
300 United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Handbook on Measurement, Reporting and Verification for 
Developing Country Parties (2014). 
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mitigation and adaptation actions, and their respective financial aspects, capacity-building 
activities and technology development and transfer. 
3.8  Conclusion 
The materials covered in this chapter reflect three concerns that also inform the chapters that 
follow. First, the Earth Summit marked the early attempt of mostly developed countries and 
other stakeholders to broaden the scope of binding commitments to developing countries 
through either forest protocol or convention. In turn, developing forest countries rejected such 
proposals since they were not accompanied by substantial financial transfer and capacity 
building to help address poverty as the main cause of deforestation. Second, the chapter has 
described the implementation of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol through 
its three flexible mechanisms. Among the flexible mechanisms, CDM has been the main 
focus as it is the only mechanism available for the developing countries’ mitigation activities. 
It has also been found that the emission reductions targets imposed by the Kyoto Protocol 
have not been ambitious enough to meet the overall objective of the UNFCCC. Furthermore 
even though the Kyoto Protocol provides for avoided deforestation as part of mitigation 
measures, the detailed implementation rules of CDM have precluded the avoided 
deforestation and degradation from receiving carbon credits. Reasons cited include: the lack 
of permanence and high risk of leakage since the CDM activities are implemented at a project 
level. The negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period began by facing 
the pressures to have deep emissions. This situation saw the beginning of a negotiation of the 
REDD+ mechanism which is now repeated in the Paris Agreement to be implemented from 
2020. Third, the above discussion has discussed the place and legal nature of the REDD+ 
mechanism. The chapter has argued that the place of the REDD+ mechanism must be 
considered within the broader framework of the international climate change regime. The 
international climate change regime has a hybrid governance (or pledge-and-review) 301 
approach. This is to say that on the one hand, countries are responsible for pledging how to 
prepare and implement the elements of the NDC and on the other hand, these elements are 
subjected to top-down review processes. Thus developing countries implementing the 
REDD+ mechanism face different sets of compliance questions. These are inter alia 
reporting on forest carbon stock changes and to provide information on financial, technology 
                                                 
301  Neto E.R., Beyond 2015: Exploring the Future of Global Climate Governance. Conference Paper - 
Amsterdam, November 20, (2014) at 11-12. 
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transfer and capacity-building support needed and received. In order to comply with these 
procedural requirements in line with positive incentive requirements, a wide set of legal and 
institutional approaches may have to be undertaken by developing countries. These are inter 
alia conventional matters of improving forest conservation protection and assessment and 
new ways of looking at property ownership, land use, forest management and forest 
inventories and social and environmental impact. To this end, the legal nature of REDD+ is 
likely to be only procedural in nature.302 Apart from the main international climate change
regime, other initiatives have been attempting to raise other aspects in the climate change 
mitigation. A reference to be made here is the initiatives which were advocated by the COP 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity as indicated above as well as other voluntary 
initiatives discussed in chapter 4. Given the hybrid governance approach of the international 
climate change regime, the question that arises relates to the emerging system which 
determines the scope and activities to be undertaken and regulated at a domestic level. This is 
the subject of discussion of the next chapter. 
302 Robles F.F., Forest Carbon Tenure in Asia-Pacific: A comparative analysis of legal trends to define carbon 
rights in Asia-Pacific. FAO Legal Papers Online No. 89 (2012) at 7. 
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Chapter Four: 
REDD+ as Self-Regulatory System 
4.1    Introduction 
The critical question in this chapter is to explore what is meant by REDD+. Admittedly, a 
number of studies have already discussed this aspect. REDD+ is linked with different 
concepts such as Green Economy1 and can be undertaken as part of Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Action (NAMA).2 Scholars have also considered REDD+ to be a performance-
based aid,3 as an investable asset,4 as a form of governance,5 REDD+ as a new form of power
1 Watson C. et. al., Integrating REDD+ into a green economy transition: Opportunities and challenges. Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), (2013) at 10. 
2 “The UNFCCC negotiations have defined different approaches to NAMA MRV depending on the type of 
NAMA planned. Unilateral NAMAs are subject to domestic MRV, in accordance with general international 
guidelines; while supported NAMAs are subject to national and international MRV. Credited NAMAs are not 
officially defined by the UNFCCC but will likely be subject to the most stringent MRV since the validity of any 
credits will need to be verified.” Also it should be stressed that “countries in favor of keeping REDD+ emission 
reductions domestically to be counted towards national efforts rather than offsets to be sold internationally 
would prefer REDD+ to be included as a NAMA. Contenders of this view include large developing countries 
such as Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil, but also smaller countries such as Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Tuvalu.” See Costenbader J. et. al, NAMAs and REDD+: Relationship and main 
issues for consideration -with a focus on Southeast Asia. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit  (GIZ), (2013) at 10 and 16. The choice here implies a different approach on the allocation of 
carbon rights ownership as seen in chapter 5. 
3 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. WIDER 
Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013). 
4 Laing T. et. al., Understanding the demand for REDD+ credits. The Centre for Climate Change Economics 
and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, (2015) at 2. Available: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Working-Paper-193-Laing-et-al.pdf 
[accessed 15 June 2014]. 
Also see, Sukhdev P. et. al., REDD+ and a Green Economy: Opportunities for a mutually supportive 
relationship. UN-REDD Programme Policy Brief #01. (Undated) at 2. 
5 This is due to the presence of multiple actors and interests involved. As such this represents an example of the 
notion of “governance beyond government” in managing natural resources, including the forest sector. See 
Somorin O.A. et.al., REDD+ policy strategy in Cameroon: Actors, institutions and governance. Environmental 
Science and Policy 35 (2014) 87-97 at 89. These authors also add that this means that we should acknowledge 
there are multiple interests and actors with stakes in forests; multiple forest ecosystem services or outcomes 
(carbon, livelihoods and biodiversity); differentiated management systems; intricately complex drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation; and unresolved methodological issues (additionality, leakage, and 
permanence) ibid at 90. Also see Buizer M. et.al., Climate change and deforestation: The evolution of an 
intersecting policy domain. (2014), Environmental Science and Policy, 35, 1–11 at 5 who argue that REDD+ is 
a dynamic and emerging form of governance where more rules are almost certain to emerge through 
negotiations between existing and possible new actors within the donor community, environmental NGOs and 
indigenous peoples. These rules will vary from country to country. Therefore the question that follows is what 
policy-makers should consider to be an ideal legal and policy framework for REDD+ which will also take into 
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and knowledge constituted by a complex interplay of actors and practices across scales rather 
than a top-down process involving hierarchically nested governance arrangements, 6 
neoliberal environmental governance, 7  processes of “inclusive” neoliberal conservation, 8 
polycentric programmes,9 (global) environmental governance,10 regimes11 and a multi-level 
Payment of Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme.12 But each of these framings has its own 
validity in terms of mobilising efforts to govern the implementation of REDD+ activities. At 
the same time, each framing can lead to a distinctive emphasis and choice of policy 
instruments. The chapter argues that REDD+ should be seen as a “self-regulation system”. 
This view of REDD+ as a self-regulatory system allows one to perceive REDD+ beyond 
solely as a mechanism to offset emissions and the incentives that come with it. Viewed as 
such can help us to design tools (consciously rather than accidentally) to regulate self-
                                                                                                                                                        
account the seemingly vast and rapid growing body of rules for implementing REDD+. This thesis has argued 
that a reflexive REDD+ legal framework holds that potential (discussed in detail in chapters 8 and 9). 
6 McGregor A. et.al., Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia. (2015) 47 
Environment and Planning,138–155 at 139-40. 
7 Scheba A., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+): The costs and benefits 
of neoliberal forest-carbon conservation. Institute for Development Policy & Management, University of 
Manchester, UK at 4. 
8 Scheba A., Commodifying forest carbon: How local power, politics and livelihood practices shape REDD+ in 
Lindi Region, Tanzania. PhD Thesis, University of Manchester (2014) at 189. Available: 
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-
scw:234415&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF [accessed 15 June 2014]. 
9 Long A., REDD+, Adaptation, and Sustainable Forest Management: Toward Effective Polycentric Global 
Forest Governance. (2012)  Tropical Conservation Science, Forthcoming at 32. Boyd W., Climate Change, 
Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage. 
(2014), 32:2 Journal of International Law, 457 at 512–13. The author describes REDD+ as part of a post-
Copenhagen legal assemblage which is a form of polycentric governance. Others argue that “Polycentric 
approaches to track forest change hold great scope for the effective implementation of programs such as 
REDD+.” And that Polycentric forest governance may also “alleviate concerns about the distribution of 
financial incentives through programs such as REDD and REDD+”. Nagendra H. and Ostrom E., Polycentric 
Governance of Multifunctional Forested Landscapes. (2012) 6:2 International Journal of the Commons 104–
133 at 123. 
10 Thompson  M. C. et. al., Seeing REDD+ as a project of environmental governance. (2011) 14 Environmental 
Science & Policy 100–110 at 102-105. See also Angelsen A. (ed)., Realising REDD+ National strategy and 
policy options. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia, (2009). Mustalahti I and Rakotonarivo S., REDD+ benefit sharing 
mechanisms: Does it make a difference in equity? In Toppinen A. et. al. (eds)., Proceedings of the Biennial 
Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics. Hyytiälä, Finland, (2012) at 115.  
11 Young M.A., REDD+ and Interacting Legal Regimes. Human Rights, Environmental Sustainability, Post-
2015 Development, and the Future Climate Regime.  Prepared for the 3rd UNITAR-Yale Conference on 
Environmental Governance and Democracy, 5-7 September (2014), New Haven, USA at 2. By categorising 
REDD+ in this way, the author means REDD+ is a “sets of norms, decision-making procedures and 
organizations coalescing around functional issue-areas and dominated by particular modes of behaviour, 
assumptions and biases.” 
12  Corbera E., Problematizing REDD+ as an Experiment in Payments for Ecosystem Services. (2012) 4 
Environmental Sustainability, 612–619 at 612. Bond I. et.al, Incentives to sustain forest ecosystem services: A 
review and lessons for REDD. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) (2009) at 15-16. 
Available: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/13555IIED.pdf [accessed 5 June 2014]. Also see Loft L. et. al., Taking 
Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. (2015) 6, Forests, 1031-1060 
at 1032. Available: http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/6/4/1031[accessed 12 June 2014]. 
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regulation so as to implement REDD+ activities as discussed in chapter 8. As pointed out in 
chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is on identification of the ideal model legislative 
framework sufficient to implement REDD+. Therefore, in discussing the meaning of 
REDD+, the analysis is limited to its regulatory aspect and implications thereof. To regulate 
well, regulators must ask (1) what is the subject of regulation, (2) who is the object of 
regulation and (3) what is a feasible regulatory architecture. Thus the chapter proceeds by 
exploring the concept of REDD+ by discussing the technical and regulatory-related aspects of 
preparing, consulting and standard setting, and communicating these contributions. The 
argument that REDD+ should be seen as a “self-regulation system” arises out of the core idea 
that REDD+ is based on incentives. The manner in which such incentives are entrenched and 
regulated reveals characteristics similar to “self-regulation” discussed by Julia Black 
(elaborated on in the next section). The chapter extends the analysis of self-regulation from 
different disciplines to the study of REDD+. It examines how multiple actors are engaging to 
implement  REDD+. In their approaches, such actors develop inter alia a number of 
principles and strategies. The realisation of these strategies and principles relies on various 
categories of self‐regulation as discussed in section 4.2.2. The chapter concludes by 
recognising some of the challenges of self-regulatory governance in terms of achieving the 
3Es. 
4.2   Self-Regulation 
4.2.1   Introduction 
 
Self-regulation is exhibited in different places.  Ants, for example, work in a completely self-
organised and mainly in a decentralised fashion without a hierarchical structure of command 
and control. The same applies to social animals such as flocks of birds, termites, and schools 
of fish. The ecological and immune systems also function in a decentralised and highly 
efficient way, due to the evolutionary principles of mutation and selection.13 Other examples 
are discerned from insurance, professions (such as medical), sports, the press, advertising and 
financial services, and illegal and harmful Internet content which are regulated to a large 
extent by self-regulatory bodies. In regulating such services, these bodies may become 
significant sources of law and policies.14 But self-regulation is a fuzzy concept due to many 
                                                 
13 Helbing D., Economics 2.0: The Natural Step towards a Self-Regulating, Participatory Market Society. (2013) 
10:1 Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review 3–41 at 5. 
14 Black, J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 26. See also Baldwin 
R. et. al., Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. 2nd ed (2012) at 137. Self-regulation 
approaches have also being used in environmental law. See self-regulatory initiatives in relation to addressing 
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possible forms of self-regulation.15 Often, self-regulation is used interchangeably with other 
concepts.16 In some cases, the term has been used uniformly but the meanings which are 
attributed to the term “self-regulation” vary greatly.17 For the purpose of this thesis, I suggest 
it is important to ask what is meant by “self-regulation” in the context of “decentring 
regulation” or “regulation in many rooms” as discussed by Black.18 This is because these 
concepts to some extent reflect the picture of REDD+ as this chapter attempts to demonstrate. 
4.2.2   Understanding Self-Regulation 
 
Before further discussion on self-regulation, it is important to briefly discuss what is meant 
by decentring. According to Black (one of the leading analysts of this scholarly 
development), decentring is a term used to describe changes occurring with government and 
administration with the view to express the removal of the government from the conceptual 
hierarchy of government-society, and move to a hierarchical relationship in which the role of 
governors and governed are both shifting and ill-defined.19 This process is similar to the New 
Governance paradigm which departs from “the traditional top-down model of regulation, in 
which the power to create rules belongs exclusively to the [government] (also known as 
monocentric model), [and] is being replaced by a more flexible “governance” model (also 
known as polycentric model),20 in which power to set and enforce the rules is increasingly 
diffused among a variety of societal actors working alongside the governments.” 21  As 
                                                                                                                                                        
Internet child pornography. Akdeniz  Y., Internet Child Pornography and the Law: National and International 
Responses (2008) at 247. Brousseau É., Internet Regulation: Does Self-Regulation Require an Institutional 
Framework? Paper to be presented at the DRUID Summer Conference on "Industrial Dynamics of the New and 
Old Economy - who is embracing whom?" Copenhagen/Elsinore 6-8 June (2002). 
15 Gunningham N. and Rees J., Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective. (1997) 19:4 Law & Policy 
364 at 366. 
16 These include inter alia: “self-governance”, “co-regulation”, “voluntarism”, “private regulation”, “soft law”, 
“quasi-regulation”, “communitarian regulation”, “polycentric governance”, “noddle governance”, and “adaptive 
governance”. Sovacool B.K., An international comparison of four polycentric approaches to climate and energy 
governance. (2011) 39 Energy Policy 3832–3844 at 3833. See also Omarova S.T., Wall Street as community of 
fate: Toward financial industry self-regulation. (2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 411 at 424. 
17  Black, J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. The Modern Law Review (1996) 24-55 at 26. Black, J., 
“Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ 
World” (2001) 54:1  Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 121. See also Harlow C. and Rawlings R., Law and 
Administration. 3rd ed (2010) at 324-325. 
18 Black J., Proceduralisation and Polycentric Regulation. (2005) 1 Especial  99-130 at 103. 
19 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 104. 
20 These two models are discussed in chapter 8. 
21 For a discussion of the emerging New Governance model, see Lobel O., The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342. 
For a recent analysis of the multidisciplinary scholarship on New Governance, see Burris S. et. al., Changes in 
Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1. See Black, 
J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ 
World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146. 
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discussed in section 4.5.1 below, the concept of REDD+ displays both the attributes of self-
regulation and decentring regulation. It is argued that the former is seen as a means to ensure 
the latter. In answering what role is assigned to self-regulation in ensuring decentring 
regulation, Black indicates that the role assigned to self-regulation in the process of 
decentring can be viewed twofold: first, self-regulation is seen as the solution to the limits of 
“centred” regulation, and secondly, self-regulation is the challenge that has to be addressed. 
That is to say that regulation of self-regulation is the new challenge that has to be 
addressed.22 Examples of self-regulating systems include microfinance, internet content, and 
technology diffusion.23 Thus, we can now discuss what is meant by self-regulation. 
What makes regulation “self-regulation” is not easy to recognise.24 One set of definitions 
assumes that self-regulation is a process of collective government. It “describes the situation 
of a group of persons or bodies, acting together, performing a regulatory function in respect 
of themselves and others who accept their authority.”25 For many, it is that regulation is 
voluntarily initiated, whether on a unilateral, bilateral or collective basis, and that the 
jurisdiction of any enforcer is voluntarily submitted to, which is the hallmark of “pure” self-
regulation.26 Others associate self-regulation with soft law or bilateral agreements entered 
into between government and a particular firm or firms with voluntary efforts to reduce 
carbon. 27  A distinction is also made where self-regulation is labeled in a variety of 
arrangements in which associations or individuals may retain authority to make rules and to 
monitor and enforce them, but which involve different relationships with government. 
Therefore, they have broadly identified four types of possible relationships: “mandated self-
                                                 
22 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 104. For challenges and prospects of self-
regulation see Harlow C. and Rawlings R., Law and Administration. 3rd ed (2010) at 324-325. With regards to 
the prospects, a number of cost-effective measures are outlined. Among the challenges, the authors points out 
that there is a danger of self-interest being put ahead of the public interest, the organisations involved in 
enforcement may not be open and transparent about their processes and outcomes. Akdeniz Y., Internet Child 
Pornography and the Law: National and International Responses (2008) at 248. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Self-regulation may have certain disadvantages in the sense that self-regulatory practices or schemes may not 
apply to those who are not members of a particular initiative. This could potentially lead to partial coverage and 
a lack of wider standards for the sector concerned, and to a distortion of the market with non-members not 
following the self-regulatory rules and codes of practice. It is also possible that standards in practice may vary 
amongst those participating. 
23 Ghose J.R., What does it mean to regulate? A review of epistemological frameworks and their application 
within the Indian context. See also Lessig L., Code: Version 2.0. (2006). 
24 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 116. 
25 Black, J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 27. 
26 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 116. 
27 Ibid at 116-17. 
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regulation, in which a collective group, an industry or profession for example, is required or 
designated by the government to formulate and enforce norms within a framework defined by 
the government, usually in broad terms; sanctioned self-regulation, in which the collective 
group itself formulates the regulation, which is then subjected to government approval; 
coerced self-regulation, in which the industry itself formulates and imposes regulation but in 
response to threats by the government that if it does not the government will impose statutory 
regulation; and voluntary self-regulation, where there is no active state involvement, direct or 
indirect, in promoting or mandating self-regulation.”28 The question that follows is: under 
what category can REDD+ be conceptualised? The answer to this question in section 4.5.1 
indicates that REDD+ does not neatly fit neatly into distinctions of self-regulatory systems 
discussed here. Rather it displays both aspects of voluntary29 and coerced self-regulatory 
measure. Other variables could be built into the above explanation. These include collective 
self-regulation that could take the form of consumer or community representatives such as 
rulemaking with communities. Also self-regulation “could be 'verified' self-regulation, in 
which third parties are responsible for monitoring compliance (auditors, NGOs, others); or 
'accredited' self-regulation, in which rules and compliance are accredited by another non-
governmental body (e.g. technical committee).”30 
Self-regulation is triggered by incentives.31 But what is understood by incentives must be 
clarified. In discussing incentives, it is important to point out positive and negative incentives 
that can trigger self-regulation. The positive incentives “consist of rewards for superior 
                                                 
28  Black, J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 27. See also  
Gunningham N. and Rees J., Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective. (1997) 19:4 Law & Policy 
364 at 365. Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 118. Senn M., Non-state regulatory 
regimes: understanding  institutional transformation. (2010) at 110, 148. 
29 Arthurs has pointed out that the use of the term “voluntary” to describe codes requires some explanation. 
“They are typically adopted without compulsion of law; thus in a juridical sense they are indeed voluntary. But 
in a practical sense, they are generally less so. They are often adopted only after a corporation has been accused 
of exploiting or abusing its workers, either at home or abroad. Adverse publicity ensues, and the corporation is 
confronted by threats of moral, economic or political sanctions such as consumer boycotts, sympathetic 
industrial action, denial of government loans and procurement contracts, or (infrequently) legislation barring its 
goods from market. If these threats are deemed credible, the corporation must respond. One response is to adopt 
a ‘code’ which declares its commitment to respect fundamental labour rights such as freedom of association, a 
safe work environment and the absence of coercion and discrimination.” See Arthurs H., Corporate Self-
Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law, in Estlund C. and Bercusson B. 
(eds.), Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation. New Challenges, New Institutions. (2008) at 21. 
30 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 119. 
31 Omarova S.T., Wall Street as community of fate: Toward financial industry self-regulation. (2011) 159 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 411 at 455. The author discusses the incentives for the emergence of a 
system of embedded self-regulation in the financial services sector. The author contends that the financial 
services industry currently lacks meaningful incentives to develop self-regulation which is more publicly 
minded and socially responsible. 
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performance.”32 With reference to Smith’s line of thinking, one could say that the objective 
of positive incentives is to reinforce or increase something which the target entities find 
pleasant.33 Such incentives are usually cash payments or other direct money transfer.34 Non-
monetary positive incentives generally entail recognition of exemplary behavior and may 
result in economic benefits. 35  These include, for example, awarding the provider a 
competitive advantage in attracting new investors.36 Positive incentive systems are referred to 
in the COP decisions.37 It should be noted that climate change negotiators, policy-makers and 
stakeholders from developed and developing countries have “investigated whether positive 
incentives are more than just a slogan, whether they can be designed in such a way as to 
advance international climate change negotiations and if so, determining the optimum 
conditions to achieve them.”38 The negative incentives consist of punitive measures. They are 
usually embedded in command and control.39 That approach is intended to force individuals 
or countries to obey the demands issued by more powerful or influential actors. The next 
sections discuss REDD+ as self-regulatory governance. The discussion begins by analysing 
REDD+ within the UNFCCC followed by a discussion of REDD+ outside the UNFCCC 
process. 
4.3    REDD+ within the UNFCCC Process 
The REDD+ within the UNFCCC focuses on a mechanism negotiated by states at 
international level under the banner of the UNFCCC. 
4.3.1   What is being Regulated? 
 
The main object of regulation in REDD+ within the UNFCCC process is on reducing and 
control of carbon by avoiding deforestation and degradation, conservation of forest carbon 
stocks, sustainable management of forest and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. This is 
                                                 
32 Geron S.M., Regulating the Behavior of Nursing Homes Through Positive Incentives: An Analysis of Ilinois' 
Quality Incentive Program (QUIP). (1991) 31:3 The Cerontologist 292-301 at 292. 
33 Smith K.W. and Stalans L.J., Encouraging tax compliance with positive incentives: A conceptual framework 
and research directions. (1991) 13 Law & Pol'y 35 at 37. 
34 Geron S.M., Regulating the Behavior of Nursing Homes Through Positive Incentives: An Analysis of Ilinois' 
Quality Incentive Program (QUIP). (1991) 31:3 The Cerontologist 292-301 at 292. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Such as FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Cancun Decision which refers to “positive incentives on issues relating to 
[REDD+]”. 
38 http://aei.pitt.edu/9414/2/9414.pdf. 
39 At a domestic level, command and control means “regulation by the state through the use of legal rules 
backed by (often criminal) sanctions.” Black J., Proceduralisation and Polycentric Regulation. (2005) 1 Especial 
99-130 at 102. Available: http://direitosp.fgv.br/sites/direitosp.fgv.br/files/rdgv_esp01_p099_130.pdf [accessed 
12 June 2014]. 
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the initial idea and it is the point of greatest agreement.40 Skutsch and Torres have pointed out 
the object of regulation according to three types. Type 1 relates to the activities to be 
developed within the forests. Type 2 relates to activities to be developed outside forests41 
while type 3 involves general policies.42 Skutsch and Torres discuss how all of these types of 
activities increase the costs and the scope of beneficiaries more than previous thought. They 
also point out that implementers of REDD+ within type 1 can be able to estimate their costs 
and therefore be able to claim the appropriate benefits. By the same token, implementers in 
types 2 and 3 are faced with difficulties in estimating their costs and that affects the 
appropriate amount of the benefits they can claim.43 The other objects of regulation (referred 
to as “co-benefits” or “non-carbon benefits”) have been added. These include protecting 
biodiversity and strengthening local communities’ rights.44 
The above objects of regulation find their theoretical justification in conceptions of 
compensation of opportunity costs forgone and CBDR discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
However, there is no consensus on the additional objects. Differences exist within countries 
in negotiations of REDD+ and also within academic debates. A major concern is that the 
additional objects in the REDD+ negotiation will overload the negotiations of climate 
mitigation and some prefer that attempt to be left out at this stage.  Some share this concern 
but argue that “the key to the ultimate success of REDD+ lies in combining the conservation 
and development objectives of sustainable development. Both in the national policy arena 
and in local implementation, REDD+ must deliver on both fronts to be successful.”45 This 
                                                 
40 Decision 1/CP.16 2011 para 70. See also McDermott C.L., REDDuced: From sustainability to legality to units 
of carbon-The search for common interests in international forest governance. (2014) 35 Environmental Science 
& Policy 12-19 at 17. This is with exception of some parties such as Bolivia. Accordingly, Bolivia’s chief 
negotiator, Rene Orellana argues that “as people who live in the forest, we are not carbon stocks. We disagree 
with REDD because we oppose the commodification of the forests.” Bolivia worried about proposals to use 
private sector markets to fund forest conservation, as this did not take account of the multiple functions forests 
provide. Newmarch J., “COP-17: Bolivia’s forest proposal gets little attention” Business Day 2 December 2011. 
41 These include stall feeding of cattle instead of forest grazing and improved stoves and charcoal kilns. 
42 These might involve sectorial and macro-economic policies and planning laws have a direct bearing on 
deforestation and degradation in a broad way. An example cited is that the Ministry of Agriculture might change 
its policies on subsidising clearance for agriculture which in turn might reverse the deforestation and 
degradation. 
43 Skutsch M. and Torres A.B., Challenges for pro-poor benefit sharing schemes in the implementation of 
REDD+ in Mexico. Scoping paper prepared for The Forest Dialogue (TFD) on REDD+ Benefit Sharing 
Chetumal, Mexico 2-5 June 2014 at 11-12. 
44 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 3. Brown D. 
et. al., How do we achieve REDD co-benefits and avoid doing harm? In Angelsen A., Moving Ahead with 
REDD issues, Options and Implications. (2008) 108-118, at 109. Angelsen A. et al. (eds), Analysing REDD+: 
Challenges and choices. (2012) at 42. 
45 Angelsen A. et al. (eds)., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 42.  The impact of REDD on 
poverty and equity depends on the way its key design variables are implemented, including reference scenarios 
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means that trade-offs must be undertaken. Others argue that the expansion of the scope was 
motivated by the realisation that a narrower focus may create perverse incentives for carbon 
leakage and biodiversity loss. 46  For instance, countries with high forest cover and low 
deforestation rates may be prompted to increase deforestation in order to benefit from 
REDD+ payments.47 
REDD+ is also increasingly linked to the agriculture climate agenda.48 Notwithstanding the 
scope of REDD+ above, many (both developing and developed) countries along with civil 
society observers and technical agencies, have recently called for further expansion of such 
scope to go beyond REDD+ and also include carbon and other GHGs on agricultural and 
other non-forest lands commonly known as AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land 
Use).49 It is further observed that many parties are of the view that agriculture can only be 
brought into the accounting scope once appropriate measurement and monitoring 
methodologies are developed. 50 However, some other parties, particularly African countries, 
have been pushing for agriculture to be included in the post-2012 agreement as this may 
provide their best opportunity for participation in land-based mitigation.51  
At COP 21, parties advocated for the development of the “assessment of risk and 
vulnerability of agricultural systems, taking into consideration the particular vulnerability of 
agriculture to climate change impacts and the central role of the agriculture sector in ensuring 
food security in different climatic conditions.”52 Thus, agriculture in the Paris Agreement is 
                                                                                                                                                        
or levels, the scope of the accounting system, its position within the international framework, the way it is 
financed, liability issues, and the spatial scale. There are also concerns regarding effects on food and commodity 
prices, knowledge and interpretation of opportunity costs benefit sharing mechanism, information availability 
and understanding, the role of carbon rights, verification and compliance systems, corruption, accountability and 
transparency and REDD policies and measures. Peskett L, et.al., Making REDD Work for the Poor. (2008) at 
44. See also Cendra de Larragán J.D., Distributional Choices in EU Climate Change Law and Policy: Towards 
a Principled Approach? (2011) at 239. 
46 Lawlor K. et.al., Expanding the Scope of International Terrestrial Carbon Options Implications of REDD+ 
and Beyond, (2010) Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at 5. 
47 Savaresi A., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries under the UNFCCC: Caveats 
and Opportunities for Biodiversity, Forthcoming, (2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law at 
11. 
48 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 3. Brown D. 
et. al., How do we achieve REDD co-benefits and avoid doing harm? In Angelsen A., Moving Ahead with 
REDD issues, Options and Implications. (2008) 108-118, at 109. Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: 
Challenges and choices. (2012) at 42. 
49  As discussed by Lawlor K. et.al., Expanding the Scope of International Terrestrial Carbon Options 
Implications of REDD+ and Beyond, (2010) Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at 6. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52  FCCC/SBSTA/2015/INF.7: Report on the workshop on the assessment of risk and vulnerability of 
agricultural systems to different climate change scenarios at regional, national and local levels, including but not 
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said to be addressed in the preamble which refers to the “priority of safeguarding food 
security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to 
the adverse impacts of climate change”.53 With regards to mitigation, analysts argue that 
since the “Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperatures ‘well below’ two degrees C, 
and pursue a 1.5 degree target,” the debate between a 1.5 or two degree C target means that 
“much greater emission reduction efforts will be required than what have already been put 
forward.” 54  Therefore, “a 1.5 degree C target demands urgent mitigation in agriculture 
sector.”55 
The question of how much emissions should be reduced under the REDD+ mechanism is not 
well clarified. The negotiation text before the Copenhagen Accord indicated that the aim is to 
reduce the forest cover loss in developing states by 2030 at the latest and reduce gross 
deforestation in developing countries by at least 50% by 2020 compared with the current 
levels.56 The subsequent COP decisions have watered down such targets. Since the COP 
decisions are silent on the emission target for REDD+, academic debates indicate that a basic 
principle of REDD+, as introduced in the UNFCCC negotiations, was voluntary participation 
to receive positive incentives for activities which are reasonably attributable to human 
activities.57 This might be interpreted as a “no-lose” principle; i.e. REDD+ countries should 
have a non-negative net benefit (total international REDD+ transfers, less the real costs of 
REDD+) from any REDD+ agreement it enters. They have also explained the implication of 
this approach for setting reference levels. The point to be emphasised from this implication is 
that a country will reduce emissions up to the point where the marginal cost equals the price 
(realised REDD+).58 
A detailed discussion on the eligible activities under these objectives raises confusion. For 
example, the definition of REDD+ as reflected from COP13 decisions includes 
                                                                                                                                                        
limited to pests and diseases. Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice Forty-third session, Paris 
2015. 
53  Meadu V. et. al, The Paris Climate Agreement: what it means for food and farming. Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) (2015).  
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56 FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8, UNITED NATIONS Negotiating Text, para x. 3 Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/redd140809web2.pdf [accessed 7 
June 2014]. 
57 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 10. See also 
Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental 
Science at 3. 
58 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 10. 
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“enhancement of forest carbon stocks.” This aspect has been interpreted differently. Some 
parties have argued that this includes forests plantations while others have not.59 Some of the 
representatives in charge of facilitating REDD+ have indicated the confusion related to the 
REDD+ concept. In Brazil, it is stated that there are many misunderstandings of the REDD+ 
concept. This confusion is brought by some actors who look “at emissions reduction at any 
cost” from multiple examples around the world. This has brought fear to people. 60   In 
Tanzania, it is stated that there, are now misconceptions and misunderstandings about 
REDD+. Raja Jarrah who is a Technical Advisor for the CARE-HIMA REDD+ project in 
Tanzania said, we “ourselves don’t have enough information to explain REDD+ in detail 
[…]. We lack specifics because we ourselves have not done the math.”61 These sentiments 
appear to suggest why some scholars define REDD+ as an “objective rather than a clearly 
delimited set of actions or activities.”62 Therefore, the emerging confusion is not necessarily a 
bad thing. Angelsen suggested that part of the reason for REDD+ success is because of the 
broadness or vagueness of the concept.63 Support for REDD+ remained high and as long as 
REDD+ was still vague, different viewpoints and interests have been accommodated.64 For 
example, developed countries have attempted to reach agreement on what REDD+ should do, 
but failed because the process of reaching such an agreement is flawed. At the same time, 
developing countries which are being paid to reduce their emissions may prefer to not agree 
to a common understanding because that common understanding might take away the degrees 
of power to determine how REDD+ is put into practice according to their domestic 
circumstances.65 
Given the lack of clarity on what REDD+ entails, a key question is how will REDD+ be 
implemented and how will costs and benefits be allocated? It is contended that while REDD+ 
has managed to create a global objective of exceptional clarity, this clarity creates confusion 
                                                 
59 Angelsen A. and McNeill D., The evolution of REDD+ in Angelsen A. et al., (eds). Analysing REDD+: 
Challenges and choices. (2012)  at 33. 
60  Monica de los Rios from Acre’s Department of Climate Change (Brazil) cited in Portaccio A. et. al., 
Endorsing REDD+ in the institutional mechanisms: how could tropical forests and voluntary initiatives be 
affected? (2013). Available: http://intra.tesaf.unipd.it/pettenella/index.html 
61  Raja Jarrah of the HIMA project in Tanzania. Cited in Angelsen A. et al., (eds). Analysing REDD+: 
Challenges and choices. (2012) at 189. 
62 Angelsen, A. (ed.), Moving Ahead with REDD. (2008) at 11. 
63 Angelsen A. and McNeill D., The evolution of REDD+ in Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges 
and choices, (2012) at 33. 
64 Ibid at 35. 
65 Ibid at 49. 
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about how REDD+ activities will be implemented.66 In the context of distribution of costs 
and benefits, it is difficult to decide precisely who is allocated costs and benefits and the basis 
for such decision. Boyd has argued that the discussion of how tropical deforestation has 
become an object of climate governance has been largely contributed by the scientific and 
technical innovations.67 In particular, Boyd points to the role played by such innovations in 
objectifying and framing particular problems, thereby shaping the possibilities for particular 
legal and policy responses.68 Therefore the role of scientific and technical ways of seeing will 
have implications for the distribution of costs and benefits. For example, Skutsch has argued 
that payment by performance to individual communities or forest owners is technically 
almost impossible for reduction in deforestation and degradation because these activities can 
only be measured against a forecasted baseline.69 However, it is well known that scientific 
and technical innovation is constantly improving and the question that follows is how to 
devise laws and policy which are progressive (i.e. within the limits of the available scientific 
and technical aspects). This chapter argues that viewing REDD+ as self-regulatory 
governance might be a point of departure. Building on this understanding chapter 8 considers 
reflexive law as a potential solution to the distribution of costs and benefits. 
4.3.2   Regulating REDD+ Objectives 
 
Whatever the amount of emissions to be reduced by REDD+, it is necessary to address the 
issues of leakage, permanence, additionality, reference levels and MRV (see chapter 2 for 
conceptual clarification of these elements). The practical aspect of these requirements present 
some challenges for host countries. Submissions by countries to the UNFCCC proposed that 
these elements may best be addressed if participation in REDD+ is voluntary, and the level 
and means of participation are flexible.70 It was emphasised that, a voluntary, flexible, step-
wise approach that is well-designed would offer real potential for consensus and broad 
participation among parties. For REDD+ to have maximum impact, it was added that there 
should be a suite of options that would allow for increasing levels of participation, climate 
benefits, scale of reduced deforestation and associated sustainable development benefits, and 
                                                 
66 McDermott C.L., REDDuced: From sustainability to legality to units of carbon-The search for common 
interests in international forest governance. (2014) 35 Environmental science & policy 12-19 at 17. 
67 Boyd W: Ways of seeing in environmental law: how deforestation became an object of climate governance.  
(2010) 37 Ecology Law Quarterly 843-916 at 898. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See chapter 2. 
70 Joanneum Research et.al., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: potential policy 
approaches and positive incentives. Submission to the UNFCCC/SBSTA UNFCCC/SBSTA/2006/L.25 
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stringency of regulation. 71  Lastly, it was proposed that developing countries should be 
allowed to select the option that best represents their national circumstances and their 
capacity to participate.72 
The above exposition provides reasons as to why it was decided that REDD+ activities be 
implemented in phases by “beginning with the development of national strategies or action 
plans, policies and measures, and capacity building (phase 1), 73  followed by the 
implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies or action plans that 
could involve further capacity building, technology development and transfer and results-
based demonstration activities (phase 2),74 and evolving into results-based actions that should 
be fully measured, reported and verified (phase 3).”7576 The choice of a starting phase could 
depend on the specific national circumstances, capacities and capabilities of each developing 
state.77 The third phase entails three main uncertainties and consequent risks for the parties. 
First, the future values of drivers of deforestation and degradation such as the prices of 
soybeans, and the relationship between such drivers and the agricultural land expansion into 
forests are not known. Subsequently developing a reliable reference level becomes 
problematic.78 Second, the agricultural incomes that could have been obtained from cleared 
land are uncertain and thus the costs of avoided deforestation and degradation are also 
uncertain. 79  Third, it is unclear how actors such as farmers will respond to particular 
incentives, aimed to constrain forest clearing. For this reason, the effectiveness of the 
REDD+ policies implemented is uncertain.80 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/redd140809web1.pdf 
[accessed 12 June 2014]. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Decision 1CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 para 73. 
77  Ibid, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 para 74. 3 Phases, 3 Approaches, 3 Tiers, 3 Steps at 290, Options for 
performance indicators across REDD+ phases at 242 in Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and 
choices. (2012). See also MRV objectives for different phases of REDD+ participation at 92, Elements of a 
phased approach toward REDD+ at 15 in Angelsen A. (ed)., Realising REDD+ National strategy and policy 
options. (2009). How can we monitor, report, and verify (MRV) carbon emissions from forests? at 87 in 
Angelsen, A. (ed.), Moving Ahead with REDD, (2008).  
78 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 11. For 
challenges related to leakage and distribution of costs and benefits see Skutsch M. et. al., Rights to carbon and 
payments for services rendered under REDD+: Options for the case of Mexico. (2013) 23 Global Environmental 
Change 813-825 at 823. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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Given the practical difficulties in implementing REDD+ activities such as discussed above, it 
is argued that “REDD+ will be pursued as a broader set of national forest conservation 
policies including command-and-control (e.g. establish and better enforce protected areas) 
and addressing drivers (e.g. removing agricultural subsidies).”81 These are known as emission 
reductions programmes. This means that rewards are based on Emission Reductions (ERs) as 
opposed to Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) which are generated in the CDM due to 
project-based transactions. This is to say that, at the third phase of REDD+ implementation, 
ERs are in some cases not going to be traceable to a particular project on the ground but 
result from national policies accounted for at the national level.82 With this in mind, it can be 
imagined how difficult it would be for governments to enforce the rules pertaining to REDD+ 
in a command and control fashion. This is because it is well known that developing countries 
lack capacity to police forest areas. Given this situation, it is argued that for REDD+ to 
succeed, the REDD+ mechanism must exhibit self-regulatory governance attributes.  
 
The safeguards provided in the REDD+ mechanism under the UNFCCC focus on the (1) 
indigenous peoples and members of local communities, and (2) biodiversity and ecosystems 
and sustainable development. Regarding the former, developing countries are requested when 
developing and implementing their national strategies or action plans in relation to REDD+, 
to address, inter alia, the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, 
forest governance knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local 
communities. 83   It is provided that this approach should take into account relevant 
international obligations, national circumstances and laws.84 In addition, developing states are 
required to develop a system for providing information on how the safeguards referred to in 
appendix I are being addressed and respected throughout the implementation of the REDD+ 
activities while respecting sovereignty. 85  Regarding the latter, the COP decisions require 
REDD+ to contribute to the achievement of the objective set out in Article 2 of the 
Convention,86 be consistent with parties’ national sustainable development needs and goals 
and be implemented in the context of sustainable development and reducing poverty, while 
                                                 
81 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 3. 
82  Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Available: 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/Documents/tagged/FCPF_CF_Valuation_Note_10-08-
08.pdf [accessed 2 June 2014]. 
83 Ibid, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 para 74. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Decision 1/CP.16 para 71 (d). 
86 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Appendix I 1(a). 
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responding to climate change.87 In addition, there is also the requirement for REDD+ to be 
consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, protection and 
conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and 
environmental benefits. 88 The REDD+ mechanism shall ensure that state parties take 
precautionary measures and establish safeguards to protect biological diversity in host states, 
including safeguards against the conversion of natural forests to forest plantations.89 Thus, 
REDD+ activities should be consistent with, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Forum on Forests, and United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification with the view to achieving sustainable forest 
management.90 
4.3.3   Incentives to Self-Regulate 
 
Following the call to participate voluntarily, there is a notable provision of positive incentives 
within a range of COP decisions. 91   So the chapter asks what is meant by “positive 
incentives” as reflected in the COP decisions? What reference levels (as the basis for a 
starting point of compensation and not the crediting line) should be used (i.e. historic 
reference levels and/or projected or forward-looking reference levels)? Does REDD+ offer 
compensation for the costs incurred only or revenues beyond mere financial compensation? 
The need to clarify this provision has been a subject of scrutiny in the past where climate 
change negotiators, policy-makers and stakeholders from developed and developing countries 
“investigated whether positive incentives are more than just a slogan, whether they can be 
designed in such a way as to advance international climate change negotiations and if so, 
what would be the optimum conditions to achieve this?”92 More related questions are: what is 
expected in exchange of positive incentives? And which principles and concepts apply and to 
whom (investors, host governments or communities)?   
                                                 
87 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Appendix I 1(f) and (g). 
88 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Appendix I 2(e). 
89 Para 108.1 at 6 . UNFCCC. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/redd140809web3.pdf [accessed 12 
June 2014]. 
90  Para 109.1 at 7 UNFCCC. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/redd140809web3.pdf [accessed 12 
June 2014]. 
91 Decision 1CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 para 73. See also Decision -/CP.13 articles 1(b) (iii), 1(e) (ii). 
92 Egenhofer C. et. al., Positive Incentives for Climate Change Action: Some Reflections. European Climate 
Platform (ECP) (2008). Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/9414/2/9414.pdf [accessed 12 July 2014]. 
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The issue related to the choice of reference levels is answered in chapter 3 where reference 
levels are to be based on historic reference levels and not projected or forward-looking 
reference levels. This decision is lauded by some as a credible way towards a delivery of 
emissions reductions. 93  Others argue that one of the consequences of the selection of 
historical reference levels means insufficient incentives for the Congo Basin countries 
because of a historically low rate of deforestation.94 The conclusion is that such “countries 
would bear all or part of the costs to control deforestation while at the same time facing even 
more pressure on their forests due to international leakage.”95 Ultimately, reference levels 
will be needed to assess countries’ performance and reward with “positive incentives” or 
even possibly punish them. To answer the question of what is meant by “positive incentives” 
the Bali Action Plan provides that such incentives are constituted by financial and other 
incentives that are new and additional.96 This is in line with developing countries’ demands. 
For example, Brazil proposed that “incentives should encompass the provision of new and 
additional financial resources and transfer of technology, as well as means for capacity-
building and enhancement of endogenous capacities.” 97  For these reasons, the following 
sections discuss the issues of finance, technology transfer, capacity building, and other 
incentives and implications for REDD+. 
Climate Finance 
Climate finance is divided into two parts as provided by the Cancún Agreements. The first 
type of climate finance is entitled Fast-Start Finance (FSF). 98  This commits developed 
countries to providing new and additional USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012.99 A 
study on this aspect reveals that on 18 November 2011 the financing pledges had reached 
USD 28.22 billion whilst the amount requested and/or budgeted stood at USD 16.23 billion. 
                                                 
93  Greeenpeace., REDD: Reference Levels. (2011). Available: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/REDD%20-
%20Reference%20Levels.pdf  [accessed 5 July 2014]. 
94 The World Bank., REDD Reference Levels and Drivers of Deforestation in Congo Basin Countries. (2009). 
http://www.comifac.org/Members/tvtchuante/technical-note-on-redd-reference-levels-and-drivers-of-
deforestation-in-congo-basin-countries [accessed 8 July 2014]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Article 1(d) (i) read together with Article 1 (e) (i). 
97 Brazil’s Submission on Positive incentives for voluntary action in developing countries to  address climate 
change: Brazilian perspective on reducing emissions from  deforestation. The 12th Conference of Parties to the 
UNFCCC, Nairobi, Kenya (2006) at 4. Available: 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/dialogue/application/pdf/wp_21_braz.pdf [accessed 12 July 2014]. 
98 Decision 1CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 para 95 and para 97. 
99 Ibid. 
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However, it was unclear about the actual payment of these sums.100 A recent study reveals 
that developed countries mobilised USD 35 billion, exceeding agreed commitments during 
the FSF period. Likewise, “much of the finance mobilised would not meet many proposed 
definitions for additionality.”101 Regarding the distribution of FSF, the study indicates that 
nearly half (43%) of FSF has been directed to Asia, 18% was directed to sub-Saharan Africa, 
and 16% to Latin America.102 The connection of this source and amount of finance confirms 
what is expected in exchange for the positive incentives. Angelsen points out that in 
exchange for FSF, the host government was supposed to undertake “deep policy reforms”.103 
It is clear that both objects (i.e. raising USD 30 billion that is new and additional, and 
performance and results) have failed to be realised.104 That said, questions can be asked about 
what role was expected for the host government and the meaning of policy reform. Regarding 
the former, the role of government in REDD+ activities is said to be on the designation of 
existing or creation of new systems and institutions to implement REDD+ activities (e.g., 
monitoring, benefit distribution, revenue management and conflict resolution).105 Others see 
the role of government to be that of leading coordination REDD+ activities “with sub-
national activities being developed in cooperation with government agencies, promoted by 
local private or public actors, or by a combination of both REDD+ incentives resulting from 
successful implementation would be issued exclusively to governments by the UNFCCC.”106 
An exception is made in terms of when and where emission reductions are traded through 
sub-national activities which may be asked to make their accountability transparent to 
national governments so as to avoid double counting.107 The latter focused on ensuring that 
these institutions and systems are well-governed – particularly in terms of their accountability 
                                                 
100 Stasio K. et. al., Summary of Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges. November (2011). 
World Resources Institute. Available: http://pdf.wri.org/climate_finance_pledges_2011-11-18.pdf 
101 Nakhooda S. et. al., Mobilising International Climate Finance: Lessons from the Fast-Start Finance Period. 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), World Resources Institute (WRI), Global Environmental Strategies 
(IGES), and Open Climate Network (OCN), November (2013) at 39. 
102 Ibid at 30. 
103 Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 (2013) at 1. See also 
Ibid Nakhooda S. et. al., at 39. The author indicates that for “many developing countries there is a need to 
strengthen the underlying policies, regulations and governance that will facilitate investment in low-carbon and 
climate-resilient approaches”. 
104 Angelsen concludes that “…aid cannot buy policy reforms, yet this remains a major idea in current REDD+ 
discourses”. Angelsen A., REDD+ as performance-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of 
Norway. World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 2013/135 
(2013). 
105 Williams L.G., Putting the pieces together for good governance of REDD+: an analysis of 32 REDD+ 
country readiness proposals. Working Paper, (2013) at 4. 
106 Corbera E. and Schroeder H., Governing and implementing REDD+. (2010) Environmental Science and 
Policy at 2. 
107 Ibid. 
Chapter 4:  REDD+ as Self-Regulatory System 
 
-111 -  
 
and transparency, to stakeholders, as well as being inclusive in terms of their decision-
making.108 
The UN-REDD Programme has provided good governance principles for “effective and 
inclusive national governance systems” for REDD+. These principles relate to integrity, 
transparency and accountability and stakeholder engagement. 109  To be realised, the UN-
REDD Programme supports the conduct of nationally owned, multi-stakeholder, inclusive 
and participatory governance assessments. The emphasis is placed “on the process of 
developing these indicators rather than the indicators themselves, based on what 
stakeholders’ value, and on the process of establishing an information management system 
that reinforces domestic accountability over time”.110  These elements can be seen as an 
example of a step towards decentring regulation. However, there is no indication as to what 
strategy is essential in removing the state from the conceptual hierarchy of state-society. This 
is the role of self-regulation. 
The second type of climate finance is generally referred to as “long-term finance”. Regarding 
this aspect, developed countries pledged that in the context of “meaningful mitigation actions 
and transparency on implementation” by developing countries, they would raise US $100 
billion per year by 2020 to address both adaptation and mitigation actions in the developing 
countries.111 Most of the fund would be dispersed through the Green Climate Fund.112 Zahar 
et. al., point out that despite many meetings the sources of finance mentioned above are still 
only vague and uncertain ideas, which await systematic exploration at the COP level.113 
Efforts to raise finance for REDD+ began in 2012 under the banner of the UNFCCC. 
However, currently, there is still no clarity on how adequate and predictable long-term 
finance for REDD+ will be mobilised.114 What is commonly understood is that the COP 19 
decision in Warsaw in 2013 clarified what was largely pointed out in the literature about the 
source of this long-term finance. The decision established that results-based finance for 
REDD+, may come from multiple sources such as public and private (such as through trading 
                                                 
108 Ibid Williams L.G., (2013) at 4. 
109  UNDP, Supporting Inclusive and Effective National Governance Systems for REDD+. UN-REDD 
Programme (2010). 
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111 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16 (2010), para 98. 
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113 Zahar A. et. al., Australian Climate Law in Global Context. (2013) at 275. 
114  Watson C. et. al., Integrating REDD+ into a green economy transition: Opportunities and challenges. 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Report (2013). Available: 
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carbon credits within compliance carbon markets), bilateral and multilateral, including 
alternative sources.115 In return the host countries are required to provide information on how 
all safeguards have been addressed and respected before they can receive results-based 
payments. The decision on results-based finance also establishes an information hub on the 
web platform on the UNFCCC website as a means to publish information on the results of 
REDD+ activities and corresponding results-based payments. However, the decision does not 




The question raised here is whether REDD+ is considered to be a mechanism that is expected 
to facilitate technology transfer.117 This is because, pursuant to article 4.9 of the UNFCCC, 
Nepal on behalf of the least developed countries group submitted that such provision must be 
reflected in all decisions related to REDD+.118 What should the provisions on technology 
transfer reflect? Some have advocated that the REDD+ mechanism is a cost-effective way to 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, precisely because “no new technologies are required 
except maybe for the monitoring of forest-carbon changes except perhaps for important 
monitoring purposes.”119 This begs the question as to how REDD+ will be implemented 
successfully in the absence of technology particularly for the renewable energy sector. 
Without this undertaking, it seems that the success of REDD+ in the long term would be 
impossible. This is because the pressure that is exerted on forests resources can only be 
avoided once there are alternative sources of energy, environmentally friendly organic 
fertilisers and pesticides and efficient machinery among others.120 It should be recalled from 
                                                 
115 Ibid. Also see Dutschke M. et al., How Do We Match Country Needs with Financing Sources?, in Angelsen 
A. (ed)., Moving ahead with REDD: Issues, options and implications, (2008) at 47-48.  
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117 Under CDM, African countries “hoped that technology can be sent to developing countries to assist in the 
pursuit of sustainable energy projects. In turn, African countries can generate markets for CDM projects.” See 
Gupta J. and Cray K., in Chaytor B. and Gray K.R., International Environmental Law and Policy in Africa. 
(2003) at 72. 
118 http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/nepal_redd.pdf. 
119 Stern N. Stern review: the economics of climate change. Cambridge: HM Treasury UK Government (2006). 
Corbera, E. et al., Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries: revisiting the assumptions. Climatic Change, 100, (2010) 355-388. The Stern Review Report at 538; 
Available: http://www.hm-
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[accessed 9 June 2013]. See also, Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation. (2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-456 at 3. 
120 Wibisana points out that emission reductions would be realised by utilising these factors in the agricultural 
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chapter 3 that the resistance to commit forests for climate change mitigation was based on the 
finance and technology transfer. But the issue of technology transfer is rarely brought into the 
REDD+ debate. This could be in part because the issue of technology transfer is being 
negotiated within the overall climate change agreement. Others see that how REDD+ 
implementation takes place can become a catalyst to facilitate technology transfer.121 From 
the connection between REDD+ and the green economy it is clear that this connection 
“entails pursuing the possibility to enhance technology transfer along all three channels” 
namely: “trade, licensing and foreign direct investment.”122 This is despite the fact that these 
are generally quite segregated policy arenas with separate constituencies.123 
4.4     REDD+ outside the UNFCCC Process 
The emerging of REDD+ outside the UNFCCC Process is motivated by a range of issues. We 
have seen above that the provision of REDD+ under the UNFCCC process requires that 
REDD+ mechanism to be implemented in phases. To facilitate this process numerous 
organisations have become involved in REDD+ readiness activities. These include a number 
of multilateral organisations, regional and bi-lateral REDD+ funding initiatives. In addition to 
these governmental activities, NGOs and the private sector are involved in designing and 
investing in individual REDD+ projects, developing certification schemes to verify carbon 
and non-carbon performance, as well as working with governments on voluntary standards 
for REDD+.124  This approach is similar to what Bodansky refers to as the evolutionary 
process which allows for trial and error.125 The author contends that countries use this process 
“to see whether a particular policy approach works before deciding what to do next.”126 An 
example cited is that countries can set voluntary standards before deciding whether to convert 
the voluntary regime into a binding one.127 
                                                                                                                                                        
Wibisana A. (eds.), Regulating disasters, climate change and environmental harm: Lessons from the Indonesian 
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The motivation of the private sector and NGOs to get involved in voluntary markets such as 
REDD+ outside the UNFCCC process can also be explained by the desire to acquire “carbon 
offsets generated in order to offset their greenhouse gas emissions and/or those of their 
customers in order to reduce their carbon footprint or those of their customers.”128 Private 
actors include inter alia private manufacturing and service companies, private foundations, 
credit brokers, carbon project developers, legal assistance providers and companies 
established by NGOs.129 These actors are referred to in this thesis as self-regulatory bodies. 
4.4.1   What is being Regulated? 
 
The result of numerous self-regulatory bodies is an enormous level of complexity, 
fragmented decision-making and uncertainty in the sense that they attempt to establish 
objectives for REDD+ in a way which advances their own interests and priorities for REDD+ 
without the need for global consensus. 130  For example, besides reducing emissions, the 
objects of regulation in REDD+ outside the UNFCCC include “(i) creating private protected 
areas on private land; (ii) conducting research, for example into carbon stocks or alternative 
energy generation that can help generate carbon credits for the market; (iii) conserving 
existing public protected areas and buffer zones; (iv) safeguarding sovereign frontiers; and 
(v) developing alternative income generation opportunities for local communities that are 
compatible with nature conservation.”131 These objects can be seen in more than 100 private 
sectors involved in REDD+ projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America recorded at the end of 
2013.132 
4.4.2   Regulating REDD+ Objectives: Standards and Principles 
There are a number of standards and principles which reflect a wide range of interests in 
legitimising certain aspects of voluntary offsets.133 The question that arises is: what standards 
and principles are reflected in regulating REDD+ objectives? To answer that question, it is 
important to explain what is meant by standards and principles. The use of standards is not 
exclusive to command and control regimes and standard-setting issues may arise when 
                                                 
128 Deatherage  S.D., Carbon Trading Law and Practice. (2011) at 64. 
129 Nhantumbo I., Carbon rights legislation: not yet ready for private sector REDD+. The International Institute 
for Environment and Development (2013). 
130 Ibid McDermott C.L., (2014) at 18. 
131 Ibid Nhantumbo I., (2013). 
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133 Bumpus A.G. et. al., The rise of voluntary carbon offset standards: self -regulation, legitimacy and multi-
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incentives, rather than sanctions, underpin regulation.134 Standards can thus be divided into 
three categories in correspondence with these three stages of intervention.135 The first is that 
specification “standards focus on prevention by controlling the processes that give rise to 
dangerous situations—by demanding, for example, that industrial activities conform to 
specification on plant construction, equipment to be used, or modes of operation.”136 Second, 
performance standards demand a given level of delivery at the act stage but do not specify 
how that delivery is to be achieved.137 Third, target standards seek to overcome the problems 
of linking standards to regulatory goals by stating those goals or outcomes directly.138 These 
standards prescribe no particular type of process or level of risk creation, but call for the 
avoidance of certain harmful consequences (e.g. removing the water’s capacity to support 
fish life). The advantage of such standards is that firms are left free to decide how best (and 
most cheaply) to achieve the set targets.139 Principles: regulatory “authorities can demand that 
regulatees comply with precise rules but, in the alternative, they can call on them to act to 
further certain principles. In principles-based regulation, principles are used to outline 
regulatory objectives and values, and regulatees are left free to devise their own systems for 
serving such principles”.140 The next section discusses the standards and principles advocated 
by the regulatory bodies.  
UN-REDD and FCPF 
In order to implement the REDD+ mechanism in the sub-national and national programmes, 
two main multilateral readiness programmes were established. These are the UN-REDD 
Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). 141  The UN-REDD 
programme was established by collaboration of three UN agencies, UNEP, UNDP and FAO. 
It is a multi-donor trust that provides funding with a view to implementing the REDD+ 
mechanism.142 The FCPF is a World Bank program. It was established to “build partnerships 
among developed and developing countries, public and private sector entities, international 
                                                 
134 Baldwin R. et. al., Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. (2012) at 296. 
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organizations, non-governmental organizations, forest-dependent indigenous peoples and 
forest dwellers to prepare for possible future systems of positive incentives for REDD, 
including innovative approaches to sustainable use of forest resources and biodiversity 
conservation.”143 Another objective is to assist host countries to build their capacity and 
develop a methodological and policy framework that provides incentives for the 
implementation of REDD programs.144  This objective is explored further in the capacity 
building section below. 
To explain the standards employed by the above bodies in the implementation of REDD+ 
activities, the UN-REDD Programme developed principles and criteria and associated tools 
and guidance are still under development, with a working title of the UN-REDD Programme 
“Social and Environmental Principles Framework”. The Framework is made up of two 
components: First, a minimum standard risk assessment and mitigation framework: UN-
REDD Programme funded programs/projects/actors will have to comply with a set of 
minimum environmental and social standards also referred to as “safeguard”’ or “do no 
harm” principles.145 These are reflecting the specification standards explained above. Second, 
an assessment of impact magnitude is intended to account for and provide guidance for 
designing, implementing, and operating REDD programs in a way that minimises social and 
environmental risks and maximises multiple benefits for climate, sustainable development, 
and conservation.146 
FCPF has developed the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA). The 
purpose of SESA is to incorporate “environmental and social concerns into national REDD+ 
strategy process and ensures that the FCPF readiness activities comply with World Bank 
Policies during the strategic planning phase, considering that these strategic activities could 
have potentially far reaching impacts.”147 A specific output of the SESA is the Environmental 
and Social Management Framework (ESMF). The ESMF is a framework to avoid and/or 
mitigate and manage potential risks of the REDD+ strategy options related to the adoption of 
future REDD+ projects, activities, and policies. For the ESMF to ensure compliance with the 
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Bank’s safeguard policies, it has to be consistent with the applicable World Bank safeguard 
policies, including the policy on Environmental Assessment, and it is expected to contain 
sections addressing the requirements of other applicable policies.148 
Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) 
 
The Voluntary Carbon Standard Association (VCSA) is an organisation which administers 
the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and was formed by the International Emissions Trading 
Association, the Climate Group and the World Economic Forum in 2005.149 The Verified CS 
is a greenhouse gas accounting program with the aim to verify and issue carbon credits in 
voluntary markets.150 The focus of the VCS is on GHG reduction attributes only and does not 
require projects to have additional environmental or social benefits.151 After the VCS was 
introduced, it was planned that the VCS would be updated yearly for the first two years and 
every two years after that.152 The VCS has been applied widely in Kasigau Corridor REDD+ 
projects in Kenya.153 
The VCS works by accepting methodologies that serve as the protocols for developing 
carbon credit projects. Some of these methodologies are created through the VCSA which 
relies on expert committees from organisations such as the CDM Meth Panel, the World 
Bank and leading non-profit and private sector organisations.154 In addition, VCSA accepts 
methodologies adopted by the Executive Board of the CDM.155 In order to obtain approval of 
a carbon project and the issuance of Verified Carbon Units (VCUs), a third-party 
validator/verifier must validate the project design document submitted by the project 
developer, and verify the amount of greenhouse gas emissions actually reduced and, 
therefore, how many VCUs should be issued. The VCSA relies on third-party registries to 
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actually issue the credits and maintain them on their registries. The VCSA does not play a 
direct role in the issuance of carbon credits for individual projects.156 
Verified Emission Reductions (VER+) 
TÜV SÜD is a technical service organisation founded in 1866 in Germany. It provides 
validation and verification services for CDM and JI projects according to the Kyoto Protocol 
among other things.157 Based on that experience, the company also offers validation and 
verification services for projects that do not intend to get registered under the Kyoto scheme 
or any other governmental system.158 This certification organisation has already validated 
REDD+ projects in Brazil and it is likely to expand its services to other countries.159 
In order to demonstrate additionality, the VER+ standard requires the VER+ project to apply 
the most recent version of the CDM Additionality Tool.160 In dealing with permanence, the 
VER+ standard requires that emission reductions should not be reversible. However, in case 
of land use related projects which cannot ensure permanence, the VER+ requires applications 
of adequate safeguards in order to balance potential reversibility (e.g. buffer of not-issued 
credits).161  Thus the VER+ provides a general statement that any VER+ Project Design 
Document (PDD) has to undergo a validation process before registration. But verification is 
undertaken according to the monitoring reports prepared by the project participants. In case 
of retroactive projects it is possible to perform both activities in one joint effort. The first 
verification is carried out at least one year after registration of the starting date of the 
crediting period. But in the case of land use and forestry activities a first verification shall not 
occur later than 5 years after validation. 162  The monitoring of the project specific 
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methodology approach is based on the guidance from criteria for baseline setting and 
monitoring as established for JI project activities.163 
Application for registration under the VER+ is based on the submission of an application for 
registration as a VER+ activity to TÜV SÜD and an independent assessment of compliance 
with the aforementioned criteria. Upon a positive validation opinion the project will be 
registered by TÜV SÜD’s certification body “climate and energy” and an account will be 
opened at TÜV SÜD’s Blue Registry.164 The registry allows project participants and traders 
to administer their VER+ credits and thus avoid any potential double selling.165 In order to 
ensure that offsets are sold only once, the VER+ requires that “emission reductions that are 
caused or are included indirectly to other existing schemes have to be factored out from the 
amount of VER+.”166 In an event that there is a further claim of emission reductions by the 
same activity in the same time frame in a different regime (i.e. CDM/JI emission trading 
schemes or other voluntary VER schemes), the VER+ considers this claim to be a misuse of a 
TÜV SÜD certificate.167 The same conclusion is reached in the case of multiple use of VER+ 
credits either by selling/transferring the same charge of VER+ credits to several buyers or by 
using it in several cancellation transactions.168 In this case such misuse leads to a fine of 
€300,000.169 
Regarding the environmental and social impacts, VER+ only provides a general statement 
which requires project activity to avoid causing substantial negative impacts on the 
environment and social aspects. Any potentially negative impact shall be mitigated. 
Therefore, if the project activity requires an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
according to national legislation, VER+ provides that the latter should have been submitted 
for approval by the end of validation.170 
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Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a voluntary GHG emissions cap-and-trade scheme 
based in North America. Although participation is voluntary, compliance with emission 
reduction objectives is legally binding once a member joins.171 The CCX standards have been 
applied in REDD+ in regional carbon trading programs in America and Australia.172 
Plan Vivo System  
 
The Plan Vivo System is a set of tools, processes, guidelines and standards which enable 
communities in developing countries to access payments for ecosystem services.173 The Plan 
Vivo Foundation certifies and issues only ex-ante credits, known as Plan Vivo Certificates.174 
The Plan Vivo System was first conceived and developed in 1994, as part of a UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) funded research project in Mexico. The 
system was devised by the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Management (ECCM) at the 
University of Edinburgh, in partnership with other organisations.175 The Plan Vivo Standard 
has been designed to cater to the needs of smallholder and community based projects.176 In 
recent years the Plan Vivo Standard has been used in the REDD+ pilot projects in 
Tanzania.177 
The Plan Vivo Foundation selects and commissions expert reviewers to conduct an initial 
validation of each new project. Then third-party verifiers assess projects against the Plan 
Vivo Standards based on terms of reference agreed between project coordinators and 
verifiers.178  The Plan Vivo Foundation also approves verifiers that are accredited by an 
international certification authority such as the CDM, International Standards Organisation 
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(ISO).179 Plan Vivo producers are land-holders that have written and registered Plan Vivos, 
and signed sale agreements with the project coordinator agreeing to carry out specified 
monitoring and management activities in return for staged payments.180 Purchasers wishing to 
resell Plan Vivo Certificates must therefore register as a Plan Vivo Reseller with the Plan 
Vivo Foundation and agree to comply with a Code of Good Practice which seeks to recognise 
and reinforce the importance of professional reselling, prohibits double-selling, and promotes 
the transparent flow of quality information.181 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance  
The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), is a partnership of international 
NGOs including CARE, Rainforest Alliance, Conservation International, Nature 
Conservancy, and the Wildlife Conservation Society. The CCBA oversees the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Standards (CCBS).182 Development of such standards was due 
to increasing concerns that standards such as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), 
Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and American Carbon Registry (ACR) only focus on 
emission reductions and that meant that the local communities and biodiversity were not 
addressed.183 Therefore, CCBS focuses on identification of high quality land-based carbon 
projects that adopt best practices to generate significant benefits for local communities and 
biodiversity. 184  However, it should be noted that the CCBA does not issue quantified 
emission reductions certificates (nor does it provide a registry).185  Instead, the standards 
require project developers to apply other carbon standards such as CCX or VCS in 
combination with CCBS in order to obtain quantified carbon credits.186 The CCBA can be 
used for projects funded with either private or public investment, and the standards apply to 
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projects that generate carbon credits for either voluntary or compliance markets.187 Examples 
of REDD+ projects that use CCBA are cited in the literature.188 
 
4.4.3   Incentives to Self-Regulate 
 
Climate Finance 
Apart from the financing options existing under the UNFCCC process, there is an emerging 
voluntary market for REDD+ credits.  For example a “variety of multilateral banks and 
carbon funds provide financing for carbon credit projects. The World Bank has established 
the Carbon Finance Unit. Within this unit the World Bank operates several carbon funds that 
are financed with sovereign funds and private funds, depending on the project. There are a 
number of funds which are managed by the bank. Those with a direct bearing on REDD+ are 
the FCPF and BioCarbon Fund,189 and Forest Investment Programme (FIP).190 
It has been asked how it is possible that non-state actors would invest in reducing emissions 
without any government mandate because this might not be possible under a traditional view 
of economics or corporate behaviour.191 The answer has to do with public interests. It was 
pointed out that as the public has become more informed about causes and impacts of climate 
change, demand for action by consumer product and service companies to reduce carbon 
emissions or to offset them has developed dramatically.192 So some buyers are purchasing 
carbon credits for “green” corporate policies or marketing programs.193 Another plausible 
scenario is that some buyers are taking early initiatives to purchase credits so as to use them 
once the compliance regime has been finalised. These buyers are usually referred to as “pre-
compliance” buyers.194 These buyers may be buying for marketing or public relations reasons 
                                                 
187  The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA). Available: http://www.climate-
standards.org/standards/pdf/ccb_standards_second_edition_december_2008.pdf [accessed 6 December 2013]. 
188 Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, 
(2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-456, at 22. Available: 
http://www.carbonneutral.com/carbon-offsets/kasigau-corridor-redd-forestry/ [accessed 6 December 2013]. 
189Deatherage S.D., Carbon Trading Law and Practice. (2011) at 214. The World Bank. The World Bank 
Carbon Funds and Facilities (2013). Available: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/world-
bank-carbon-funds-facilities [accessed 6 December 2013]. 
190  Climate Funds Update. Available: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/forest-investment-program 
[accessed 29 December 2013]. 
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but may also or solely be acquiring voluntary credits in order to accumulate a certain volume 
of credits before a mandatory program is instituted.195 
Capacity Building 
Different service providers have been involved in offering capacity building programmes. 
These included development of national REDD+ baselines, calculating the costs versus 
benefits of REDD+, training for REDD+ fund management and benefit sharing, leveraging 
the mainstream media to raise public awareness about REDD+, to raise awareness services in 
local and tribal languages especially in the context of REDD+ pilot projects and in countries 
with a high diversity of ethnicities and in formulating policies and strategies.196 An example 
of capacity building can be explained by UNREDD and FCPF. Under the UN-REDD 
programme, the focus of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
is on technical issues related to forestry, natural resources and supporting in particular the 
development of REDD+ monitoring, including MRV systems.197 The focus of the UNDP is 
on good governance, socio-economic implications of REDD+ and the engagement of 
Indigenous Peoples and civil society. Lastly UNEP is focusing on convening expertise and 
decision-makers in the REDD+ agenda, increasing knowledge and capacity on multiple 
benefits of REDD+ and facilitating the enabling conditions to migrate towards a low-carbon 
economy by transforming the forest sector through analysis, scenario development and 
assessment of options for investments.198 On the other hand, the FCPF complements the 
UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ by demonstrating how REDD+ can be implemented at the 
national and sub-national level and by learning lessons from this early implementation 
phase.199  This program has two main objectives: like UN-REDD it has the objective of 
capacity building for REDD+ readiness, and the second aim is to test a program regarding 
                                                 
195 Ibid. 
196 REDD+ in Asia-Pacific: Are capacity building services meeting countries’ needs? RECOFTC – The Center 
for People and Forests (2011). Available: http://www.recoftc.org/site/uploads/content/pdf/UN-
REDD%20capacity%20building%20providers%20study_182.pdf [accessed 29 December 2013]. See also 
UNDP Capacity Assessment: Practice Note (2008) Available: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-
assessment-practice-note/Capacity%20Assessment%20Practice%20Note.pdf [accessed 21 December 2013]. 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Capacity Building Program for Forest-Dependent People on REDD 
plus February 22, 2010. Available: 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/Documents/tagged/FCPF_FMT_Note_2010-
8_IP_Capacity_Building_02-22-10%5B1%5D.pdf [accessed 21 December 2013]. 
197 Ibid, the UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-2015. 
198 Ibid. 
199 The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Available: http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12 
[accessed 21 December 2013]. 
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incentive payments in some pilot countries.200 Thus it can be seen that both the UN-REDD 
and the FCPF have taken on unique but integrated roles in the process of supporting national 
governments in their preparations for implementing REDD+ activities. 201  The point of 
emphasis here is that UN-REDD has been the leader in the design of effective MRV 
strategies, while the FCPF has been the leader in the development of successful economic 
incentives and tools for REDD+ programs.202 Thus the need for capacity building in REDD+ 
fits well with what is referred to as the information asymmetry between regulators and the 
regulated. In this case, the emphasis is that “no single actor has all the knowledge required to 
solve complex, diverse, and dynamic problems, and no single actor has the overview 
necessary to employ all the instruments needed to make regulation effective.”203 
Other Incentives 
Not all potential incentives from REDD+ can be quantified in financial terms, technology 
transfer and capacity building.  Other incentives relate to how “national governments are 
expected to benefit from increased investment (such as spending of income in local markets 
or creation of jobs elsewhere in the economy), development of physical infrastructure, 
reduced spending in certain sectors (such as on flood management due to improved forest 
environmental services), and promotion of national environmental objectives”.204 In addition, 
indirect incentives include how REDD+ implementation can clarify land tenure, support 
forest management and governance, and improve ecosystem services such as water 
provision.205 
So far, we have discussed positive incentives which seem to encourage developing countries 
to participate in the REDD+ mechanism. But it is argued here that a positive incentive is not 
the only motive. In a context of climate change mitigation, a threat of a carbon border tax can 
be seen as an example of negative incentives. It should be mentioned that this approach has 
not been used within the UNFCCC process but rather developed countries have been 
                                                 
200 Danon S. and Bettiati D., Reducing Emissions from Deforestaton and Forest Degradation (REDD+) – What 
is Behind the Idea and What is the Role of UN-REDD and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)? 2:2 
(2012) SEEFOR (South-East European Forestry. 
201 Thompson M.C. e.t .al., Seeing REDD+ as a project of environmental governance. (2011) 14 Environmental 
Science & Policy 100–110 at 101. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 107. 
204 Cited in Mathur V.N. et al, Experiences of host communities with carbon market projects: towards multi-
level climate justice. (2014) 14:1 Climate Policy, 42-62 at 46. 
205 REDD+ Benefit Sharing. CIFOR, (2013). Available: 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/factsheet/4258-factsheet.pdf. 
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threatening to use carbon border taxes outside the UNFCCC process. This threat is being 
given serious consideration and it seems to be one of the factors influencing the decision to 
undertake climate change mitigation in South Africa.206 In the context of REDD+ this line of 
thinking can be advanced based on the earlier discussion.207  It was discussed that some 
corporations were pushing for high standards. This explains why Canada advocated for a 
forest convention with the view to establishing international rules on tariffs and trade barriers 
against timber exports. 208 Higher global standards would make Canadian timber more 
competitive internationally since its high domestic forest management standards place 
Canadian timber at a comparative disadvantage relative to tropical timber. Many Canadian 
businesses have signed up to the International Organization of Standards (ISO), and the 
Canadian Pulp and Paper Association has argued that ISO standards should be made 
applicable worldwide.209  Given this understanding, it is possible that the call to impose 
carbon border tax adjustments to those who do not undertake the REDD+ mechanism could 
have a significant negative effect for the export affected products. In essence, carbon border 
tax adjustments would benefit importers of those products as they have already implemented 
higher standards for forest resources as explained. 
4.5             The Aspect of Self-Regulation 
4.5.1   Introduction 
 
Before discussing the self-regulation aspect, it is useful to discuss the decentring aspect of 
REDD+. It is argued that REDD+ at international negotiations contains both the decentring 
regulation and self-regulation aspects. The decentring regulation aspect is divided into the 
international and domestic dimensions. As seen in chapter 3, historical international 
negotiation changed from the top-down to the developing countries’ initiatives to participate 
in climate change mitigation. Negotiation of REDD+ is in the form of a bottom-up approach 
whereby in principle each country is required to determine its own level of ambition. 
However, in reality this ambition is defined by multiple actors with formal and informal 
                                                 
206 It is noted that some “developed countries are considering the introduction of Border Carbon Adjustments 
(BCAs) where higher import duties are levied on carbon-intensive goods and services originating from countries 
without an effective GHG mitigation strategy and/or carbon price”. National Treasury Department, Republic of 
South Africa. Policy Paper for Public Comment. Carbon tax policy paper: Reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and facilitating the transition to a green economy, (2013) at 16. Available: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Carbon%20Tax%20Policy%20Paper%202013.pdf [accessed 
20 December 2013]. 
207 Chapter 3 section 3.2.2. 
208 Humphreys D., Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, (2006) at 43. 
209  Humphreys D., The Elusive Quest for a Global Forests Convention. (2005) 14:1 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law at 4. 
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power and authority.210 In this sense, REDD+ falls under the decentring paradigm. This 
change of top-down to bottom-up in the second climate change commitment period is well 
explored elsewhere.211 Self-regulation as discussed in section 4.2 above is seen as a strategy 
to enable decentring regulation to be realised. With this in mind, we can now discuss the self-
regulation aspect of REDD+. The discussion focuses on voluntary and coerced self-
regulation, verified self-regulation, rule making with actors, markets for intervention rights, 
and accredited self-regulation. 
4.5.2   Voluntary and Coerced Self-Regulation 
 
In discussing what makes REDD+ self-regulation within the international dimension, I first 
look at the concepts of “opportunity costs” and “voluntary” which is a useful framework to 
understand how REDD+ can be viewed as a concept of self-regulation. This is because this 
concept encourages internal self-reflection concerning not only costs of compliance but also 
the net gain which encourages a change of behaviour. The behaviour in this case is the 
change of government policy in terms of management of forests and in this case is the forest 
management for the purpose of climate change mitigation. The issue of “positive incentives” 
is a key concept in the Bali Action Plan and was interpreted by many to mean compensation 
provided by Annex I to non-Annex I countries for achieving measurable reductions in 
forestry emissions. In this case, REDD+ seems to fit well with the division established in the 
Kyoto Protocol: Annex I countries would take on commitments for emission reductions, 
while non-Annex I countries would do so on a voluntary basis (more recently expressed as 
NAMAs).212 
South Africa can be cited as an example of an African country undertaking mitigation action 
on a voluntary basis. It has pledged to undertake mitigation action to enable a 34% deviation 
                                                 
210 As concluded in section 4.6 below. 
211  Qi X., The rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations. (2011) 18:3 South African Journal of 
International Affairs. 295-318. Bodansky D., “History of the Global Climate Change Regime” in Luterbacher 
U. and Sprinz D.F. (eds)., International Relations and Global Climate Change.  (2001) at 23-39. Bodansky D. 
and Diringer E., The Evolution of International Regimes: Implications for Climate Change. Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change Report, (2010). Bodansky D., A tale of two architectures:The once and future U.N. 
climate change regime (2011) 43, Arizona State Law Journal, 697–712. In this latest publication, Bodansky 
indicates that the “Copenhagen Accord embraces a fundamentally different architecture than the Kyoto 
Protocol. Rather than defining emissions targets from the top down through international negotiations, the 
Copenhagen Accord establishes a bottom-up process that allows each party to define its own commitments and 
actions unilaterally.” 
212 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 34-35. 
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below business as usual growth trajectory by 2020 and a 42% deviation by 2025.213 REDD+ 
is part of the REDD+ considered as a component of NAMA.214 South Africa emphasises that 
the extent to which this action will be implemented depends on the provision of financial 
resources, the transfer of technology and capacity-building support by developed countries.215 
Viewing mitigation measures in this sense it seems that REDD+ has a self-regulatory aspect 
where countries take the initiative themselves to undertake climate change mitigation.   
Developed countries such as Norway, Australia, the USA and European Union have also 
expressed support for REDD+ as a NAMA, generally viewing NAMAs as broad economy-
wide low emission development strategies that include unilateral actions, with REDD+ 
functioning as a component of that strategy. Conversely, developing countries such as Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Guyana and Colombia who do not support the inclusion of REDD+ 
in NAMAs. They see it as an approach to impose a binding commitment to least developing 
countries and they argue that referring to REDD+ as part of NAMAs will dilute the focus on 
REDD+.216 It can be understood that the support for REDD+ as part of NAMA means that 
the supporters do so because they are welcoming the emission reductions targets of 
developing countries.  
The above dichotomy forces us to view REDD+ as a coerced self-regulatory measure. This 
follows a discussion pointed out in chapter 3 where the reference to “…legal instrument or 
[…] applicable to all Parties” indicates a departure from the Bali Action Plan, which stressed 
that REDD+ is concerned with “policy approaches and positive incentives …”, with positive 
incentives interpreted by many to imply full compensation to developing countries.217 This 
radical shift could end up being a watershed in climate negotiations, including for REDD+. 
This is mainly because of the shifting from REDD+ being predominantly a system of 
payments from developed to developing countries for reduced forest emissions, to one that is 
perceived as a shared responsibility.218At a domestic level, the concepts of “opportunity 
                                                 
213  Department of Environmental Affairs, Republic of South Africa 29 January 2010. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/southafricacphaccord_app2.pdf 
[accessed 21 December 2013]. 
214 Rahlao S. et.al., South Africa’s national REDD+ initiative: assessing the potential of the forestry sector on 
climate change mitigation. (2012) 17 Environmental Science & Policy 24-32. 
215 Ibid Department of Environmental Affairs, Republic of South Africa.  
216 Climate Focus. Developing Effective National REDD Programmes: REDD and NAMAs. (2009) at 16-20 
and 40-47.  Available: 
http://www.climatefocus.com/documents/files/developing_effective_national_redd_programmes_redd_and_na
mas [accessed 21 December 2013]. 
217Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 47. 
218 Ibid. 
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costs” and “voluntary” point to voluntary self-regulation. Taken together, these concepts 
seem to encourage internal self-reflection concerning not only costs of compliance but also 
the net gain which encourage a change of behaviour. The nature of “voluntary” suggests that 
parties will apply their own logic of opportunity costs in order to decide whether to get 
involved in REDD+ activities. In this sense REDD+ has a self-regulatory aspect. An example 
of self-regulation is the use of voluntary agreements deployed by Plan Vivo Systems. 
4.5.3   Verified Self-Regulation 
 
As seen above, verified self-regulation is established as a form of self-regulation when third 
parties are responsible for monitoring compliance. To observe this aspect in REDD+, this 
section needs to draw from the earlier discussion of MRV in chapter 2. What transpired in the 
conclusion is that at the moment there is no precedent on “verification” under the UNFCCC 
or Kyoto Protocol.219 So we are left with a discussion of verification outside the UNFCCC 
process. However, an example of the verification discussed in chapter 2 is exemplified by 
FCPF. The FCPF requires host countries to fulfil different aspects in order to enter in 
agreements to begin and develop what is known as a Readiness Preparedness Proposal (RPP). 
With reference to the FCPF charter, Thompson et al note that a country needs to devise a 
Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) which is “the initial proposal submitted to the Facility 
Management Team. . . outlining the basic elements of that Country’s proposal for a 
Readiness Preparation Proposal.”220 Host countries are furnished with a template of R-PIN 
which content includes a number of questions to be answered. These include questions 
related to forest law enforcement and forest sector governance e.g., concession policies and 
enforcement, land tenure, forest policies, capacity to enforce laws.221 Once the R-PIN is 
approved by the Trustee of the Readiness Fund then such countries may enter into 
agreements to fund a RPP. The authors note that such proposal is reviewed by the FCPF 
Facilities Management Team and upon a successful review, the proposal is approved by the 
Participants Committee that is comprised of 14 REDD country participants and 14 donor 
country and Carbon Fund participants. 222  It is argued that such process establishes 
governance by verifying and validating any country’s framework for REDD+ 
                                                 
219 Ibid. Saunders J. and Reeve R., (2010) at 19. 
220 Thompson M.C. et al, Seeing REDD+ as a project of environmental governance. (2011) 14 Environmental 
Science & Policy 100–110 at 104. 
221 The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) Template. March 8, 
(2008). 
222 Thompson M.C. et al, Seeing REDD+ as a project of environmental governance. (2011) 14 Environmental 
Science & Policy 100–110 at 104. 
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implementation. 223  This is because it shapes what is to be measured and how that 
measurement is to take place.224 For this reason, it makes sense to think of REDD+ as 
verified self-regulation.225 
4.5.4   Rule Making with Actors 
 
As we have seen in the introduction in self-regulation, government shares with regulated 
entities and regulatory beneficiaries the power either to set the contents of regulations or to 
enforce regulations or both at once.226 In REDD+ both within and outside the UNFCCC, this 
explanation can be located within the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) 
and it is argued that this is an aspect of power sharing. However, while FPIC by local 
communities is required in many cases the basic question of “consent for what?” is not 
answered.227 Given the lack of clarity, there “has been considerable confusion about how this 
right is most effectively exercised by indigenous peoples and best respected by outsiders.”228 
This chapter argues that we can draw from Ostrom’s analysis of self-regulation to make FPIC 
work. Ostrom indicates that "common pool resources" (i.e. natural resources used by many 
individuals in common) have long been subject to over exploitation and misuse by 
individuals acting in their own best interests. Ostrom observed that attempts to regulate the 
common have traditionally relied on two main approaches: centralised governmental 
regulation or privatisation of the resource. Ostrom argues that individuals in the community 
can design durable cooperative institutions that are organised and governed by the resource 
users themselves. And this is the third approach that should be used for long-term success. 
The work of Ostrom aimed to answer “how a group of principals who are in an 
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint 
benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically."229 
                                                 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. 
225 This also takes note of the Cancun Agreements requiring developing countries’ mitigation actions to be 
reported in biennial update reports comprising a national inventory report, information on mitigation actions, 
needs and mitigation support received. These reports will be subject to “international consultation and analysis.” 
Here the object is to increase the transparency. Costenbader J. et.al, NAMAs and REDD+: Relationship and 
main issues for consideration -with a focus on Southeast Asia. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). (2013) at 9 
226 Bregman E. and Jacobson A., Environmental performance review: Self-regulation in environmental law. 
(1994-1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 465 at 467-468. 
227 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices, (2012) at 41. 
228 Colchester M. and Ferrari M., “Making FPIC Work: Challenges and Prospects for Indigenous Peoples”, 
FPIC Working Papers, Forest Peoples Program, June (2007) at 3. 
229 Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. (1990). 
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With this in mind, one can argue that the principle of FPIC should be consenting to self-
regulation which includes inter alia the operational principles defined by the author.230 
It has been noted that the “idea or principle of national sovereignty has become a major issue 
in debates surrounding the establishment of a set of international REDD+ safeguards. 
National governments want to retain their autonomy in social and environmental policy, 
which makes it challenging to implement internationally mandated safeguards.” 231 
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that the function of the government includes attending to 
the needs of its people but in reality, because of their particular social and political situations, 
many developing countries are incapable of guaranteeing those rights. Subsequently, people 
feel compelled to develop self-regulation mechanisms to remedy the deficiencies of the 
country’s legal system. In this case, self-regulation provides the only possibility for their 
communities to enjoy such rights as security or justice. 232  Whereas the claim to self-
regulation can be justified on the basis of internal cohesion of the group, the practices which 
it entails are related to the fundamental demands of justice, morality and values which the 
group considers worthy of respect.233 The claim to self-regulation is therefore clearly related 
to the most vigorously asserted rights: those to land and to self-determination.234 Many native 
groups seek to enjoy the free possession and control of the territories where they live, or to 
recover those which they have lost. Control means in this case not only the free disposition of 
their natural resources or the power to exclude outsiders from their territories. 235  Self-
regulation does not mean that one can choose the rules as one likes.236 Instead, it only works 
when the rules must be able to achieve a balance between the interests of everyone who is 
affected by the externalities of a particular decision.237 
 
                                                 
230 These principles are: (1) clearly defined boundaries and membership; (2) congruence between members’ 
resource appropriation and provisions; (3) member participation in defining operational rules; (4) monitoring; 
(5) graduated sanctions; (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms; (7) members’ right to devise their own institutions 
unchallenged by government; and (8) in the case of larger systems, activities are organised in multiple layers of 
nested enterprises. 
231 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices, (2012) at 304. 
232 Ardito W., The right to self-regulation legal pluralism and human rights in Peru. (1997) 39 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism at 22. 
233 Ibid at 17-18. 
234 Ibid at 18. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Helbing D., Economics 2.0: The Natural Step towards a Self-Regulating, Participatory Market Society. 
(2013) 10:1 Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review 3–41 at 32. 
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4.5.5   Markets for Intervention Right 
 
Markets for rights to engage in undesirable environmental interventions allow regulated 
entities to determine for themselves the content of regulation. The instrument of self-
regulation is the creation of property rights to engage in harmful interventions and the trade 
of these rights in an organised market.238 The call for carbon rights and the linkage to the 
market is discussed in chapter 5 under the title “from carbon sequestration to carbon 
sequestration right”. With this in mind, it is possible to see how such approach fits with a 
model of self-regulatory governance. 
4.5.6   Accredited Self-Regulation 
Accredited self-regulation in which rules and compliance are accredited by another non-
governmental body (e.g. technical committee) was discussed above.239 An example of this is 
reflected in REDD+ outside the UNFCCC where CCBS does not verify emission reductions. 
The offsets must be verified through another standard (e.g. VCS or CDM). When the carbon 
credits are verified, they are tracked by the registry associated with the carbon accounting 
standard used. 
4.5.7   Under which Category of Self-Regulation does REDD+ fit? 
 
Having examined the different types of self-regulatory systems, this begs the question: under 
what category can REDD+ be conceptualised? The answer to this question is that REDD+ 
does not fit neatly into distinctions of self-regulatory systems discussed above. Rather it 
displays both aspects of voluntary and coerced self-regulatory measures. This is because of 
the fundamental principle of international law (state sovereignty) that states cannot be forced 
(theoretically speaking) to enter into an agreement. This is also in line with Lobel’s 
contention that the new governance paradigm defies the dichotomy of self-regulation. Instead 
it requires ongoing roles for government and law.240 
                                                 
238 Bregman E. and Jacobson A., Environmental performance review: Self-regulation in environmental law. 
(1994-1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 465 at 478. 
239 Black, J., “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems, 103-146 at 119. 
240 Lobel O., New Governance as Regulatory Governance. In David Levi-Four (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance (2012). Lobel O., The renew deal: The fall of regulation and the rise of governance in 
contemporary legal thought, 89 Minnesota Law Review 342 (2004). Lobel O., Setting the Agenda for New 
Governance Research. (2004-5) 89 Minnesota Law Review 498. “[I]t can be postulated, that pure forms of self-
regulation hardly exist in reality. Most are hybrid forms, which can appear under various constellations.” Senn 
M., Non-state regulatory regimes: understanding  institutional transformation. (2010) at 111. 
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For the purpose of this chapter, it is useful to keep in mind that self-regulation occurs at the 
domestic level and international level. It is noted that the literature on self-regulation has 
largely emphasised that self-regulation happens within a particular national jurisdiction. Put 
differently, the relationship between actors in self-regulator and regulatory beneficiaries 
occurs within a particular country. In this chapter, this concept is extended to international 
actors (regulatory bodies such as the World Bank, UNEP, FAO, UNDP etc.), and countries 
which are negotiating either in the new climate change agreements, or countries negotiating 
in the implementation of REDD+ activities within a host country. 
4.5.8   Potential Prospects for the 3Es Outcomes 
 
Cost-Effectiveness 
To many scholars self-regulation has many benefits as opposed to other regulatory 
approaches such as command and control. The most cited benefit is cost-effectiveness from 
the government’s point of view.241 This is because most enforcement duties and costs would 
be internalised by the regulated (the regulatees) which would be required to establish its own 
independent inspectorial group. Once that is achieved, the primary role of governmental 
inspectors would be to warrant the independence of this group and to assess its efficiency 
among other things.242 In chapter 2, it was noted that cost-effectiveness refers to the extent to 
which the programme has achieved or is expected to achieve its results at a lower cost 
compared with alternatives. It is submitted that self-regulation seems to offer that possibility. 
This implies that in order to achieve cost-effectiveness, it is crucial to see REDD+ as self-
regulatory governance. 
Equity  
Chapter 2 identified principles of justice for designing a regulatory framework for REDD+. It 
is argued that the application of those principles will have different implications depending 
on the objectives of the project at hand. As shown in this chapter, the objectives of REDD+ 
depend on the actor which anchors development of REDD+. McDermott et al conclude that 
                                                 
241 Sinclair D., Self-regulation versus command and control? Beyond false dichotomies. (1997) 19:4 Law and 
Policy at 530. Braithwaite J., Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control. (1982) 
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“it matters whether the goal of an initiative is to maximise gains in social equity, or merely to 
‘safeguard’ it.”243 A more recent paper argues that the UN-REDD and FCPF place demands 
on the principle of do no harm to the REDD+ countries.244 And this has been the dominant 
principle in REDD+ implementation.245 In the analysis of the mentioned principle, the author 
rightly contends that:   
The principle of do no harm is problematic for justice in REDD+ primarily because it 
is a negative principle. A negative principle of justice means that no action is 
necessary unless a new action or activity takes place. This is problematic for two 
primary reasons: first, as a negative principle, do no harm suggests that justice is the 
baseline in the absence of a new REDD+ intervention. It assumes that the status quo 
is fair and just. It presumes that project proponents have no prior relationships with 
the rights-holders and ignores the long and often unjust relationships that forest 
peoples have had with forest conservation interventions for decades-experiences that 
sparked the outcry following the promotion of REDD+ as a major carbon emissions 
mitigation and forest conservation mechanism. Second, the principle of do no harm 
and its operationalization through a standard (“generic”) set of justice practices 
further reifies norms and principles of justice that do not reflect the conceptualizations 
of justice articulated and pursued by forest peoples.246 
 
The exposition above raises further concerns. Suiseeya argues that the use of the do no harm 
principle above raises questions of clarity.247 For example, it is not easy to establish what 
constitutes harm, who decides when harm has taken place, over what time period protection 
from harm is required, as well as who is responsible for remediating occurrences of harm.248 
Thus in the absence of a common conceptualisation of what harm entails, it is hard to assess 
the extent to which the said principle can assist justice along any of the three dimensions of 
equity (distributive, procedural, and contextual) as discussed earlier. In this sense the role of 
such principle is to retreat “from more positive justice principles that have historically 
permeated global forest governance.”249 
Another aspect of equity relates to the allocation of positive incentives to the host countries. 
REDD+ incentives within the UNFCCC seem to be allocated to the national governments 
                                                 
243 McDermott, M. et. al., Examining equity: a multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services. (2012) 33 Environmental Science and Policy  416-427 at 424. 
244 Suiseeya K.R.M., A Retreat from Justice in Global Forest Governance: REDD+ and the “Do No Harm” 
Principle. A paper presented at the 3rd Annual UCSB Environmental Politics Conference UC Santa Barbara 
June 5, (2015) at 21. 
245 Ibid at 5. 
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based on what is considered to be sustainable development by the host governments. For 
instance, positive incentives to attract host governments include increased investment (such 
as spending of income in local markets or creation of jobs elsewhere in the economy), 
development of physical infrastructure, reduced spending in certain sectors (such as on flood 
management due to improved forest environmental services), and promotion of national 
environmental objectives. 250  Critics argue that such an approach might be sustainable 
development according to host governments but not according to the local community. The 
implication is that the host community would stand to lose. Therefore, it is then important 
from a justice perspective to examine how local impacts are balanced with national-level 
benefits.251 More importantly, there is a need to apply and balance the rest of the principles 
discussed in chapter 2.  
Environmental Effectiveness 
 
Traditional regulatory approaches such as command and control and/or privatisation of the 
resource have proven ineffective for solving many environmental issues.252 Subsequently, 
there have been efforts to search for viable alternatives.253 Self-regulation is an approach 
capable of resolving the problem of the overexploitation of the common resource. Ostrom 
through a number of case studies proposes a set of design principles common to each of the 
cases for the success of environmental effectiveness.254 Ostrom dispels the three dominant 
models (the tragedy of the commons, the prisoners' dilemma, and the logic of collective 
action) because they are all inadequate for they are based on the free-rider problem where 
individual, rational, resource users act against the best interest of the users collectively.255 It 
is revealed that Ostrom argues that these models are not necessarily wrong, but rather the 
conditions under which they hold are very particular. This is because they apply only when 
the many, independently acting individuals involved have high discount rates and little 
mutual trust, no capacity to communicate or to enter into binding agreements, and when they 
do not arrange for monitoring and enforcing mechanisms to avoid overinvestment and 
                                                 
250 Mathur V.N. et al, Experiences of host communities with carbon market projects: towards multi-level climate 
justice. (2014) 14:1 Climate Policy, 42-62 at 46. 
251 Ibid. For a discussion of the limits of Self-Regulation see Graham D. and Woods N., Making Corporate Self-
Regulation Effective in Developing Countries. (2006) 34:5 World Development 868–883. 
252 Lobel O., The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 Minnesota Law Review (2004) 342 at 343. Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action. (1990).  
253 Ibid. 
254 Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. (1990) at 181. 
255 http://www.scottlondon.com/reviews/ostrom.html. 
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overuse.256  Ostrom concludes that the challenge is to foster contingent self-commitment 
among the members.257Another study by Cameron Holley on self-regulation in the context of 
environmental sustainability sought to address the conditions for new environmental 
governance to be achieved. The study concluded that the key pillars to achieve such 
governance include, inter alia: capacity building and training, skillfully designed incentives, 
mobilising environmental interests, linking action at different scales, and improving the flow 
of information.258 
4.6    Conclusion 
This study extends the analysis of self-regulation from different disciplines to the study of 
REDD+. It has examined how multiple actors are engaging for the implementation of 
REDD+. In their approaches, such actors develop inter alia a number of principles and 
strategies. The realisation of these strategies and principles relies on various categories of 
self‐regulation as discussed in section 4.2.2. Thus the potential self-regulatory practices that 
are beginning to emerge out of these principles and strategies can be translated to mean 
different things in different contexts. At times they seemingly undermine the objects they 
purport to support as pointed out in the discussion of the principle of do no harm above. 
Thus, potential challenges of REDD+ as a self-regulatory tool relate to what the critics refer 
to as self-regulation is self-serving, self-interested and lacking in sanctions. These attributes 
have potential to derail efforts to secure the 3Es. As indicated above, self-regulation bodies 
define the objectives of REDD+ in a way which advances their interests. As they do that, 
they compete to define appropriate solutions. 259  This is seen as self-serving and self-
interested. “In particular, the privileging of market-based solutions reflects the interests of 
certain organizations and countries, with their neo-liberal emphasis on using the market and 
allocating property rights to create incentives to reduce emissions wherever it is cheapest to 
do so.” 260  The increase of actors and locations for governance also raises substantial 
challenges in terms of policy coordination and consistency.261 Such exposition is evident in a 
brief comparison of UN-REDD and FCPF programmes. It has also been pointed out that the 
UN-REDD programme seems to maintain a more socially oriented approach while the 
                                                 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. (1990) at 181. 
258 Holley C., New Environmental Governance. PhD Thesis, Australian National University (2008) at 366 and 
373. 
259 Bulkeley H. and Newell P., Governing Climate Change, (2010) at 51. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid. 
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presence of a carbon fund suggests a natural financial approach by the World Bank.262 The 
challenges that emerge from the two approaches such as envisaged by these actors are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
The emphasis revealed by this chapter is that self-regulation is not a simple, single-
equilibrium undertaking about the private actors regulating their own actions. Instead, it is an 
effort regarding the relationship between the public and private actors. In particular, a self-
regulatory system is about the ability of the former to induce collective action within the 
latter and vice versa depending on the objective at hand and the ability of actors to influence 
the direction of the other actor.263 By arguing that REDD+ should be viewed as a self-
regulatory system, we begin to gain a new and clear understanding of the conditions of 
possibility of a form of governance that can be harnessed to provide an optimal and feasible 
aspect of a regulatory framework. Therefore, the questions that emerge are: how can a self-
regulatory system be regulated? And what should be the role of the government thereof? The 
thesis returns to these questions in chapter 8. However before we address this aspect, the 
focus is directed to the understanding of the factors that create perils and promises in self-
regulation. This approach is deemed as a necessary preliminary in order to ascertain how to 
regulate a self-regulatory system. 
 
                                                 
262 Danon S. and Bettiati D., Reducing Emissions from Deforestaton and Forest Degradation (REDD+) – What 
is Behind the Idea and What is the Role of UN-REDD and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)? (2012) 
2:2 SEEFOR (South-East European Forestry). 
263 Newman A.L. and Bach D., Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public Power: Resolving Digital 
Dilemmas in Europe and the U.S. (2004) 17:3 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, 
and Institutions, 387–413 at 388.  
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Chapter Five: 
Carbon Rights: Developing a Property Law Framework and 
a Self-Regulatory Governance Regime 
5.1    Introduction 
Chapter 3 concluded that the international climate change regime has a hybrid governance (or 
pledge-and-review) approach. Thus developing countries face different sets of compliance 
questions, many arising out of REDD+ projects undertaken in the context of reporting on 
forest carbon stock changes in national communications. 1 In order to comply with these
procedural requirements in line with positive incentives requirements, a wide set of legal and 
institutional approaches may have to be undertaken by developing countries. These are inter 
alia conventional matters of improving forest conservation protection and assessment and 
new ways of looking at property ownership, land use, forest management and forest 
inventories and social and environmental impact.2  However, so far, a limited number of
countries have legislated rights specific to carbon sequestration (carbon rights). These include 
inter alia New Zealand, six states in Australia, and the province of Alberta, Canada.3 At the
time of writing, some developing countries (such as Mexico and Costa Rica) have devised 
climate legislation to prepare the ground for REDD+ implementation but have not explicitly 
expressed rights to carbon in their laws.4
1 Robles F.F., Forest Carbon Tenure in Asia-Pacific: A comparative analysis of legal trends to define carbon 
rights in Asia-Pacific. (2012) 89 FAO Legal Papers Online at 7. 
2 Ibid. 
3  Knox A. et. al., The Interface of Land And Natural Resource Tenure and Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies: Challenges and Options. Background paper prepared for the Expert Meeting on Land Tenure Issues 
for Implementing Climate Change Mitigation Policies in the AFOLU sectors by the Rural Development Institute 
(Seattle, USA) November 2010. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Rome, 15-17 
November (2010) at 17. 
4 Ibid Knox A. et. al., (2010). Also see Townshend T. et. al., The GLOBE Climate Legislation Study: A Review 
of Climate Change Legislation in 66 Countries. 4th ed London: GLOBE International and the Grantham 
Research Institute, London School of Economics. (2014). Available: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Globe2014.pdf  [accessed 21 March 2014]. 
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What carbon rights mean5 and who should be subject to such rights have been discussed 
widely.6 The underlying premise of carbon rights is to establish the first step in a process of 
distributing the benefits flowing from carbon finance amongst different stakeholders.7 Thus 
this chapter explores the property nature of carbon rights and does so with a view to 
suggesting a self-regulatory system for the governance of a REDD+ mechanism. It continues 
from chapter 4 which argued that the REDD+ mechanism represents a self-regulatory system. 
The conclusion was that the system holds promises (the solution to the limits of “centred” 
regulation and therefore highly efficient) as well as perils (that it could be self-serving, self-
interested and lacking in sanctions). Thus the main task of this chapter is to investigate the 
underlying concepts of “carbon rights” and the notion of “property” in the context of 
developing a cohesive governance system to source finance for REDD+. This is helpful in 
determining the conceptualisation of carbon rights. This undertaking is important because 
answers to it will add to a better understanding of how the definition and understanding of the 
concept of carbon rights can impact the regulatory functions of REDD+. This is by revealing 
essential characteristics which show how the ability of the host state can be facilitated or 
constrained in exercising the regulatory oversight in the self-regulatory system. Additionally, 
because the central question of this thesis is to identify the ideal model legislative framework 
sufficient to implement REDD+, answering this question contributes to knowledge of how 
                                                 
5 Can the carbon be categorised as a proprietary interest? If that is the case, then what is the most appropriate 
legal model to give effect to that right? How does the carbon right intersect with human rights and ecological 
dimensions? These types of questions were raised in Zahar A. et. al., Australian Climate Law in Global Context. 
(2013) at 348. Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 
Sydney Law Review 239. 
6 Streck, C., asks “who has the right to be compensated”? Streck, C., Rights and REDD+: legal and regulatory 
considerations. In: Angelsen, A., et al. (ed.), Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. (2009) at 
160. Other scholars ask who should benefit from REDD+ and why? Luttrell C. et. al., Who should benefit and 
why? Discourses on REDD+ benefit sharing in Chapter 8 in Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges 
and choices. (2012) at 155-157. See also Luttrell C. et. al., Who should benefit from REDD+? Rationales and 
realities. (2013)18:4 Ecology and Society 52. Takacs D., Forest Carbon: Law and Property Rights. Conservation 
International, (2009) at 18. O’Brien S., asks: who owns the carbon in the forests (and soils)? O’Brien S., 
REDD+ and Forest Carbon Rights in Papua New Guinea. Background Legal Analysis. International Climate 
Initiative Regional project Climate Protection through Forest Conservation in Pacific Island Countries. SPC/GIZ 
Regional REDD+ Project (2012) at 14. Lyster R., asks: who really owns the carbon in tropical rainforest 
countries: “land tenure” or “resource tenure”? Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. (2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-456 
at 35. Barnes and Quail point out that the question of “who owns the Carbon?” is relevant to REDD initiatives as 
it identifies the major stakeholders and potential “beneficiaries” of REDD payments. But, in addition, the answer 
to this question “determines the required effort, resources and time to clarify and document carbon property 
rights” Barnes G. and Quail S., Property rights to carbon in the context of climate change. University of Florida 
Proceedings WB Land and Poverty Conference (2009) at 7. 
7 Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the 
Environment, Sweden (2014) at 20. 
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different sources of climate finance at the global level shape regulatory outcomes at the local 
level. 
The next section briefly discusses the conceptualisation of carbon rights. This is followed by 
a discussion on ownership of carbon rights and “allocation of benefits” by focusing on private 
and public sector finances to discern some potential perils and promises for the REDD+ 
mechanism. In addition, the chapter discusses how these sources of financing REDD+ impact 
the conceptualisation of carbon rights and implications for a self-regulatory system. The 
chapter concludes with the implications of the framework for REDD+ regulation at a 
domestic level. 
5.2    Conceptualising Carbon Rights 
Arguably, in exploring the concept of carbon rights, we must examine what the term intends 
as well as the actors or forces behind that intention. But an understanding of the key concepts 
on which carbon rights are based is a necessary preliminary to such an inquiry. These are 
“carbon sink”, 8  “reservoir”, 9  “carbon sequestration”, and “enhancement of carbon 
sequestration”. Thereafter the next step is to allocate “rights” (either ownership rights or the 
economic right to benefit, or both) associated with the aforementioned concepts.10 
5.2.1   Carbon “Stock”, “Sink”, “Reservoir” and “Sequestration” 
 
Neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol defines carbon sequestration (also known as a 
sink).1112 However, the UNFCCC defines the terms “reservoir” and “sink” as indicated in 
next paragraph. Elsewhere, there are some examples that are helpful in the definition of these 
concepts. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines carbon sequestration as 
“[t]he uptake and storage of carbon.” 13  The Parliament of Australia defines carbon 
sequestration as a process of capturing and storage of carbon over a long period of time. The 
                                                 
8 The term “sink” appears in the definitions of the UNFCCC as discussed in section 5.2.1.    
9 The term “reservoir” appears in the definitions of the UNFCCC as discussed in section 5.2.1.    
10 Gupta H.S., Policy and Legal Aspects of Forestry Carbon Projects. In Gupta H.S. et. al., Science and Business 
of Forestry Carbon Projects. (2014) at 143. 
11 IPCC Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF. Annex A: Glossary at G18. Available: http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_files/Glossary_Acronyms_BasicInfo/Glossary.pdf [accessed 12 
March 2014]. 
12 Carbon Sequestration Options Under the Clean Development Mechanism to Address Land Degradation. World 
Soil Resources Reports, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome, 2000 at 9. Available: 
http://www.fao.org/forestry/15528-0534f06d08a9c3cbcd73deefd8d06c674.pdf [accessed 1 March 2014]. 
13 Ibid. 
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capturing can occur at the point of emission (e.g. from power plants) or through natural 
processes (such as photosynthesis), which remove carbon from the earth’s atmosphere.14 This 
definition is different to the New South Wales Conveyancing Act.15 The Act provides that 
“carbon sequestration” by a tree or forest means the process by which the tree or forest 
absorbs carbon from the atmosphere.16 
The UNFCCC defines “reservoir” to mean a “component or components of the climate 
system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.” It also defines 
the term “sink” to mean any process, activity or mechanism which removes carbon or a 
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.17 The opposite of the term “sink” is 
“source” which is defined as a process or activity which releases carbon into the atmosphere.18 
Removal of carbon by sinks is provided in the Kyoto Protocol under Article 3.3 as discussed in 
chapter 3. The requirement is that Annex Parties can rely on carbon sequestration to help meet 
their obligations. Specifically the article provides that: 
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, […] 
measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period shall be 
used to meet the commitments […]. 
The term “carbon stock” is not defined, but its scope has been suggested. A carbon stock refers 
to the amount of carbon stored in a carbon pool (also known as a reservoir).19 Within the land-
use category the relevant classification of “carbon pool” relevant for the REDD+ mechanism is 
provided by the IPCC 2006 guidelines as follows: 
 Biomass (above and below ground): Above ground contains all biomass of living 
vegetation, both woody and herbaceous, above the soil  including stems, stumps, 
                                                 
14 Parliament of Australia, Carbon sequestration, 22 October, 2010. Available: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse_by_Topi
c/ClimateChange/responses/mitigation/Carbon_sequestration [accessed 27 March 2014]. 
15 Section 87A of the New South Wales Conveyancing Act 1919 No 6.   
16 Ibid. 
17 Article 1 (8). 
18 IPCC Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF. Annex A: Glossary at G19. Available: http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_files/Glossary_Acronyms_BasicInfo/Glossary.pdf. 
19  Cited in Carbon Sequestration Options Under The Clean Development Mechanism To Address Land 
Degradation. World Soil Resources Reports, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
Rome,2000 at 16. Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/15528-0534f06d08a9c3cbcd73deefd8d06c674.pdf 
[accessed 28 March 2014]. The term “pool” means “a component of the climate system, other than the 
atmosphere, which has the capacity to store, accumulate, or release a substance of concern (e.g., carbon, a 
greenhouse gas, or a precursor). Oceans, soils, and forests are examples of reservoirs of carbon.” See Glossary 
of Terms used in the IPCC Third Assessment Reportat 383. Available: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/tar-ipcc-
terms-en.pdf [accessed 20 March 2014]. 
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branches, bark, seeds, and foliage. Below ground contains all biomass of live roots 
except fine roots of less than (suggested) 2mm diameter 
 Dead organic matter; all dead wood, and litter 
 Soil (including peat and organic carbon in mineral soils which includes live and dead 
roots of less than 2mm diameter)20 
 
Given the above exposition, there are various appropriate management practices which are 
used to enhance carbon sequestration. These include inter alia: 
 Enhancing the storage of carbon in forests and other vegetation (plant sequestration) 
 Enhancing the storage of carbon in soil (soil sequestration) 
 Storing carbon in underground geological formations (geo-sequestration)  
 Storing carbon in the ocean (ocean sequestration) and 
 Subjecting the carbon to chemical reactions to form in organic carbonates (mineral 
carbonation)21 
5.2.2   Approaches to Creating New Property Rights 
 
Concerns over, inter alia, the nature of carbon sequestration as discussed above, the 
management practices thereof, the need to translate the sequestered carbon into commercial 
benefits have given rise to the need to create carbon rights as new property rights. In turn 
there has been a scholarly discussion about carbon rights as new property rights.22 This raises 
                                                 
20 The UNFCCC has requested the state parties that implement REDD+ activities to use the most recent IPCC 
guidelines, as adopted or encouraged by the COP, as a basis for estimating anthropogenic forest-related 
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks (Dec. 4/CP. 15, para. 1(c)). The most recent 
guideline is IPCC 2006 which provides the said categories of carbon pools above. See IPCC 2006 Guidelines for 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Vol. 4 on AFOLU, Ch. 1, Table 1.1 (http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html). [accessed 10 March 2014]. 
21 Glazewski J. et. al., Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS): Towards a Regulatory and Legal Regime in 
South Africa’ Institute of Marine and Environmental Law (IMEL) and African Climate and Development 
Initiative (ACDI), University of Cape Town, Cape Town (2012). Available: 
http://www.imel.uct.ac.za/usr/law/imel/downloads/CCS_Report.pdf [accessed 16 March 2014]. Parliament 
of Australia, Carbon sequestration, 22 October, 2010. Available: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse_by_Topi
c/ClimateChange/responses/mitigation/Carbon_sequestration [accessed 16 March 2014]. 
22  Using $500 as compensation to Jose for not cutting down a tree, Barnes argues that a prudent project 
proponent needs to answer five fundamental questions: (1) What rights did Jose have to the tree given that the 
state owned the land? (2) How could the transaction be legally formalised? (3) What would prevent Jose from 
selling the development rights to a number of other unsuspecting gringos? (4) How could the proponent’s rights 
be enforced if Jose turned around and logged the tree for its timber value? (5) Is $500 a fair market price for the 
tree given its ecological function as a carbon sink? The authors believe that all of these questions point to the 
fundamental property rights. Barnes G. and Quail S., Property rights to carbon in the context of climate change. 
University of Florida Proceedings WB Land and Poverty Conference (2009) at 1. This line of thinking could be 
supported by Hepburn’s observation that new forms of proprietary interests have emerged as society recognises 
new types of objects which may be owned and new forms of relationships which are proprietary in nature. 
Hepburn S., Principles of Property Law, (2001), at 25. The introduction of legislation for the creation of rights in 
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a question of what are essential elements to take into account so as to classify carbon rights as 
new property rights.  
In deciding whether to assign a proprietary status to a particular resource, Gray argues that 
three criteria must be satisfied. A resource cannot be propertised if, on any of these grounds, 
it lacks the quality of excludability.23 These are: 
(1) physical excludability 
(2) legal excludability and  
(3) moral criteria of excludability24 
The first criterion of physical non-excludability arises where it is not possible or reasonably 
practicable to exclude strangers from access to the benefits of a particular resource in its 
existing form. The lighthouse example as discussed by Gray provides quite a good 
illustration. 25  Gray stresses that it “is important to observe that the test of physical 
excludability requires careful application. A physically non-excludable resource presents 
itself only where it is not reasonably practicable to exclude strangers from access to the 
benefits of that resource in its existing form.”26 Therefore no one can claim "property" in a 
resource in relation to which it is physically unrealistic to exclude strangers from access and 
                                                                                                                                                        
sequestered carbon in some jurisdictions has been motivated by the need to attract investment by overseas 
investors, who demanded a legislative mechanism to recognise carbon rights. Such rights would afford “the 
owner” the legal and commercial benefits due to carbon sequestration and risks and liabilities in the event 
of carbon release occurring with respect to the carbon right which is registered. Thus, in determining the 
elements of carbon rights, those charged with devising regulatory instruments must ensure that carbon 
rights are aligned with the rules of the carbon offsets trading regime in which they are to be traded (i.e. either in 
a compliance market or voluntary market). O’Conner P. et. al., From Rights to Responsibilities: 
Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in Australia. (2013) 30:5 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal, at 3-4. The Western Australian Carbon Rights Act 2003, S 8:1. And Boydell S. et. al., Carbon Rights in 
Context. (2009) 11:2 Environmental Practice at 112. Explicit definitions of carbon rights are probably needed 
for trade mechanisms, but a “more precise definition of rights to benefits from land and carbon sinks may instead 
be required under other conditions” such as the need to prevent potential violations of human rights and 
biodiversity degradation. Boydell S. et. al., Carbon Rights in Context. 11:2 Environmental Practice (2009) at 
108.  Expert meeting on land tenure issues and requirements for implementing climate change mitigation 
policies in the forestry and agriculture sectors. 15‐17 November, Headquarters, Rome, Italy (2010). Available: 
http://www.fao.org/climatechange/65623/en/. Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of 
statutory verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 239. Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal 
framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the Environment, Sweden (2014). Boydell explains 
that in “the face of rising green litigation in Australia, the finance and business sectors, as well as the legal 
profession, have been calling for a clearer understanding of carbon property rights.” Boydell S. et. al., Carbon 
Rights in Context. (2009) 11:2 Environmental Practice at 105 and 110. 
23 Gray K., Property in Thin Air, (1991) 50 Cambridge  Law Journal 252-307 at 17. 
24 Ibid at 17 and 44. 
25 Ibid at 17and 18. Once the lighthouse is in operation, “the light cannot be artificially confined to a subset of 
the seafarers within its broad sweep.” In this case the beam of light is non-excludable, and resources of such 
nature are retained in the commons. Gray then argues that a person can have “property rights” in the lighthouse 
but not in the light. 
26 Ibid at 20. 
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use it consistently over prolonged periods.27 The limiting factors that have to be taken into 
account include inter alia cost-effectiveness of providing protection.28 As discussed in the 
above section, carbon sequestration exists in an intangible nature. However, to ensure its 
existence, there must be some degree of physical excludability or control over an area of 
forest. This means that REDD+ activities will not be immune from various conflicts over land 
and resource access. Ostrom has argued that the ability to exclude unwanted beneficiaries 
depends both on the technology of physical exclusion devices.29 These may include barbed 
wire fences and the existence and enforcement of various bundles of property rights such as 
the use of customary law to enforce locally devised rules as to who was allowed to access and 
utilise the resource in question.30 
The second criterion is frequently invoked to ensure that a resource is protectable against 
strangers by legal means. If, however, the plaintiff fails to use such means, where available, 
to regulate the access of strangers to the benefits of a resource, then Gray contends that the 
resource must be considered to be non-excludable.31 Subsequently, the resource should be 
available for use and exploitation by all who actually succeed in gaining access. Just as in the 
instance of physically non-excludable resources, the burden and risk of legal non-
excludability rests with the claimant who seeks to propertise a particular resource.32 
A third and final ground on which a resource may be left outside the threshold of property 
arises in cases of moral non-excludability.33 The notion of moral non-excludability derives 
from the fact that there are certain resources which are simply perceived to be so central or 
intrinsic to constructive human coexistence that it would be severely anti-social that these 
resources should be removed from the commons.34 To propertise resources of such social 
                                                 
27 Ibid at 19. 
28 Gray K., Property in Thin Air, (1991) 50 Cambridge LawJournal 252-307 at 20.  A similar reasoning is also 
being discussed by Bell. The author argues that: “It must be borne in mind that the cost of property protection 
depends on the available technology. In this case the advancement of technology may make it possible and cost-
effective to create new property rights in as yet unprotected resources.” Bell A. and Parchomousky G., A theory 
of property. (2005) Cornell Law Review, 90, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics, 
Research Paper 04-0 531 at 533 and 564. 
29 Ostrom E., How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective active. 15:3 Journal of Theoretical 
Politics (2003) 239-270 at 241. 
30 Ibid at 241. 
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vitality is contra bonos mores.35 This means that the resources in question are non-excludable 
because it is widely recognised that undesirable or intolerable consequences would flow from 
allowing any one person or group of people to control access to the benefits which they 
confer.36 
One can add the fourth criterion by making reference to the Lord Wilberforce in National 
Provincial Bank Ltd v. Ainsworth case.37 This case concerned two aspects: the quality of a 
person's interest in a home when people reside together, and licences in land. Thus, before the 
House of Lords the “legal problem involve[d] an effort to balance matrimonial relations and 
real property rights.”38 In making the distinction between an equitable interest and a “mere” 
equity, Lord Wilberforce stated: 
Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right 
affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its 
nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or 
stability. The wife's right has none of these qualities, it is characterised by the reverse 
of them.39 
With reference to this case, Hepburn points out that a “right to the intangible benefit flowing 
from carbon storage does not, however, have any identifiable physical boundaries making the 
nature and scope of associated rights obscure in the absence of express articulation.”40 
According to Lyster, it:  
is not a simple undertaking to identify what amounts to “property” in forest carbon.41 
This is so for a number of reasons not the least of which that in trying to craft a 
definite legal answer to this issue, one realises that REDD+ schemes are multi-
jurisdictional where either common law or civil law predominate, and where the 
constitutions of former colonies may now include the protection of fundamental legal 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Gray K., Property in Thin Air, (1991) 50 Cambridge  Law Journal 252-307 at 21 and 23. 
37 Temelini P.D., National Provincial Bank vs. Ainsworth, [1965] 2 All E.R. 472, (1966)  4:1 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 133-141 at 134. 
38 Ibid. 
39 National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth, [1965] 2 All E.R. 472 at 19. Available: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1965/1.html [accessed 13 April 2014]. 
40 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 239 at 263. 
41 Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, 
(2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-456, at 36. 
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rights either by way of a Bill of Rights or Directives of State Principle.42 Accordingly 
this then limits the options for identifying “property” in carbon according to first 
principles about the notion of property.43 
5.2.3   Property and Property Rights 
 
Property law can arise from common law, statutes, and the Constitution.44 However, the 
creation of new property rights presents challenges for property law.45 This is so because 
there is no consensus on the meaning of “property” despite extensive discussion. 46  A 
convincing argument  in this respect is that property is not a thing but rather a “power 
relationship” which one has with a thing.47 One cannot therefore “own  land  or  property,  
but  rather  a  collection  of  right,  obligations,  and restrictions, or an individual right, 
over a [thing].”48 This is why it is “possible for a number of people to acquire different, but 
compatible, rights in or over the same thing”.49 It is contended that property rights that can be 
owned are rights to use.50 Property rights to use include: the right of usufruct in civil law 
                                                 
42 Lyster indicates that these “are aspirational goals which may be relied upon by Supreme Courts to interpret 
other rights such as the fundamentally protected “right to life”.” See Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate 
Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, (2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal, 417-456, at 36. 
43 Ibid Lyster R., (2009) at 36. 
44 Johnson D.R., Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, (2007)  32:247 Vermont Law Review at 248. 
45 O’Connor P., “The Extension of Land Registration Principles to New Property Rights in Environmental 
Goods.” In Dixon M. (ed)., Modern Studies in Property Law, Volume 5. (2009)  at 364. 
46 Glazewski J. The bill of rights and environmental law, in, Glazewski J., Environmental Law in South Africa. 3   
ed. (2013) Durban: Lexis Nexis at 23. Munby J. et. al., Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre, The Law Commission (LAW COM No 327) (2011) at 13. Available: 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf [accessed 13 April 2014]. 
47 Gray K. and Gray S.F., The idea of property in land, in Bright S. and Dewar J.K. (eds), Land Law: Themes 
and Perspectives (1998), 15-51. Available: http://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/show.php?dowid=870. [accessed 13 April 
2014]. Gray K and Gray S., Elements of Land Law, 5th ed. (2009) at 98. See also Fairlie K. and Boydell S., 
Representing carbon property rights. FIG Working Week (2010) at 6. Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate 
Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, (2009) 26: 6, Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal, 417-456 at 37. 
48 Fairlie K and Boydell S., Representing carbon property rights. FIG Working Week (2010) at 6. Available: 
http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2010/papers/ts01e%5Cts01e_fairlie_boydell_4224.pdf [accessed 18 April 2014]. 
49 Gray K and Gray S., Elements of Land Law 5
th ed. (2009) at 594. 
50 Bouckaert divides property rights into ownership rights and rights to use. See Bouckaert B., Property 
(ed.), Law and Economics: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed. (2010) at 33. But Hepburn points out 
the confusion that may arise in some cases. The author indicates that it is not clear to draw the distinction 
between “ownership” and “right to use”. An example cited is the property rights in the human body. Hepburn S., 
Principles of Property Law, 2nd ed., (2001) at 26. Maguire explains that from a government “perspective, the most 
important considerations in the design of forest regulation are issues connected with forest tenure and use rights. 
Such rights lie at the heart of forest regulation, as they define who holds the right to use the forest area and how it 
may be used, depending on the nature of the right conferred.” Maguire R., Global Forest Governance: Legal 
Concepts and Policy Trends. (2013) at 15. 
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systems51 or profit à prendre52 in common law systems, the right of servitude in civil law 
systems, the right of “easement”53  in common law and covenant in common law.54 
Boydell et al noted that “existing property law is vexed and often embedded over metaphors 
such as the “bundle of rights”55 to explain a normative view of property. This is strange, 
given that “the categories of interests in land are not closed. They change and develop as 
society changes and develops.”56 This general overview is important for the discussion on 
carbon rights because linking carbon rights to property rights would mean to represent a 
“claim to a benefit stream that the state agrees to protect through the assignment of duty to 
others who may interfere with the benefit stream.”57 
5.2.4   Potential Verification of Carbon Rights 
 
There exist four main approaches in creating a new set of property rights. With respect to 
carbon sequestration in Australia, O’Connor observes that options for legislative drafters to 
create a new set of property rights are by: assimilation; analogy; full statutory specification as 
a new class of right; and specification through statutory agreements.58 
The assimilation approach is used to create new statutory rights by equating them with an 
existing common law class but that is subject to statutory modifications. The benefit of this 
approach is that it allows the import of a set of ready-made rules, but the danger is that it can 
lead to incoherence if the new right does not fit. 59  An example cited is a statutory 
endorsement of the concept of carbon rights as a profit à prendre as provided in some states 
                                                 
51 Bouckaert B., Property (ed.), Law and Economics: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed. (2010) at 
36. 
52 The term profit àprendre refers to a right of taking. It confers upon the holder a right to “profit” from the 
natural produces obtained from the land. It is best understood within the broader framework of the concept of 
bundle of rights. Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 
Sydney Law Review 239 at 245 and 258. 
53 “A conservation easement is a legal agreement, made between a landowner and an eligible organization, that 
serves to restrict the activities that may take place on the landowner’s property.” Cited in Aaronson D.L. and  
Manuel M.B., Conservation Easements and Climate Change. (2008) 8:2 Sustainable Development Law and 
Policy  at 27. 
54 Gary C., Views of the forest: Property law and carbon rights. (2013) 15 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental 
Law 69-94 at70. 
55 Boydell S. et. al., Carbon Rights in Context. (2009) 11:2 Environmental Practice at 105-6. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Bromley D., Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy, (1991) Cited in Palmer C., 
Property rights and liability for deforestation under REDD+: Implications for “permanence” in policy design. 
(2011)  70 Ecological Economics 571-576 at 571. 
58 O’Connor P., Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement 
Costs. (2013) 39:1 Monash University Law Review 38-65 at 52-53. 
59 Ibid at 53. 
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in Australia.60 However, this approach has been criticised because this reference represents an 
inappropriate profile for carbon interests as it does not accurately reflect their character and 
form. For this reason, it does not respond to the variety of structural and conceptual issues 
underpinning their innovative character.61 For example, if carbon rights mean a profit then: 
What is the physical scope of this right, what are its incidental rights and how does it 
affect the rights of the underlying landowner? A right of taking would ordinarily 
include any associated rights necessary to support the act of physically removing 
natural produce from the land. A right to the intangible benefit flowing from carbon 
storage does not, however, have any identifiable physical boundaries making the 
nature and scope of associated rights obscure in the absence of express articulation.62 
[Therefore] the creation of new carbon land interests may generate interpretive 
difficulties for courts and other regulatory bodies to comprehend the nature and scope 
of these unique interests and their impact upon the property framework.63 
The analogy approach allows the specification of the new right by correlation with a 
conventional class of right, so that the rules applicable to that right are adopted.64 The full 
statutory specification is undertaken to constitute the new right as a sui generis right, a novel 
statutory form with its own rule set.65 Hepburn proposes that the fundamental difficulty of 
connecting carbon rights to pre-conceived and incompatible common law categories is 
avoided, if such interests are fully regulated within a statutory framework.66 Therefore, the 
most effective way of formalising and responding to the carbon interest as a property right is 
through the implementation of specific regulatory provisions detailing the form, content and 
                                                 
60 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property:  Towards a Uniform Framework. Volume, DOI: (2005) at 7. 
McMahon M., Carbon Sequestration Rights as They Apply to a Conveyancing Practice. Speech Presented at the 
Brothers and Sisters in Law conference at Parramatta on 19th and 20th March, (2011). Available: 
http://mmmlegal.com.au/public-speaking [accessed 16 April 2014]. See also Boydell S. et. al., Carbon Rights in 
Context. (2009) 11:2 Environmental Practice at 105 and 110. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 239 at 262. 
63 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: Towards a Uniform Framework., (2005) at 8. 
64 O’Connor P., Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement 
Costs. (2013) 39:1 Monash University Law Review 38-65 at 53.  Gary C., Views of the forest: Property law and 
carbon rights. (2013) 15 Asia Pacific Journalof Environmental Law 69-94 at 70. See also Hepburn S., Carbon 
Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 239 at 255 and 
263. See also Boydell S. et. al., Carbon Rights in Context. (2009) 11:2 Environmental Practice at 105 and 110. 
65 O’Connor P., Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement 
Costs. (2013) 39:1 Monash University Law Review 38-65 at 54. 
66 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property:  Towards a Uniform Framework. Volume, DOI: (2005) at 8. 
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scope of this unique and important natural resource interest.67 The author cites legislative 
provisions in Western Australia as a potential model law to draw from. In particular, the said 
law makes proprietary verification dependent upon registration.68 Hepburn has also outlined 
advantages of articulating carbon sequestration rights as a sui generis statutory right. Drawing 
upon Merrill and Smith, she identifies the advantages as including clarity, universality, 
comprehensiveness, stability and implicit compensation.69 She then points out that statute “is 
an appropriate method of introducing new proprietary interests that are associated with a 
difficult subject matter because it ensures the introduction of detailed provisions to regulate 
unclear or ambiguous areas.”70 This is because “statutory proprietary interests can only arise 
where the requirements expressly set out in the statute are proven.”71 In addition, the statute 
will also clarify the rights attached to the interest.72  As mentioned earlier, while a fully 
elaborated statutory scheme is ideal, examples are rare due to the difficulty of the task.73 At 
the same time statutory interests expressed as sui generis have been held to be inherently 
susceptible to change and legislative whim, and have therefore acquired a diminished 
proprietary status by comparison with their institutionalised common law counterparts.74 
There has also been an argument to derive carbon rights from conservation easements. This is 
an option recommended in place of the profit à prendre and pure statutory interest.75 If the 
conception of carbon rights is compared to specific easements, then it becomes clear that they 
are owned by those who invest and compensate the land owner.76 This means carbon rights 
                                                 
67 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review, 239 at 245. 
68 By the reference to “a pure statutory interest” Hepburn means “a property interest which is not aligned with 
any common law form.” Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. 
(2009) 31 Sydney Law Review. 239 at 242. 
69  O‘Conner P. et. al., From Rights to Responsibilities: Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in 
Australia. (2013) 30:5 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, at 12. 
70 Hepburn S., Principles of Property Law,  2nd ed., (2001), at 26. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 O’Connor P., Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement 
Costs. (2013) 39:1 Monash University Law Review 38-65 at 54. 
74 McMahon M., Carbon Sequestration Rights as They Apply to a Conveyancing Practice. Speech 
Presented at the Brothers  and  Sisters  in  Law  conference  at  Parramatta  on  19th  and  20th  March,  (2011). 
Available: http://mmmlegal.com.au/public-speaking [accessed 12 April 2014]. 
75 Karsenty A. et. al., “‘Carbon rights”’, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. Environmental 
Science (2012) at 24.  Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 
31 Sydney Law Review, 239 at 263. 
76  Karsenty A. et. al., “‘Carbon rights”’, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) 
Environmental Science at 24. 
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must be separated from land tenure in order to be compared to easements.77 However, the 
scope and character of such a benefit is still unclear in this case. Be that as it may, this 
approach has not yet been endorsed in any of the Australian legislative frameworks.78 
Having noted the above challenges, Australian legislators have increasingly resorted to a 
specification through statutory agreements. This approach requires that the rights be only 
partly defined and specified by the statute, and their content be regulated by individualised 
statutory agreements.79  In some cases, the content of the agreements is partly structured 
through incorporated guidelines setting out standard requirements.80 
Apart from the above examples, others have proposed an option to classify carbon rights as 
a web of interests.81 This argument is motivated by the social dimensions of carbon property 
rights that need to be considered-such as who should be allowed to own carbon property 
rights. In particular, questions that arise are: do carbon rights represent an individual right, a 
right you can purchase or allocate, o r  a right that is held by countries or industry?82 The 
proponents of carbon rights as a web of interests argue that in the face of scientific, social, 
and legal uncertainty about the future direction of carbon property rights, what is needed is a 
new way to conceive of the complex web of interests.83 The authors add that we “need to 
come to terms with the consequences of isolating carbon property rights from the 
unfortunate metaphor of ‘bundle of rights’ that currently make up Australian property 
law.”84 This means that ownership:  
is no more than a "bundle of rights" qualified in their extent by law and the 
limitations of the actions which can be brought to enforce the rights. The three 
elements of ownership - the right of indefinite user; the right of unrestricted 
disposition; and the unlimited duration of the right of enjoyment - are each subject to 
qualification, direct or indirect.85 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 239 at 263. 
79 O’Connor P., Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement 
Costs. (2013)  39:1 Monash University Law Review 38-65 at 54. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Boydell S. et. al., Carbon Rights in Context.(2009) 11:2 Environmental Practice at 111. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at106 and 111. 
84 Ibid at 111. 
85  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Available: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5672e/y5672e04.htm [accessed 18 April 2014]. 
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This chapter does not seek to engage and add to the critical analysis of the question of what 
has been presented above. As mentioned earlier, its focus is on an examination of what 
carbon rights intend as well as the actors or forces behind that intention. This analysis is 
useful because it will provide clues as to how carbon rights might be framed. Once that is 
done, we can find ways to identify potential perils and promises that might be associated with 
those forces.  
5.2.5   Carbon Rights, Carbon Credits and Benefit Sharing 
 
The concept of “carbon rights” appears to be synonymous with the term “benefit sharing” but 
the two concepts do not refer to the same thing.86 In most countries these concepts are closely 
associated with land tenure and resource tenure.87 Some scholars argue that defining carbon 
rights is the first stage in a process of distributing the benefits flowing from carbon 
sequestration amongst different stakeholders.88 Given the challenges of verification of carbon 
rights discussed above, carbon rights can only be defined broadly as “intangible assets created 
by legislative and/or contractual arrangements that allow the recognition of separate benefits 
arising from carbon sequestration.”89 Following this, the term “carbon rights” contains two 
fundamental concepts: (1) the property rights to sequestered carbon (i.e. emission reductions 
and any increases in stocks contained in the carbon sink; and (2) the rights to benefits that 
arise from the transfer of these property rights, such as through emissions trading schemes.90 
                                                 
86 Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the 
Environment, Sweden (2014) at 20. Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. (2012) at 9. 
87 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices, (2012) at 9. 
88 Ibid. Also see Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. 
Ministry of the Environment, Sweden (2014) at 20.    
89 Cited in Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012)  
Environmental Science and Policy at 2. 
90 Peskett L. and Brodnig G. Carbon Rights in REDD+: Exploring the Implications for Poor and Vulnerable 
People. World Bank/REDD-net 2011; 1-34 at 3. See also Skutsch M., Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies 
around the distribution of benefits. Review (Undated). And Skutsch M. et. al., Rights to carbon and payments for 
services rendered under REDD+: Options for the case of Mexico. (2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 813-
825 at 815. The authors point out that carbon rights do not necessarily imply ownership of carbon. As such the 
term could refer simply to the right to some share of the benefits. O’Conner P. et. al., From Rights to 
Responsibilities: Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in Australia. (2013) 30:5 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal, at 4. 
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It is emphasised that it is a misnomer to refer to carbon rights to mean land tenure or resource 
tenure.91 Carbon rights are generated by investment and are awarded once there are emission 
reductions below reference levels. This means carbon rights are not awarded based on the 
carbon found in the forest (see chapter 4 which indicates that in the third phase benefits i.e. 
payments will be based on performance).92 Karsenty added that if all the carbon credits were 
held by the landowner, then there would be no incentives to the investor to invest in REDD+ 
projects.93 This is because in a market-based approach in forestry and land-use mitigation 
activities carbon credits are the only tangible financial expression of the carbon rights.  94 
Using this line of thinking, having land tenure and resource tenure cannot be said to be 
owning carbon rights.95 This has also been the case in the case of the CDM.96 Karsenty cites 
the carbon rights ownership rules of the CDM to emphasise this point. In particular for an 
enterprise in the energy sector the carbon credits go to the investor whose investments 
triggered emission reductions.97 If, by law, the “carbon rights” (the value of the expected 
carbon credits) were allocated to the landowner rather than to the investor, it would allow 
only large private landowners (with financial capacities and REDD+ opportunities) to 
undertake such projects.98 However, government could decide by law that carbon credits must 
be shared between the investor and the forest owner or land owner (the communities) but this 
would not alter the ownership of carbon rights.99 
The arguments presented above are compelling but one has to take into account the context in 
which REDD+ has been negotiated in order to identify more possible ways of conceptualising 
carbon rights. Section 3.7 of chapter 3 has discussed how REDD+ can be construed as an 
offset or non-offset mechanism. With the twofold interpretation in mind, it is useful to think 
of carbon rights in two fundamentally different aspects as discussed by various authors who 
contend that “carbon rights” refer to: 
                                                 
91 Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental 
Science and Policy at 5. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid at 25. 
94 Ibid at 9. 
95 Ibid at 5. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid at 24. 
98 Ibid at 6. 
99 Ibid at 5. 
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1. The property rights to sequestered carbon, which is physically contained in land, trees 
and soil, but does not necessarily coincide with the property rights over the physical 
resources.100 This gives the holder the rights to benefits from payments for emissions 
reductions from non-market sources. In this case no tradable carbon rights are 
created. 101 Under this approach carbon rights may also define the management 
responsibilities associated with a specific area of forest.   
 
2. The property right to sequestered carbon which is distinct from the right to benefit 
from selling carbon credits.102 Under this approach carbon rights may only define the 
commercial aspect and it is left up to the actors to define the management 
responsibilities associated with a specific area of forest. The purpose of distinguishing 
between carbon credit and carbon rights is that credits can be freely traded on the 
carbon market separately from the latter.103 Viewed in this way, an observation from 
the Australian Carbon Farming Act becomes helpful. The Act provides that carbon 
credits are issued to the actor who holds carbon rights, “but thereafter the credits can 
be aggregated or disaggregated and traded in the market separately from the real 
property right.”104 This means after the first transaction, the credit will pass to an actor 
who has no real property right in the land. At this stage there is no effective 
contractual or other means between the two actors of ensuring that the carbon remains 
sequestered or ensuring the permanance. The task of ensuring permanence is 
established by the legislation.105 
 
A decision of a preferable conceptualisation of carbon rights is likely to be determined by the 
source of finance as discussed in section 5.3.3 below. The twofold interpretation of carbon 
rights as illustrated above will have different legal implications when land tenure and forest 
tenure are taken into account. This is so because land tenure and forest tenure are provided by 
                                                 
100  Luttrell C. et. al., Who should benefit and why? Discourses on REDD+ benefit sharing, In Angelsen A. 
et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices, (2012) at 145. Costenbader J. (ed)., Legal Frameworks for 
REDD: Design and Implementation at the National Level. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland (2009) at 27. 
101  REDD-net.Carbon Rights in REDD+: Towards a Common Understanding–Summary of 
Cancun Event December (2010). Available: http://redd-net.org/resource-library/carbon-rights-in-redd+-
towards-a-common-understanding-sum [accessed 14 April 2014]. 
102 Ibid. See also Costenbader J.(ed).,  Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and Implementation at the 
National Level. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland (2009) at 27. 
103 O’Conner P. et. al., From Rights to Responsibilities: Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in 
Australia. (2013) 30:5  Environmental and Planning Law Journal, at 5. 
104 Ibid. Also see McKellar R. and Eckert E., Securing rights to carbon sequestration: The Western Australian 
experience. (2007-2008) 8 Sustainable Dev. L. and Pol'y 30 at 30. 
105 Ibid O’Conner P. et. al., (2013) at 5. McKellar observed that while the scientific understanding of carbon 
sequestration is conceptually simple (as explained in section 5.2.1 above), there are significant challenges in 
converting those carbon removals or enhancement of carbon sequestration into commercially tradeable assets. 
This is because, any emission accounting or trading program which seeks to include carbon credits resulting 
from organic sequestration must address several key issues, of which additionality, permanence, and ownership 
are the most important. McKellar R. and Eckert E., Securing rights to carbon sequestration: The Western 
Australian experience. (2007-2008) 8 Sustainable Dev. L. and Pol'y 30 at 30. 
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statutes, therefore it is helpful to assess what different interpretations of carbon rights as 
provided above mean against the general backdrop of the respective statutes of the two case 
study countries. Such statutes set the framework for the structure and respective rights and 
obligations of different actors at a domestic level. This undertaking is discussed in chapter 6. 
The above discussion brings us to the issue of benefit sharing. The claim for benefits can 
depend on whether the carbon rights holders are those who possess the rights to the carbon 
stock itself or those who have rights that affect (i.e. decrease emissions) the stock either 
directly or indirectly (i.e. within and outside carbon stock). This aspect is elaborated on in 
section 5.3.4. For now it is important to stress that since REDD+ is ultimately required to be 
implemented at a national level (see chapter 4) “a benefit distribution mechanism at the 
national level will need to be considered in addition to project-level arrangements.”106 From a 
theoretical perspective, benefit sharing is often described as either “horizontal” or “vertical” 
as follows:107 
 “Vertical” distribution occurs between different institutional levels, such as a 
multilateral fund to a national government, and/or a national government to a sub-
national government. A fund structure could be used for this purpose. 
 “Horizontal distribution” refers to how benefits are distributed between participants at 
the local level, for example, between communities and/or between households. Legal 
vehicles used to distribute money “horizontally” could be community trust funds or 
contracts (among others). 
5.2.6   Scope of Carbon Rights 
 
Carbon rights have also been discussed from the interaction with human rights and ecological 
dimensions. Carbon rights can be interpreted as a means to eliminate property regimes that 
influence deforestation and degradation on the one hand and an incentive to enhance carbon 
stocks in forests. It is for this understanding that an effort is made to see how the scope of 
carbon rights will be in compliance with and possibly complement human rights,108 land use 
law, land tenure and resource tenure, and environmental laws.109 
                                                 
106 Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the 
Environment, Sweden (2014) at 33. 
107 Chapman S. and Wilder M., Defining the legal elements of benefit sharing in the context of REDD+. REDD+ 
Law Project - Working Paper (2014) at 17. 
108  Peskett L. and Harkin Z., “Risk and Responsibility in Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation”, Forest Policy and Environment Programme Forestry Briefing (2007), 1, at 4. One can learn from 
the other fields how to define carbon rights so as to complement human rights law. An example of this approach 
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5.2.6.1  Interaction with Human Rights 
How can carbon property rights “complement” or be “consistent” with the objectives of 
international human rights law? To answer this, one must begin by considering the objectives 
of human rights instruments. These objectives are well known to oblige states parties to 
respect, (i.e., to refrain from activities infringing upon rights), to take positive measures to 
fulfill rights and protect subjects within their jurisdiction against violations carried out by 
third parties.110 This means that, exclusory claims of property (in this case carbon) rights stop 
where the infringement of basic human rights and freedoms begins. 111  This is why the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey observed in State v Shack that property “rights serve human 
values. In so doing, property rights are recognised to that end, and are limited by human 
values.” The same court also concluded that, "an owner must expect to find the absoluteness 
of his property rights curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion of the best interests 
of others for whom these organs also operate as protective agencies."112 Property rights can be 
curtailed if they violate human rights such as a right to life. With reference to the Indian 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, Lyster points out that, the Court curtailed property rights in 
tropical rainforests because such rights threatened the right to life of those who are regarded 
as “squatters”, or exercising rights of “resource” tenure, in such rainforests without any 
formal recognition of tenure. 113  Lyster further noted that the “court held that since the 
eviction of pavement and slum dwellers would lead, in a vicious cycle, to the deprivation of 
their employment this would infringe the right to life which included the “right to 
                                                                                                                                                        
has been undertaken by property rights reform in the U.K. and they can be instructive in the REDD+ legal 
analysis. See Easements, Covenants and Profits À Prendre. The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 186. 
Available: 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp186_Easements_Covenants_and_Profits_a_Prendre_Consultation.p
df [accessed 12 April 2014]. 
109 Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 11 Dec. 2010, Appendix 1, para. 2 (a) which provides that 
REDD activities should “complement” or be “consistent with relevant international conventions and 
agreements”. Other concerns include the need to address the interconnectedness and the impact of carbon bio-
sequestration on water rights in the same catchment. Fairlie K and Boydell S., Representing carbon property 
rights. FIG Working Week (2010) at 14. 
110 Savaresi  A., REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing Synergies between International Regimes, (2013) 18:3: 
Ecology and Society 5. 
111 Gray K., Property in Thin Air, (1991) 50 Cambridge  Law Journal 252-307 at 42. See also Gray K and Gray 
S., Elements of  Land Law 5th ed. (2009) at 89. 
112 Gray K., Property in Thin Air,(1991) 50 Cambridge  Law Journal 252-307 at 42. 
113 Lyster R., REDD+, Transparency, Participation and Resource Rights: The Role of Law. Sydney Law School 
Research Paper No. 10/56, (2010) at 8.  See also Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. (2009) 26:6, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-
456, at 43-44. 
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livelihood”.”114 The underlying obligation is to use property rights in a way which does not 
harm another.115 
5.2.6.2  Interaction with Ecological Dimensions 
 
In considering the environmental dimension, the process of incorporating carbon rights in the 
design of REDD+ policies should take into account sound land-use planning by considering 
the whole landscapes, rather than just forests. 116 The language of ecosystem services has 
allowed shifts in policy away from treating the environment as an externality, and away from 
governing natural resources one by one.117 The conservation of biodiversity, however, does 
not necessarily complement carbon sequestration. As a matter of fact, a focus on maximising 
carbon stocks may have detrimental impacts on the provision of other ecosystem services. An 
example cited is that the plantations of invasive species could provide rapid carbon 
sequestration but with a negative impact on biodiversity. 118  Therefore, the same line of 
thinking discussed above applies in the context of carbon rights. That is to say that carbon 
rights should be curtailed if they violate other ecosystem services such as biodiversity 
conservation. 
 
5.3             Ownership 
5.3.1  Introduction 
 
The question of ownership in any given case is complicated by the potential for different 
owners, since a carbon sequestration project may be developed and managed by a person 
who is not the owner of the reservoir.119 The problem associated with ownership is the 
                                                 
114 Lyster R., REDD+, Transparency, Participation and Resource Rights: The Role of Law. Sydney Law School 
Research Paper No. 10/56, (2010) at 8.  See also Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. (2009) 26:6, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-
456, at 43-44. 
115 Glazewski J., “The rule of law: opportunities for environmental justice in the new democratic legal order” in 
D. McDonald (ed.), Environmental Justice in South Africa, (2002). 
116 Rival L.M., From Carbon Projects to Better Land-Use Planning: Three Latin American Initiatives, (2013) 
18:3 Ecology and Society 17. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Savaresi A., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries under the UNFCCC: Caveats 
and Opportunities for Biodiversity. Forthcoming, (2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law at 13. 
119 Emission Reduction Trading Protocol Team, A Basis for Greenhouse Gas Trading in Aariculture Calgary: 
Climate Change Central, (2002). Hepburn S., Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory 
verification. (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 239 at 245. 
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novel nature of the carbon sequestration right.120 Complexity may be further increased 
where the title to particular land is already split in various ways (which may be 
incompatible with REDD+ objectives) through grants of surface and mineral rights,121 as 
well as other land use such as protected areas. Admittedly, the question of ownership 
“ raises some of the most complex issues associated with the creation and trading of organic 
carbon sequestration rights, especially where other benefits, such as harvestable timber, 
improved ground water quality, erosion control, or biodiversity enhancement, are created by 
the same actions.”122 If you own the land, do you necessarily own the trees? If you own the 
trees, do you necessarily own the carbon?123 It follows that in attempting to address the 
question of ownership the following issues below should be taken into account. 
5.3.2  What can be Owned? 
 
The distinction about what can be owned is essential for descriptive clarity. For example, if 
we say water is inalienable, for example, we need to know whether we are referring to the 
stock, the flow, or both.124 The distinction is also important because it represents a “seam” of 
sorts in the common-pool resource that will often mark a change in property rights or 
ownership arrangements.125 As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, REDD+ activities entail both 
increases in carbon stocks and estimated decreases in the rate of loss of carbon stocks.126 
Therefore, there is a need to make a legal distinction between rights to carbon stocks, 
including any increases in stocks and rights to reductions in emissions of carbon.127 O’Conner 
et al point out that one of the conceptual deficiencies in past legislative attempts to define 
carbon rights was the failure to distinguish between a right to claim a credit for the emissions 
                                                 
120 Kennett S. A. et. al., Property Rights and the Legal Framework for Carbon Sequestrationon Agricultural 
Land. (2005-2006) 37 Ottawa L. Rev. 171 at 179. See also, Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and 
payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental Science and Policy at 5. 
121 Ibid Kennett S.A. (2005-2006) at 179. 
122 McKellar R. and Eckert E., Securing rights to carbon sequestration: The Western Australian experience. 
(2007-2008) 8 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 30  at 30. 
123 Takacs D. Forest carbon: Law and property rights. Arlington, USA Conservation International (2009) at 14. 
124Fennell L.A. Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons. (2011) 5:1 International Journal of the 
Commons. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Skutsch M., Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits. Review (Undated). See 
also Skutsch M. et. al., Rights to carbon and payments for services rendered under REDD+: Options for the case 
of Mexico. (2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 813–825 at 815. 
127 Skutsch M., Slicing the REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits. Review (Undated). See 
also Skutsch M. et. al., Rights to carbon and payments for services rendered under REDD+: Options for the case 
of Mexico. (2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 813–825 at 815. Takacs, D. Forest carbon: Law and 
property rights. Arlington, USA, Conservation International (2009) at 13. 
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reduction from sequestered carbon (the credit) and a right to the tonne of sequestered carbon 
or increase the sequestered carbon in the relevant carbon pool on land (the real property 
right).128 This raises the question of liability. Drawing from the analysis of carbon capture and 
storage by Glazewski,129 there is a likelihood that the carbon sequestration project developer 
and manager and the owner of the reservoir will need to conclude a rental agreement for the 
utilisation of the reservoir. Such agreement will likely specifically assign, to one or other of 
the parties, duties that usually follow ownership/control of land but which can be modified by 
contract, e.g. liability for damage that might be caused by activities undertaken on the land or 
activities which might damage the object of the project such as forest fires.130 An observation 
from Australian Carbon Farming Act is that a distinction is made between a carbon credit as a 
chose in action (personal property) and a carbon right as a real property.131 O’Conner et al 
cited Passero who argued that between the aforementioned distinctions, it is the credit that has 
value for exchange on the carbon market.132 By the same token, a carbon right as a real 
property is the one with value in a non-carbon market. 
5.3.3  Should Carbon Property Rights be a Separate Property Right? 
 
Having discussed what can be owned, what follows is an effort to determine whether it is 
preferable to separate carbon rights from land and resource tenure.133 This is because it is not 
                                                 
128 O’Conner P. et. al., From Rights to Responsibilities: Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in 
Australia. (2013) 30:5 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, at 4.  Also see Skutsch M., Slicing the 
REDD+ pie: controversies around the distribution of benefits. Review (Undated). See also Skutsch M. et. al., 
Rights to carbon and payments for services rendered under REDD+: Options for the case of Mexico. (2013) 
Global Environmental Change 23 813–825 at 815. 
129 Glazewski J. et. al., Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS): Towards a Regulatory and Legal Regime in South 
Africa Institute of Marine and Environmental Law (IMEL) and African Climate and Development Initiative 
(ACDI), University of Cape Town, Cape Town (2012) at 21. 
130 Ibid. 
131 O’Conner P. et. al., From Rights to Responsibilities: Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in 
Australia. (2013) 30:5 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, at 5. 
132 Ibid. Others argue that the right to emissions reduction and/or the right to maintain or increase the tonne of 
sequestered carbon are the ones which will be “monetised” . Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal 
framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the Environment, Sweden (2014) at 30. For the 
historical development of carbon rights from the commercial perspective see Thompson A. and Campbell-Watt 
R., Carbon Rights - Development of the Legal Framework for a Trading  Market., (2004) 23 Australian 
Resources and Energy L. J. 156-162 at 157. 
133 Baker & McKenzie. “Background Analysis of REDD: Regulatory Frameworks”, 53–54. Report prepared for 
the Terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-REDD Programme. Sydney, Australia: Baker & McKenzie, (2009) at ii. 
Takacs, D. Forest carbon: Law and property rights. Arlington, USA, Conservation International 
(2009) at 13-14. Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation, (2009) 26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, at 35. See also Understanding REDD+: 
The Role of Governance, Enforcement and Safeguards in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation. Global Witness (2010). 
Chapter 5: Carbon Rights: Developing a Property Law Framework and a Self- 




-158 -  
 
automatically legally obvious that the owner of the tree, the forest, the soil, or the parcel of 
land will necessarily own the sequestered carbon. 134  In a legal context a tree is often 
considered to be part of the land from the perspective of real property in some countries (the 
United Kingdom and Australia) but not others (Uganda and Tanzania) since these there is a 
possibility of individual tree ownership.135 From an ecological perspective, carbon may be 
“captured” by trees in the process of sequestration – yet it cannot be separated from the tree 
while the tree is alive.136 The search for an answer should perhaps begin by considering the 
potential complexities illustrated by the following example:137 
If X owns [rights over] the land and Y owns the carbon sequestration potential 
[rights], is it clear that Y can require X to manage the land as Y wishes? If X sells the 
[rights over that] land to Z, does Y still have full rights to manage the land to 
maximize the carbon sequestration potential, as one would wish for [achieving 3Es?] 
Can Y sell her property rights to manage the land to A, or if Y wishes to give up her 
property rights in carbon sequestration potential, do those rights revert to Z, the new 
owner of the land? 
The above exposition “demonstrate[s] that concepts  of  ownership  become  more  complex  
when  the  interdependencies  of  ecological systems are contrasted against individual rights 
across land elements.”138 The example also raises the possibility of potentially competing 
claims by various legitimate claimants which has implications for the achieving the 3Es. 
Given this possibility, it is suggested that developed countries can provide lessons of how to 
address such problem. This is by separating carbon rights “from forest or land rights and how 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Apr2011/Unders
tanding%20REDD+.pdf [accessed 12 April 2014]. 
134 Baker & McKenzie. “Background Analysis of REDD: Regulatory Frameworks”, 53–54. Report prepared for 
the Terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-REDD Programme. Sydney, Australia: Baker & McKenzie, (2009) at ii. 
Takacs, D. Forest carbon: Law and property rights. Arlington, USA, Conservation International (2009) at 13-14. 
Lyster R., The New Frontier of Climate Law: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, (2009) 
26:6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 417-456, at 35. See also Understanding REDD+: The Role of 
Governance, Enforcement and Safeguards in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. 
Global Witness (2010).   
135  Fairlie K and Boydell S., Representing carbon property rights. FIG Working Week (2010) at 7, citing 
Fortman L., “The tree tenure factor in agroforestry with particular reference to Africa”, (1985) 2:4 Agroforestry 
Systems, 229-251. 
136 Fairlie K and Boydell S., Representing carbon property rights. FIG Working Week (2010) at 7. 
137 Takacs D., Forest carbon: Law and property rights. Arlington, USA, Conservation International (2009) at 14 
citing Rosenbaum K.L. et. al., Climate Change and the Forest Sector: Possible National and Subnational 
Legislation 39 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Agency of the United Nations, 2004). 
138 Fairlie K and Boydell S., Representing carbon property rights. FIG Working Week (2010) at 7. 
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to manage land tenure and issues related to conflicting interests in land.”139 Ogle, in contrast, 
argues that separating carbon rights is an approach that is more suited to Western-style 
property systems, such as those in Australia, which depends for its efficacy on a robust 
system of land registration and administration.140 It is also being indicated that separating 
carbon rights could enable packaging of these rights into less risky instruments for 
investors.141 However, separation and trading of carbon rights carries with it increased risks 
of fraud and corruption as third parties may seek to improperly register carbon rights.142 It is 
also pointed out that the “intangible nature of ‘carbon rights’ means the only physical 
evidence of ownership is a piece of paper and/or an electronic record in a register. This makes 
fraudulent claims of ownership more difficult to detect.”143 The separating of carbon rights 
means that one has to design a mechanism of administrative structures for carbon rights. In 
addition, if carbon rights are separated, then it implies that sequestered carbon can be 
assigned without reform of forest tenure and it could be detrimental to the poor.144 Thus, it is 
argued that preliminary evidence suggests that dangers lurk for local tenure security where 
carbon rights are separated from land tenure.145 
                                                 
139  Baker & McKenzie. “Background Analysis of REDD: Regulatory Frameworks”, 53–54. Report prepared for 
the Terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-REDD Programme. Sydney, Australia: Baker & McKenzie, (2009) at ii 
and 31. 
140 Ogle L., REDD+ and Forest Carbon Rights in Melanesia. Synthesis Report of Country Legal Analyses. 
SPC/GIZ Regional REDD+ Project (2012) at 44. 
141 Knox A. et. al., Land tenure and payment for environmental services: Challenges and opportunities for 
REDD+. (2011)  Land Tenure Journal at 32. 
142 Ogle L., REDD+ and Forest Carbon Rights in Melanesia. Synthesis Report of Country Legal Analyses. 
SPC/GIZ Regional REDD+ Project (2012) at 44. Sunderlin W.D. et. al., Forest tenure rights and REDD+: From 
inertia to policy solutions. In: Angelsen, A., et al. (Ed.), Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy 
Options. Centre for International Forestry Research, (2009) at 142. See also Sunderlin  W.D.,  How  are  
REDD+  Proponents  Addressing  Tenure  Problems?  Evidence from Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, 
and Vietnam, (2013) xxx World Development xx,–xxx, at 15. Knox A. et. al., Land tenure and payment for 
environmental services: Challenges and opportunities for REDD+. (2011) Land Tenure Journal at 32. 
143 Understanding REDD+: The Role of Governance, Enforcement and Safeguards in Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation. Global Witness (2010). 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Apr2011/Unders
tanding%20REDD+.pdf [accessed 19 April 2014]. 
144 Sunderlin W.D. et. al., Forest tenure rights and REDD+: From inertia to policy solutions. In: Angelsen, A., et 
al. (Ed.), Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. Centre for International Forestry Research,  
(2009) at 141. 
145 Cotula L. and Mayers  J., Tenure in REDD-Start-point or Afterthought? (2009) Natural Resource Issues 15. 
International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK at 25. 
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From a cost-effective perspective, if rights to benefit from carbon rights are attached to these 
resources, compensating for opportunity costs will be straightforward.146 This is because a 
single individual or group can make a choice whether or not to give up or adapt its other uses 
of those resources in exchange for the carbon benefits.147 However, if rights are separated and 
vested in different individuals, it becomes difficult to align incentives and coordinate 
behaviours to achieve REDD+ objectives.148 Those who hold carbon rights will need to find 
ways to compensate those who hold rights to uses that could interfere with carbon 
sequestration.149 This in turn leads to high transaction costs and makes benefit sharing with 
those who hold other resource rights untenable.150 To this end, the decision to separate carbon 
rights needs to take into account the country’s land tenure, resource tenure and forest 
ownership among other issues.151 
Earlier, this chapter has argued that in exploring the concept of carbon rights, we must 
examine what the term intends as well as the actors or forces behind that intention. This 
analysis is useful because it will provide clues as to how carbon rights might be framed. 
Martijin et al argue that in “order to attract and manage REDD+ investments (both public and 
private), countries need to decide on their approach to REDD+ implementation through a 
series of policy choices, and then implement those policy choices through strong legal 
frameworks.”152 An important question for REDD+ host countries to consider, therefore, is 
how to develop robust legal structures to facilitate REDD+ implementation.153 Following 
from this line of thinking, it is not surprising that carbon rights are separated from the other 
rights. This is particularly crucial if private finance is part of the sources of finance. The 
interests of private sectors can be a powerful force to compel the decision to separate carbon 
                                                 
146 Knox A. et. al., Forest Carbon Rights Guidebook a Tool for Framing Legal Rights to Carbon Benefits 
Generated Through REDD+ Programming. Report Prepared for the United States Agency for International 
Development, USAID (2012) at 18. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149  Ibid. However, discussion is available about the issue of measurement costs and mechanism in which 
property law has conventionally controlled them. O’Connor P., Contractual Specification of New Property 
Rights in Resources: The Problem of Measurement Costs. (2013) 39:1 Monash University Law Review 38-65 at 
41. 
150 Knox A. et. al., Forest Carbon Rights Guidebook a Tool for Framing Legal Rights to Carbon Benefits 
Generated Through REDD+ Programming. Report Prepared for the United States Agency for International 
Development, USAID (2012) at 18. 
151 Ogle L., REDD+ and Forest Carbon Rights in Melanesia. Synthesis Report of Country Legal Analyses. 
SPC/GIZ Regional REDD+ Project (2012) at 42. 
152 Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the 
Environment, Sweden (2014) at 3. 
153 Ibid. 
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rights from other rights. We have seen that private actors need to know that they can transfer 
rights to third parties in order to trade. However, if the source of finance is a public source, 
then it is possible that a developed country as a financier from a public source would be 
interested to acquire carbon credits for itself. In this case, carbon rights are likely to be 
construed to run parallel to the other rights. However, it should be known that both of the two 
viewpoints will depend on whether the forest is located on public land, private or communal 
land.  
In light of the foregoing issues, it seems to me that a decision to separate carbon rights from 
land and resource tenure or let carbon rights run in parallel with land and resource tenure 
depends on two factors: (1) the objectives established in the REDD+ mechanism (taking into 
account what developing countries (hosts) have proposed and what developed countries 
(financiers) have agreed); and (2) the demands of the private sectors who wish to trade carbon 
rights in carbon markets. Given this dichotomy, it becomes clear as to why anyone can 
legitimately claim benefits arising from carbon sequestration or increase sequestration as 
explored below. 
5.3.4  Legitimate Claim to Benefit from Carbon Credits 
 
An argument in the REDD+ literature indicates that one of the preconditions in any incentive 
mechanism is to first identify who should be entitled to rewards for positive actions and 
punished for the negative actions.154 Thus in REDD+ the question is: who should be rewarded 
for pursuing practices that reduce carbon emissions or enhance sequestration and held 
responsible for doing otherwise?155 Therefore, it may be asked why anyone can legitimately 
claim benefits arising from carbon credits. This question helps us to investigate possible 
beneficiaries of the REDD+ activities and their resultant costs that must be met in order to 
achieve REDD+ objectives. Additionally, the question is pertinent in addressing equity. In 
discussing equity, the section takes into account a discussion in chapter 2 in section 2.4 where 
it was indicated that competing versions of what is perceived as equitable are often contested and 
aligned with the interests of individuals who support them. Such an undertaking allows us to 
appreciate why, when and how such claimants may claim benefits arising from carbon credits 
                                                 
154 Robles F.F., Forest Carbon Tenure in Asia-Pacific: A comparative analysis of legal trends to define carbon 
rights in Asia-Pacific. (2012) 89 FAO Legal Papers Online at 9. Available: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/lpo89.pdf [accessed 19 May 2014]. 
155 Ibid. 
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and why decision-makers should vindicate such claims in the legislation. The category of 
anyone is grouped in terms of entities that can claim carbon rights. These entities are 
governments (i.e. local government, central government), “communities”156  and investors 
(such as sovereign governments, banks chartered to deal in mitigation credits, individuals, 
NGOs interested in environmental protection, entities emitting carbon and desiring offsets).157 
5.3.4.1  Host Governments 
The host government can legitimately claim benefits arising from carbon sequestration based 
on two premises. The first relates to the issue of creation of duties and liabilities under 
international law while the second relates to the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.   
With regards to the rights, duties and liabilities under international law, it is well known that 
states are primary subjects in the creation and development of international law. 158 Such 
involvement is fueled by mutual agreements and consensus.159 This collaboration of states in 
international law creates a blend of “hard laws” in the form of customary rules and treaties, 
and “soft laws” comprising conference resolutions, guidelines and programmes of action.160 
In turn, international law regulates relations between states but also relations between 
international organisations and individuals.161 Therefore, states have traditionally been the 
subject of international law in the sense that they bear rights and duties in international law. 
                                                 
156A “community is defined as a group of people grounded in a particular locality with a cultural attachment to 
forest spaces.” In addition, it is “sometimes suggested that indigenous peoples and environmental groups have 
appropriated the concept of “local communities” to the exclusion of other local interests with a stake in the 
forest, such as forest workers.”  Humphreys D., Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance 
(2006) at 15. Others make a distinction between “community” and “local community”. Community is defined 
“… a human group sharing a territory and involved in different but related aspects of livelihoods-such as 
managing natural resources, producing knowledge and culture, and developing productive technologies and 
practices”. Since this definition can apply to a range of sizes (such as a city, and the sum of all people inhabiting 
a watershed) , it has been specified that “local community” refers to those communities where members “are 
likely to have face-to-face encounters and/or direct mutual influences in their daily life”. Borrini-Feyerabend G. 
et. al., Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation: 
Guidance on Policy and Practice for Co-Managed Protected  Areas and Community Conserved Areas (2004) at 
9. Available: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pag_011.pdf [accessed 8 April 2014]. 
157 Rosenbaum, K.L., et. al., Climate change and the forest sector. Possible national and subnational legislation, 
FAO Forestry Paper 144. Rome, Italy: FAO (2004) at 32-34. 
158 States have the capacities and immunities to make treaties and agreements which are valid at international 
level. See Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., (1998) at 57. 
159 Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., (1998). 
160 Dugard J., International law: A South African perspective, 3rd ed., (2005) at 391-392. 
161  Kotzé L.J., and Du Plesssis A., “The inception and role of international environmental in domestic 
biodiversity conservation efforts: The South African experience” (2006) 6 Queensland University of Technology 
Law and Justice Journal  30 at 33. 
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This does not mean that non-state actors are not the subject of international law. 162  To 
illustrate how non-state actors assume rights and duties under the climate change regime the 
reader should consider articles 6 (3) and 12 (9) of the Kyoto Protocol.163 Accordingly, article 
6 (3) allows Annex I parties to authorise legal entities to participate, under its responsibility, 
in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition of emission reduction units. In the 
same vein, article 12 (9) authorises private and/or public entities to acquire certified emission 
reductions subject to guidance provided by the executive board of the CDM.  Palmer has 
proposed that since international climate law as part of international law tends to be agreed 
and implemented by national governments, states will ultimately be held liable for 
maintaining emission reductions below pre-agreed reference levels.164 This means that the 
REDD+ mechanism will, following carbon accounting procedure, attribute all “carbon 
credits” to the national or sub-national level in the first instance.165 At this point, carbon 
credits are likely to be legitimately claimed in a legal sense by the governments pursuant to 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as discussed below taking into 
account the concept of CBDR discussed in chapter 2.166 
                                                 
162  Chirwa D.M., Towards binding economic, social and cultural rights obligations of non-state actors in 
international and domestic law: A critical survey of emerging norms. LLD Thesis University of the Western 
Cape (2005). 
163 Takacs indicates that the Kyoto Protocol “does not bind private investors, and thus they are not legally 
required to respect the fundamental goals of sustainable development.” Takacs D., Forest Carbon Offsets and 
International Law: A Deep Equity Legal Analysis. (2010) 22 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 521 at 13. In contrast, Swayne points out that under the climate change regime, the COP and Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP) hold a wide discretion to establish policy directions, create new 
standards required for the achievement of the UNFCCC objectives and make adjudicative decisions affecting 
sovereign rights and interests. This rule making discretion of the COP and MOP extends to the domestic sphere 
and to private individuals and firms. Therefore private parties may choose, following initial authorisation from 
their state, to participate in the market mechanism as project developers, carbon traders and accredited experts. 
When this occurs, those participants become subject to the jurisdiction of the regulatory bodies under this 
climate change regime. Therefore, the MOP and its subsidiary bodies may reach decisions affecting private 
interests and can enforce the rules of the regime against those private interests without any country involvement 
in that process. See Swayne N., The Role of Law in Responding to Climate Change: Emerging Regulatory, 
Liability and Market Approaches. PhD thesis Queensland University of Technology (2009) at 116. 
164 Palmer C., Property rights and liability for deforestation under REDD+: Implications for “permanence” in 
policy design. (2011) 70 Ecological Economics 571-576 at 575. 
165 Torres B. A. and Skutsch M., Splitting the difference: a proposal for benefit sharing in reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). (2012) 3:1 Forests, 137-154 at 141. 
166 The extraction of CBDR can be inferred by the Brazil’s Federal Government which “argued that it cannot 
allow rights to carbon to be sold internationally, as this will simply result in a lower national baseline, which is a 
concern if it adopts a post-2012 target.” See chapter 6. For a discussion of legitimacy in a legal sense see chapter 
2, section 2.4.1. 
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The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is provided in various 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly and regularly adopted after 1952.167 This principle 
gained significance in terms of seeking greater equity in the international order in 1962 after 
it was adopted by a landmark resolution of the UN General Assembly.168 Since then, it has 
been reaffirmed by the UNFCCC and other related instruments.169 The principle affords the 
right of a state to exercise full and permanent sovereignty over its natural resources.170 So 
when confronted by the claim of carbon rights in the forests, it is expected that government 
leaders will assert that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources means 
that carbon credits are simply the sovereign property of the state. Therefore the state is free to 
exercise whatever it wishes in the interest of their national development of the well-being of 
the people.171 It should also be said that the power to exercise such right is often contested by 
state agencies. Takacs noted that “REDD+ proposals”172 contain legal wrangling between 
different levels of government over who controls forests, and who can negotiate their uses. 
The expectation is that wealth will accrue to those who successfully claim sovereignty over a 
given forest.173 Problems can be expected in the case of REDD+ and it is for this reasoning 
that it seems necessary to identify which government agencies can legitimately claim to own 
carbon rights. For example, some government agencies are tasked with the objectives which 
may complement or “conflict”174 with REDD+ activities depending on how claims are being 
                                                 
167  These include the UNGA Res. 523 (VI) (1950), as cited in Sands P., Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 2nd ed., (2003) at 236. For an extensive discussion on this principle see Schrijver N., 
Sovereignty over natural resources: Balancing rights and duties. (1997) at 132 and 306. 
168 Sands P., Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd ed., (2003) at 236. The UNGA Res. 1803 
(XVII) (1962) resolved that the “rights of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development of the well-being of the people of 
the state concerned.” 
169 The UNFCCC provides that states possess “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and development policies,” See also the Preamble to the CBD and the Rio Declaration. 
170 Westing A.H., Transfrontier reserves for peace and nature: A contribution to human security. (1993) UNEP, 
Nairobi at 22. See also Schrijver N., Sovereignty over natural resources: Balancing rights and duties. (1997) at 
206. 
171 Takacs D., Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 
(2013) 37 Vermont Law Review, 653-736 at 709. Schrijver observes that the duty of a state is to exercise this 
right “in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.” 
See Schrijver N., Sovereignty over natural resources: Balancing rights and duties. (1997) at 308. 
172 These are Readiness Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) submitted by REDD+ Country Participants to the World 
Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). See https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/ [accessed 9 
May 2015]. 
173 Takacs D., Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 
(2013) 37 Vermont Law Review 653-736 at 711. 
174 In Zambia Hansungule points out the inevitable conflicts between government agriculture and forestry staff, 
with Agriculture usually pushing for de-gazetting of forest reserves to allow human settlements and Forestry 
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addressed. Agricultural departments usually have a desire or mandate to stimulate growth in 
agriculture and this may require cutting of trees while forestry departments are usually 
charged with the sustainable use of trees.175 Therefore, institutional analysis could add insight 
on the question of which government agency can legitimately claim to own carbon.176 
5.3.4.2  Communities 
Indigenous peoples and local communities have emphasised that the principle of “state 
sovereignty does not and cannot preclude attention to and respect for indigenous peoples’ 
internationally guaranteed rights.” 177  Instead, the principle encompasses respect for the 
traditional land rights of indigenous peoples.178 These claims are increasingly accepted as 
legitimate by many REDD+ scholarly publications.179 Larson argued that “if historic and 
traditional rights and past abuses of traditional peoples are taken into account, many 
communities have legitimate claims to rights related to forests, and there is little justification 
for continuing to deny [them these rights].”180 To acquire forest tenure, Lyster argues that 
local communities will need to base their claims on something other than “land” tenure.181 
She points out that the concept of “resource” tenure provides an appropriate avenue for 
identifying forest tenure in publicly owned forests.182 The emphasis is made that the claim of 
resource tenure has its foundation in international law and domestic jurisdictions.183 Given 
                                                                                                                                                        
desperately trying to defend forests against further encroachment. Hansungule M. et. al., Report on land tenure 
insecurity on the Zambian Copperbelt, Oxfarm GB in Zambia (1998) at 38. 
175  Maguire “explains the concepts of state sovereignty and property as principles creating rights and 
responsibilities in relation to forest use and management.” Maguire R., Global Forest Governance: Legal 
Concepts and Policy Trends. (2013).  
176 Questions relevant for institutional analysis for REDD+ are raised by Costenbader as follows: (1) which 
institutions’ activities are related to or have an impact on the forest? (2) What is the legal mandate of the 
institution? (3) Does the institution have the capacity to carry out its legal mandate? (4) Do officials or agencies 
within the institutions have the appropriate political clout for the institution to carry out its legal mandate? (5) 
How effective is the institution in carrying out its mandate? (6) Is there concurrent or conflicting jurisdiction 
between institutions? (7) Are there procedures for institutional coordination? Legal Frameworks for REDD+ 
IUCN at 114. 
177 Humphreys D., Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance. (2006) at 5. 
178 Ibid. 
179  Cotula L. and Mayers  J., Tenure in REDD-Start-point or Afterthought? Natural Resource Issues 15. 
International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK (2009) at 15. 
180 Larson A.M., Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+. Global Environmental 
Change 21 (2011) 540-549 at 547. 
181 Lyster R., REDD+, Transparency, Participation and Resource Rights: The Role of Law. Sydney Law School 
Research Paper No. 10/56, (2010) at 7. 
182 Ibid. 
183 These instruments include, inter alia, the 2007 adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which has built on the work of the 
International Labour Organization. 
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this possible intervention, experience has shown that it is “often difficult both politically and 
logistically to define the borders of the forest area to which communities have rights.”184 
 
5.3.4.3  Investors and Others 
The CDM experience shows that climate change mitigation investors are motivated by the 
prospects of acquiring carbon rights.185 The same approach can also be expected in REDD+ 
activities because both schemes deal with investment in the forestry sector. In some cases, 
some actors (e.g. agro-industries) will have to change their behaviours or stop their operations 
in order for REDD+ objectives to be fulfilled. In doing so, they can legitimately claim for the 
losses, damages and costs they incur. Some analysis indicate that there “is a lack of 
willingness – at both national and international levels – to fully compensate agro-industries 
for lost income from stopping business as usual forest conversions.”186 However, in some 
cases, denying compensation to actors like this might not be possible. Tienhaara points out 
that where there is foreign direct investment agreement it is likely that such agreement would 
already contain “investor-state dispute settlement” provisions. Using this provision, a private 
sector can sue governments in an international forum over changes in regulation that 
negatively impact their investments.187 
The above exposition has shown a range of actors which can claim benefits or compensation 
as a result of implementation of REDD+ activities. This section discusses how REDD+ 
investors can acquire carbon rights and use them to benefit themselves in a self-regulation 
system (discussed in chapter 4) at the expense of the local community or government or both. 
This is undertaken through the lens of foreign direct investment. 
5.4   Potential Perils: Private Sector Finance 
Private sector finance is defined as revenue generated through a mechanism which is not 
controlled by a public body.188 Private sector actors in REDD+ include individual, for-profit, 
                                                 
184 Larson A.M., Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: Lessons for REDD+. (2011) 21 Global 
Environmental Change  540-549 at 545. 
185 Karsenty A. et. al., “Carbon rights”, REDD+ and payments for environmental services. (2012) Environmental 
Science and Policy at 5. 
186 Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices, (2012) at 48. 
187 Tienhaara K., China free trade: is there a devil in the detail? Available: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-
17/tienhaara-will-there-be-a-devil-in-the-detail-of-the-china-fta/5896534 [accessed 19 May 2015]. 
188 Streck C. and Parker C., Financing REDD+, in Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and 
choices, (2012) at 116. 
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and commercial enterprises or businesses; business associations and coalitions as well as 
corporate philanthropic foundations.189 The roles played by these actors include inter alia the 
implementation of emissions reductions, advisory, brokering and buying of carbon credits.190 
To take advantage of the carbon rights, private actors are likely to rely on the foreign direct 
investment in order to protect their investments. On the other hand, this approach makes 
governments and/or the local communities susceptible to the pitfalls of foreign direct 
investment.191 
Foreign direct investment constitutes the “transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one 
country to another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the 
total or partial control of the owner of the assets.” 192  In order to attract foreign direct 
investment, countries have increasingly provided certain forms of legal protection to foreign 
investors, including inter alia recourse to international arbitration mechanisms in the event of 
a dispute.193 These protections are usually provided in national laws and bilateral investment 
treaties, in numerous regional treaties and many state contracts.194 Under the international 
arbitration mechanism there are general principles which shape the rules in the area of foreign 
investment protection.195 In many cases international tribunals have often selected rules that 
favour the promotion of investment protection and which are harmful to the interests of the 
host country.196 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly being recognised as a vital tool in stimulating 
economic development. In developing countries, FDI flows have increased from an average 
of less than $10 billion in the 1970s to a yearly average of less than $20 billion in the 1980s 
                                                 
189 Henderson I. et. al., The Role of the Private Sector in REDD+: the Case for Engagement and Options for 
Intervention. UN-REDD PolicyBrief Issue #04. 
190cEngaging the Private Sector in REDD+: Challenges and Opportunities. Discussion paper. The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. (2012). Available: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/redd_engaging_private_sector.pdf [accessed 27 May 2015]. 
191 Tienhaara K., The Potential Perils of Forest Carbon Contracts for Developing Countries: Cases from Africa. 
(2012) 39:2 The Journal of Peasant Studies 551-572 at 556. 
192 Sornarajah M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed (2010) at 8. 
193 Tienhaara K., What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the 
Environment in Developing Countries. (2006) 6:4 Global Environmental Politics 73-100. Available: 
http://mwbdvjh.muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.4tienhaara.html [accessed 27 May 
2015]. Sornarajah M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed (2010) at 9. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Sornarajah M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed (2010) at 86. 
196 Ibid. 
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to $208 billion in 1999.197A recent study shows that FDI accounts for more than 50 percent of 
all resource flows to developing countries.198 The private sector could become a significant 
source of finance for REDD+, with the potential to provide about US $13 billion per annum 
by 2020.199 However, private sources of finance have not been without significant risks in 
some cases.200 Tienhaara argues that there are similarities between foreign direct investment 
in the REDD+ mechanism and foreign direct investment in natural resource extraction.201 
With that comparison, the author draws on the investment scholarship in other natural 
resource sectors to highlight plausible issues of concern that are likely to arise in forest 
carbon deals.202 
Tienhaara in her study of “forest carbon contracts” points out that the key to explaining how 
potential perils are created lies in a principle of the “sanctity” of contracts. Tienhaara cites 
Sornarajah to explain that this principle “denies the host state the right to change an 
investment contract unilaterally, continues to be accepted in mainstream international legal 
discourse despite the objections of critical legal scholars.” 203  The author discusses this 
principle together with other issues-bidding, negotiation, government take, liability and 
indemnity-to illustrate the perils in REDD+. 
On the issue of bidding, Tienhaara explains difficulties associated with the competitive 
bidding in the context of REDD+. In particular, due to the less capital-intensive nature of 
implementing REDD+ as opposed to other extractive projects such as gas, oil and mining, it 
is possible that a range of bidders will not be limited to a small group of large multinational 
corporations. The problem associated with this is that it can be difficult for governments to 
assess which actors are reputable and legitimate and which are “carbon cowboys”, purely 
looking to take advantage of a new and largely unregulated market.204 
                                                 
197 Going Global. Available: http://www.going-
global.com/articles/understanding_foreign_direct_investment.htm [accessed 27 May 2015]. 
198 Nieman M.D. and Thies C.G., Democracy, Property Rights, and Foreign Direct Investment. University of 
Iowa citing World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C. (2011). 
199 Streck C. and Parker C., Financing REDD+, in Angelsen A. et.al., Analysing REDD+: Challenges and 
choices, (2012) at 121. 
200 For a detailed discussion on risks in foreign investment see Sornarajah M., The International Law on Foreign 
Investment. 3rd ed (2010) at 69. 
201 Tienhaara K., The Potential Perils of Forest Carbon Contracts for Developing Countries: Cases from Africa. 
(2012) 39:2 The Journal of Peasant Studies 551-572 at 556. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid at 552. 
204 Ibid at 557. 
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With regards to negotiation, Tienhaara names three key factors: corruption, how investment 
contracts are drafted, and the lack of expertise to negotiate investment contracts. Regarding 
the first factor, she explains that sometimes investment contract negotiations are undertaken 
by corrupt government officials thereby lacking accountability. In this case, it can be difficult 
and costly for the government in question to later cancel or renegotiate these contracts.205 
This is because foreign investors would rely on the principle of “sanctity” to prevent 
government to do so. She cites a case of mining companies in Indonesia, and a case of a 
carbon contract in Liberia to substantiate this point. 206  With regards to how investment 
contracts are drafted, the author indicates that the agreements are drafted with the view to 
bind two discrete parties namely investors and states. 207  In this case, it is usually one 
particular agency or ministry that is responsible for negotiating the contract and even other 
ministries and parts of government (e.g. parliament) may not have opportunities to review the 
contract or provide input. 208  Also local communities and the benefits thereof may be 
mentioned in the contract, but in many cases communities are usually excluded in the 
negotiation process. As a result, benefits are likely to be lower in the “contractual hierarchy” 
of a project and, hence, less specific and less enforceable.209 The issue of lack of expertise is 
expounded by the difficulty for governments to retain lawyers and sector specialists in public 
service which have the necessary expertise to negotiate investment contracts. The problem is 
exacerbated when negotiators are dealing with a new type of foreign direct investment which 
they have little knowledge of. As such, forest authorities often lack knowledge of how much 
foreign companies might profit from carbon trading, and/or how long they plan to keep the 
forest land out of other uses to ensure that carbon continues to be sequestered and maintained 
that way.210 These factors combined are likely to have detrimental effects on the “government 
take”. 
Tienhaara defines government take as the economic deal inscribed in an investment contract. 
This can take different forms depending on the resource in question. Using the example of oil 
and gas contracts, she pointed out that there is usually a division of the resource (such as 
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid at 558. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Cited in ibid at 557. 
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profit oil) between the parties. In other sectors it is common for the government to use land 
rental fees, royalties and/or taxation.211  In terms of mineral extraction, it is difficult for 
government and investors to settle a fair deal where prices are volatile. However, this aspect 
becomes more complex in a situation like REDD+ because in addition to volatility issues, 
governments simply do not have enough experience (within the country or in foreign 
contexts) to draw on when valuing the resource.212 Sometimes it is not so easy to quantify 
opportunity cost forgone both from the monetary as well as non-monetary aspects.213 The 
author cites a case of the Uganda Wildlife Authority and a German company to illustrate this 
point.214 
 
Tienhaara reminds us that all foreign direct investments have associated risks that can lead to 
liability disputes and foreign direct investments in REDD+ are not exempted.215 The author 
cautions against various risks that are associated with REDD+ projects such as political risk 
(expropriation of carbon rights), local hostility to a project or civil unrest and the risk for the 
government that the investor may fail to meet his obligations or simply disappear and 
delivery risks (trees may not grow as quickly as modelled due to ecological or even climate 
change-driven factors as well as the possibility of forest fire).216 A standard approach to 
address some of these issues is by including a “force majeure” clause in an investment 
contract that dictates that, for example, in the event of a natural disaster the contract will be 
terminated.217 However, it is noted that getting a definition of force majeure that appropriately 
balances the interests of the parties can be very problematic. To address the other risks that 
are not covered by force majeure, investment contracts usually have clauses that are explicit 
about who is to be liable for what and to whom.218 Among the contractual examples cited, it 
is the government that is liable for full reimbursement to the investors in the event of 
                                                 
211 Ibid at 558. 
212 Ibid at 559. 
213 See chapter 2 for this discussion. 
214 Tienhaara K., The Potential Perils of Forest Carbon Contracts for Developing Countries: Cases from Africa. 
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considered in the drafting of a carbon sequestration agreement to support the successful operation of a 
biosequestration offsets project. Christensen S. et. al., Issues in Negotiating a Carbon Sequestration Agreement 
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termination of the contract, loss or damage incurred by investors including for any shortfall in 
the production of carbon credits that may occur. On the other hand, investors are only liable 
for the fulfilment of payment obligations under the contract.219 
5.5   Potential Promise: Public Sector Finance 
Public sector finance is referred to as revenue generated through a mechanism controlled by a 
public body.220 Forms of public sector finance are generated from a variety of “traditional” 
forms of public finance (e.g. Official Development Assistance (ODA) and domestic 
government spending allocated through general public budgets) and private bodies (e.g. 
through taxes or other fees).221 
In financing climate change mitigation mechanisms such as REDD+, public sector finance is 
not authorised with the expectation of acquiring carbon credits.222 Activities that generate 
carbon credits are to be financed from the private sector and sales of REDD+ credits to 
Annex I governments for offsetting their carbon emissions.223 Thus, it has been observed that 
the increasing donor interest in REDD+ has boosted the amount of ODA available for 
capacity building and policy development for REDD+ activities.224 The financing through 
public sources is seen as an approach to support and strengthen government institutions and 
increases government’s ownership of the REDD+ mechanism.225  However, where carbon 
credits returns are guaranteed, financing can be provided through loans.226 
Following the above exposition, some leading scholars in the field of REDD+ argue that more 
fragile states are likely to rely on ODA-type finance.227 It has also been argued that public 
finance is extremely relevant for emission reductions beyond forests and in forest frontiers 
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that have comparatively weak land tenure systems and governance structures.228 In principle, 
public financing should be more “pro-poor” than private finance, particularly as the lead 
agencies are mandated to promote development agendas.229 Therefore, upfront public finance 
is needed to create policy environments that enable the delivery of effective REDD outcomes 
practically in weak governance contexts. 230  The authors have noted that few developing 
countries have shown the ability or political will to finance the aforementioned aspect of 
REDD+.231 Despite its advantages, public sector finance is generally known to be a short-
term solution.232 It is also said to weaken the link between payment and performance, and 
risks repeating the poor record of traditional aid to the forestry sector.233 
5.6   Implications of Carbon Rights for Self-Regulatory System: Two Possible Futures 
Chapter 3 concluded that objections to the forest convention by developing countries were 
motivated by the lack of substantial financial transfer and capacity building to help address 
poverty as the main cause of deforestation. Chapter 4 indicates that most countries argued for 
a dual funding approach, where financial transfer and capacity building would come from 
private and public mechanisms. These mechanisms of access to finance and capacity building 
lead the author of this study to make a number of claims about the potential implications of 
carbon rights in a self-regulatory system. 
The first and most obvious claim is that foreign direct investment represents a platform in 
which self-regulation can take place and in doing so alter power relations. In chapter 4, the 
meaning of self-regulation entails the view that the role of government is removed from the 
governance of top-down. The discussion on FDI illustrates that within a self-regulation 
system states and state agencies are not conceived of as existing at the top of a pyramid of 
power and influence. Nor are they seen as a capping the authority of governing auspices that 
devolves authority to others. Under circumstances like this, “the private sector steers and the 
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state rows.”234 This relinquishes the sovereign power of the host governments discussed in 
section 5.3.4.1 above. This power dynamic means that private sectors are able to compel 
states to adopt a conception of carbon rights which favour the private actors’ interests. The 
contractual examples of carbon credits investments in developing countries cited in the 
Tienhaara study illustrate how this approach is likely to happen.235 
This chapter argues that, if developing countries rely on FDI for financial resources for 
REDD+ implementation, then host countries will be compelled to define carbon rights by 
separating them both from land tenure and resource tenure. As discussed in 5.3.3 above, the 
separation of carbon rights from land and resource tenure is problematic in developing 
countries. This is more suited to Western-style property systems because its effectiveness 
depends on a robust system of land registration and administration. These aspects are well 
known to be poorly approached in developing countries. 
The discussion on FDI also establishes why a self-regulatory system is not necessarily 
democratic governance or governance that safeguards the interests of the population as a 
whole. As mentioned, the use of the private sector to finance REDD+ can undermine the 
principle of sovereignty. At the same time, such dependency runs contrary to the principle 
CBDR (discussed in chapter 2) which provides that countries “should protect the climate 
system […] in accordance with their [CBDR] and respective capabilities.” Be that as it may, 
in order for a self-regulatory system to be democratic, private sector actors must satisfy tests 
of representativeness, accessibility and negotiation that were devised in light of some set of 
democratic ideals.236 
This form of governance by private actors is not new. Examples of how private actors govern 
states have been explored in other fields such as in the case of the Federation of International 
Football (FIFA) and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In her study of how FIFA organised the 
security of the 2010 World Cup, Nakueira provided empirical evidence of how such a 
transnational private actor used agreements and self-enforcing contracts to enrol actors within 
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and beyond the state to achieve its desired outcome.237 Similarly, Shearing et. al., used the 
theory of Nodal Governance to discuss how “nodes” utilise “networks” to govern states. This 
is done through the cases of the WTO TRIPS Agreement and a “Zwelethemba Model.”238 
The second claim which arises from the discussion above is on a positive note.  The 
implication of public finance discussion means that host states can take ownership of 
REDD+. As such, government institutions are less compelled to adopt a particular type of 
carbon rights conceptualisation. Therefore, governments can decide to conceptualise carbon 
rights to run parallel with land tenure and resource tenure and still be able to attract some 
climate finance. The prospect of this classification is likely possible under REDD+ within the 
UNFCCC where countries can obtain REDD+ finance through the REDD+ public sector. 
Using the self-regulation framework discussed in chapter 4, governments may be compelled 
by financiers to develop a decentred regulation and attract regulatory bodies to play a role in 
the regulation of REDD+ activities. In this sense, the financiers are seen as active participants 
in the self-regulation.  
 
It follows that under the public finance approach it is then possible for the government to 
declare the local community to be the owner of carbon rights. This would mean that a local 
community can participate in the self-regulatory system since holding carbon rights is 
inextricably linked to having control over the forest land. There is a vast literature which 
argues in favour of allocating carbon rights to the local community.239 
5.7   Conclusion 
 
The focus of this chapter was to investigate the underlying issues of the nature of carbon 
rights and related issues of ownership and ultimately who benefits from the entitlement to 
credit. It also shed light on how the sources of finance for REDD+ can dictate the 
conceptualisation of carbon rights and in turn facilitate or constrain the ability of the host 
state in a decentred regulatory context. Discussing the sources of finance provides insights 
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238 Shearing C. et. al., Nodal Governance. 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30 (2005) at 17. Drahos P. 
and Braithwaite J., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (2002). Braithwaite J. and 
Drahos P., Global Business Regulation (2000) at 475 on “Contests of Actors”. 
239 Greenleaf M., Using Carbon Rights to Curb Deforestation and Empower Forest Communities. (2011) 18 
NYU Environmental Law Journal. 507- 599 at 512-3. 
Chapter 5: Carbon Rights: Developing a Property Law Framework and a Self- 
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into the underlying forces that influence the conceptualisation of carbon rights and who is 
likely to hold or own such rights. In short, sources of finance have a direct bearing on the 
framing of carbon rights. In turn, such a dichotomy of power relations has two implications 
for the self-regulatory system. First, a host state will be compelled to adopt a particular type 
of carbon right (i.e. either separating carbon rights from the land and resource tenure or 
allowing carbon rights to run with land and resource tenure). It has been argued that risks run 
with regard to the former approach because it is likely to have detrimental effects on the poor 
communities. The discussion on foreign direct investment illustrates how this can happen 
where local communities can object to the implementation of REDD+  for various reasons. In 
this case, the state is likely to use its police force to compel the local community to agree with 
the REDD+ implementation. If the state does not take this approach, then it will be liable to 
compensate private parties for the loss they have incurred. The latter is detrimental to the 
population as a whole because it means that tax payers money may have to be diverted for 
compensation instead of using such finance for other service delivery issues. Second, the 
implication of the public finance discussion means that host states are less compelled to adopt 
a particular type of carbon rights conceptualisation. Therefore, governments can decide to 
conceptualise carbon rights to run parallel with land tenure and resource tenure. The problem 
with this approach is that the ability of the state to attract some climate finance will be limited 
as discussed widely in the climate literature. Under these conditions, the question arises as to 
what version of carbon rights should government adopt to minimise potential perils?240 This
question is taken into account while discussing costs and benefits in chapter 9.241 The next
chapter describes governance processes in each case study. The purpose of chapter 6 is to set 
the scene for chapter 7 to explore how the Tanzanian and Indonesian governments are 
envisaging REDD+ implementation. 
240 This question is beyond the scope of this chapter but if informs the choices that can be made in defining 
benefits in chapter 9. 




Governance in Tanzania and Indonesia 
6.1 Introduction 
Governance has become a central focus in the REDD+ debate. An argument advanced 
consistently in that debate is that a successful distribution of benefits depends in part on the 
governance arrangements.1 Hence, some researchers consider improving forest governance as
one of the vital preconditions in designing an optimal regulatory framework for REDD+.2
However, the discussion thus far has been about REDD+ governance at the international 
level. Thus a discussion about domestic governance of forestry is needed. The relevant 
questions to guide that inquiry are: How does the legal system provide a legal basis for the 
government and non-government actors to utilise forests in the countries in question in this 
study? And who holds the legislative power to manage and distribute benefits?3 Arguably,
answers to these questions provide a solid background for chapter 7 that explores how the 
governments under this study think they are going to achieve the vision of REDD+ that they 
have adopted. 
In light of the above, the focus of this chapter is the administration of domestic forestry laws 
in Tanzania and Indonesia. The reasons for the selection of the countries are discussed in 
section 1.6 in chapter 1. Therefore the starting point in this chapter is the respective 
constitutions of the two case study countries. 4  Constitutions set the framework for the
1  Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 8. See also Tassa D.T. et. al., Benefit sharing mechanisms 
and governance issues in Participatory Forest Management-REDD related projects: A Community Forest case-
study in Tanzania. Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Berlin, 8-9 
October (2010). 
2  Brockhaus M. et. al., Guide for country profiles: Global Comparative Study on REDD (GCS-REDD) 
Component 1 on National REDD+ Policies and Processes, (2011) at 5. 
3 Civil society organisations are mainly concerned about this subject. See Peskett L. and Brockhaus  M., When 
REDD+ goes national: A review of realities, opportunities and challenges in Angelsen A. (ed)., Realising 
REDD+ National strategy and policy options, (2009) at 40.   
4  The rationale of beginning from the Constitution is that governments are increasingly asserting their 
sovereignty in relation to natural resources and this has been affirmed in REDD+ negotiations at the 
international level as discussed in chapters 3 and 4. This section also builds on chapter 5 on the question on 
legitimate claimants to benefits resulting from the emission reductions. 
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structure and respective rights and obligations of central, regional and local government in the 
context of the three tiers of government, namely Parliament, the executive and the judiciary.5 
This background information is informative in the discussion of REDD+ in chapter 7. This is 
because since REDD+ in its 3rd phase (as discussed in chapter 4) is carried out at a national 
level, then the choice of regulation is indicative of the scope and impact of specific activities 
that are eligible for benefits sharing. 
6.2  United Republic of Tanzania 
Tanzania is a unitary state of two formerly sovereign states, namely, the Republic of 
Tanganyika and the People’s Republic of Zanzibar. 6 In each central Government, the 
Constitution establishes the three levels of government comprising three organs of the 
government, i.e. Parliament, the executive and the judiciary.7 The power to exercise and 
control over all union matters in the United Republic and over all other matters concerning 
mainland Tanzania is vested in the Government of the United Republic and the Revolutionary 
Government of Tanzania Zanzibar.8 At the same time, the power to legislate and oversight 
over public affairs are vested in the Parliament of the United Republic (hereafter Parliament) 
and the House of Representatives of Zanzibar.9 Legislative power in relation to all union 
matters and also in relation to all other matters, regarding mainland Tanzania is vested in 
Parliament.10 Legislative power in Tanzania Zanzibar over all matters which are not union 
matters is vested in the House of Representatives.11 In this respect, laws and policies that 
apply to the environment in the mainland do not apply in Zanzibar.12 As most of the forests 
are in the mainland, this chapter focuses on laws and institutions applicable to mainland 
Tanzania only, and a reference to Tanzania is a reference to mainland Tanzania. 
                                                 
5 Glazewski J. and Rumble O., Admininstration and Governance, in, Glazewski J., Environmental Law in South 
Africa. 3rd ed. (2013) at 2. 
6 Article 1-4 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
7  Article 4 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. For a discussion on Tanzanian 
constitution making and reform see  Nchalla B.M., Tanzania’s experience with constitutionalism, constitution-
making and constitutional reforms. In Mbondenyi M.K. and  Ojienda T., Constitutionalism and democratic 
governance in Africa: Contemporary perspectives from Sub-Saharan Africa. (2013) at 15-51. 
8 Article 34 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
9 Ibid Article 4 (2). 
10 Ibid Article 64 (1). 
11 Ibid Article 64 (2). 
12 Ibid Article 64 (3)-(4). 
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The Constitution establishes Local Government Authorities (LGAs) to support each central 
government by performing various functions.13 This provision is given effect by the District 
Authorities Act14 and the Urban Authorities Act.15 Thus in urban areas, the Urban Authorities 
Act established three types of urban authority namely city, municipal and town councils.16 On 
the other hand in the rural areas, the District Authorities Act established two types of 
authority namely the District Councils and Village Council. 17  The Constitution further 
provides that such authorities are established in each region, district, urban area and village.18 
For the purpose of administration, Tanzania is divided into twenty five (25) regions.19 The 
Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government is responsible for local 
government in mainland Tanzania and is currently located within the Prime Minister’s 
Office.20 
According to the National REDD+ Strategy Tanzania had in 2010 a total of 33.428 million 
hectares (ha) of forests.21 This means that roughly 39.9% of Tanzania is forested.22 This forest 
land is divided into a number of classes as follows: 16 million ha are reserved forests, 2 
million ha are forests in national parks and the rest (15.4 million ha) are unprotected forests in 
Village and General Land subject to “open access”, thereby easily converted into other 
competing land uses (discussed in greater detail below).23 
Several factors contribute to the competing land uses in Tanzania and they are classified as 
direct and indirect causes. Overgrazing, firewood and charcoal production, uncontrolled fires, 
timber extraction, development of infrastructure/industry and bio-fuel production are some of 
the main direct causes of uncontrolled deforestation and thus forest degradation.24 On the 
                                                 
13 Their structure and composition, sources of revenue and procedure for the conduct of their business are to be 
determined by enabling legislation enacted by Parliament or the House of Representatives. See Article 145 (2) of 
the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. Available: 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania.htm [accessed 2 July 2015]. 
14 Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982. 
15 Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act 1982. 
16 Section 5 (4) Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act 1982 
17 Sections 5 (1) and 25 of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982. 
18Article 145 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
19 Available: http://aadb.pmoralg.go.tz/regions.php [accessed 20 July 2015]. 
20 Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government. Available: 
http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/ [accessed 12 July 2015]. 
21 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at xi. 
22 The REDD Desk. Available: http://theredddesk.org/countries/tanzania [accessed 2 July 2015]. 
23 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at xi. 
24 Ibid at 14-15. 
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other hand, the rapid (and uncontrolled) rural settlement expansion, market and policy 
failures, population growth and rural poverty are listed as the main indirect or underlying 
causes of uncontrolled deforestation and thus forest degradation.25 The failure of market and 
policy relates to the “inadequate capacity of the government to implement strictly the 
instituted centralised and decentralised management systems due to inadequate financial and 
management capacity.” 26  These factors resulted in the inefficient management of forest 
resources; inability of government to adequately define resource tenure rights thereby 
subjecting forests to “open access” with the consequent risk of over-exploitation and the 
inability to create the right investment incentives in forest activities.27 Furthermore, non-
forest incentives, namely: pricing policies such as tax incentives and other subsidies, 
encourage private investments in leading sectors such as transportation, energy, agriculture, 
and mining. Subsequently, these investments contribute to the conversion of forest to achieve 
their objectives.28 With regards to rapid population growth and rural poverty, the Strategy 
indicates that such growths along with urbanisation often intensify pressure on forest areas 
and thereby convert them to other uses. This includes the exploitation of forests for short-term 
benefits in terms of food production and fuel wood supply.29 That said, one would expect to 
find the strategy to use this background to inform the distribution of costs and benefits.30 
6.2.1  The Legal System  
The  major sources of law in Tanzania include the: common law, 31  constitutional law, 
principles of equity, statutes of general application, Islamic law in some cases, customary 
law, case law, principal and subsidiary law as well as international instruments to which 
Tanzania is a party.32 It follows that the main sources of environmental law are the common 
                                                 
25 Ibid at 15-16. 
26 Ibid at 15.   
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid at 16. 
30 Morgan B. and Yeung K., An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials. (2007) at 16. 
31 For a detailed discussion of the Common Law System in Tanzania see, Twaib F., The legal profession in 
Tanzania. (1997) at 19. Sawyerr G.F.A. and  Hiller J.A., The doctrine of precedent in the Court of Appeal for 
East Africa. (1971) at 15. Court of Appeal of Tanzania, The history of administration of justice in Tanzania. Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania: Mathew Bookstore and Stationers (2004) at 28. Hatchard J. et. al., Comparative 
constitutionalism and good governance in the (2004) at 12-15. Seidman, R.B., The reception of English law in 
colonial Africa revisited. (1969) 2:47 Eastern Africa Law Review at 47. 
32 Sections 3 and 11 of the Judicature and Applications of Laws Act, Chapter 358. Available: 
http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/JUDICATURE%20AND%20APPLICATION%20OF%20L
AWS%20ACT.pdf [accessed 12 July 2015]. 




-180 -  
 
and the statutory law in the form of international law, constitutional law, principal legislation 
and subsidiary legislation.33 
6.2.2  The Roles of Central, Regional and Local Government 
 
The roles of the three spheres of government in relation to the environment must be discussed 
within the broader legal framework of governance. The Central Government “executes its 
functions through Ministries led by Cabinet Ministers. Each Ministry is charged with a sector 
portfolio.” 34  The role assigned to each ministry is to formulate broad national policies, 
guidelines, and support the regional administration, local government authorities and the 
private sector to execute their assigned roles and functions.35 The ministries execute their 
roles through the regions, which connect the central and local governments.36 The relevant 
legal and institutional framework responsible for environmental management in Tanzania is 
provided in the Environmental Management Act (EMA).37  The Division of Environment 
(DoE) is also the leading Agency and authorised to manage forests. It was established in 1991 
under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT).38 In 1995, it was transferred 
to the Vice President’s Office to “give it the requisite priority and attention on promoting 
management [of the] environmental agenda.”39  The EMA provides for the establishment 
environmental sector in each Ministry. The responsibility is to ensure that all environmental 
matters contained in other written laws falling under each sector ministry are implemented 
                                                 
33  Pallangyo D.M., Environmental law in Tanzania: how far have we gone? 3:1 Law, Environment and 
Development Journal (2007) 28 at 32. 
34 Article 53 (2) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
35  Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT)., State of Local Democracy and Good Local 
Governance in Tanzania. (2011) at 21. 
36 Section 5(1)-(2) of the Regional Administration Act 1997. Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania 
(ALAT)., State of Local Democracy and Good Local Governance in Tanzania. (2011) at 21. 
37 Environmental Management Act, Cap 191 of 2004. The Vice President’s Office. 
http://www.vpo.go.tz/environment/utawala.php [accessed 15 July 2015]. For a graphical overview of the 
Environmental Management Organisational Structure see SADC Environmental Legislation Handbook 2012. 
Development Bank of Southern Africa 3rd ed (2012) at 349. Available: 
http://www.saiea.com/dbsa_book/tanzania.pdf [accessed 17 July 2015]. 
38  Sections 1 and 75 (a) of Environmental Management Act (2004). 
http://www.vpo.go.tz/environment/utawala.php.  This is unique compared to other SADC countries where they 
all have a ministry responsible for the environment. As indicated above Tanzania has instead the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism which is located under the Vice-President’s Office. SADC Environmental 
Legislation Handbook 2012. Development Bank of Southern Africa 3rd ed (2012) at 8. 
39 http://www.vpo.go.tz/environment/utawala.php. 
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and reported to the Director of Environment.40 Such implementation must comply with the 
provisions of EMA.41 
The Local Government Authority is exercised through Regional Commissioners (RC) and 
District Commissioners (DC).42 The RC represents the president at the regional level. The 
Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS), who is the head of the Regional Administration 
Secretariat, assists the RC. 43 Among other things the RC is required to assist the local 
government in his region to discharge its responsibilities.44 The main purpose is to accelerate 
the development of the people.45 Among other things, the RAS is composed of a Regional 
Environmental Management Expert mandated with the task of advising the Local 
Government Authorities on matters relating to implementation and enforcement of EMA 
within their jurisdiction.46 
District Councils are established by the Government (District) Authorities Act. 47  The 
functions of District Councils are inter alia to discharge their functions conferred upon them 
by the Act or by any other written law.48 Therefore, the Councils are empowered to make by-
laws applicable throughout their areas of jurisdiction, and to consider and approve by-laws 
made by village councils within their areas of jurisdiction.49 Thereafter, the Act requires such 
by-laws to be submitted to the Regional Commissioner for approval who is required to submit 
them to the minister who is responsible for local government for his consent.50 With respect 
to forests, the functions and duties of the District Council in relation to its jurisdiction is to51 
make provision for the prohibition or regulation of livestock husbandry52 and to establish, 
preserve, maintain, improve and regulate the use of forests and forest produce subject to the 
                                                 
40 Section 30 (b) of Environmental Management Act (2004). 
41 Ibid Section 31 (2). 
42  The Hauser Global Law School Program. Available: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania.htm 
[accessed 15 July 2015]. 
43 Van Dijk M.P., The Impact of Decentralisation on Poverty in Tanzania. In Crawford G. and Hartmann C. 
(eds)., Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? (2008) at 151. 
44 Section 5(3) of the Regional Administration Act 1997. 
45 Article 146 (2) (c) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977). 
46  United Republic of Tanzania, National Report for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, Rio+20. The Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment (2012) at xiv. 
47  Section 5(1) of Government (District) Authorities Act No. 7 of 1982. Available: 
http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/local_government_district_authorities_act_1982_2.pdf [accessed 5 
August 2015]. 
48 Section 117 (1). 
49 Sections 118 (d) and 148 (1). Procedure for this process is provided in section 150. 
50 Section 150 (3). 
51 Section 118 (1).  
52 Section 118 (2) (f) (iii). 
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provisions of this Act or any other written law.53 The discussion on the relationship between 
the local, provincial and central spheres of government in forest governance is provided 
below. 
6.2.2.1  Co-operation and Co-ordination 
In accordance with EMA, all environmental management issues including climate change 
adaptation and mitigation, are coordinated by the Division of Environment.54 At the regional 
level, the Regional Secretariat shall be responsible for co-ordination of all advice on 
environmental management in their respective regions and liaison with the Director of 
Environment and the Director-General on the implementation and enforcement of EMA.55 
Thus the minister responsible for regional administration is obliged to appoint an 
environmental management expert who is a link between the region and the Director of 
Environment and the Director General.56  
The Forest Act No. 7 of 2002 also provides for an explicit relationship between the Ministry 
responsible for forests, LGAs and Forest Management Authorities where a director general is 
obliged to consult LGAs and Forest Management Authorities and keep them informed about 
the management of forests. 57 However, the legal framework in Tanzania does not guarantee 
local governments protection from interference by the central government. This is because the 
Constitution does not provide what type of central-local relationship should exist and inform 
operations of the two spheres of government.58 In this regard the central government still 
exercises substantial authority over LGAs.59 
 
                                                 
53 Section 118 (2) (n). 
54  Sections 1 and 75 (a) of Environmental Management Act (2004). 
http://www.vpo.go.tz/environment/utawala.php  [accessed 5 August 2015]. This is unique compared to other 
SADC countries where they all have a ministry responsible for the environment. As indicated above Tanzania 
has instead the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism which is located under the Vice-President’s Office. 
SADC Environmental Legislation Handbook 2012. Development Bank of Southern Africa 3rd ed (2012) at 8. 
55 Section 34 of Environmental Management Act (2004). 
56 Section 35 (1)-(2) of Environmental Management Act (2004). 
57 Section 8 (1) Forest Act  No. 14 of (2002). 
58  Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT)., State of Local Democracy and Good Local 
Governance in Tanzania. (2011) at 4. 
http://www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/1/file/The_State_of_Local_Governance_and_Good_Local_Governance_in_Tan
zania_2011.pdf [accessed 15 August 2015]. 
59  Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT)., State of Local Democracy and Good Local 
Governance in Tanzania. (2011) at 15. 
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6.2.3  Forest and Land Tenure and Forest Categories 
 
With regard to forest ownership the Forest Act60 provides that all “biological resources and 
their intangible products, whether naturally occurring or naturalised within forests including 
genetic resources belongs to the government.”61 Thus the conservation and utilisation of such 
resources requires the guidance of the Act and any other written laws.62 In this respect it is 
important to review the Land Act and the Village Land Act63 as they are the main statutes 
which provide for a land tenure system. The basic land tenure system in Tanzania provides 
the basis for which to discuss the forest tenure system. Taken together, these statutes provide 
three types of land namely Reserved Land, Village Land and General Land.64 Added to this 
discussion is the Forest Act which provides categories of forest and their management. These 
are Community Forest Reserves (CFRs), National Forest Reserves (NFRs), Local Authority 
Forest Reserves (LAFRs), Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs), and Private Forests (PF). 
The discussion of these categories means the application of different rules and this has 
implications for the distribution of costs and benefits. 
6.2.3.1   General (State) and Village Land 
According to the Village Act65 general land (also known as state land) refers to all public land 
which is not reserved land or village land. However, the Land Act66 provides a different 
definition: it states that such land includes “all land which is not reserved land or village land 
and includes any unoccupied or unused village land.”67 Forests on general land form part of 
National Forests.68 Another type of forest which is found on general land is Local Authority 
Forests Reserve (LAFRs)69 and Private Forests.70 LAFRs are gazetted forests managed at the 
District Council level as production and protection forests. In this case they are regarded as a 
major source of district revenue from charcoal and timber extraction.71 Private Forests on 
                                                 
60 Forest Act, No. 14 of 2002. 
61 Section 69 (1) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Caps 113 and 114, respectively 2002. 
64 Section 1 (4) (a)-(c) of  the Land Act 1999. 
65 Section 2 of  Village Land  Act 1999. 
66 Section 4 (a)-(c) of the Land Act 1999. 
67 Section 4 (a)-(c) of the Land Act 1999. 
68 Section 4 (a) (iii) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
69 Section 4 (b) (ii) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
70 Section 4 (d) (ii) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
71  Akida A. and Blomley R., Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional 
Arrangements: Are they contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? Case Study from the 
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general land are “forests [for] which the rights of occupancy or a lease has been granted to a 
person or persons or a partnership or a corporate body or a Non-Governmental Organisation 
or any other body or organisation for the purpose of managing the forest.”72 The general land 
which accounts for two (2) percent of Tanzanian73  land is non-gazetted or non-reserved 
land.74 
The Village Land Act defines “village land" to mean the land declared to be village land and 
includes any transfer land transferred to a village.75 The precise demarcation of village land is 
provided in section 7 of the Act. According to the information from the Ministry of Lands and 
Human Settlement Development, 70 percent of Tanzania’s land is village land.76 It is also 
stated that most forests are on this land.77 The classifications of forests within village land 
are: Village land forest reserves (VLFRs) and Community Forest Reserves (CFRs). Under 
village land, private forests are those “forests on village land held by one or more individuals 
under a customary right of occupancy.”78 
A further type of forest on village and general land is unreserved forests. 79  There is 
ananecdotal report which states that 16 out of the 35 million ha of forest land in Tanzania are 
unreserved, and most of these forests are reported to be on village land.80 The Forest Act 
provides that village forests on village land include “forests which are not reserved which are 
on village land and of which the management is vested in the village council.”81 In view of 
this provision, the distinction between “reserve” and “unreserved” is not well provided as it 
                                                                                                                                                        
United Republic of Tanzania. Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/12511-
0a38b2dd54443592fd647a92d27de18fc.pdf [accessed 18 August 2015]. 
72 Section 4(d) (ii) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
73 Cited in Veit P.G. et. al., Threats to village land in Tanzania: Implications for REDD+ benefit sharing 
arrangement. A paper presented for presentation at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty” 
the World Bank-Washington DC, April 23-26, 2012. 
74  Akida A. and Blomley R., Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional 
Arrangements: Are they contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? Case Study from the 
United Republic of Tanzania.  (Undated) at 4. Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/12511-
0a38b2dd54443592fd647a92d27de18fc.pdf [accessed 19 August 2015]. 
75 Section 2 of  Village Land  Act 1999 Cap 114. 
76 Cited in Veit P.G. et. al., Threats to village land in Tanzania: Implications for REDD+ benefit sharing 
arrangement. A paper presented for presentation at the “Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty” 
the World Bank-Washington DC, April 23-26, 2012. 
76 Section 69(1) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Section 4(d) (i) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
79 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 2. 
80 Zahabu E. et. al., Forestland tenure systems in Tanzania: an overview of policy changes in relation to forest 
management. INA fagrapport 14, (2009) at 6. 
81 Section 4(c) (iii) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
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provides the management responsibility to the village council. This assigning of management 
responsibility seems to be the same criterion applicable to the “reserve forest” as the Act 
shows that local, village and national authorities are empowered to regulate forest activities 
depending on the object of the reserve, as alluded to above, and subject to different 
management plans. 
6.2.3.2   Reserved Land 
The Land Act provides that reserved land is land set aside for a number of activities including 
forest conservation.82 This land is reserved for inter alia national parks, wildlife conservation, 
marine parks and reserves, towns, and public utilities.83 
 
6.2.3.3  Participatory Forest Management 
The management of forest on village land follows the decentralised approach where a number 
of actors including villages can exercise management activities under long-term management 
agreements and the state is no longer considered to be the statutory manager.84 Thus two main 
approaches of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) are provided under the Forest Act.85 The 
first approach is Community Based Forest Management (CBFM).86 This approach takes place 
on village land and is managed by the Village Council. Thus Community Forest Reserves 
(CFRs) and Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs) are managed by the Village Council on 
behalf of the village residents.87 While a group of people living in or near to a forest or any 
other group of persons can be formed to manage CFRs88 the supervision thereof is exercised 
by the District Council.89 
The second approach is a collaborative management approach, termed Joint Forest 
Management (JFM). JFM is a collaborative management approach that divides the costs and 
benefits of forest management between the forest owner (usually central or local government, 
                                                 
82 See categories of reserved land in section 6 (l) of the Land Act 1999. 
83 Ibid. 
84 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at xi.  Dokken T. et. al., Tenure Issues in REDD+ Pilot Project Sites in 
Tanzania. Forests 5 (2014) 234-255 at 238. 
85 Sections 38 and 42 of the Forest Act, 2002. 
86 Robinson E. J. Z. et.al., Implementing REDD through community-based forest management: Lessons from 
Tanzania. Natural Resources Forum 37 (2013) 141–152. 
87 Section 34 of the Forest Act, 2002. 
88 Section 42 (1) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
89 Section 42 (4) of the Forest Act, 2002. 
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and even the private sector) and the forest managers (usually forest-adjacent communities).90 
JFM takes place in categories of forest stated above such as LAFRs, NFRs and private forest 
reserves. The Act establishes the legal basis for establishing JMAs and provides for forest 
concessions. 91  Forest concessions refer to the process for establishing forest concession 
arrangements for the management of trees in forest reserves or general land.92 Forest policy 
elaborates on forest concessions by stating that the process means: 
a long-term agreement between the government and a forest industry enterprise, the 
latter to manage a forest reserve, industrial plantation or part thereof mainly for timber 
production. The company is responsible for all harvesting and silvicultural activities 
including road construction and maintenance. The government collects the agreed 
royalty and concession fees.93 
 
The opportunities highlighted by the above view are opportunities where market based 
regulation such as the Coasian Approach: Payment for Environmental Services (PES) takes 
place. In Tanzania, PES has been explored to a small extent.94 
6.2.3.4  Implications for REDD+ 
As shown by the previous discussion, if a carbon right is interpreted to be separate from 
property rights over physical resources in the context of village land then it means the carbon 
                                                 
90  United Republic of Tanzania. Joint Forest Management Guidelines; Forestry and Beekeeping Division, 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism: Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, (2007).  Dokken T. et. al., Tenure Issues 
in REDD+ Pilot Project Sites in Tanzania. Forests 5 (2014) 234-255 at 238. Akida A. and Blomley R., Trends in 
Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional Arrangements: Are they contributing to Better 
Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? Case Study from the United Republic of Tanzania.  (undated) at 5. 
Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/12511-0a38b2dd54443592fd647a92d27de18fc.pdf [accessed 20 August 
2015]. 
91 Sections 16 and 20 of the Forest Act 2002. 
92  Akida A. and Blomley R., Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional 
Arrangements: Are they contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? Case Study from the 
United Republic of Tanzania.  (undated) at 4. Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/12511-
0a38b2dd54443592fd647a92d27de18fc.pdf [accessed 20 August 2015]. 
93 Cited in Akida A. and Blomley R., Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional 
Arrangements: Are they contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? Case Study from the 
United Republic of Tanzania.  (undated) at 4. Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/12511-
0a38b2dd54443592fd647a92d27de18fc.pdf [accessed 20 August 2015]. 
94 Zahabu E. et.al., Payments for Environmental Services as Incentive Opportunities for Catchment Forest  
 Reserves Management in Tanzania. (undated) 
http://www.communitycarbonforestry.org/NewPublications/Payments%20for%20Environmental%20Services%
20-%20Zahabu.pdf [accessed 25 August 2015]. Kaczan D. et.al., Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
program design in Tanzania: Famers’ preferences for enforcement and payment options. Selected Paper 
prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association’s 2011 AAEA & NAREA Joint 
Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, July 24-26, 2011. Available: 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/103673/1/Kaczan%20-
%20PES%20design%20in%20rural%20Tanzania%20(3).pdf [accessed 26 August 2015]. 
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rights holder will be required to negotiate with the customary rights holders. This is because 
such rights are recognised in the Village Land Act. In this sense, the REDD+ implementers 
will be obliged to involve local communities in forest management and to respect their 
customary rights over physical resources and social structures. In the same vein, if a carbon 
right is interpreted to run parallel to the property rights over physical resources in the context 
of village land, it will result in confusion as to what the incidental rights of carbon rights 
holders? are and how they affect customary rights of the local community. In this case, there 
is a possibility of carbon rights of clashing with or trumping customary rights over physical 
resources. 
In the context of reserve land, the interpretation of carbon rights to run parallel to the property 
rights over physical resources mean that it is possible to delineate the incidental rights 
because reserved land is regulated by statutes as indicated in section 6.1 of the Land Act. This 
means carbon rights can be fully regulated within a statutory framework because the 
incidental rights can be clearly established. This is also the case for general land.95    
The PFM discussed in section 6.2.4.3 above indicates legal requirements for the 
establishment of PFM in the context of village land. The discussion also highlights rights and 
responsibilities for the parties concerned in the context of forests management. Such 
background provides a useful platform for defining the management responsibilities in the 
context of REDD+.  
6.2.4  Enforcement of and Compliance with Forestry Regulatory Framework 
 
As explained above, forest land in Tanzania is divided into a number of classes as follows: 16 
million ha are reserved forests, 2 million ha are forests in national parks and the rest (15.4 
million ha) are unprotected forests in village and general land subject to “open access” 
thereby easily converted into other competing land uses.96 This classification has meant that 
different tools are provided to implement and enforce rules pertaining to forest conservation. 
The following sections discuss such tools. 
                                                 
95 Sundet G., The 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act: A technical analysis of the practical implications of the 
Acts, Oxfam (2005) at 3. The author provides that the “distinction of Reserved Land from General Land does 
not alter much in relation to the present system of tenure. It does little more than to draw attention to the fact that 
Reserved Land has been set aside for a special purpose under a different legislation. For example, forestry 
reserves will continue to be administered according to the legal provisions of the Forests Ordinance.” 
96 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at xi. 
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6.2.4.1   Command and Control Approach 
The state through different agents has retained exclusion, management, access and 
withdrawal rights for all land areas classified as reserved land.97 The management of reserved 
land falls under sectoral pieces of legislation. In particular, these include the National Parks 
Ordinance, Forest Act, Wildlife Conservation Act, and Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance. 98  General land is managed by the Commissioner of Lands on behalf of the 
president but forests on this land (i.e. general land forests) are under the authority and 
jurisdiction of the Director of Forestry and Beekeeping.99 Mainly, a number of approaches are 
deployed to regulate such areas as follows: 
Statutory Enforcement 
The Forest Act prohibits a number of activities both in the forest reserves and outside forest 
reserves. In the event that offences have been committed, the Act prescribes a number of 
fines.100 To impose the fines, the Act authorises an officer, forestry officer or police officer to, 
inter alia, “arrest without warrant any person whom he has reasonable cause to suspect … has 
committed or has been involved in an offence” and “prevent the movement of, seize and 
detain any such forest produce or livestock in respect of which there is reason to believe that 
an offence has recently been committed […]”.101 In addition, if an individual commits an 
offence, the Act authorises the director or any officer authorised by the director to publish a 
notice in a Gazette to compound such offence by accepting from such person a sum of money 
together with the forest produce.102 Christy explains that “compounding” allows the executive 
to accept a fine instead of bringing criminal proceedings. This is only on condition that the 
offender accepts this procedure instead of insisting on exercising the right to be tried.103 
 
 
                                                 
97 Dokken T. et. al., Tenure Issues in REDD+ Pilot Project Sites in Tanzania. (2014) 5 Forests 234-255 at 238. 
98 Zahabu E. et. al., Forestland tenure systems in Tanzania: an overview of policy changes in relation to forest 
management. INA fagrapport 14, (2009) at 6. 
99 Section 6 (l) of the Land Act 1999. 
100 Part XI of the Forest Act 2002. 
101 Section 93 (1) (c) and (d) of the Forest Act 2002. 
102 Section 95 (1). 
103 Christy L.C. et. al., Forest Law and Sustainable Development Addressing Contemporary Challenges Through 
Legal Reform. The World Bank (2007) at 150. 
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Criminal Law 
The Forest Act provides permits to carry out an activity or activities in the national and local 
authority forest reserve and the conditions thereof.104 Breach of these conditions may amount 
to a civil or criminal offence.105 
Administrative Appeals 
The Forest Act also provides for administrative appeals.106 With respect to the procedures for 
the declaration of national and local authority forest reserve, any aggrieved person with 
regards to the decision made under the Act is allowed to appeal to the High Court.107 Another 
example relates to management of local forest. If a village council fails to exercise the 
management of a local forest function as prescribed by the Act, the local authority may take 
over and exercise such management functions. However, a village council may appeal to the 
minister in charge of the local authority against any decision by a local authority to take over 
and exercise the said functions.108 
 
Permits and Licensing 
 
The permit or licence system constitutes the prime regulatory technique as far as 
environmental conservation and pollution control are concerned. The Forest Act provides for 
how to issue permits and licences for activities carried out in national and local authority 
forest reserves.109 These activities are felling or extracting timber for domestic commercial 
use and sale, export, mining purposes or prospecting and for exploration of mineral resources. 
In addition, the Act requires permits and licences for inter alia operating sawmills and other 
industrial processes and machinery, constructing roads, bridges, paths, waterways, railways or 
runways and gathering and taking away specified forest produce and picking or taking parts 
or extracts of any protected plant.110 The breach of these conditions may lead to an abatement 
notice, or a criminal offence. 
 
                                                 
104 Part VI. 
105  Section 54 (5) (a) of the Forest Act, (2002). Available: 
http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/forest_act_tanzania.pdf [accessed 26 August 2015]. 
106 Section 22 (1) (6). 
107 Section 22 (1) (6). 
108 Sections 34 and 41(1)-(3). 
109 Section 49. 
110 Ibid. 
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Institutions Enforcing Environmental Laws 
The primary courts (i.e. the lowest courts in the hierarchy) and High Courts are the main 
enforcers of both civil and criminal law and are administered by the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs.111 The Tanzania Police Force (TPF) which is part of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs is charged with enforcing the criminal law. Institutions, with an enforcement 
role in environmental management include inter alia Sector Ministries, the National 
Environment Management Council (NEMC)112 and Local Government Authorities.113 EMA 
authorises Local Government Authorities to manage environmental matters and it has created 
Environmental Management Committees at the local level. 114  The powers of these 
committees include to: initiate inquiries and investigations about any allegation related to the 
environment and the implementation or violation of the provisions of EMA and initiate 
proceedings of a civil or criminal nature against any person, company, department or 
institution that refuses or fails to comply with any directive issued by any such committee.115 
6.2.4.2   Forest Certification Schemes 
A voluntary enforcement mechanism such as the Forest Certification System is discussed in 
chapter 3. In Tanzania such approach appears to have few existing certificates programs.116 
The experiences in two projects in Tanzania reveal that there is a potential for the scheme to 
allow costs to be shared between members, and which is easily expandable to include other 
communities and forests.117 
 
 
                                                 
111 The Hauser Global Law School Program. Available: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania.htm 
[accessed 26 August 2015]. 
112 Established in section 3 of the National Environment Management Council Act, No 19 of 1983. Its powers, 
composition and functions with respect to the Environnmental Impact Assessment are provided in Part III(d) of 
the Environmental Management Act of 2004. Available: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan71740a.pdf [accessed 
26 August 2015]. 
113 The Vice President’s Office: Available: http://www.vpo.go.tz/environment/utawala.php [accessed 24 August 
2015]. 
114  United Republic of Tanzania, National Report for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, Rio+20, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment (2012) at 38. Available: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/980tanzania.pdf [accessed 24 August 2015]. 
115  United Republic of Tanzania, National Report for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, Rio+20, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment (2012) at 38.  
116  Kalonga S.K., Forest Certification Initiatives in Tanzania: Updates. (2010). Available: 
http://www.agref.info/files/resource_1/Documents/Forest%20Certification%20Initiatives%20in%20Tanzania%2
0-%20Updates%20revised%20100622.pdf [accessed 22 August 2015]. 
117 Kalonga S.K., Forest Certification Initiatives in Tanzania: Updates. (2010). 
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6.2.4.3   Implications of the Governance Approach to REDD+ 
 
The above exposition illustrates that the legal framework for governance of forests in 
Tanzania is found in segmented legislative provisions.118 Despite being segmented, there are 
some provisions regarding the coordination among such segmented statutes. As seen in 
section 6.2.2.1, the Forest Act requires a director general at  the Ministry responsible for 
forests to consult LGAs and Forest Management Authorities and keep them informed about 
the management of forests and EIA process. Majamba has observed that most of the 
authorities mandated to oversee the institutional framework for the environment and natural 
resource management as well as those charged with implementing REDD+ lack a 
comprehension of the interplay of the legal framework that governs the resources.119 This 
piecemeal approach to governance which is based on command and control is expected to be 
a challenging task under REDD+ because the requirements of REDD+ (i.e. permanance, 
leakage and additionality) as discussed in chapters 3 and 4 mean that implementation of 
REDD+ activities will likely require a wider scope of intervention and coordination which is 
beyond what a forestry legal framework provides. As the previous chapters have shown, to 
address the issue of leakage, regulatory initiatives for implementing REDD+ are required 
from a wider scope including inter alia general laws and policies on the environment, 
forestry, land, agricultural, energy, property, tax and investment. To amend such laws and to 
improve the practical applications of such a corpus of law will likely prove to be a much more 
complex undertaking. This thesis provides recommendations to address this challenge in 
chapter 9. 
6.3  Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia 
Indonesia adopted a unified governmental structure as a founding component of its national 
philosophy under the 1945 Constitution.120 In 1949 Indonesia temporarily adopted a federal 
system of government and abandoned it a year later and reverted back to a unified system.121 
The Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia is divided into provinces which in turn are 
                                                 
118  Majamba H.I, Legislative frameworks for implementing REDD : the case of forest governance and 
management in Tanzania. (2012) 5:3 Journal of African and International Law, 489-507 at 506. 
119 Majamba H.I, Tanzania's legislative framework in the context of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation Plus (REDD+) safeguards. (2012) 15: 2 Recht in Afrika: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für 
afrikanisches Recht, 187-205 at 203. 
120 Sakumoto N., The Participatory Forestry Management System in Indonesia. Policy Trend Report, (2002) 52-
76 at 55.  
121 Ibid. 
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subdivided into districts, municipalities, administrative municipalities, administrative cities, 
and sub-districts.122 
Indonesia has more than 130 million hectares of forests which cover about 70 percent of its 
land area.123 Drivers of deforestation and degradation in Indonesia are classified as direct and 
indirect drivers. The direct drivers include illegal logging.124 The indirect drivers are made up 
of inter alia international demand to produce and export both material commodities from 
forestry and agribusiness.125 Recently, the country is reported to be the largest global emitter 
of carbon from land use change and forestry (but not point sources) with total emissions of 
2.5 Gt per year. Thus Indonesia is ranked third overall after China and the USA, whose 
emissions derive from fossil fuel use.126 
6.3.1  The Legal System 
 
The Indonesian legal system is said to be complex because it is a confluence of three distinct 
systems.127 These are adat (customary) law, Dutch colonial law (based upon the civil law 
rather than the common law system) 128  and national law, which co-exist in modern 
Indonesia.129 Pursuant to the Enactment of Laws and Regulations Act,130 the sources and 
                                                 
122  Usa U.I. (ed)., Indonesia Company Laws and Regulations Handbook. (2012) at 41. Sakumoto N., The 
Participatory Forestry Management System in Indonesia. Policy Trend Report, (2002) 52-76 at 55.  
123 Indonesian REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 2. 
124 Luttrell C. et. al., Lessons for REDD+ from measures to control illegal logging in Indonesia. Working Paper 
74 CIFOR (2011).   
125  Dehm J., “REDD faces all around” Implementing reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in Indonesia (undated) 98-125 at 100. Available: 
https://www.academia.edu/1589055/REDD_Faces_all_Around_Implementing_reducing_emissions_from_defor
estation_and_forest_degradation_in_Indonesia [accessed 2 August 2015]. 
126 Noordwijk M. et. al., Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in Indonesia: 
options and challenges for fair and efficient payment distribution mechanisms. Working Paper nr 8, World 
Agroforestry Centre (2008) at 9. Available: 
http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=7525&tmpl=component&format
=raw&Itemid=53 [accessed 4 August 2015]. 
127 Law and technology resources for legal professionals. Available: http://www.llrx.com/features/indonesia.htm 
[accessed 8 August 2015], see also 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=lps_lsapr [accessed 8 August 
2015]. 
128  http://indonesialawonline.com/IndoLaw%20Common%20and%20Civil%20Law%202.aspx [accessed 8 
August 2015] 
129 Law and technology resources for legal professionals. Available: http://www.llrx.com/features/indonesia.htm 
[accessed 8 August 2015]. 
130 Article 7 (1) of the Enactment of Laws and Regulations Act No. 10 of 2004. 
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hierarchy of the legal framework in Indonesia are classified in at least five (5) themes as 
follows:131 
1. The Constitution of Indonesia 1945, 
2. Laws or Government Regulations Substituting for Law (Perpu), 
3. Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah), 
4. Presidential Decree (Peraturan Presiden of Perpres) and 
5. Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah, Perda) which comprises: 
i. Provincial Regulation (Peraturan Daerah Provinsi) 
ii. District Regulation (Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten) 
iii. Village Regulation (Peraturan Desa). 
 
The above legal framework stands in a hierarchical relationship. An example cited is that a 
Government Regulation is higher in rank than a Presidential Decree. Such vertical 
hierarchical relationship was meant to denote the legal power of each regulation. Therefore, 
the content of a lower regulation cannot contradict the content of a higher regulation.132 The 
statutes that are not mentioned by the Enactment of Laws and Regulations Act, such as the 
Ministerial Regulation (also known as ministerial decrees before 2004) or Governor 
Regulation also have legal binding power as long as they have been devised pursuant to the 
legislation of a higher category.133 However, the Enactment of Laws and Regulations Act 
does not locate the position of ministerial regulations in the hierarchy of legislation. In this 
regard, Safitri states that the ministerial regulations are situated between presidential and 
regional regulations. This is because ministerial regulations are implemented nation-wide 
whilst regional regulations only apply to a specific region as the name suggests.134 Other 
sources of laws in Indonesia include doctrine (this is the opinion of law from jurists or legal 
scholars applied to interpret a general conception of law within other legal sources or to 
provide explanation on the ambiguity of laws), and jurisprudence (but these court decisions 
merely have a persuasive force of precedence).135  
                                                 
131 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 69. 
132 Article 7 (5) of the Enactment of Laws and Regulations Act No. 10 of 2004. 
133 Nurrochmat D.R., Review Infrastructure Framework and Mechanism Related to SFM as Important Option in 
Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. Ministry of Forestry of Indonesia – 
International Tropical Timber Organization RED-PD 007/09 Rev. 2 (F) Report (2011) at 10. 
134 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 69. 
135 The Hauser Global Law School Program. Available: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Indonesia.htm 
[accessed 26 August 2015]. 
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6.3.2  The Roles of Central, Regional and Local Government 
 
The respective roles and responsibilities of the spheres of government with respect to forest 
governance must be understood within the broader initiatives to decentralise power as 
discussed in the introduction above. As such, the main statutes which laid out a broad 
framework for the decentralisation are the “Regional” Governance Act136  and the Fiscal 
Balancing Act. 137  The main objective of the Regional Governance Act focused on “the 
delegation of governance authority” to autonomous regions – but more specifically to district 
and municipal governments. It empowered these regions “to govern and administer the 
interests of the local people according to their own initiatives, based on the people’s 
aspirations, and in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations.”138 The scope of that 
authority spans a number of fields including public works, agriculture, capital investment, 
industry and trade, environment, and land affairs.139 The Fiscal Balancing Act on the other 
hand provides a framework for the redistribution of revenues among national and regional 
governments. In particular, the law provided considerably greater authority and responsibility 
to district and provincial governments to manage their own budgets, and to raise their own 
revenues.140  However, the details of the said legislation did not provide clear guidance on the 
distribution of authority and administrative responsibilities. This led to many district and 
provincial governments issuing regulations that would seem to exceed the authority granted 
to them by such legislation.141 
Given the above lack of legal clarity, two statutes were issued to clarify the rights, authority, 
respective roles and obligations of governments at each level of Indonesia’s administrative 
apparatus.142 Accordingly the Amended Regional Governance Act143 and Amended Fiscal 
                                                 
136 Governance Act No. 22 of 1999, the meaning of “Regional” in the Act refers to provinces, districts, and 
municipalities. 
137 Fiscal Balancing Act No. 25 of 1999. Also see Barr C. et. al. (eds)., Decentralization of Forest Administration 
in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic Development and Community Livelihoods. 
Center for International Forestry Research (2006) at 11 and 64. 
138  Barr C. et. al. (eds)., Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest 
Sustainability, Economic Development and Community Livelihoods. Center for International Forestry Research 
(2006) at 52-53. 
139 Ibid at 11. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid at 14. 
142 Ibid at 52-53. Darmawan R.E.D., The practices of decentralization in Indonesia and its implication on local 
competitiveness. University of Twente (2008) at 56. The Hauser Global Law School Program. Available: 
http://essay.utwente.nl/59282/1/scriptie_R_Darmawan.pdf [accessed 8 August 2015]. 
143 Amended Regional Governance Act No. 32 of (2004). 
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Balancing Act144 were issued to replace older versions described above. First, the Amended 
Regional Governance Act is aimed at promoting cooperative relations among regional 
governments and at ensuring effective coordination between regional governments. It 
articulates areas where regional governments can exercise autonomy, and areas where they 
are required to engage in “co-administration” functions, together with governments at other 
levels.145 Therefore, the Amended Regional Governance Act provides authority to the central 
government to influence and control the activities of regional governments at each level.146 A 
common interpretation of the “right to control” in the forestry sector has been taken to mean 
powers to regulate, plan and allocate natural resources.147 However, Safitri points out that the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court has broadened this interpretation to include the authority of 
policymaking, regulating, governing, managing and supervising, for the greatest prosperity of 
the people. 148  The Court also clarified the term “regulating” to mean “the authority to 
legislate and implement laws and regulation and regulations-making”, and “governing” to 
mean the “authority of issuing and revoking licenses and concessions.”149 
Secondly, the Amended Fiscal Balancing Act provides for revenue sharing between the 
central government and the regional governments.150 The purpose is to address two issues. 
First is the vertical imbalances between central and sub-national governments, and secondly, 
the horizontal imbalances among sub-national governments. 151  The sources of funds are 
derived from a number of natural resources including forestry. 152  The discussion on the 
relationship between local, provincial and central spheres of government in forest governance 
is provided below. 
                                                 
144 Amended Fiscal Balancing Act 33 of 2004. 
145  Barr C. et. al. (eds)., Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest 
Sustainability, Economic Development and Community Livelihoods. Center for International Forestry Research 
(2006) at 52-53. 
146 Ibid at 52-53. 
147 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 76. 
148 Constitutional Court Decision Case number OOl-021-022/PUU-I/2003, at 334; Decision on Case number 
OOl-021-022/pUU-Ij2003, at 211. Cited by Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges 
of securing communities' rights. PhD Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 77. 
149 Cited in Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. 
PhD Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 77. 
150 Preamble of the Law No. 33 of 2004 on Fiscal Balancing Between the Central Government and Regional 
Governments. Available: http://www.bkpm.go.id/file_uploaded/uu_33_2004_en.pdf [accessed 8 August 2015]. 
151 Murniasih E., Is the new intergovernmental equalisation grant in Indonesia equalising? (Undated) at 1-2. 
Available: http://www.publicfinance.ru/filemanager/files/ind_2_transferts_indonesia.pdf [accessed 8 August 
2015]. 
152 Article 11 (3) of the Law No. 33 of 2004 on Fiscal Balancing Between the Central Government and Regional 
Governments. 
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In order to manage forestry, the Forest Act153 provides that Government shall delegate a part 
of its authority to Regional Administrations.154 The Act provides that government regulation 
will provide more details to ensure this decentralisation. In this respect, the applicable 
regulation is the Government Regulation on forest arrangement and formulation of forest 
management plan as well as forest exploitation. 155  It provides that “government and/or 
provincial governments and/or municipal governments are responsible for Forest 
Management in accordance with the criteria established in the regulation.” 156  Thus the 
Agencies responsible for the management of forests in Indonesia at national level is the 
Ministry of Forestry, at provincial level is the Provincial Forest Service while at the Regency 
level is the District Forest Service.157 
6.3.2.1  Co-operation and Co-ordination 
The co-operation and co-ordination in the context of forestry is provided by the Government 
Regulation.158 This regulation was designed to restrict the authority of district and provincial 
governments and to reaffirm the dominant role played by the Ministry of Forestry (MoFo).159 
Some scholars observed that since 2003 MoFo used this regulation to stop the allocation of 
small-scale logging and forest conversion permits by district governments within the 
boundaries of the Forest Estate.160 On the other hand, the MoFo is empowered to issue forest 
conversion licences for plantation development and renew the contracts of several large-scale 
timber concession-holders.161 However, the MoFo is required to seek approval from both the 
district and provincial governments before making such decisions. An example cited is that 
provincial governments have the power to determine how allocations from the Reforestation 
                                                 
153 Forest Act No. 41 of 1999. 
154 Article 66 (1) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 41 of 1999. The REDD Desk. Available: 
http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/uu41_99_en.pdf [accessed 8 August 2015]. 
155 Government Regulation No. 6/2007. 
156 Article 8 of Government Regulation No. 6/2007. 
157 Karyaatmadja B., Indonesia law and forest tenure. Available:  
http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_1767.pdf [accessed 28 August 2015]. 
158 Regulation No. 34 of 2002 on Forest Administration and the Formulation of Plans for Forest Management, 
Forest Utilization, and the Use of the Forest Estate. Article 8 provides that the government and/or provincial 
governments and/or municipal governments in accordance with their respective scopes of authority stipulate 
organisations of forest management areas. 
159 Barr C. et. al., Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, 
Economic Development and Community Livelihoods. Center for International Forestry Research (2006) at 123. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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Fund 162  will be distributed to districts and municipalities within their jurisdictions. This 
stands in contrast to the centralisation era, when the central government managed the 
Reforestation Fund in a highly unrestricted manner with allocations largely made through 
presidential decree.163 
Other scholars argued that the issue of coordination across government agencies, and 
coordination between central, provincial and district governments is still a major challenge 
for Indonesia.164 This is because the Amended Regional Governance Act severely curtailed 
the “all inclusive” authority of districts.165 The law provides for forests to be managed as 
Forest Management Units where district governments have only technical responsibilities 
while decisions regarding issues such as financing, design and establishment are made at 
higher levels. Despite this legal provision, many districts still lay claim to control of forests 
and thus coordination and cooperation is limited in practice.166 This situation is likely to have 
a significant effect on the way distribution of costs and benefits in REDD+ will be 
addressed.167 
6.3.3   Forest and Land Tenure and Forest Categories 
6.3.3.1   Forest Tenure/Property Status 
In Indonesia, arrangements for forests are usually separate from those for land use. The 
Forestry Act168 regulates forest land use, while the Basic Agrarian Law169 regulates regions 
outside forest areas.170 The Basic Agrarian Law provides for the status of customary land as a 
separate entity.171 In non-forest areas, recognition of such rights is stronger while in forest 
                                                 
162 This is one of the mechanisms which distributes State revenues from natural resources. See Article 14 of the 
Law No. 33 of 2004 on Fiscal Balancing Between the Central Government and Regional Governments. 
163 Barr C. et. al., Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, 
Economic Development and Community Livelihoods. Center for International Forestry Research (2006) at 14. 
164 Larson A.M. and Ribot J.C., Lessons from forestry decentralization in Angelsen A. (ed)., Realising REDD+ 
National strategy and policy options. (2009) at 178. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. See also Indrarto G.B. et.al., The context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, agents and institutions. 
Working Paper 92, CIFOR (2012) at 21. 
167 Ibid Larson A.M., (2009) at 178.  
168 Forestry Act of 41 of 1999. 
169 Basic Agrarian Law No 5 of 1960. 
170 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 71. Indrarto G.B. et. al., The context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, 
agents and institutions. Working Paper 92 (2012) at 35. Available: 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP92Resosudarmo.pdf  [accessed 12February 2014].  
171 Ibid. 
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areas recognition of such rights is weak in forestry law.172 To understand how Indonesian 
forestry legislation regulates state and community property rights, it is necessary to be 
acquainted with some legal terms, concepts and classifications used by forestry legislation 
regarding the property status and formal functions of forest.173 
(a) State and private forests 
 
According to the Forest Act, 174 forest is divided into two categories: the first being state, 
where forests on untitled land form are regarded as state forests and the second being private 
forests, which are located on titled land.175 There are two factors determining the status of 
private forest: the presence of a land certificate which verifies a private right, and the 
administrative decision of a head of district or mayor to assign the land as private forest.176 
Private forests are regulated under the jurisdiction of district or town governments.177 
(b) Forest Area 
 
The Forest Act provides the term “forest area” as a concept which refers to an area designated 
and or specified by government to be reserved as permanent forest.178 Forest area must be 
distinguished from the term “forest”. The former is based on a government's administrative 
decision to distribute and utilise certain land - forested or not - as forest while the latter is 
designated primarily on the basis of its physical qualities.179 The Forest Areas are under the 
jurisdiction of and administered by the Ministry of Forestry.180 However, the power to control 
forest areas can be changed and transferred to other parties. 181  Thus other government 
agencies, private companies and the people can establish land ownership rights on forest 
areas as per procedures established in the Act.182 
 
 
                                                 
172 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 87.   
173 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 87.   
174 Article 5 (1). 
175 Ibid at 88.   
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid at 89.   
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid at 90.   
181 Ibid at 98.   
182 Ibid. 
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6.3.3.2   Categories of Forest 
The management of forests in Indonesia is organised according to the functions of forest, which 
are legally defined. The Forest Act states that forests (state or private) have three major functions: 
production, protection and conservation.183 The permitted activities in the production forest are 
clear cutting forests and industrial timber plantations. 184  Within the production forest 
category, the Act establishes “Convertible Production Forests”. These are defined as 
production forests that can be converted into non-forestry functions, particularly for other 
development objectives such as agriculture. 185  They consist of national parks, wildlife 
sanctuaries, grand forest parks, nature recreation parks and nature reserves.186 The permitted 
activities include extraction of non-timber forest products, forest area utilisation activities, 
cultivating medicinal/decorative plants, capturing wildlife, apiculture, and cattle feed. 
Conservation forest which varies according to its sub-classification (national park, natural 
reserve, wildlife reserve, grand forest park, nature recreational park, hunting park) allows for 
research, education, cultivation activities, cultural activities, and limited tourism to take 
place.187 
6.3.3.3   Participatory Forest Management (PFM) 
The Forest Act provides for the rights of the community as follows:188 
1. Individuals who have lost rights to property as a result of a decision to develop a 
forest area have the right to seek compensation in accordance with law. 
2. Communities have a right to knowledge and information regarding plans for benefit 
sharing in relation to forestry and forest products. 
3. Communities have the right to offer information, advice and ideas regarding forest 
development. 
4. Communities have the right to utilise forests and their products according to the 
relevant laws. 
5. Communities affected by forestry operations and by forest disappearance may seek 
compensation for losses. 
6. Communities have the right to oversee forest development, either directly or 
indirectly. 
7. Society has the right to enjoy environmental quality as derived from forests. 
                                                 
183 Safitri M.A., Forest Tenure in Indonesia: The socio-legal challenges of securing communities' rights. PhD 
Thesis Leiden University, (2010) at 99.   
184 Compiled from Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry, Minister of Forestry Regulation P.50 of 2009, Minister of 
Forestry Regulation 37 of 2007, and Government Regulation 68 of 1998. 
185 Ibid Safitri M.A., (2010) at 100.   
186 Ibid. 
187 Compiled from Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry, Minister of Forestry Regulation P.50 of 2009, Minister of 
Forestry Regulation 37 of 2007, and Government Regulation 68 of 1998. 
188 Article 68. 
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The relevance of the above rights for REDD+ in Indonesia is established in the next section. 
6.3.3.4   Implications for REDD+ 
Given that in Indonesia arrangements for forests are usually separate from those for land use, 
it is beneficial to define carbon rights as separate from property rights (as provided above)  
over physical resources. This implies that the eligible beneficiaries are those with the right 
over use of environmental services rather than land tenure. In this sense the management 
responsibilities will depend on the negotiations between carbon rights holders and those with 
rights over the use of environmental services. In the same vein, if the definition of carbon 
rights is to run parallel to the property rights over physical resources, it means that elibility 
for benefits and responsibilities for the community will be limited since their customary rights 
are not strongly protected in the forest areas.  
 
6.3.4  Enforcement of and Compliance with Forestry Regulatory Framework 
6.3.4.1  Command and Control Approach 
The Indonesian Environmental Management Act (EMA)189 and Forest Act are heavily based 
on the command and control approach. Under the Forest Act, the use of protected forest is 
through the use of area utilisation operation permits, environmental service utilisation 
operation permits and non-timber forest produce collection permits.190 When a licence holder 
does not act in accordance with the terms stipulated in a licence or uses forest resources 
without a licence, there are in theory three ways of enforcement. These are administrative 
law, criminal law and civil law.191 
Administrative Measures 
 
The Forest Act provides administrative sanctions for anyone who violates the “utilization 
operation permit, environmental service utilization operation permit, forest produce 
utilization operation permit, or forest produce collection permit.” 192 This includes the 
                                                 
189 Environmental Act No. 32 of 2009. 
190 Article 26. 
191 Stroink F., Supervision and enforcement in the Law Concerning Environmental Management, Law No. 23 of 
1997. In Faure M. and Niessen N. (eds)., Environmental Law in Development: Lessons from the Indonesian 
Experience. (2006) at 184. 
192 Article 80 (2) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 41 of 1999.  
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The Forest Act allows anyone to utilise state forests by holding licenses of forest utilisation.194 
Using this Act and its implementing Regulation,195 the Ministry of Forestry has developed a 
number of initiatives to strengthen forest governance. These include: the establishment of a 
one-roof forestry permit system - including an online system - which aims to reduce direct 
interface between government officers in the ministry and clients,196 and six online permit 
systems within the Ministry of Forestry. The permits are: the logging utilisation permit, 
timber plantation permit, ecosystem restoration, forestry permit for mining activity in state 
forest areas, forestry permit for exploration and surveying in state forest areas, and forest 
conversion for other land uses.197 
Administrative Law Enforcement Procedure  
 
The Minister, governors or regents/mayors are empowered by the EMA to supervise the 
compliance of personnel in charge of business in order to ensure environmental conservation. 
Such supervisors are empowered to impose sanctions on the aforementioned personnel if an 
environmental permit is violated.198 Such sanctions consist of written warning, government 
coerciveness, freezing of an environmental permit and revocation of an environmental 
permit.199 However, administrative sanctions remain unclear under the Ministry of Forestry. It 
is reported that the Minister of Forestry has no power to impose administrative sanctions for 
violations in state forests if permits were issued by another government agency such as 
mining or estate crops. 200  This complicates the issue of control, and eventually law 
enforcement, over the permits issued by other government agencies.201 
                                                 
193 Article 128 (1) of Government Regulation No. 6/2007 on forest arrangement and formulation of forest 
management plan as well as forest exploitation. 
194 Articles 26 to 39 of Law 41/1999 regulate forestry licensing. 
195 Regulation, GR 6/2007 on Forest Systematization, and Planning for Forest Management and Utilization. 
196 Syarif L.M., Current Development of Indonesian Environmental Law. IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 
e-Journal (2010) 1 at 14. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Articles 71 and 76 (1) of Environmental Act No. 32 (2009). 
199 Article 76 (2) of Environmental Act No. 32 (2009). 
200 Indrarto G.B. et.al., The context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, agents and institutions. Working Paper 92, 
CIFOR (2012) at 20-21. 
201 Ibid. 
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Criminal Law 
In relation to criminal enforcement, the EMA empowers civil servant investigators to 
undertake investigations and they can request the national police for assistance.202 In this 
respect the EMA provides that in environmental criminal enforcement, civil servant 
investigators, the Attorney General Office and the national police shall collaborate and 
coordinate under the supervision of the Minister of Environment.203 Syarif indicated that this 
requirement was in response to the prior difficult experience in coordination among such 
authorities.204 
Institutions Enforcing Environmental Laws 
The judiciary is among the institutions that enforce environmental laws. It consists of four 
different jurisdictions under the Supreme Court. Two sub-systems are closely related to 
environmental cases, namely the general judiciary and the administrative judiciary.205 The 
second is the Public Prosecutor. The duty of a prosecutor in an environmental criminal 
context involves (a) carrying out prosecutions against violators, (b) executing judge rulings 
and court decisions, (c) supervising and administering conditional criminal decisions, and (d) 
completing cases sometimes requiring coordination with investigators. 206  The third is 
National Police. The roles of the police officer include enforcing the Criminal Procedure 
Code that deals with environmental crimes.207 The fourth is regency or city governments 
which are responsible for implementing environmental management policy within their own 
territory. 208  Lastly, the provincial governments are empowered to address environmental 
problems pertaining to cross-regency/city matters and impose several administrative sanctions 
within their jurisdiction.209 
6.3.4.2  Forest Certification Schemes 
Apart from the command-and-control enforcement measures for forestry in Indonesia, there 
are Forest Certification System initiatives operating as voluntary enforcement measures. 
There are two major forest certification systems in Indonesia: the “Lembaga Ekolabel (LEI) 
                                                 
202 Article 94 (2). 
203 Article 94. 
204 Ibid Syarif L.M., (2010) at 15. 
205 Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Indonesia Rapid Assessment. (2008) at 11. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Article 77 (1) of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 41 of 1999.  
208 Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Indonesia Rapid Assessment. (2008) at 11. 
209 Ibid. 
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scheme” 210  and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) Scheme. 211  Although these two 
systems are different in origin and have been developed independently they are currently 
collaborating to certify Indonesia timber products.212 To this end, the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) along with other organisations pursuing the preparation of logging companies 
for certification, such as the Tropical Forest Foundation and Tropical Forest Trust, all use the 
FSC certification standard. Nevertheless, progress with certification in Indonesia has been 
slow.213 
6.3.4.3  Implications of the Governance Approach to REDD+ 
 
Indonesia faces similar challenges that affect the governance of REDD+ activities in 
Tanzania. Problems are seen particularly when it comes to decision-making and coordination. 
In the case of Indonesia, it has been observed that even though initiatives have been 
undertaken to address the problems related to the issues of decentralisation, in practice, many 
authors appear to express doubt on the prospects of effective coordination and decision-
making. These practical realities are likely to persist through the REDD+ implementation 
under the command and control approach discussed in Indonesia. Thus addressing issues of 
leakage and permanance cannot be expected at least in the short term. 
6.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined governance approaches and illustrated the challenges in realising 
the implementation of sustainable forest management. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, 
REDD+ is more challenging than previous efforts to deal with forest. Whereas in previous 
efforts to avoid deforestation aimed merely at forest conservation in general, the primary 
object of REDD+ is reducing and control of carbon by avoiding deforestation and 
degradation, conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forest and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The complexities brought by this objective are how to 
deal with leakage, additionality and MRV, the aspects which have never been undertaken in 
forestry in the countries in this study. Reiterating this complexity here is a reminder that when 
                                                 
210 The Indone-sian Eco-la-belling Institute. Available: http://www.lei.or.id/tentang-sertifikasi-lei [accessed 12 
February 2015]. 
211 Sakumoto N., The Participatory Forestry Management System in Indonesia. Policy Trend Report (2002) 52-
76 at 61. 
212 Luttrell C. et.al., Lessons for REDD+ from measures to control illegal logging in Indonesia. Working Paper 
74 CIFOR (2011) at 12.   
213 Ibid at 11.   
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countries are dealing with the question of governance, there is a need to assess whether the 
same governance approach used in previous efforts with limited success is the same approach 
that is envisaged to deal with REDD+. The argument advanced in this chapter is that the 
governance processes required for REDD+ must be broad and all-encompassing in their 
scope.214 As discussed in chapters 8 and 9, this thesis departs from the governance processes 
discussed in this chapter. 
                                                 
214 Ibid at 15.   
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Chapter Seven: 
Aspiring to Achieve Equity, Environmental Effectiveness and Cost-
Effectiveness Outcomes (3Es) 
7.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the governance, compliance and enforcement of forest related laws, this 
chapter explores how the Tanzanian and Indonesian governments envisage how they are 
going to achieve Equity, Environmental Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness (3Es) 
outcomes.1 The chapter explores the distribution of benefits and costs, and regulatory nuts
and bolts discussed or envisaged in the regulatory frameworks for REDD+. This analysis is 
made against the conceptual framework set out in chapter 2 in order to judge whether such 
regulatory framework can be said to be an optimal and feasible model legislative framework 
sufficient to implement REDD+ in developing countries. Such investigation provokes the 
following pertinent questions: first, do the regulatory frameworks for REDD+ have a 
regulatory technique for allocating burdens and benefits and enforcement (hereinafter 
regulatory framework), or they have just devised ad hoc policy responses driven by nothing 
other than pragmatic politics? The analysis suggests that there is, indeed, a strong regulatory 
framework implicit in each regulatory framework. One response to this claim may be that 
there is no underlying regulatory framework intentionally adopted in Tanzania and Indonesia, 
but (for the purpose of this thesis) that is irrelevant. The question is whether there is a 
regulatory framework in each country’s regulatory framework that is identifiable, not whether 
it was intended.2 Secondly, following the regulatory nuts and bolts that follow the theories,
what relationships exist between types or strategies of regulation, on the one hand, and the 
potential 3Es outcomes on the other? This focus is necessary because one needs to distinguish 
1 For a detailed discussion on the 3Es, see chapter 2. 
2 It should be emphasised that an outcome might be positive or negative but the chances of having an outcome 
that is positive is unlikely if deliberate actions are not taken to prevent potential barriers. This aspect is crucial to 
the decision-makers who are charged with devising regulatory frameworks for REDD+ because they should be 
mindful of the potential inhibitors while they are exercising their duties on the behalf of the public. In this sense, 
many would agree that decision-makers have to pay attention to the regulatory technique vs the potential 
outcome and impacts. 
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whether the compliance and enforcement mechanisms for REDD+ replicate the same 
institutional and equity framework that has dominated forest governance interventions for 
decades. As argued later in chapter 8, different governance models are likely to produce 
different results. Thus, the chapter advances this argument by identifying whether and how 
the three dimensions of equity (distributive, procedural, and contextual) discussed in chapter 
2 are envisioned in REDD+ regulatory frameworks in each country. Further the chapter 
advances this argument by looking at the governance model that is aimed at reinforcing the 
mentioned dimensions of equity and examines the extent to which REDD+ offers an 
alternative normative basis/structure for the pursuit of the 3Es outcome.  
7.2  Tanzanian Approach to Climate Change Mitigation 
 
Tanzania is party to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.3 In fulfilling its obligations,4 Tanzania 
developed the Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2003. The objective of this 
communiqué was in response to the UNFCCC requirement to develop an inventory of human 
induced greenhouse gas emissions and removals and to communicate to the COP.5 The major 
sectors covered in the inventory are energy, agriculture, industrial process, waste 
management, forestry and land use. 6  In the current international climate negotiations, 
Tanzania is advocating for an approach to the REDD+ mechanism that “establishes a pathway 
to engage in voluntary Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by developing 
countries in the context of sustainable development.”7 The country agreed to the terms of the 
Bali Action Plan and Copenhagen Accord8 and pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
economy wide between 10 and 20% by 2030 relative to the BAU scenario of 138-153 million 
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) - gross emissions.9 In the context of forestry the 
                                                 
3 UNFCCC. Available: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php 
and UNFCCC. http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php [both accessed 11 
February 2015]. 
4 Obligations for developing contries are discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3. 
5 See chapter 3. 
6  Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC (in July 2003) at 7. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/tannc1.pdf [accessed 12February 2015]. 
7  FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.4 at 4. Also see Peskett L. and Brockhaus M., When REDD+ goes 
national: A review of realities, opportunities and challenges in Angelsen A. (ed)., Realising REDD+ National 
strategy and policy options, (2009) at 38.   
8  Burian  B.S., Minister of State Vice-Presidents Office - 3rd February, 2010. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/pdf/unitedrepublictanzaniacphaccord.pdf 
[accessed 12 February 2015]. 
9 The United Republic of Tanzania Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 2015 at 5. 
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Tanzanian “NDCs” 10  mention enhancing carbon sinks through forest conservation, 
afforestation and reforestation activities as an approach to mitigate climate change.11 The 
implementation of the identified INDCs will strongly depend on how the international 
community meets its commitments in terms of financial and technological support. 12  In 
addition, Tanzania has developed a National Strategy on REDD+.13 Therefore the approved 
national REDD+ Strategy and its Action Plan are (so far) the main regulatory framework for 
implementing REDD+ activities in Tanzania.14 The main goal of REDD+ “is to facilitate 
well-coordinated and effective implementation of REDD+ related policies, processes and 
activities so as to contribute to the climate change agenda and overall sustainable human 
development, enabling Tanzania to benefit from a system based on results-based payments 
for demonstrated emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation.”15 
7.2.1  Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
7.2.1.1  Institutional Arrangements 
 
On 5 February 2007 the President of Tanzania approved the Division of Environment to 
coordinate climate change adaptation and mitigation at the national level.16 At the regional 
and district levels, the coordination of REDD+ activities follows the existing local 
government institutional structure discussed in chapter 6. This is to say that the Regional 
Administrative Secretariat serves as the link between the Ministries and the District Councils. 
At the district and municipal levels, Environmental Management Committees as established 
by the Environmental Management Act, 2004, will function as coordinators for REDD+ 
activities in their respective areas.17 
                                                 
10 See chapter 3 for a discussion on NDCs. 
11 Ibid at 4-5. 
12 Ibid at 8. 
13 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 2. 
14  REDD Readiness Progress Fact Sheet. November 17, (2013). Available: 
http://forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/Nov2013/REDD%20Readiness%20Progress%20Fact%20
Sheet.docx%20November%202013.pdf [accessed 15 February 2015]. 
15 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at viii. 
16 The REDD Desk. Available: http://theredddesk.org/countries/actors/division-environment-vice-
president%E2%80%99s-office-tanzania [accessed 12 February 2015]. 
17 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 21. 
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A review funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy established that the Vice-President's 
Office’s (VPO) “mandate to coordinate REDD+ is agreed by all, however, capacities remain 
low, institutional behaviour is unchanged and private sector is uninvolved. As a result of the 
project there is a widespread consensus among National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF) 
members regarding the legal mandate of DoE in the VPO for coordinating issues of climate 
change, including REDD+. The mandate of VPO over REDD+, which is essentially a forestry 
initiative, was contested in the beginning. It is unclear whether the acceptance of VPO’s 
mandate has been translated into increased capacity within VPO. It is currently too early to 
say whether this consensus will continue into the future.”18 However, the private sector and 
the Ministry of Finance are not yet involved in REDD+ discussions at national level.19 A 
study on how REDD+ has been unfolding on the ground has pointed out that the Tanzanian 
government has been reluctant to develop the institutional arrangements necessary to see 
REDD+ beyond the pilot phase, in particular for finance and benefit-sharing mechanisms.20 
7.2.1.2  Authority with Jurisdiction to Distribute Costs and Benefits 
 
The Tanzania REDD+ Strategy envisages the establishment of National REDD+ Fund to 
consolidate and distribute funds at the national level.21 This idea has its foundation in the 
previous views expressed in the NRTF. Accordingly, the task force expressed that both forms 
of benefits i.e. market or non-market payments must be administered through a REDD+ trust 
fund. They saw central coordination as necessary for equitable benefit-sharing, suggesting 
that the government is in the best position to oversee the achievement of this objective, 
thereby protecting local communities from the tricky business of carbon trading.22 This view 
was opposed by a civil society organisations coalition who argued that such approach would 
                                                 
18 National REDD Policy Project Tanzania End-of-project Review Final Report. February 25th, (2014) at 23. 
Available: 
http://www.norway.go.tz/PageFiles/713138/Final%20review%20report%20REDD%20Policy%20Project%2025
-2-2014.pdf [accessed 19 February 2015]. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Sills E.O. et.al. (eds)., REDD+ on the ground:  A case book of subnational initiatives across the globe. (2014) 
at 220 CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. 
21 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 20. 
22 Rantala S. and Di Gregorio M., Multistakeholder environmental governance in action: REDD+ discourse 
coalitions in Tanzania. Ecology and Society 19:2 (2014) 66. Also see Rantala S., Equity in REDD+: Varying 
logics in Tanzania. Environmental Policy and Governance (2015) at 3.  
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prevent benefits from reaching local communities, thus threatening both the equity and 
environmental effectiveness criteria.23 
 
At sub-national level, the REDD+ national strategy does not propose benefit-sharing options. 
It does, however, refer to Participatory Forest Management (PFM) and Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs) as possible models upon which to build. The interview of MNRT officials has 
revealed that the option favoured by the government is the creation of “aggregates”, that is, 
cooperatives or federations (composed of groups of villages and communities) that would 
receive money from the National REDD+ Fund. These “aggregates” would then be charged 
with responsibility for distributing money to communities. The role of government in this 
respect is to assist in the establishment of such “aggregates” and maybe to establish general 
rules on how to use REDD+ funds.24 
7.2.1.3  Eligible Emission Reductions Activities and/or Factors 
The eligible activities for REDD+ interventions in Tanzania are not provided by the strategy. 
It appears, however that activities that aim at reducing deforestation, forest degradation, forest 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
form part of the main eligible activities. This is because the strategy indicates three categories 
of REDD+ activities to mean: 
(i) “forest land converted to other land” – deforestation 
(ii) “forest land remaining as forests” – degradation, forest conservation, sustainable 
forest management, and enhancement of carbon stocks 
(iii) “other land converted to forest” – afforestation/reforestation of non-forest land.25 
 
Many government officials and NGOs interviewed by Davis expect that the performance 
measure will be “increased carbon sequestration.”26At this point it is not clear how other 
sources of carbon emissions such as agriculture and soil will be included. 
                                                 
23 Rantala S. and Di Gregorio M., Multistakeholder environmental governance in action: REDD+ discourse 
coalitions in Tanzania. Ecology and Society 19:2 (2014) 66. Available: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art66/ [accessed 25 February 2015]. 
24 Davis C. et. al., Analysis of institutional mechanisms for sharing REDD+ benefits: Case studies: Property 
Rights and Resource Governance Project (PRRGP). World Resources Institute (2012) at 48.   
25 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 33.   
26 Davis C. et. al., Analysis of Institutional Mechanisms for Sharing REDD+ Benefits. Property Rights and 
Resource Governance Project (PRRGP), World Resources Institute (2012) at 47-8. 
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7.2.1.4  Determining the Source and Object of Distribution 
The object of distribution is not defined. However, the strategy indicates that if REDD+ is 
properly designed then it is expected to contribute to multiple benefits. Depending on the 
location and type of REDD+ activity, these benefits may include poverty alleviation, 
technology transfer, sustainable use of forest resources, biodiversity conservation, and forest 
dependent communities’ rights.27 Tanzania is at this moment envisaging its participation in 
the REDD+ mechanism under fund based financing arrangements. However, this might 
change depending on the outcome of the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations.28 
7.2.1.5  Determining REDD+ Beneficiaries 
In order to be successful, a National REDD+ strategy must target both direct and indirect 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.29 Whether this is a benchmark that is used to 
decide on who should be fit is not clear. The strategy identifies “a wide range of beneficiaries 
for REDD+ funds to be distributed by NRTF,” including “government ministries, 
communities, researchers, students, NGOs and civil society organizations implementing 
REDD+ related activities,” based on submission of proposals by “registered organizations or 
individuals.” 30 A discussion about engagement of public-private partnership in REDD+ 
activities in Tanzania has been ongoing in parallel with REDD+ strategy development. 
However, differences of opinion within the National REDD+ Task Force, Institute of 
Resource Assessment,31 and Royal Norwegian Embassy, on how to address this output and 
promote local government engagement, coupled with a poor definition of outcomes in the 
project document have resulted in long delays in achieving any real progress under this 
output.32 It is noted that two project proposals have been generated by consultants, but these 
proposals are very provisional and much work will be needed to provide any basis for 
                                                 
27 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 52. 
28 Ibid at 17. 
29 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 47. 
30 Ibid Davis C. et. al., (2012) at 47. 
31The REDD Desk. Available: 
http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/ira_redd_policy_development_and_implementation_contract_1_0.pdf 
[accessed 25 March 2015]. 
32 National REDD+ Strategy Development and Implementation Process in Tanzania. Mid Term Review, Final 
Report. April, (2013) at v-vi.  
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engagement of said partnerships and for attracting donor funding. 33  Subsequently, the 
REDD+ strategy is silent on the public-private partnerships engagement. 
7.2.1.6  Identifying Distributive Equity 
 
With regard to whom should get paid within the communities, Salas indicates that there are 
two dominant views (i.e. views of government officials, members of NGOs and international 
organisations) in Tanzania.34 One view is that funds should be used to pay communities 
according to the accountability principle.35 The basis for this view is that most surveyed 
forests are on village land. However, the type of performance that should be rewarded was 
not clarified.36 Thus this leaves open the debate on whom to reward: those who provide 
efforts to sequester carbon, or those who produce results based on the eligible activities 
described above.37 The second view is that all communities in the country should be paid 
according to the egalitarian principle.38 The former view is said to find support with most 
government officials and NGOs. 39  Other non-dominant views are that payments to the 
communities should be according to the need principle (i.e. forest dependency) and 
compensation principle specifically elaborated as to take account for the opportunity cost of 
the land and the time spent in forest conservation tasks.40 Apart from that, other studies point 
out that the exposure of the NRTF officials to the REDD+ pilot projects has resulted in their 
openness to the view that the benefit sharing mechanism should be flexible and community-
driven within participating communities and groups.41 However, it is noted that less progress 
has been made on identifying how “vertical” benefit sharing will take place (between national 
and local actors).42 With regards to the engagement of public-private partnerships there are no 
provisions on applicable principles this aspect. 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Salas P.C., Implementation of REDD+ Mechanisms in Tanzania. Policy Research Working Paper 6815, The 
World Bank Development Research Group Environment and Energy Team (2014) at 28.   
35 Ibid. See also Davis C. et. al., Analysis of Institutional Mechanisms for Sharing REDD+ Benefits. Property 
Rights and Resource Governance Project (PRRGP), World Resources Institute (2012) at 47-8. 
36 Ibid.   
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.   
39 Ibid.   
40 Ibid.  
41 National REDD Policy Project Tanzania End-of-project Review Final Report. February 25th, (2014) at 25.  
42 Ibid.  
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7.2.2  Determining Regulatory Approach 
 
Command and Control 
There are two approaches envisaged by the Tanzanian government to implement REDD+ 
activities. In an attempt to address ineffective forest governance, REDD+ strategy provides 
that there is a need to ensure “adequate financial, technical and managerial capacity for 
efficient centralized and decentralized management of forest reserves at all levels.”43 This 
section argues that the latter is an extension of the centralised forest management and thus the 
strategy mainly provides for the command and control approach. This argument is 
substantiated by two points. First, the regulatory powers given to the National REDD+ Fund 
as discussed in section 7.2.1.5 means that conceptually, nothing stops a government from 
using REDD+ funds to enforce new forest regulations that keep people out of the forests.44 
Secondly, in contrast to the previous attempt to manage forest, Community Forest 
Management (CFM) under REDD+ is largely a command and control model. This view is 
expressed by some scholars who rightly argue that “when other forces external to designated 
REDD communities drive forest change, REDD+ through CFM becomes an enforcement 
programme that faces similar issues to all previous ‘fence and fine’ deforestation prevention 
programmes […].”45 The difference to be observed here is that “local communities rather than 
government agencies being responsible for the enforcement.”46 
Regarding the choice of CFM models47 to be used, Tanzanian REDD+ strategy only identifies 
CBFM as the model to contribute to REDD+.48 It identifies a number of factors which makes 
JFM incompatible with REDD+. Among these factors are the challenges of establishing and 
operationalising a cost-benefit sharing mechanism, and the long processes involved in 
establishing JFM.49 This decision then suggests a narrow approach to the CFM. To explain 
further the limitations associated with CFM in REDD+, a study which aims to discern the role 
                                                 
43 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 48. 
44 Robinson E.J.Z. et.al., Implementing REDD through community-based forest management: Lessons from 
Tanzania. (2013) 37 Natural Resources Forum 141–152 at 146. 
45 Ibid at 142. 
46 Ibid at 142. 
47 CFM models emanated from the CFM are CBFM and JFM as discussed in chapter 6. 
48 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 9. 
49 Ibid. 
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of CFM in REDD+ established that that role is to take actions against deforestation and to 
some extent enhance the carbon stocks through sustainable forest management.50 However, 
the study argues that it is doubtful that CFM can play a significant role against deforestation 
which to a large extent is driven by outside economic forces. Moreover the opportunity costs 
pertaining to the economic forces are much higher.51 The conditions in which CFM can 
contribute meaningfully to REDD+ have to be moderately to heavily populated.52  These 
revelations suggest that although CFM has a role to play, the benefits associated with their 
role are likely to be insignificant if the criterion to benefits is based on the accountability 
principle. Empirical evidence suggests that “it is likely that REDD+ project could be accepted 
easily in the villages which are far from town with both low population and abundance forest 
resources.”53 This then suggests that opportunities for maximising benefits are dependent on 
low population growth. Nevertheless, it is argued that “carbon credits for this will be difficult 
to claim as it is almost impossible to construct a reliable baseline for past forest 
degradation.”54 
Market Based 
Section 7.2.1.6 above, indicated that REDD+ strategy does not provide for the engagement of 
public-private partnerships. However, REDD+ strategy indicates that “a mechanism to 
engage the private sector in the forest sector for the entire value chain of forest products, from 
planting to end-product development” is underway.55 In addition, the strategy lists Payment 
for Environmental Services (PES) to be used as one of the strategic actions to address 
underlying market failures as drivers of deforestation and deforestation.56 The purpose of PES 
is to be a poverty reduction strategy for communities involved in REDD+ activities.57 
                                                 
50 Skutsch M. and McCall M.K., The role of community forest management in REDD+. (2012) 63:1 Unasylva 
239, at 54. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Mukama K. et. al., Participatory Forest Carbon Assessment and REDD+: Learning from Tanzania. (2012) 
International Journal of Forestry Research at 7.  
54  Skutsch M., REDD+: What´s in it for community forest management? In: Forest-people interfaces: 
understanding community forestry and biocultural diversity. (2012) 139 - 148.  
55 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 49.   
56 Ibid.   
57 Ibid.   
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7.2.3  Determining Compliance and Enforcement 
The focus of the enforcement mechanism envisaged in the Strategy is largely on the 
command and control of forests as the Strategy lists a number of laws applicable to forestry.58 
Having discussed the governance, compliance and enforcement of forest related laws in 
Tanzania, the equivalent issues in Indonesia are now turned to. 
7.3  Indonesian Approach to Climate Change Mitigation 
Indonesia is party to the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Both were ratified by Law 
Number 6 of 1994 and Law Number 17 of 2004 respectively.59 In recent time, Indonesia‘s 
commitment to climate change action has been increasing. In 2007 the country hosted the 
COP 13 in Bali60 and subsequently published its National Action Plan (NAP)61 for addressing 
climate change. The purpose of NAP is to provide guidance to the Government of Indonesia 
for a coordinated and integrated approach to addressing climate change.62 Since then the 
Indonesian President has announced Indonesia’s commitment to reduce emissions by up to 
26% through domestic effort and 41% with international support by 2020.63 This commitment 
is regarded as the largest absolute reduction made by any developing country.64 Beyond 2020, 
Indonesia envisions 29% as the unconditional reduction target of the business as usual 
scenario by 2030.65 In 2008, Indonesia established the National Council on Climate Change 
(NCCC) which is headed by the President. The NCCC is charged with developing strategies, 
policies and programmes to coordinate climate change activities and strengthening 
Indonesia’s position in international negotiations.66 This led to an agreement between the 
Indonesian Government and Norwegian Government where a Letter of Intent (“LoI”) was 
signed between the two governments in 2010. Under the terms of the LoI, the Norwegian 
Government has pledged to contribute US$ 1 billion to Indonesia’s REDD+ efforts. As part 
                                                 
58 Ibid at xvi. 
59 Cited in the Minister of Forestry Regulation No P. 68/Menhut-II/2008. 
60 See chapter 3. 
61 Indonesia National Action Plan 2007.   
62 Brown J. and Peskett L., Climate Finance in Indonesia: Lessons for the Future of Public Finance for Climate 
Change Mitigation. Overseas Development Institute (2007) at 8. 
63 Ibid at 9. 
64 Ibid at 9. 
65 The Indonesian Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 2015 at 2. 
66 Ibid at 8. 
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of this initiative, the Indonesian government has established a Presidential Task Force to 
devise a national strategy on REDD+ and an instrument for financing.67 
7.3.1  Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
7.3.1.1  Institutional Arrangements 
The implementation of REDD+ activities is overseen by the REDD Commission established 
under the Ministry of Forestry. This is in addition to the NCCC and has raised questions as to 
how the REDD Commission relates to the NAP or the NCCC.68 Brown and Peskett argue that 
in terms of the effectiveness of the REDD Commission and NCCC with respect to their 
authority and coordinating roles, it is a matter of experiment. 69  The commitment of the 
different government agencies involved in the REDD Committee and NCCC depends on and 
is regularly limited by the formal mandate they enjoy.70 Despite these challenges, a National 
REDD+ Taskforce was established in 2010 to fast-track national REDD+ readiness 
Processes.71  This led to the formation of the REDD+ Agency charged with the task of 
preparing a regulatory framework for REDD+.72 The REDD+ Agency operates outside the 
mandate of MoFo and this decision created political tensions which emanated from MoFo 
because MoFo “has long been the authoritative agency in forest governance and was 
instrumental in initiating REDD+ in Indonesia.”73 
At the sub-national level, each provincial government may create a REDD+ Institution to 
organise and implement its Regional REDD+ strategy and Action Plan which is developed 
from the REDD+ National strategy.74 In this regard, Regional REDD+ Agencies are required 
to coordinate a number of activities from the following themes: (i) measurement, reporting 
and verification of emission reductions; (ii) assurance of the effectiveness of REDD+ 
funding; and (iii) periodic reporting on developments in regional programs or projects to the 
                                                 
67 Ibid at 9. 
68 Ibid at 8. 
69 Brown J. and Peskett L., Climate Finance in Indonesia: Lessons for the Future of Public Finance for Climate 
Change Mitigation. Overseas Development Institute (2007) at 8. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid McGregor A. et. al., (2015), at 146. 
72 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 9.   
73 McGregor A. et. al., Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia. 47 Environment 
and Planning, (2015) 138–155 at 146. 
74 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 8. 
Chapter 7: Aspiring to Achieve Equity, Environmental-Effectiveness and Cost-




-216 -  
 
national REDD+ Agency.75 The role of districts is also recognised. Districts can establish 
REDD+ institutions to consistently and efficiently coordinate all aspects of district-level 
REDD+ activities and report results to the provincial level.76 Thus government regulations on 
forests77 provide a key legal basis for provincial and district governments to authorise permits 
for the utilisation of environmental services.78 
7.3.1.2  Authority with Jurisdiction to Distribute Costs and Benefits 
 
Following the establishment of a REDD+ Agency, the strategy establishes two more 
institutions at the national level namely: a REDD+ Funding Instrument and MRV Agency.79 
The relationship between the agencies is as follows: the REDD+ Agency is empowered to 
control the Funding Instrument and the MRV Institution by inter alia determining the 
priorities, strategies, and policies for funds management.80 Therefore, the Agency will need to 
establish policies, regulations, and standards for measurement, reporting and verification.81 In 
turn, the MRV Institution will be required to provide verification results for emissions 
reduction to the Funding Instrument for performance-based payment.82 To do this there is a 
need for cooperation between the Funding Instrument and the MRV Institution in terms of 
inter alia developing evaluation protocols for social and environmental safeguards.83 In an 
effort to manage funds in a decentralised fashion, the strategy indicates that the Funding 
Instrument will be managed with a multi-stake holder approach with a variety of potential 
sources and a wide variety of users. 84  However, the strategy does not provide details 
regarding the power given to the said multi-stakeholder. Moreover, there is the obligation to 
harmonise “regulations relating to fiscal transfers from the Central Government to Regional 
Governments as incentives to ensure the success of the REDD+ program.”85 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 GR 6 of 2007 and GR 3 of 2008. 
78 Loft L. et. al., Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. (2015) 
6 Forests, 1031-1060 at 1047. 
79 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 8. 




84 Ibid at 11. 
85 Ibid at 26. 
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7.3.1.3  Eligible Emission Reductions Activities and/or Factors 
REDD+ strategy does not explicitly provide eligible activities for REDD+ implementation. 
However, to ascertain eligible activities it is perhaps appropriate to begin with the approach 
taken by Indonesia. In particular, Indonesia intends to implement REDD+ within the low 
carbon and green economy framework. This approach is said to ensure that efforts to mitigate 
land use-driven climate change are carried out in line with Indonesian policies and the need 
for sustainable development.86 Against this background, the strategy provides the framework 
and pillars. These include a threefold strategic program namely: conservation and 
rehabilitation, sustainable agriculture, forestry and mining, and sustainable management of 
landscapes.87 It is evident that eligible activities are contained within the details of these 
programs.88 Apart from this strategy, the Regulation on procedures for REDD+ activities 
defines REDD+ as “all efforts of forest management to prevent or reduce the decline of forest 
quality and/or quantity of forest covers and carbon stock through various activities that 
support sustainable national development.”89 However, the more recent Regulation on the 
Implementation of Forest Carbon does not reference REDD+.90 
7.3.1.4  Determining the Source and Object of Distribution 
 
The object of distribution in the Indonesia legal framework appears to be defined almost 
entirely as cash distribution. 91  For example, the strategy envisages that in order to take 
advantage of the carbon market, it provides for an independent third party verification process 
so that Verified Emissions Reduction (VER) and Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) 
certificates can be issued. Such certificates are the basis for the disbursement of performance 
payment for the financial benefit of those carrying out REDD+ programs and activities.92 
 
                                                 
86 Ibid at 2. 
87 Ibid at 7. 
88 See Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 7 where these programs are expected to contribute to 
emissions reduction and increased carbon stocks. 
89 Article 1(12) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009 on the Reduction of Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Procedure. 
90 Ministerial Regulation P.20/Menhut-II/2012 on Implementation of Forest Carbon. 
91  Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 14. Also see 
http://theforestsdialogue.org/sites/default/files/presentation_2_iwan_wibisono.pdf [accessed 25 March 2015]. 
92 Ibid. 
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7.3.1.5  Determining REDD+ Beneficiaries 
 
The provisions for determining REDD+ beneficiaries are found in a number of instruments 
that form part of the regulatory framework. In the National REDD+ Strategy, regional 
governments, all parties with rights over the area of the REDD+ program/project/activity, and 
communities are all set to receive benefits.93 To ascertain REDD+ beneficiaries in REDD+ 
regulation, it is important to begin by mentioning REDD+ implementers. These are provided 
in chapter 3 of the regulation and are classified as national and international entities.94 The 
entities at a domestic level are classified as any forestry licence holder in a specified location, 
customary forest managers, right forest owners or managers, and village forest managers.95 
However, the regulation does not provide for obligations for local communities, forest-
dependent peoples, tenure security or indigenous people’s rights, or benefits that will flow to 
these communities.96 At the international level, the entities include government, business 
agencies, international organisations and individuals who bear the funds for REDD 
implementation.97 
Having established the entities, the regulation provides that national entities will receive 
payment from an international entity for emissions reduction.98 Following from this it is not 
clear whether other actors can receive payments directly from the international entity. Also it 
appears from this regulation99 that both implementers may buy and sell100 REDD+ certificates 
for post‐2012 REDD carbon trading associated with the implementation of emission 
reduction commitment of developed countries.101 According to Agus Sari,102 the government 
                                                 
93 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 29. 
94 Article 4 (1) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No. : P. 30/Menhut-II/2009. 
95Article 4 (1)-(2) read together with Article 14 (1) of the Implementation Procedures of Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation], No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009. 
96 Johnstone N., Indonesia in the “REDD”: Climate Change, Indigenous Peoples and Global Legal Pluralism. 
(2010) 12:1  Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal at 106. 
97Article 4 (1)-(2) read together with Article 14 (1) of the Implementation Procedures of Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009. 
98 Article 14 (1) (a) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No. : P. 30/Menhut-II/2009. 
99 Ibid Article 14 (1) (c). 
100 A question may arise as follows: Does this implicitly suggest that implementers have carbon rights? As such 
“carbon rights have been defined by experts, as a form of property that ‘commoditize’ carbon and allow it to be 
traded in voluntary and regulatory markets.” See Robles F.F., Forest Carbon Tenure in Asia-Pacific: A 
comparative analysis of legal trends to define carbon rights in Asia-Pacific. (2012) 89 FAO Legal Papers Online 
at 14. Available: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/lpo89.pdf [accessed 5 April 2015]. 
101 Article 14 (1) (c) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No. : P. 30/Menhut-II/2009. 
102 He is the Deputy Chair on Planning and Funding REDD+ Management Agency and he is responsible for 
developing Indonesia’s REDD+ Funding Instrument. 
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intends to “not only buy and sell [REDD certificates] like traditional dealers, but [also] 
package them so that [the government] buy insecure credits and sell secure credits.”103 The 
purpose is to increase the value of such credits and in so doing the government’s efforts 
would offer offset buyers a degree of certainty that they may not enjoy when purchasing 
offsets directly from private projects.104 
International entities are allowed to use REDD certificates as part of emission reduction 
commitments of developed countries.105 This is in contrast to the decision by Brazil as noted 
in chapter 5 that the Federal Government has argued that it cannot allow rights to carbon to be 
sold internationally. Such a move, Brazil argues, will simply result in a lower national 
baseline, which is a concern if it adopts a post-2012 target. The approach that is taken in 
Indonesia106 seems to be contradictory to the objective of the CBDR principle as explained in 
chapter 2. 
7.3.1.6  Identifying Distributive Equity 
Arrangements regarding procedural equity are provided by Indonesia’s strategy. It requires 
the REDD+ Agency to implement and apply the principles of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) in all REDD+ programs and projects.107 A number of principles have been 
outlined. The most relevant for the distribution of costs and benefits requires that the FPIC 
should be “through their traditional authorities, or through representative organizations 
selected on the basis of traditional systems adhered to by the given indigenous community” in 
order to seek indigenous and local communities’ consent.108 In obtaining this consent, the 
strategy requires that consent be obtained through legal mechanisms. Such consent must be 
categorised as tentative, temporary, partial, with specific stipulations, with other options, or 
full agreement. 109  In addition, consultation with the public must be complete, balanced, 
honest, unbiased, in language that they understand, and done within an adequate frame of 
time before permits are legalised or activities commenced. 110  The question of who is 
                                                 
103 Zwick S., Indonesian Government May Buy Carbon Offsets from Domestic Forest Conservation. (2014).  
104 Ibid. 
105 Article 14 (1) (b) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No. : P. 30/Menhut-II/2009. 
106 I.e. to allow international entities to use REDD certificates as part of emission reduction commitments of 
developed countries. 
107 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 27. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid at 28. 
110 Ibid. 
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considered the “public” in the context of REDD+ is not addressed. The strategy is silent on 
the question of whether such public must prove the existence of customary rights. This is 
important because it is likely that communities would invoke their customary property rights 
to the forests and therefore refuse or qualify (as aforementioned) their consent for others to 
implement REDD+. Wright concluded that “specific regulations must be adopted that detail 
not only the ‘commercial’ side of a REDD+ project but also address how FPIC is to be 
obtained, how Indigenous People will participate in REDD+, and how the financial benefits 
will reach them.”111 In addition in order to consult with the public there are other factors that 
must be taken into account but are not provided in the strategy. These issues relate to the need 
to “consult on ongoing bases” as discussed in chapter 8.112 
Regarding the distributive equity, the strategy provides a number of principles. For instance, 
community members are entitled to receive payments either individually or collectively in 
line with the accountability principle (i.e. their roles played). However, this is done within the 
context of having rights over resources and provision of services. 113  Hence the strategy 
provides that all “parties with rights over the area of the REDD+ program/project/activity 
location have the right to payment.”114 This requirement is similar to the libertarian principle 
discussed in chapter 2. Therefore, these provisions combine the accountability principle with 
the libertarian principle. Elsewhere, a provision is made for the members of communities who 
do not have rights but contribute to the achievement of VER/CER.115 The strategy also points 
out that “[r]egional governments are among the parties with the potential to receive benefits 
from REDD+ projects if VER/CER can be achieved as a result of their policies and public 
sector investments.”116 In this case, the strategy only provides for the accountability principle 
as the basis for distributing benefits. The reference to the compensation principle in the 
REDD+ framework in Indonesia does not seem to exist in the strategy. However, this principle 
                                                 
111 Wright G., Indigenous People and customary land ownership under domestic REDD+ frameworks: A case 
study of Indonesia. (2011) 7:2 Law, Environment and Development Journal 119-131 at 131. 
112 Here one of the key issues is to consult on an ongoing basis. This takes into account the discussion in chapter 
2 where it was pointed out that environmental effectiveness should also be seen not only in terms of outputs and 
outcomes but also in terms of inducing their subjects to comply with systems of rules and regulations and 
address successfully the distributional justice issues among other issues. This line of thinking provides chapter 8 
with some ideal means of successfully addressing these issues given some challenges related to information 
dissemination. 
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is implicitly provided for by making reference to the Forest Act 117  as required by the 
strategy. 118  In particular, the Forest Act gives the right to communities to “obtain 
compensation in case its access to the forest is removed as a consequence of forest 
classification.”119 
Apart from the strategy which is applicable at a national level, there are a number of 
regulations which authorise provincial and district governments to authorise benefits 
distribution within their jurisdictions as indicated above. 120  The Forestry Regulation 
determines who can apply for a REDD+ project to the Head of District and the conditions 
thereof.121 With regards to benefits distribution, this regulation provides that benefits are to be 
distributed to the state (in the form of non-tax state revenue), developer and surrounding 
communities.122 The egalitarian principle is used to provide a set of uniform percentage-based 
splits.123 In addition, the regulation provides that payment and the use of state revenues from 
the REDD+ implementation will be regulated under stipulated regulations.124 However, part 
of such revenues will be used as a collateral of REDD implementation at the national level.125 
This is for the managing of a national registry and/or addressing national emissions 
reduction. 126  This requirement also resembles the accountability principle. However, as 
chapter 2 illustrates, it is very difficult and time consuming to obtain evidence of emission 
reductions of the policies which are aimed at reducing emissions. Therefore, the justification 
of receiving benefits resulting from their policies and public sector investments seems to be 
unfounded.  
A further observation in the strategy is a provision of an egalitarian principle but 
differentiation is made dependent on the specific target group. Specifically, the strategy 
                                                 
117 Forest Act No. 41 of 1999. 
118 With reference to the forestry legislative framework, the REDD+ Strategy provides that the strategic plan was 
devised to serve as the government’s main reference to implement forestry and land use climate change policy. 
Indonesian REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 6. 
119 Article 68 (3) Act 41/1999. Also see Arnscheidt J., “Debating” Nature Conservation: Policy, Law and 
Practice in Indonesia, a discourse analysis of history and present. (2008) at 152. 
120 Thus the relevant regulations in this case are Ministry of Forestry Regulation (MoFo-R) No 36 of 2009 and 
Minister of Forestry Regulation (MoFo-R) No. 30 of 2009. 
121Article 5 of the MoFo-R 36 of 2009. 
122 Ministry of Forestry Regulation (MoF-R) No 36 of 2009 Annex III. Also see Loft L. et. al., Taking Stock of 
Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. (2015) 6, Forests, 1031-1060 at 1048. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Article 20 of MoFo-R 30 of 2009. 
125 Article 21 (1) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No.: P. 30/Menhut-II/2009. 
126 Article 21 (2) (b) of the Minister of Forestry Regulation No.: P. 30/Menhut-II/2009. 
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provides that distributing revenues will depend on forest type licence and the project 
developer entity. Government would receive between 10 and 50 percent and communities 
between 20 and 70 percent although in most cases both communities and government each 
would receive 20 percent and project developers between 20 and 60 percent.127 The rationale 
for this distribution is not justified. The lack of reasons for this means the legitimacy of the 
decree may be contested. Costenbader points out that a potential difficulty with the egalitarian 
principle for revenue‐sharing arrangements lies in the fact that economic theory would 
suggest various sub‐national regions have different opportunity costs for avoided 
deforestation.128 The basis for such factors includes distance to markets, local forest land 
carbon content, micro‐climates and land quality.129 A recent economic analysis has confirmed 
this theoretical problem in Indonesia particularly because of competing land uses. 130  In 
addition,  Chokkalingam points out that some areas in Indonesia have low emissions and want 
to develop intensively, while others have poor and declining forest conditions.131 It follows 
that a decision to use the egalitarian principle for distribution of costs and benefits may be 
seen to be unfair to those who incur the greatest costs. 
The contextual dimensions in Indonesia include widespread lack of effective rights to land, 
lack of legal status to obtain licences for selling carbon credits, and lack of access to legal 
texts translated into local languages and cultures. 132  This contextual equity has been 




                                                 
127 Attachment III of Indonesia Decree number: P. 36/Menhut-II/2009, regarding procedures for licensing of 
commercial utilisation of carbon sequestration and/or storage in production and protected forests. 
128 Costenbader J., REDD+ Benefit Sharing: A Comparative Assessment of three National Policy Approaches. 
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and UN-REDD Programme (2011) at 36. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Olsen, N. and Bishop, J. 2009. The Financial Costs of REDD: Evidence from Brazil and Indonesia. Gland, 
Switzerland: IUCN. 64 pp, at vi‐vii cited in Costenbader J., REDD+ Benefit Sharing: A Comparative 
Assessment of three National Policy Approaches. The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and UN-
REDD Programme (2011) at 36. 
131 Chokkalingam U., UKP4 workshop discusses legal aspects of REDD+ MRV in Indonesia DEC Forest 
Carbon Asia Articles 13, (2013) http://www.forestcarbonasia.org/articles/ukp4-workshop-discusses-legal-
aspectsredd-mrv-indonesia/. 
132 Ituarte-Lima C. et. al., Assessing equity in national legal frameworks for REDD+: The case of Indonesia. 
(2014) xxx Environmental Science and Policy 1-10 at 6. 
133 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 18. 
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7.3.2  Determining Regulatory Approach 
 
Command and Control 
The REDD+ Strategy requires the harmonisation of “regulations relating to fiscal transfers 
from the Central Government to Regional Governments as incentives to ensure the success of 
the REDD+ program.”134 This appears to be the first effort to decentralise several tasks and 
responsibilities in the forestry sector from central to regional governments. Even with this 
provision, however, Indonesia’s REDD+ Strategy seems to have some key limitations. 
Questions remain as to the authority for decision-making of finance and oversight at a district 
level. It is reported that the decentralisation era has generated competition and conflict 
between the Ministry of Forestry, provincial governments, and district governments over the 
authority to control, plan, and allocate rights within the forest estate.135 In a recent study of 
REDD+ governance, most interviewees from the Ministry of Forestry blamed the high 
deforestation rate in the early 2000s on decentralisation and the lack of capacity within sub-
national governments to regulate forest access. 136  The role of law in contributing to 
deforestation has also been highlighted elsewhere.137 
Market Based 
The Indonesian strategy advocates the use of market-based incentives to implement REDD+ 
activities. As discussed in section 7.3.1.4 above, the strategy establishes procedures for the 
authorisation of VER/CER certificates which constitute the basis for the disbursement of 
performance payment for the financial benefit of those carrying out REDD+ programs and 
activities.138 The discussion of the reflexive aspect of market-based regulation is discussed in 
chapter 8 section 8.3.3. 
 
 
                                                 
134 Ibid at 26. 
135 Cited in Davis C. et. al., Analysis of institutional mechanisms for sharing REDD+ benefits: Case studies: 
Property Rights and Resource Governance Project (PRRGP). World Resources Institute (2012) at 89. 
136 Mulyani M. and Jepson P., REDD+ and Forest Governance in Indonesia: A Multistakeholder Study of 
Perceived Challenges and Opportunities. (2013) 22 The Journal of Environment Development 261 at 269. 
137Arnold concludes that “law has created key flaws in the division of authority between the Central Government 
and regional governments, namely an unclear division of power, an inappropriate allocation of power and an 
insecure transfer of devolved power.” See Arnold L.L., Deforestation in decentralised Indonesia:What’s law Got 
to do with it? (2008) 4:2 Law, Environment and Development Journal, 75-100 at 100. 
138 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 14.   
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7.3.3  Determining Compliance and Enforcement 
 
The focus of the enforcement mechanism envisaged in the strategy is largely on the command 
and control of forests but it does not explain how the distribution of benefits is linked with 
enforcement. 139  Nevertheless, the general enforcement practices in the field of natural 
resources is carried out by the joint enforcement team, comprising MoFo, MoE, public 
prosecutors, the corruption eradication commission, the financial intelligence unit, the 
Presidential Task Force, the police and the special working group on Legal Review and Law 
Enforcement under the REDD+ Task Force which work to eradicate judicial corruption.140 To 
compliment that approach, the Indonesian Supreme Court, the Ministry of Environment, the 
Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law and the Asian Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement Network have created the practice of environmental certification of judges. The 
purpose is to authorise only certified judges to address environmental and natural resources 
related cases.141 The certification programme is under the authority of the Supreme Court.142 
This is different compared to the establishment of environmental courts established in other 
countries such as South Africa. 143  Under the program, only judges who have obtained 
environmental certificates are allowed to adjudicate environmental cases at the court of first 
instances and of appeals.144 In the event that a court of first instance and court of appeal panel 
do not have  certified judges, then the requirement is that  the chair in the panel of judges is 
set to be certified.145 Whereas in a court of first instance, there is no certified judge, the chief 
of the court of appeal who has jurisdiction over the court of first instance is required to 
appoint a certified judge from other courts of first instance within his jurisdiction. 146 
Similarly, if in a court of appeal there is no certified judge, the chief justice is required to 
appoint a certified judge from other courts of appeal.147 
                                                 
139 Ibid at 19-20.   
140 Santosa M.A and Khatarina J., REDD+ in Indonesia. Law and Governance Perspectives. In Faure M. and 
Wibisana A., (eds.), Regulating disasters, climate change and environmental harm: Lessons from the Indonesian 
experience (2013) at 183.   
141 Ibid. Also Santosa M.A. et.al., Indonesia. In Lord R. et.al., Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and 
Practice. (2012) at 205.  
142 Supreme Court Directive Number 134/KMA/SK/IX/2011 on the certification of environmental judges. 
143 Rahmadi T., The Indonesian Judicial certification program on the environment. TRAFFIC, Environmental 
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Regarding the regulations that authorise the provincial and districts governments to 
implement REDD+, Loft et al argue that there are essential questions about the validity and 
enforceability of some of the regulations 148  used to distribute benefits at provincial and 
district level.149 The authors question whether the Forestry Regulation150 will be implemented 
due to three main reasons:151 The first is that the regulation indicates that it will be elaborated 
on by another regulation which has not yet been formulated to date. The second reason is that 
the Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Forestry is empowered to deal with 
revenue sharing arrangements. As such the Ministry of Finance has already challenged the 
regulation. The final reason is that the determination of REDD+ revenues as non-tax revenues 
should be stipulated by a Government Regulation, rather than a Ministerial Regulation. The 
former has higher legal status than the latter.152 
7.4  Comparative Analysis 
7.4.1  Benefits Comparison 
 
Determining the Sources and Object of Distribution  
The object of distribution in the Indonesia legal framework appears to be defined almost 
entirely as a cash distribution, while in Tanzania there is a wider scope of the object of 
distribution. The advantage of defining and expanding the object of distribution makes it 
possible to identify criteria for their distribution. For example, when the object of distribution 
is financial, it means it is likely that the libertarian principle based on land and resource 
tenure is a criterion for distribution of such benefit. This is the case for Indonesia. As 
indicated in chapter 5, this approach faces considerable practical problems in terms of 
attaining the benefits for local communities especially the most vulnerable. However, this 
problem could be addressed if the object of distribution is access to technology, or “clean” 
energy, because the other principles such as utilitarianism or egalitarianism can be used as 
criteria with less practical problems. The choice of criterion will obviously depend on the 
clear definition of what type of technology or energy is made available. Chapter 5 also 
                                                 
148 Such as MoFo-R No. 36 of 2009 and MoFo-R No. 30 of 2009. 
149 Loft L. et. al., Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. 
(2015) 6 Forests, 1031-1060 at 1048. 
150 MoFo-R No. 36 of 2009. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid at 1048. 
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established that the source of benefits has implications for the self-regulatory system. Where 
the benefits arise from private finance, the risks are much higher compared to where the 
benefits arise from the public sources. 
Comparing the Distributive Equity and the Principles 
In Tanzania, very limited progress has been made in terms of agreeing on a REDD+ financing 
mechanism, this is largely due to the uncertainty over the level of future REDD+ financing 
and the ongoing national level discussions between the VPO, Ministry of Finance and 
development partners on options for the financing of climate change activities. 153  This 
revelation can be one of the reasons to explain why the Tanzanian REDD+ Strategy only 
indicates that a system to ensure equitable sharing of benefits will need to be established.154 
Thus there is no explicit reference to the distributive equity principles relating to REDD+ 
benefits. However, one can note that the accountability principle and egalitarian principle are 
said to be the dominant views in the Forestry and Beekeeping Division within the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism.155  In contrast to the Tanzanian Strategy, the Indonesian 
Strategy provides for benefit sharing.156 It states that a fair distribution of benefits is based on 
the libertarian principle, accountability principle, egalitarian principle and compensation 
principle as discussed above. However, it is noted that both countries do not provide for the 
need principle and the utilitarian principle. 
The procedural aspect for distribution of costs and benefits in Tanzania must be seen in the 
context of the World Bank’s policies. This is because the Tanzanian REDD+ strategy adopts 
a number of the World Bank’s policies to implement REDD+.157 Among these policies, the 
OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment requires the borrower to consult “project-affected 
groups and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) about the project's environmental 
                                                 
153 National REDD Policy Project Tanzania End-of-project Review Final Report. February 25th, (2014) at iv.  
154 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 10. 
155 Davis C. et. al., Analysis of Institutional Mechanisms for Sharing REDD+ Benefits. Property Rights and 
Resource Governance Project (PRRGP), World Resources Institute (2012) at 47-8.   
156 Indonesian REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 32.   
157 These are Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Forests (OP/BP 4.36), 
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10). United Republic of Tanzania 
(URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) February, 
(2013) at 53. 
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aspects and takes their views into account.”158 Thereafter, the policy requires the borrower to 
provide “relevant material in a timely manner prior to consultation and in a form and 
language that are understandable and accessible to the groups being consulted.” 159  The 
borrower is further obliged to provide “for the initial consultation a summary of the proposed 
project's objectives, description, and potential impacts; for consultation after the draft 
Environmental Assessment (EA) report is prepared, [and] provide a summary of the EA's 
conclusions.” Lastly, the policy requires the borrower to make the draft EA report available at 
a “public place accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs.” 160  In contrast, 
Indonesia provides for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) through their traditional 
authorities, or through representative organisations selected on the basis of traditional systems 
of governance adhered to by the given indigenous community in order to seek indigenous and 
local communities’ consent. In addition, the Indonesian Strategy goes further to explain the 
categories of such consent.161 This category is commendable because there is no clarity about 
the nature of REDD+ in terms of the positive incentives. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4 
questions still remain as to when to expect positive incentives, type of incentives to receive, 
for how long REDD+ will be implemented and thus the timeframe to expect the incentives 
and periodicity. This situation raises questions about their implications for liability or 
accountability. 
The contextual equity gives rise to issues that are context specific.162 Therefore, in defining 
the context in Tanzania, one must include the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation 
and explain how these factors are relevant to distribution of costs and benefits. The 
determination of the causes of the deforestation and forest degradation is important to the 
subject of benefit sharing because it creates scope for the identification of beneficiaries. The 
Tanzania REDD+ Strategy correctly states that in “order to be successful, a National REDD+ 
Strategy must target both direct and indirect drivers of deforestation and forest degradation”. 
However, no reference is made to these causes of deforestation and degradation in the context 
                                                 
158  OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment at 5. Available: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMD
K:20064724~menuPK:4564185~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html [accessed 25 
April 2015]. 
159 OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment at 5. 
160 Ibid. 
161 See above. 
162 See chapter 2 section 2.4.4. 
Chapter 7: Aspiring to Achieve Equity, Environmental-Effectiveness and Cost-




-228 -  
 
of benefit distribution, and nothing is stated on the vitally important issue of how these causes 
are to provide clues in the identification of beneficiaries. Consequently the importance of 
such link may not be appreciated. Instead the following provision concludes with the broad 
statement that REDD+ is expected to contribute to multiple benefits. These benefits are 
“poverty alleviation, technology transfer, sustainable use of forest resources and biodiversity 
conservation, and forest dependent communities’ rights.”163 To discuss the benefits that could 
be further elaborated a following link could be made. It is well understood that small-scale 
farmers’ “agricultural practices are associated with poor socio-economic conditions [that] 
create a vicious cycle in which poor small-holder farmers have to deforest and use new often 
marginal lands, so increasing deforestation and overall degradation.”164 In this regard, the 
benefits that arise out of this linkage could be measures which are proposed to assist small-
scale farmers. For instance Watson has proposed that efforts “should be placed on developing 
cooperatives, farmer organizations, business associations, scientific organizations explicitly 
supporting the needs of small-scale agricultural producers, and entrepreneurs to capture and 
add value to on-farm, post-harvest and off-farm enterprises.”165 Such emphasis should be 
complimented by trade reforms. In particular, trade reforms specific to small-scale farmers 
should be accompanied by a number of factors. These are removal of resource-use distorting 
subsidies, taxes on environmental and social externalities, increased public investment in 
rural infrastructure and public goods, increased access to credit for small-scale farmers, 
addressing property rights and financial payments to farmers for carbon sequestration.166 The 
Strategy should have defined benefits in this way. Once a wider scope for the definition of 
benefits has been addressed such as indicated, a further effort should be taken to set 
conditions for attracting such benefits. For example the provision for  “public-private 
partnership” participation should be made conditional on the sustainable practices to 
agriculture.  
 
                                                 
163 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 52.   
164 Watson R.T., Presentation to ECOSOC. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development. Key Findings from Global Summary for Decision Makers. Available:   
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/statement08/robert_watson.pdf [accessed 15 September 2015]. 
165  Watson B., How to Assist the Small-Scale Farmer. 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/statement08/robert_watson.pdf [accessed 8 April 2015]. 
166 Ibid. 
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7.4.2  Compliance and Enforcement Approach Comparison 
 
The issue of governance, compliance and enforcement of both countries appear to rely largely 
on command and control regulation. This is not a surprise because in the environmental field 
legislatures have traditionally employed a command-and-control approach to prohibit certain 
activities, set standards to protect or improve environmental quality and set up a regulatory 
agency to monitor and enforce compliance with the legal standards and police power.167 As 
such, command and control capitalises on the threat of sanctions to achieve its objectives.168 
Yet, it is acknowledged that many individuals comply out of a sense of good citizenship.169 
Thus, the system is designed to compel the few who are not inclined to comply out of a sense 
of good citizenship.170 Command and control regulations are effective because they rely on 
fear as the motivating deterrent. When sanctions are not feared because they are not severe 
enough or they are not likely to be administered effectively, such regulations are likely to fail 
to achieve their objectives.171 This is not to say that the command and control approach is 
naturally inefficient, not cost-effective, and inequitable compared to alternatives. Rather what 
is optimal and feasible is always relative to an environmental situation.172 
Apart from command and control used in both countries, they also envisage the use of market 
based approaches particularly the use of the Payment for Environmental Services (PES). PES 
is attributed to the Coasian economic approach as one of the market based regulations. Orts 
discusses four main conventional economic approaches to environmental governance.173 The 
first, approach (known as the Pigouvian approach) imposes taxes or charges on activities that 
are environmentally harmful. 174 A second assigns rights of "ownership" in the natural 
                                                 
167 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1257.  Karpl 
D.R. and Gaulding C.L., Motivational Underpinnings of Command-and-Control, Market-Based, and Voluntarist 
Environmental Policies. (1995) 48:5 Human Relations, 439-465 at 442. 
168 Karpl D.R. and Gaulding C.L., Motivational Underpinnings of Command-and-Control, Market-Based, and 
Voluntarist Environmental Policies. (1995) 48:5 Human Relations, 439-465 at 440. 
169 Ibid at 442. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid at 449. 
172 Cole D. and Grossman P., When is Command and Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the 
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection. (1999) Wisconsin 
Law Review 887 at 88. 
173 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1242. 
174 Ibid.  An example of this approach in climate change mitigation is carbon tax. See for instance Putting a Price 
on Carbon with a Tax. http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/background-
note_carbon-tax.pdf [accessed 15 April 2015]. 
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environment. The expectation is that if natural resources are reduced to “human ownership, 
then the market will, in theory, accurately value the newly created property.”175 This approach 
is attributed to Coase.176 A third market-based approach to environmental regulation involves 
the creation of tradeable pollution rights.177 It assigns marketable pollution "rights" as a sort 
of property. Here the market based approach relies on command-and-control to establish the 
overall level of pollution allowed.178 Lastly, a fourth type of market-based regulation attempts 
to harness the consciences of consumers to favour environmentally friendly products. This 
type of environmental marketing regulation is used to aid consumer identification of "green 
products" or environmentally harmful products and to assure truthful environmental 
advertising claims. 179  This involves creating and administering programs for “green 
labels”.180 
7.4.3  Implications for Achieving the 3Es Outcome 
 
Following the regulatory framework established in the Tanzanian case study, what 
relationships exist between the type of regulatory framework, on the one hand, and the 
potential 3Es outcomes on the other? Accordingly, recommendations in the REDD+ 
literature181 to design legislation or amend existing forestry legislation to address REDD+ 
inadvertently overlook the implications that are likely to arise from recommendations to 
design command and control regulations. For example, sectoral legislative amendments are 
time-consuming and sometimes amendments do not come to effect. 182  In addition, the 
absence of discussion on the issue of rights to carbon rights would result in government 
                                                 
175 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1243. 
176 Ibid. 
177 An example is carbon trading. “Under a carbon trading scheme, the government establishes a limit or cap on 
emissions and then allocates the cap as allowances or permits amongst emitters, who are required to “hold 
allowances equal to their emissions” at the end of a defined period, either by mitigating their emissions or 
trading allowances.” Tyler E. et al., “Emissions Trading as a Policy Option for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in 
South Africa” (2009) The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation. Available at 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/publications/09Tyler-etal-Emissions_trading.pdf [accessed 18 September 
2015]. 
178 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1244. 
179 Ibid at 1246. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Enabling Legislative and Institutional Framework for Climate Change Response in Kenya. The International 
Development Law Organization (IDLO) Italy (2012) at 12. Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal 
framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the Environment, Sweden (2014). 
182 The delays in amending legislation can be too long and sometimes can continue to infinity. An example of 
this is the delays of the new Forestry Act in Zambia which was entered into the government gazette in 1999 to 
repeal the old Forestry Act of 1973 but that amendment has not come into effect. See 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6824e/X6824E04.htm [accessed 15 September 2015]. 
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agencies facing challenges in the exercising of functions and obligations in the distribution of 
costs and benefits because of difficulties in defining carbon rights as discussed in chapter 5. 
In section 5.3.4.3 it was established that because of the “eminent domain” it might not be 
possible stop actors like agro-industries from losing income from stopping business as usual 
forest conversions without just compensations. These aspects are taken into consideration in 
the development of the REDD+ legal frameworks. 
7.5  Conclusion 
 
A survey of the regulatory framework for REDD+ has revealed that the main instruments for 
REDD+ in the countries under study are inadequate to deal with the 3Es because they rely 
mainly on the command and control models. In Tanzania, the government has argued that the 
policy failures are a result of, inter alia, “inadequate capacity of the government to implement 
strictly the instituted centralised and decentralised management systems due to inadequate 
financial and management capacity.”183 These factors resulted in the inefficient management 
of forest resources; inability of government to adequately define resource tenure rights 
thereby subjecting forests to “open access.”184 This is similar to what is widely advocated by 
the Tragedy of the Commons. 185  In this scenario, unregulated demand from “rational” 
individuals exceeds the physical carrying capacity of the resource. The author then argues for 
privatisation of resource access and enclosure of resources through allocation of clear 
property rights as a means of preventing degradation.186 Re-examination of Harding’s work 
has identified that the origins of resource over-extraction is the failure of cooperative property 
arrangements rather than the lack of establishing private property rights in resource 
management.187 The Harding’s argument only apply to a minority of situations. 188  Lyster and 
others indicate that “PES depends on deliberate social interventions and political will for their 
creation” and function. 189  In this case, PES interventions cannot be considered to be 
                                                 
183 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD+) February, (2013) at 15.   
184 Ibid.   
185 In his book, Harding’s classic problematisation of resource degradation of the grazing commons under “open-
access management regime”. 
186 Lyster R, et al., Law, Tropical Forests and Carbon:The Case of REDD+. (2013)  at 210. 
187 Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. (1990). Lyster R, et 
al., Law, Tropical Forests and Carbon: The Case of REDD+. (2013)  at 210. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Lyster R, et al., Law, Tropical Forests and Carbon:The Case of REDD+. (2013) at 211. Emphasis is mine. 
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politically neutral.190 However, the chapter has argued that the overall implementation of 
REDD+ is based on command and control with limited decentred management systems. This 
theme runs through from chapters 6 to 7. Given the regulatory framework considered in 
Tanzania and in Indonesia, this and earlier chapters have prepared the ground for constructing 
the optimal and feasible model legislative framework sufficient to give effect to REDD+. In 
light of this conclusion, the following chapter addresses how the inadequacy of the command 








Reflexive Regulatory Framework for Achieving Equity, Environmental- 
Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness Outcomes (3Es) 
8.1 Introduction 
Government officials at various levels in REDD+ host countries are engaged in developing, 
implementing, and enforcing REDD+ regulations. 1 However, these aspects are already
happening through a self-regulatory system.2 The conception of REDD+ as a self-regulatory
system provides new insights about interactions among actors involved in implementing 
REDD+ activities. In particular, it reveals the emergence of a decentred governance model (as 
opposed to “decentralisation” and “devolution”)3 where public and non-public actors interact
to define what needs to be regulated; apply the standard-setting role; and apply the roles of 
MRV, implementation, enforcement and adjudication. As discussed in the command and 
control section 7.4.2, these roles have traditionally been undertaken largely by command and 
control regulatory regimes. 4  The point of departure in this section is that command and
control has been highly ineffective, inequitable, and cost-ineffective in addressing many 
environmental problems.5
In the context of climate change mitigation, some scholarly critics of command and control 
have recommended an alternative in the form of a market based regulatory system. This 
system seeks to achieve its objectives by providing diverse motivation incentives. Section 
1 See chapters 6 and 7 on the Tanzanian and Indonesian case studies. 
2 This should form the basis for devising a legislative framework to give effect to REDD+ activities. 
3 As discussed in chapter 6, decentralisation means “transferring authority and responsibility for government 
functions from the central government to subnational governments”,  while devolution refers to the transferring 
of power and responsibility for government functions from the state to non-state bodies. The main distinction 
between a decentred governance model and “decentralisation”and “devolution” is that in the latter arrangement, 
central government still exercises substantial control over the main key decisions both of the lower levels of 
governments and of non-public actors. In the former arrangement, government is removed from the top-down 
decision-making position. Here the roles are interchangeable depending on the different roles of the actors which 
are determined by their know-how. 
4 Chapter 4. 
5 Discussed in chapter 4. Also see Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University 
Law Review at 1235. 
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7.4.2 reviewed various types of market-based regulation in the context of climate change 
mitigation. Against this background the following questions are considered: should Tanzania 
and Indonesia continue with the command and control approach to implementing REDD+? If 
not, what other regulatory framework would be optimal and feasible? What might the new 
regulatory framework look like? How can private actors be accommodated in this approach?  
These questions have not received extensive attention although there is a proliferation of legal 
and policy analysis specific to REDD+.6 In particular, what cannot be avoided is how to deal 
with the nature of rights pertaining to carbon rights and legal protection associated with such 
rights in the preferred policy tool. Thus, in the context of thinking about the type of REDD+ 
regulation, this chapter explores a new model. The argument is that reflexive law (elaborated 
on in section 8.2) holds potential to become an optimal and feasible legal framework to give 
effect to the REDD+ mechanism. Thus the chapter assesses how the 3Es identified in the 
conceptual framework in chapter 2 can be motivated. The chapter proceeds with a discussion 
on how the said legal framework could be selected, followed by analysis of emerging 
reflexive elements in existing legal frameworks in Tanzania and Indonesia. The main 
questions that arise relate to: how the reflexive law might be designed and how it could be 
implemented in practice as it is a departure from conventional contract law. These issues and 
many others will be explored in-depth so as to understand the factors which are likely to 
make the policy choice an optimal and feasible framework. 
8.2   Reflexive Law 
It is noted that policy tools grounded on reflexive law have become common in the USA and 
elsewhere.7 As noted in chapter 1, Gunther Teubner pioneered the concept of reflexive law as 
                                                 
6 In the study of REDD+ policy making in Nepal, Bushley investigated whether policy processes and the 
configurations of actors involved reflect state-centric, market-oriented, or polycentric governance. The author 
concluded that REDD+ policy making is dominated by a tripartite coalition of key government actors, external 
organisations (international NGOs and donors), and select civil society organisations. This came at a cost to 
other important stakeholders because their views were marginalised thus threatening recentralised forest 
governance. Bushley B.R., REDD+ policy making in Nepal: toward state-centric, polycentric, or market-
oriented governance? (2014) 19:3 Ecology and Society 34. Martijin W. et. al., Creating an enabling legal 
framework for REDD+ investments in Kenya. Ministry of the Environment, Sweden (2014). Ituarte-Lima C. et. 
al., Assessing equity in national legal frameworks for REDD+: The case of Indonesia. Environmental Science 
and Policy 44 (2014) 291-300. Chapman S. and Wilder M., Defining the legal elements of benefit sharing in the 
context of REDD+. REDD+ Law Project - Working Paper (2014). Legal Frameworks for REDD+. IUCN 
(2009). Greiber T. (ed)., Payments for Ecosystem Services: Legal and Institutional Frameworks. IUCN 
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 78 (2009). Baker & McKenzie. “Background Analysis of REDD: 
Regulatory Frameworks”, 53–54. Report prepared for the Terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-REDD Programme. 
Sydney, Australia: Baker & McKenzie, (2009). 
7 Fiorino D.J., The New Environmental Regulation. (2006) at 160. 
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a response to the problem of “regulatory trilemma”.8 The concept of regulatory trilemma is 
formulated by observations of the interactions and inappropriate relations between the 
political system (political decision), the legal system (legal norm-making), and the social area 
of life (social guidance).9 The author explains the regulatory trilemma, by asserting that every 
regulatory intervention which goes beyond the limits of the respective self-regulation is 
irrelevant because it either produces disintegrating effects on the social area of life or 
disintegrating effects on regulatory law itself.10 As noted by Black, the failure of command 
and control regulation is precisely because it disregards the limits of self-reproduction of the 
involved sub-systems.11This occurs because such regulation attempts to impose modes of 
functioning, criteria of rationality and forms of organisation which are not appropriate from 
the perspective of the regulated social areas. 12  In the event that command and control 
regulation succeeds, it does so at the cost of destroying the aforementioned structures.13 To 
elaborate further on this argument consider the example below:  
In Korea, legal precedents and legislation changed over recent decades to protect and 
promote the interests and rights of patients. However, as this policy has been 
strengthened, so-called “defensive medicine” has spread among doctors; they tend to 
concentrate their efforts on preventing medical accidents rather than on providing the 
best treatment. This means that their behaviour becomes strategic and preventive. The 
point is that such attitudes may destroy the social trust between doctors and patients, 
and their relationship may become reformulated as strategic relations between two 
traders who compete with each other to maximize their profits. […] a strong 
orientation towards the protection of patients may lead to the destruction of the 
original principles of contract law and criminal law in relation to medical accidents. 
[…] [e]ventually, the original aim of protecting the rights of patients cannot be 
undertaken.”14 
The debate created by the above view is a debate over whether, when and to what extent the 
command and control approach will promote the public interest. The regulatory trilemma as 
illustrated in the above may likely manifest in the context of REDD+ where the attempts to 
devise a strong protection on the part of either investors, government or the public may result 
                                                 
8 Teubner G., Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. (1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review, 239. 
9 Teubner G., “Juridification”, in G. Teubner (ed.), Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in 
the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law, (1987) 3-48 at 21. 
10 Teubner, G. Juridification of Social Spheres, A Comparative Analysis in the Area of Labor, Corporate, 
Antitrust and Social Welfare Law, Series A Law, European University Institute (1987) at 21. 
11 Black, J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 26. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Yi S. and Hong S.S., The legal development in Korea: juridification and proceduralisation. In Yang H. (ed)., 
Law and Society in Korea. (2013) at 116. 
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in the said strategic relationships. In chapter 5 it was concluded that attempts to devise a 
precise definition of carbon rights may be counterproductive in the sense that it would not 
result in creating the conditions for balancing of the 3Es outcomes. Thus what is obviously 
needed is the policy approach that is likely to promote and balance the 3Es outcomes. 
Teubner proposed a solution of systems concept to the regulatory dilemma of the welfare 
state by introducing a reflexive law. To explain the idea of reflexive law, the author argues 
that legal systems develop in an evolutionary fashion. The common law rules that govern 
market transactions (which he refers to as “formal law”15 systems) begin with a view to 
creating and applying a universal body of rules. Within this set of rules, private actors are 
allowed to pursue their own interests as long as they conform to such rules. Put differently, a 
formal law system “relies on a body of legal professionals who employ peculiarly legal 
reasoning to resolve specific conflicts.”16 Over a period of time, state regulation advances and 
technology-based and outcome-based standards (which Teubner conceptualises as 
“substantive law” systems) emerge. The main objective of substantive law is to empower the 
state to establish a "purposive, goal-oriented intervention.”17 In contrast to a formal law which 
authorises autonomy of the regulated actors, a substantive law focuses on the achievement of 
pre-determined outcomes through regulation and standards.18 Thus reflexive law differs from 
both the formal and substantive law as illustrated by considering the contract law example as 
discussed by Teubner. 
As such the author indicates that within the formal law systems, if there is a contractual 
dispute, the law will only look to see if certain elements establishing a valid contract have 
been met. Put differently, the law would establish whether there was mutual assent (i.e. offer 
and acceptance)19 and whether there was a “meeting of the minds”.20 It then becomes clear 
that an emphasis is on rule-oriented resolution of private disputes.21 This means that the law 
                                                 
15 “Formal law is associated with the idea of giving private rights to individuals and emphasizing private dispute 
resolution.” Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review  at 1255. 
16 Teubner G.,Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law.(1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review, 239 at 240. 
17 Ibid at 239-40. Hirsch D.D., Green business and the importance of reflexive law: what Michael Porter didn’t 
say. (2010) 62:4 Administrative Law Review at 1106. Hess D., Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to 
Corporate Social Responsiveness. (1999) 25 Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 41. 
18 Teubner G., Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. (1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review, 239-286 at 
239-40. Hirsch D.D., Green business and the importance of reflexive law: what Michael Porter didn’t say. 62:4 
Administrative Law Review (2010) at 1106. Hess D., Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate 
Social Responsiveness. (1999) 25 Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 41. 
19 Teubner G., Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. (1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review 239 at 240. 
20 Ibid at 255-256. See also Orts E.W., A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation. (1995) 5:4 Business 
Ethics Quarterly, The Environment,779-794 at 780. 
21 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1253. 
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disregards other social issues that a formal law allows contracting parties to create.22 The 
substantive law, proceeds with establishment of outcomes and is characterised by direct 
intervention of law makers and courts in setting and altering contract terms.23 Thus it places 
an emphasis on administrative, bureaucratic regulation to address social problems. 24  In 
contrast, reflexive law approaches the contract differently. It seeks to structure bargaining 
relations so as to equalise bargaining power, and at the same time seeks to subject contracting 
parties to mechanisms of “public responsibility”.25 This is its goal.26 It achieves this goal by 
creating incentives (either or both negative and positive) and procedures that induce 
contracting parties to continually assess their actions (hence the “reflexivity”) and adjust them 
to society’s goals, rather than telling them what to do in all cases.27 Moreover, it “focuses on 
enhancing self-referential capacities of social systems and institutions outside the legal 
system, rather than direct intervention of the legal system itself through agencies, highly 
detailed statutes, or delegation of great power to courts.”28 In achieving this goal, reflexive 
law opens vital new perspectives on the role of law.29 It should be noted that under this 
approach, substantive ends of that law do not disappear, but only the means for achieving 
them change. 30  The change is that the substantive norms should be determined through 
decentred governance processes instead of centralised legislation.31 The goal envisaged is that 
society "has to give up concepts of comprehensive social planning since they are utopian and 
                                                 
22 Teubner G., Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. (1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review 239 at 255. 
23 Ibid at 255-6. 
24 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1253. 
25 Teubner G., Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. (1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review239-286 at 
256. Black, J., Constitutionalising Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 46-47. 
26 Gaines S.E., Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development. (2002-2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal, 1 at 3. 
27 Teubner G., Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. (1983) 17:2 Law & Society Review, 239-286 at 
256. Orts E.W., A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation. (1995) 5:4, Business Ethics Quarterly The 
Environment, 779-794 at 780. Fiorino D.J., The New Environmental Regulation. (2006) at 19, 159-60. Orts 
E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1253. 
28 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995)  89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1232. 
29 Gaines S.E., Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development. (2002-2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal 1 at 3. 
30 “Those means can include incentives from economic instruments, such as taxes, or subsidies, the exploitation 
of existing conflicts or tensions, adjusting them so that they achieve a desirable balance, the deployement of the 
informantional and govenance capacities of organisations”. See Black J., Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I. 
20:4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2000) 597-614 at 598 citing Teubner. Cited in Hirsch D.D., Green 
business and the importance of reflexive law: what Michael Porter didn’t say. 62:4 Administrative Law Review 
(2010) at 1114-5. Hess D., Social reporting: a reflexive law approach to corporate social responsiveness. (1999)  
The Journal of Corporation Law 42-84 at 61. Also see Deakin S. et. al., Gender inequality and reflexive law: the 
potential of different regulatory mechanisms for making employment rights effective. Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 426 (2011) at 21. Rendtorff J.D. (ed)., Power and 
Principle in the Market Place: On Ethics and Economics. (2010) at 185. 
31 Gaines S.E., Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development. (2002-2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal, 1 at 3. 
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unrealistic.”32  This is to say as long as “certain procedural norms and principles of justice are 
respected, the relevant parties are free to strike whatever substantive agreements they wish.”33 
In so doing, reflexive law complements substantive law as a regulatory tool and offers an 
alternative.34 
It follows that, “adopting a reflexive law approach also does not mean that all substantive 
law, top-down regulation is abandoned.”35 Instead some functions are highly centralised. “As 
a practical matter, reflexive law strategies are more appropriate for use in concert with other 
regulatory approaches, including command and control regulation,”36 polycentric systems,37 
network governance,38 nodal governance,39 and responsive regulation.40 These concepts differ 
in some respects but they all (except command and control) share the same concept of plural 
governance that any regulated space has multiple actors with decision-making power and 
influence. Therefore no single actor has the monopoly of authority in all matters.41 
                                                 
32 Hess D., Social reporting: a reflexive law approach to corporate social responsiveness. (1999) The Journal of 
Corporation Law 42-84 at 61 citing Teubner. 
33 Cohen J.L., Regulating Intimacy: a new legal paradigm. (2004) at 4-5. 
34 Rendtorff J.D. (ed)., Power and Principle in the Market Place: On Ethics and Economics, (2010) at 185. 
35 Hess D., Social reporting: a reflexive law approach to corporate social responsiveness. (1999) The Journal of 
Corporation Law 42-84 at 61. See also Deakin S. et. al., Gender inequality and reflexive law: the potential of 
different regulatory mechanisms for making employment rights effective. Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 426 (2011) at 21. Rendtorff J.D. (ed)., Power and Principle in the 
Market Place: On Ethics and Economics. (2010) at 185. 
36 Stewart R., New Generation of Environmental Regulation? (2001-2002) 29 Capital University Law Review 
21-182. 
37“Polycentric systems are characterized by multiple governing authorities at differing scales rather than a 
monocentric unit (see Ostrom, 1999). Each unit within a polycentric system exercises considerable 
independence to make norms and rules within a specific domain (such as a family, a firm, a local government, a 
network of local governments, a state or province, a region, a national government, or an international regime).” 
Cited in Ostrom E., Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. 
(2010) 20 Global Environmental Change 550–557 at 552. Ostrom E., Nested externalities and polycentric 
institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? (2012) 49 
Econ Theory 353–369.  Ostrom E., Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global 
environmental change. (2010) 20 Global Environmental Change  550–557. Ostrom E., Beyond markets and 
states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. 100 American Economic Review (2010): 1–33. 
Available: http://bnp.binghamton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Ostrom-2010-Polycentric-Governance.pdf 
[accessed 29 September 2015]. 
38 Castells M., The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. 2nd ed. (2010).  
39 Shearing C. et. al., Nodal Governance. (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30.  
40 This refers to the use of an appropriate approach to a specific problem, but within a collaborative framework. 
Braithwaite J., Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies in Woods N. and Brown D.L. (eds)., Making 
Global Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries. (2007) at 167. See also Black, J., Constitutionalising 
Self-Regulation. (1996) The Modern Law Review 24-55 at 46-47. Deakin S. et. al., Gender inequality and 
reflexive law: the potential of different regulatory mechanisms for making employment rights effective. Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 426 (2011) at 4. 
41 Bogg A. and Novitz T. (eds.,) Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World. (2014) at 
390 on the discussion of “command and control regimes” and decentred regulatory models such as responsive 
and reflexive regulation. See Braithwaite J., Regulatory Capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it work 
better, (2008). On Nodal governance, metagovernance, 199-206. Meuleman L., Public Management and the 
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Orts discussed the modern tax law to further illustrate the concept of reflexive law. The 
author points out that modern tax laws are a triumph of substantive law. However, a reflexive 
component appears when one looks at the enforcement approach.42 This is because it has been 
realised that millions of taxpayers cannot be compelled directly by a substantive law. 
Therefore, the tax law uses a reporting system or disclosure requiring every taxpayer to file a 
form with the Internal Revenue Service.43 As such, the tax law relies to a great extent on the 
honesty of taxpayers, combined with a more or less randomly introduced element of fear of 
strict enforcement. This last component is often reserved for questionable cases. Therefore, a 
modern tax law in this way consists of a complex body of substantive law (the tax code) as 
well as a reflexive element (tax returns).44 At this point, it is expected that the reader is 
convinced by the theoretical perspective of reflexive law. However, from a practical aspect of 
legal and policy, it may not be verysatisfactory. A question may arise as to what kind of 
strategies may be envisaged in order to move beyond the theoretical discussion. This question 
is addressed in section 8.6 below. That said, reflexive law is not without criticisms.45 In 
section 9.5 a discussion will return to those criticisms. They are helpful in understanding 
some impediments to the realisation of a reflexive law. The next section continues with issues 
regarding the reflexive aspects of the current legal framework for regulating forestry 
activities. Therefore in what follows, this chapter considers the reflexive themes related to 
regulating forestry activities in general in the existing legal framework. These are information 
systems and disclosure, environmental self-audits and market based regulation. 
8.3  The Emergence of Reflexive Elements in the Existing Regulatory Framework 
8.3.1  Information System and Disclosure 
 
The Indonesian National REDD+ strategy is a good example for expounding on reflexive 
law. The relevant provision is titled “safeguards framework and information system”.46 Its 
purpose is to “ensure a risk evaluation reference point for REDD+ activities, and to facilitate 
                                                                                                                                                        
Metagovernance of Hierarchies, Networks and Markets: The Feasibility of Designing and Managing 
Governance Style Combinations. (2008) at 35 on forms of network governance. For a discussion on polycentric 
governance and the network governance see Araral E. and Hartley K., Polycentric Governance for a New 
Environmental Regime: Theoretical Frontiers in Policy Reform and Public Administration. (Undated). 
Available: http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/panel_46_s1_araral_hartley.pdf [accessed 21 September 
2015]. 
42 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1264. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Blankenburg E., “The Poverty of Evolutionism: A Critique of Teubner's Case for 'Reflexive Law,’” (1984) 18 
Law and Society Review, 273–289. 
46 Indonesian REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 29. 
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the preparation of monitoring and control steps relating to program management, financial 
accountability, and the impact of programs on vulnerable groups and the natural 
environment.” 47  To achieve its purpose the strategy requires the REDD+ activity 
implementers to take concrete steps to ensure risk mitigation as part of the implementation 
process, through periodic monitoring, evaluation, and reporting.48 It also requires these actors 
to provide information regarding the implementation of safeguards in their work area in a 
manner compatible with the information system for REDD+ safeguard implementation.49 The 
preparation of a safeguards framework for REDD+ involves inter alia: the formulation of 
criteria, indicators, evaluation procedures, and the handling of risks within the framework of 
fiduciary safeguards. The latter is based on basic principles of financial management 
accountability. 50  The requirement on the part of the REDD+ implementer to provide 
information regarding the implementation of safeguards means that the actor has to make a 
self-assessment of its activities. In addition the requirement to take concrete steps to mitigate 
risk through periodic monitoring, evaluation, and reporting is in itself a tool to encourage 
self-reflection of the actors’ actions regularly.51 The strategy, however, does not define the 
term “periodic” in order to “clarify” the time frame that is required. The danger of not 
defining the term means that it will be difficult to assess the performance systematically.  
 
By comparison, the Tanzanian REDD+ strategy adopts a number of the World Bank’s 
policies to implement REDD+. 52  Among these policies, the OP 4.01 - Environmental 
Assessment displays “information disclosure”53 can be cited as an approach to display the 
reflexive aspect.54 To observe the reflexivity, this provision must be read together with the 
public consultation provision. In particular the borrower is required to consult “project-
affected groups and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about the project's 






52 These are Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Forests (OP/BP 4.36), 
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10). United Republic of Tanzania 
(URT) National Strategy for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) February, 
(2013) at 53. 
53 This is elaborated more in section 8.6.2 below. 
54  OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment at 5. Available: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMD
K:20064724~menuPK:4564185~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html [accessed 1 
September 2015]. 
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environmental aspects and takes their views into account.”55 Thereafter, the policy requires 
the borrower to provide “relevant material in a timely manner prior to consultation and in a 
form and language that are understandable and accessible to the groups being consulted.”56 
The borrower is further obliged to provide “for the initial consultation a summary of the 
proposed project's objectives, description, and potential impacts; for consultation after the 
draft environmental assessment (EA) report is prepared, [and] provide a summary of the EA's 
conclusions.” Lastly, the policy requires the borrower to make the draft EA report available at 
a public place accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs.” 57 By disclosing 
information about the effects of the projects to the affected people, the borrower is pressured 
to invite more input from the affected people. This means that the information received can 
assist the borrower to internalise decision and take into account the additional input. For these 
reasons, this provision has a reflexive aspect. However, in the context of REDD+ it is not 
clear to whom the policy applies. This is because the original policy was designed to apply to 
the borrowing country and such a country was required to disclose that information to the 
World Bank where the Bank makes it available through its InfoShop.58 The failure to explain 
who the target of this policy is, means that no accountability and transparency is placed on the 
actors who deal with distribution of costs and benefits. Thus, it can be expected that the 3Es 
outcomes are unlikely to be realised since there is no clear avenue to hold such actors 
accountable. 
Other requirements to provide information in Indonesia can be observed in the Environmental 
Management Act and Forestry Act. The former obliges the government and regional 
governments to develop an environmental information system to support the implementation 
and development of environmental protection and management policies.59 Thereafter the Act 
requires the aforementioned governments to make that information available to 
communities.60 By making this information available to the public, this provision seems to 
encourage governments to self-reflect about the decision that they are making regarding 
environmental protection. Hence it can be said that the Act encourages a reflexive aspect. The 
reflexive scope of this Act, however, is quite limited. By its terms, the Act applies only to 
government’s actions. Therefore the Act is limited to encouraging reflexive processes within 
                                                 
55 OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment at 5. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment at 5-6. 
59 Article 62 (1) of the Indonesian Environmental Protection and Management Act No. 32/ 2009. 
60 Ibid Article 62 (2). 
Chapter 8: Reflexive Regulatory Framework for Achieving Equity, 
Environmental-Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness (3Es) Outcomes 
 
-242 -  
 
the government’s agencies. This means the scope for exploring possibilities of realising the 
goal of the Act is limited to the actions of the government only. The latter Act provides for 
forest inventory-taking. The requirement is to undertake the forest inventory on the status and 
physical condition of forest, flora and fauna, human resources as well as community social 
conditions in and around the forest.61 The Act does not stipulate who is to undertake this task. 
However, it is presumed that this role has to be performed by the state since it is empowered 
to administer forestry resources.62 
8.3.2  Environmental Self-audits 
 
In the case of Indonesia, the Environmental Protection and Management Act appears to 
provide a voluntary self-audit. The Act encourages personnel in charge of business and/or 
activities to undertake environmental audits with the view to enhancing environmental 
performance.63 At the same time the Act requires auditing for businesses and/or activities 
which are highly risky to the environment and/or activities which do not comply with the 
Act.64 If the personnel in charge of aforementioned businesses and/or activities does not 
execute such obligations, the minister in charge is empowered to assign an independent third 
party to do so at the expense of the aforementioned personnel.65 Similar to the approach taken 
in Indonesia, the Tanzania Environmental Management Act provides for two types of audits, 
namely control audits and self-audits.66 The latter is relevant to the subject of reflexive law. 
The main objectives of environmental audits are inter alia to “provide a mechanism to learn 
from experience and to refine design and implementation procedures of a project or 
undertaking so as to mitigate adverse environmental impacts.”67 Section 50 (1) provides for 
self-auditing annually. This follows after the environmental impact statement has been 
approved. The criteria to be used for the audit are based on the environmental impact 
assessment process.68 Orts argues that the emphasis on “self-auditing”, "self-disclosure" and 
"self-policing" fits with an emerging model of reflexive environmental regulation. 69  The 
Tanzanian Environmental Management Act provides that an “environmental audit shall, 
                                                 
61 Article 2 of the Forest Act No. 41 of 1999. 
62 Ibid Article 4.   
63 Ibid Article 48 fn 59 above.  
64 Ibid Article 49 (1). 
65 Ibid Article 49 (2). 
66 Sections 49 (1) and 50 (1) of Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004. 
67 Ibid Section 44 (1) (b). 
68 Ibid Section 50 (1). 
69 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1277. Gaines 
S.E., Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development. (2002-2003) 10 Buffalo Environmental 
Law Journal 1 at 11-12. 
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unless it is a self-auditing” “be conducted by a qualified and authorized environmental auditor 
or environmental inspector who shall be an expert or a firm of experts.”70 Similarly, article 48 
of Indonesian Environmental Management Act encourages environmental audits with the 
view to enhancing environmental performance.71 
Following the requirements for self-auditing, all the said Acts do not offer incentives for 
doing so. Because these Acts do not provide clear provisions of when environmental auditing 
would be protected from findings, they leave businesses to decide for themselves the costs 
and benefits of environmental self-auditing.72  As it is argued by Orts, it is possible that 
“environmental auditing may reveal evidence of environmental violations to regulators” 
(including prosecutors).73 Under these circumstances governments should credibly commit to 
cooperation with such businesses in advance by establishing regulatory relief programs and 
environmental audit policies that grant significant immunity to businesses’ violations 
discovered through self-audits and voluntarily disclosed to regulators.74 However, the relief 
should not be granted in perpetuity. Instead a timeframe should be indicated to allow the 
parties concerned to address such violations. A timeframe allows regulators to assess 
performance and make informed decisions about appropriate steps to take place in the event 
that assessment determines that violations have taken place. 
8.3.3   Market Based Regulation 
 
Market-based regulations (the Pigouvian approach and environmental marketing) are, usually, 
very flexible in the sense that they often do not specify in detail how the targeted actors are to 
respond.75 As discussed above (section 7.4.2 above) these instruments create and manipulate 
incentives, but targeted actors make their own decisions and choices based on the available 
incentives. 76  The use of market based regulation (the Pigouvian approach) has been 
recognised in the Indonesian Environmental Protection and Management Act. The Act 
empowers the government and regional governments to develop economic instruments (i.e. 
environmental taxes, levies and subsidies) with the view to creating incentives and/or 
                                                 
70 Section 46 (3) The Tanzanian Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004. 
71 Article 48 of the Indonesian Environmental Protection and Management Law No. 32/ 2009. 
72  A similar point was made by Orts about the Environmental Act in the U.S.A. Orts E.W., Reflexive 
Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1277. 
73 Ibid. 
74  Potoski M. and Prakash A., The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental 
Governance. (2004) 64:2 Public Administration Review 152-163 at 155. 
75  Hepburn G., Alternatives to Traditional Regulation. OECD Report. (Undated) at 30. Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42245468.pdf [accessed 20 September 2015]. 
76 Ibid.  
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disincentives for the preservation of the environment.77 Similarly in Tanzania, the Forest Act 
provides for forestry charges and royalties. 78  The Act requires the minister to consider 
principles of sustainability in connection with harvesting of the produce in determining the 
level of royalties in connection with any particular produce.79 
Orts argues that the market based regulation attributed to Coase (the Coasian economic 
approach discussed in section 7.4.2 above) is not considered to be flexible.80 The Coasian 
economic approach has been used to commercialise ecological goods and services by 
internalising environmental externalities and has recently expanded to include environmental 
services known as Payment for Environmental Services (PES).81 A discussion on Indonesian 
experience with regards to PES is provided by Fauzi.82 This author examined PES cases in 
Indonesia and concluded that both PES schemes are not voluntary transactions as conceived 
in PES theory.83 This is because challenges such as land ownership forced the government to 
intervene by means of establishing regulations at both the national and local levels.84 This 
made such scheme “mandatory” as opposed to voluntary as intended in the ideal PES 
scheme.85 The mandatory element therefore meant that PES is not flexible partly because it 
compels the regulated to achieve a particular outcome. Similarly, Tanzania has piloted some 
PES programmes in sectors such as water.86 As indicated in the previous chapter, efforts to 
implement REDD+ in Tanzania using the PES approach is being considered.87 
 
                                                 
77 Article 43 (3) (b) of the Indonesian Environmental Protection and Management Law No. 32/ 2009. 
78 Section 77 of Tanzania Forest Act 2002. 
79 Ibid Section 78 (2) (d). 
80 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1270-1. 
81 Fauzi A., Can commercialization really solve externalities in the forested area? Lessons learned from payment 
for environmental services schemes in Indonesia. 2013). Available: 
https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/8888/FAUZI_0640.pdf?sequence=1 [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
82 For a detailed discussion on this matter a reader is directed to Fauzi A., Can commercialization really solve 
externalities in the forested area? Lessons learned from payment for environmental services schemes in 
Indonesia. (2013). 
83 Fauzi A., Can commercialization really solve externalities in the forested area? Lessons learned from payment 
for environmental services schemes in Indonesia. (2013) at 7. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Kwayu E.J., Farmer participation in the Equitable Payments for Watershed Services in Morogoro, Tanzania. 
University of Leeds Sustainability Research Institute Paper No. 42 (2013). Available: 
http://www.see.leeds.ac.uk/fileadmin/Documents/research/sri/workingpapers/SRIPs-42_01.pdf [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
87 Kulindwa K. et. al., Payment for Environmental Services (PES) and REDD. REDD Workshop - Oasis, 
Morogoro 31st-3rd September (2009). Kaczan D. et. al., Designing a payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
program to reduce deforestation in Tanzania: An assessment of payment approaches. (2013) 95 Ecological 
Economics. 20–30, also see chapter 7. 
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8.4  Determining the Optimal and Feasible Regulatory Instrument 
 
In deciding which policy instrument is optimal and feasible to give effect to REDD+, the 
following elements may be helpful. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, REDD+ offers 
incentives for a range of objectives. Apart from the emission reductions objective (which has 
wide support from many countries) there are other multiple objectives to be achieved.88 What 
has been argued in this thesis is that the implementation must strike a balance between the 
3Es to be considered successful. 89  To achieve this balance, a choice or combination of 
different regulatory approaches can be adopted. At this point, command and control 
regulation, market based regulation and reflexive law have been discussed. In what follows, 
the discussion centres on assessing how these regulatory instruments can help attain the 3Es 
outcomes.  
8.4.1  Equity Concerns 
In chapter 2 it was established that law is a “product of struggle, negotiation, compromise and 
power dynamics, and may represent the dominant views or social compromise”.90 This means 
that there is a danger of promulgating rights that favour a particular group or individuals. In 
this regard, benefits are allocated to a few individuals while the costs are distributed 
collectively. The implication for the command and control approach is that the mentioned 
factors are likely to be the case because the substance of the command and control legislation 
is in many cases imposed by the powerful actors. In the event that the views of the powerful 
actors are not captured in the substance of the legislation, such actors can still be able to use 
their resources in the litigation to ensure that the legal system takes decisions in their favour.  
Among the aforementioned types of market based instruments,91 it was concluded that the 
PES which is attributed to Coase is the main regulatory choice for both countries under the 
study. Therefore the issue of equity has to be discussed from the PES perspective. 
Accordingly, some have argued that there is little evidence of adverse effects on equity from 
the PES schemes in select case studies in Indonesia.92 However, these scholars admitted that 
such PES projects were operating at a small scale.93 Against these findings, they caution that 
                                                 
88 Chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
89 Chapter 2. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Section 7.4.2. 
92 Bond I. et al., Incentives to sustain forest ecosystem services: A review and lessons for REDD. International 
Institute for Environment and Development (UK) (2009) at 32. 
93 Ibid. 
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if “and when REDD+ payments are implemented at much larger spatial scales and/or where 
governance is weak, facilitators and brokers will have to guard against elite and rent 
capture.”94 To understand how these risks arise, a connection is made between REDD+ as the 
largest PES experiment and the concept of “neoliberalisation”.95 The neoliberal approach is 
characterised by the re-regulation of state and non-state driven forms of conservation. The 
implication of this is “a process of territorialization that demarcates new spaces for 
controlling people and natural resources; and the subsequent uneven realization and 
distribution of accompanying benefits and costs.” 96  The neoliberal approach to REDD+ 
means the:  
… role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of 
money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and 
functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need 
be, the proper functioning of markets … .97 
The above exposition is essentially an approach to privatisation. This means having to reduce 
the involvement of the state in the economic activities by expanding the market and 
privatisation of the private sector.98 However, a key problem with privatisation has been state 
capture, defined as “the capacity to affect the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. 
laws, and regulations) through private payments to public officials”.99 Indeed, privatisation in 
Africa should be seen as part of the efforts by firms to shape the laws, regulations and 
policies of the state to their own advantage by offering unlawful private gains to public 
officials.100 Under these conditions, it is possible for elites as well as private actors to capture 
many of the benefits arising from REDD+ at the expense of the wider population at large. 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95  Corbera E., Problematizing REDD+ as an Experiment in Payments for Ecosystem Services. (2012) 4 
Environmental Sustainability 612–619 at 616. McGregor A. et. al., Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ 
governmentality in Indonesia. (2015) 47 Environment and Planning, 138–155 at 150. 
96  Corbera E., Problematizing REDD+ as an Experiment in Payments for Ecosystem Services. (2012) 4 
Environmental Sustainability 612–619 at 616. 
97  Thorsen D.E. and Lie A., What is Neoliberalism? Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. 
Available: http://folk.uio.no/daget/neoliberalism.pdf [accessed 20 September 2015]. Castree N., Neoliberalism 
and the Biophysical Environment: A Synthesis and Evaluation of the Research. Environment and Society: 
Advances in Research, (2010) 1, 5-45 at 10. 
98 Kajsiu B., A Discourse Analysis of Corruption: Instituting Neoliberalism Against Corruption in Albania, 
1998-2005. (2014) at 6. 
99 Cited in Conteh C. et.al., Public Sector Reforms in Developing Countries: Paradoxes and Practices, (2014) at 
180. 
100 Ibid. 
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A consideration of reflexive law in contribution to equity requires a revisit to the concept of 
reflexive law discussed above.101 In particular, by structuring bargaining relations to equalise 
bargaining power and subjecting contracting parties to mechanisms of “public responsibility” 
(section 8.2.), the reflexive law addresses the contextual equity thereby raising the prospects 
of advancing the procedural and distributive equity. In other words, by allowing parties to 
carry out self-regulatory arrangements which, as a result, cease to be completely mandatory 
means that the application of the law is tailored to local conditions or contextual equality.102 
8.4.2  Environmental-Effectiveness Concerns 
As discussed above, command and control regulation is the dominant form of regulation in 
the countries under the study. Such an approach has not been effective in those countries. 
This lack of effectiveness is particularly evident when one looks at both the input and output 
effectiveness as discussed in chapter 2.103 Where there has been input effectiveness, it has 
been argued that many individuals comply out of a sense of good citizenship.104 It is also 
expected that a command and control approach to regulation would mean that an enforcement 
measure may be prevented by a range of factors such as corruption, and therefore 
compromises the effectiveness of the law. In contrast, market based regulation would in 
theory be able to reduce the involvement of the state in the economic activities by expanding 
the market and privatisation of the private sector. However, as indicated earlier on, a market 
based approach in many cases operates within the context of command and control. One of 
the problems indicated above has to do with property rights to carbon. Hence it becomes 
difficult to allocate rights to carbon and this affects the ability to allocate cost and benefit in a 
balanced manner. While much of this has major implications on the attaining of equity issues, 
the resulting implication is the inability of a market based approach to achieve environmental 
effectiveness. This is because the exclusion of a certain portion of the beneficiaries could lead 
to a sabotage of the entire programme altogether. An example of this is in New Zealand 
                                                 
101 As such an explanation of reflexive law in a contract law above shows that law disregards other social issues 
that formal law allows contracting parties to create. This is similar to disregarding contextual equity discussed 
earlier (Chapter 2). This is even though it is established that the ability to attain distributional and procedural 
equity is conditioned by context. Chapter 2 points out that examples of contextual factors such as capacity, 
power, cultural values, social capital have a direct bearing on the equity of distribution (chapter 2 section 2.4.4). 
102 Deakin S. and  McLaughlin C., The regulation of Women’s Pay from Individual Rights to Reflexive Law? In 
Scott J.L. et.al., (eds) Women and Employment: Changing Lives and New Challenges. (2008) at 320. 
103 The input effectivenes is concerned with the extent to which the policy instrument realises its objectives, 
while output effectiveness is concerned with inducing subjects to comply with systems of rules and regulations. 
See chapter 2 section 2.5. 
104 Section 8.4.2. 
Chapter 8: Reflexive Regulatory Framework for Achieving Equity, 
Environmental-Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness (3Es) Outcomes 
 
-248 -  
 
where farmers threatened to cut down trees if they were excluded from carbon rights 
ownership.105 
Another issue to consider that may affect environmental effectiveness of the market based 
regulation is the interpretation of rights in the legislation as discussed in chapter 5. What was 
established is that carbon rights is not a concept that has been and can be defined clearly. 
Thus carbon rights definitions will likely raise possibilities of contradictory or conflicting 
judicial approaches and decisions from bodies such as a quasi-judicial body on the 
distribution of costs and benefits. Hence a command and control approach to REDD+ is  
likely to fail. 
8.4.3  Cost-Effectiveness 
 
Some of the justifications for the use of PES as a preferred market instrument to implement 
REDD+ focuses on the issue of resources. One view is that PES came into being after the 
failure of command and control approaches as well as a lack of resources by government to 
manage natural resources. 106  However, this view fails to realise or ignores that 
“environmental free marketers often do not take full account of the economic costs of the 
government regulation required to administer the new property rights they wish to 
establish.”107 According to arguments put forward, “new forms of private property require 
registers to record ownership and methods of enforcing the new property rights against 
trespassers. Also, technical advances may be needed, which may often entail substantial 
costs, to establish ‘tracers’ for private ownership of formerly common resources.”108 
 
To add to the above discussion, another cost that seems to be ignored is the fact that the 
establishment of market instruments such as PES or command and control requires the 
government to compensate the loss of those who have legal rights to property. This is well 
known as a just compensation clause in some jurisdictions such as the USA.109 Following this 
requirement, if a government subsequently wants to stop an existing use, or alter the planning 
                                                 
105 Gould K. et al., Legislative approaches to forest sinks in Australia and New Zealand. Working models for 
other jurisdictions? in Streck C. et al. (eds)., Climate change and Forests. Emerging Policy and Market 
Opportunities. (2008).  
106 Kulindwa K. et. al., Payment for Environmental Services (PES) and REDD. REDD Workshop - Oasis, 
Morogoro 31st-3rd September (2009). 
107 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1244.  Also see 
O’Connor P., “The Extension of Land Registration Principles to New Property Rights in Environmental Goods.” 
In Dixon M. (ed)., Modern Studies in Property Law, 5. (2009) at 384. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Barros D.B., Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause. (1995) 63:5 Fordham Law Review.  
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conditions that it deems appropriate for the implantation for REDD+, the government will be 
obliged to purchase that right back from the landholder, that is, to compensate for its removal 
or regulation.110 This speaks to the point alluded to in chapter 5 where other actors who have 
legitimately obtained their rights to forestry resources which are not compatible with REDD+ 
will need to be compensated so as to make it equitable. This then means that more resources 
will be required to compensate land use actors in order to meet the objectives of REDD+. 
Viewed in this way, the use of command and control would require more resources compared 
to alternatives, hence compromising the possibility of attaining the cost-effective criterion. 
This does not mean that reflexive law will not compensate these actors. However, the central 
point is that in the former approach the government will be liable for such compensation. 
 
Another point to take into account in terms of a choice between command and control and 
other alternatives is the issue of potential delays. Accordingly, it is expected that legislation 
that is required to give effect to REDD+ may be in conflict with other laws relating to land 
use. Thus it means that to pass a law that requires a single objective of keeping the trees 
standing will be difficult due to the many demands of forestry resources or the forest land. 
The potential effect of this is the delay in the passing of such a law. If the law will be delayed 
in being passed or amended, then surely, that cannot be cost-effective due to opportunity 
costs that may be forgone. At the same time that cannot also be environmentally-effective 
because forest degradation and deforestation and degradation will continue. Therefore in this 
sense, it is hard to see the tradeoff among the 3Es outcomes. As discussed in chapter 2, a 
policy is said to be cost-effective if it meets a given goal at least cost compared to 
alternatives.  
8.4.4  The Optimal and Feasible Regulatory Instrument 
 
In deciding the optimal and feasible regulatory instrument, perhaps the first approach is to 
determine the background against which the regulatory framework should be determined. As 
such, since the threats to environmental degradation take many forms, the optimal and 
feasible regulatory instruments to address the problem are likely to be context-specific.111 
Therefore the choice of regulatory framework to be devised will be highly dependent upon 
                                                 
110 Macintosh A. et. al., Limp, Leap or Learn? Developing legal frameworks for climate change adaptation 
planning in Australia. National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility. Gold Coast, Final Project Report 
(2013) 277 at 45-46. 
111 Gunningham N. and Sinclair D., Designing Smart Regulation. Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/env/outreach/33947759.pdf [accessed 10 September 2015]. 
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the characteristics of the environmental issue under consideration.112 The drivers of forest 
degradation and deforestation are complex and come from a range of sources.113 REDD+ as a 
mechanism to address the problem is also complex because of the requirement to understand its 
technical issues. This has led to the formation of self-regulatory bodies to devise standards and 
measures to implement REDD+.114 In the context of thinking of how the implementation of 
REDD+ can balance the 3Es outcomes, the reader is reminded about the existing synergies or 
contradictions among the 3Es discussed in chapter 2. Against this background, the answer to 
the quest of balancing the 3Es outcomes lies in the regulatory choice and the specific contexts 
in which it is applied.  
 
As discussed above, a choice of command and control regulation carries a pessimistic 
message in terms of setting extensive and detailed prescription on how to distribute costs and 
benefits. A market-based instrument such as PES is unlikely to be the most appropriate 
instrument because of the difficulties of establishing the proprietary aspect of carbon which is 
primarily caused by the problem of land tenure, as well as conceptual challenges of defining 
carbon rights. Reflexive law seems to offer an optimal and feasible solution in terms of 
achieving tradeoffs and balance among the 3Es outcomes.115 This is due to the fact that it 
structures the bargaining relations so as to equalise bargaining power among parties 
concerned. In this way it is helpful in terms of inducing compliance by the application of 
positive incentives rather than negative incentives enforced through law and police power. At 
the same time, since bargaining relations also take account of the broader contextual factors 
(e.g. capacity, power, cultural values, and social capital), then this lays a foundation for 
procedural and distributive equity.116 In this way, it can be accepted that reflexive law is the 
cost-effective instrument compared to the alternatives. For the aforementioned reasons, this 
                                                 
112 Ibid. 
113 Chapter 1. 
114 Chapter 4. 
115 A similar study of REDD+ in Tanzania expresses similar views. The author contends that  the “concept of 
adaptive governance can at times come across as idealistic when faced with dominant market interests and 
political actors. However, it also offers a solution to identifying and balancing off trade-offs.”See Bolin A., 
REDD+ planning from a community perspective: linking the local context with national and global frameworks, 
A Tanzanian case study. Master’s Thesis University of Leeds (2010). Available: http://blogs.helsinki.fi/tzredd-
actionresearch/files/2011/01/Anna-Bolin-Masters-Dissertation-Leeds-University-AY-2010.pdf [accessed 1 
September 2015]. 
116 Chapter 2, section 2.8. 
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section argues that reflexive law should be used, but not exclusively to give effect to 
REDD+.117 
8.5  Some of the Impediments to Using Reflexive Law 
The survey in section 8.3 reveals some of the emerging aspects of reflexive law in the 
existing legal framework for forestry conservation. The traditional command and control 
approach to environmental governance in Tanzania and Indonesia although still dominant, 
reveals signs of transition. However, such reflexivity appears to occur serendipitously instead 
of drawing consciously from the theory. Before proceeding to establish how reflexive law 
would operate in practice, it is worth considering why a comprehensive type of reflexive 
regulation has not already been made. Put differently, what are some of the impediments to 
using alternatives to traditional regulation? 
8.5.1  Economic and Institutional Impediments 
 
The discussion of reflexive law above reveals that an incentive is one of the key issues in 
designing reflexive law. Traditionally, in the area of forestry, there has been a lack of 
incentives to ensure sustainable use of forestry resources. This aspect might change because 
of the introduction of REDD+. Chapter 3 has established that policy-makers in developing 
countries have been adamant about establishing an effective approach in avoiding 
deforestation in the past because of a lack of incentives. Thus it can be reasonably pointed out 
that the only means of reducing deforestation without incentives is through command and 
control regulation and a voluntary approach. This means that the likelihood of considering 
policy approaches such as market based regulation and reflexive law is limited. In addition, 
special groups (such as businesses) may prefer the government to continue to use traditional 
approaches rather than alternative regulatory instruments. This is because such groups may be 
concerned about the uncertainty generated by a shift to an alternative regulatory 
instrument.118 
8.5.2  Legal Impediments 
 
As discussed throughout the thesis command and control in many cases dictates how specific 
outcomes should be achieved. In this way command-and-control instruments are considered 
                                                 
117 Section 8.8 will return to this discussion to explain the possible complementariness from the market and 
command and control regulations. 
118  Hepburn G., Alternatives to Traditional Regulation. OECD Report. (Undated) at 14. Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42245468.pdf [accessed 20 September 2015]. 
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to be more “secure”, in that non-compliance would lead to the imposition of sanctions.119 
This arguably provides assurance that the objectives of the law in question will be 
achieved.120 On the contrary, reflexive law allows both public and private actors to determine 
substantive outcomes through reflexive process. 121  As such, because of an entrenched 
regulatory command and control culture among some policy-makers there might be 
reluctance to recognise it as law. This is because reflexive law seems to lack clarity on how to 
achieve the outcome. 
8.6  Reflexive Legal Framework for REDD+ 
8.6.1  Incentives to Participate 
 
This approach to regulation is used by states to influence behaviour through a mixture of 
reward and risk (i.e. incentives and sanctions).122 Incentives to participate in voluntary self-
regulation have been observed in the field of environmental law. Orts has argued that without 
sufficient reason for actors to participate in a mechanism that would expose them to public 
scrutiny and incur substantial costs of developing environmental management and auditing 
processes, any voluntary system will fail.123 Thus, a number of incentives should be built in to 
encourage participation.124 The following possibilities are considered: 
 In the field of labour law, Cynthia Estlund has argued that preferential regulatory rules 
and processes, such as fewer inspections, should be offered to actors who adopt a 
process of self-regulation of employment practices that includes some form of 
independent representation by their employees.125 This also means that for those who 
do not undertake self-regulation, punishment could be imposed upon violations. 
 It is also recommended that if an actor opts in to voluntary self-regulation, then the 
Justice Department should state unequivocally that underlying auditing information 
will not be used against participating companies. 126  Finally, some sort of formal 
recognition of businesses participating in the program should be adopted; an example 
cited is an EPA-certified "Green Business" decal.127 As such, a marketable emblem 
                                                 
119 Du Toit L., Promoting renewable energy in South Africa through the inclusion of market-based instruments 
in South Africa’s legal and policy framework with particular reference to the feed-in tariff . PhD Thesis 
University of Cape Town (2014) at 93. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Hess D., Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness. (1999) 25:1 
Journal of Corporate Law 41 at 51. 
122 Doorey D.J., A Model of Responsive Workplace Law. (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal at 63. 
123 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1324. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Doorey D.J., A Model of Responsive Workplace Law. (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal at 64. 
126 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1325-6. 
127 Ibid at 1327. 
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may be used to attract economic consumer awareness. This approach may offer an 
additional incentive for businesses to participate.128 
 Doorey has presented a policy approach and referred to it as “variable sanctioning 
models”. The objective of this model is to provide reduced penalties or exemptions 
thereof for statutory infringements when private actors have taken the precautionary 
procedural steps that the state desires. 129  The exemption of penalty or reduced 
penalties happens when an actor has established the internal management checks and 
balances which are devised to reduce the possibility of a violation but still violation 
occurs.130 This is to say that although the violation is the same in each case, the 
justification for penalising the actor to a lesser degree is that it is beyond the control of 
the actor since it made reasonable efforts to avoid the problem in a manner endorsed 
by the state.131 
 Other incentives can be tax relief for the businesses which submit information. The 
amount of relief can be spread over a period of time.132 
8.6.2  Public Information Disclosure and Dissemination 
 
Public disclosure implies public scrutiny.133 By so doing, the disclosure of information can 
empower the private actors and the public in their activities with the disclosing actor. By 
providing information about firm behaviour to private watchdogs, it can alter the relative 
balance of power between the firms and the watchdogs and thereby alter the dynamic of the 
negotiations.134 This balance of power is of course enhanced when there is a possibility of 
public or private action to penalise false or misleading statements.135 This is why it is one of 
the preferred tools in reflexive law.136 
The use of disclosure based regulation as a tool for influencing entities’ practices is not 
novel.137 Many countries have relied on it to address an array of issues.138 Observations can 
be seen in consumer law, where regulated entities are required to disclose risk information in 
the form of product labelling;139 environmental law, where corporations are obliged to create 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 Doorey D.J., A Model of Responsive Workplace Law. (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal at 65. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Tax relief has been awarded for a number of reasons. In South Africa, criteria for tax relief are provided in 
South African Revenue Service: Tax Guide for Small Businesses 2013/14 at 34. 
133 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995) 89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1232. 
134 Doorey D.J., A Model of Responsive Workplace Law. (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal at 67. Orts 
E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995)  89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1232. 
135 Orts E.W., Reflexive Environmental Law. (1995)  89:4 Northwest University Law Review at 1232. 
136 Doorey D.J., A Model of Responsive Workplace Law. (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal at 67. 
137 Doorey D.J., Who made that?: influencing foreign labour practices through reflexive domestic disclosure 
regulation. (2005) 43:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 353-405 at 373. 
138 Ibid. 
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Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and disclose the amounts of designated toxins released into 
the community;140 consumer protection law which mandates regulated entities to disclose a 
racial breakdown of loan recipients to discourage racially based lending practices;141 and laws 
that govern the securities industry which oblige entities to disclose important financial 
information through the registration of securities.142 It should also be noted that though the 
“common laws of tort and contract have long required some disclosure of information that 
was [of] special relevance to consumers; legislative requirements to disclose are a relatively 
recent development.”143 In the field of environmental law, it is noted that there has been a 
lack of emphasis to utilise disclosure of information as a primary focus.144 Instead, use of 
environmental informational regulation has been "piecemeal," "inchoate," and "haphazard."145 
As indicated above, one of the core elements of reflexive law is information disclosure as a 
regulatory strategy with the view to instigating and regulating self-regulation. Generally, 
scholars agree that regulating through disclosure can have a normative influence on the 
behaviour of those who are regulated.146 This influence is created by the inducement of a risk 
and opportunity elements that must be addressed by the regulated entities.147 An example 
cited in the USA is that, information disclosure has been used to get entities to internalise 
environmental norms based on three subcategories: (1) collect and disseminate negative 
information about the entities’ environmental impacts and in doing so create the need for such 
entities to want to reduce environmental damages; (2) “collect and disseminate positive 
information about the entities’ environmental performance and thereby use a carrot, rather 
than a stick, to encourage improvement; (3) and those that disclose other types of relevant 
                                                 
140  United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Available: http://www.epa.gov/tri [accessed 20 
September 2015] cited in Doorey D.J., Who made that?: influencing foreign labour practices through reflexive 
domestic disclosure regulation. (2005) 43:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 353-405 at 374. 
141 Repetto R., Making disclosure work better: the experience of investor-driven environmental disclosure. In 
Woods N. and Brown D.L., Making global self-regulation effective in developing countries. (2007) at 86 citing 
the U.S.A. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 1975. 
142 Ibid at 86 citing the U.S.A Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
143 Freiberg A., The Tools of Regulation. (2010) at 167. 
144  Case D. W., Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics 
Perspective, Case, (2005) 76 University of Colorado Law Review 379-442 at 384. 
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146 Doorey D.J., Who made that?: influencing foreign labour practices through reflexive domestic disclosure 
regulation. (2005) 43:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 353-405 at 353 and 358. Hirsch D.D., Green business and 
the importance of reflexive law: what Michael Porter didn’t say. (2010) 62:4 Administrative Law Review at 
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information, such as descriptions of green business success stories.” 148  With such an 
undertaking, it has been reported that some environmental groups have used such negative 
information to expose and publicly shame the entities with the worst environmental practices, 
and sometimes work with such entities to identify ways to reduce their environmental 
pollution.149 By the same token, those with the positive environmental performance use such 
platform to boost their public image. To this end, once this potential is realised by regulators, 
then the challenge for such regulators is to identify the scope of disclosure that constrains the 
regulated entities to respond to the intended objectives.150 To have the said effect, policy-
makers need to devise policies that share five basic design features. These are the scope and 
contents of disclosed information, information discloser and timeframe, communication-
based regulation, and decentred experimentalism. These elements are elaborated on below. 
8.6.2.1  Determining the Scope and Contents of Disclosed Information 
Defining the scope of what must be disclosed relates to the aspect of the information disparity 
that the policy seeks to redress.151 Information to be disclosed for the purpose of this thesis 
relates to the distribution of costs and benefits in a way that balance the 3Es outcomes. 
Usually, information disclosure targets two aspects. First the requirement is to disclose what 
is already available to the discloser.152 That is to say that the information to be disclosed is 
that which was created for managerial decision-making. Secondly, the scope of information 
requires disclosers to generate new information that is not yet available to the regulated 
entity.153 
 
The contents of the information disclosure in REDD+ can be influenced by at least three 
factors. The first factor is determined by the way effectiveness is being understood. Chapter 3 
states that one way of arguing that the law is effective is that the law has resolved the problem 
in question with some level of success. This is known as output effectiveness. Effectiveness 
of the law is also understood from the input activities with the view to achieving output 
effectiveness. This discussion informs what information needs to be disclosed in the context 
of reflexive law for REDD+. This is to say that the disclosers need to disclose the information 
                                                 
148 Cited in Hirsch D.D., Green business and the importance of reflexive law: what Michael Porter didn’t say. 
(2010) 62:4 Administrative Law Review at 1113. 
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regarding the costs (both the opportunity forgone from the monetary as well as non-monetary 
aspects) and compensation on the one hand, and the benefits (either in monetary or non-
monetary aspects or both) of changing behaviour on the other hand. 
However, the above requirement is not an easy task because, as it has been discussed in 
chapter 4, activities that may lead to emission reductions in a way that is permanent and 
ensures permanence are classified as type 1 (activities to be developed within the forests), 
type 2 (activities to be developed outside forests) and type 3 (change of policies which have 
detrimental effects on forests). What has also been discussed in chapter 4 is that the costs and 
benefits related to type 1 can be easily calculated while types 2 and 3 possess significant 
challenges in attributing the costs and the benefits that should be incentivised. The problem is 
exacerbated because no one actor (such as a REDD+ investor) has control of all the types of 
activities. At most, an actor can be able to have control of type 1 and type 2 while another 
actor (possibly the government) can have some degree of control of type 3. This has to be 
kept in mind when deciding who needs to disclose information.154 
The second factor that follows from the above discussion is the next information to be 
disclosed. This relates to the question of the eligibility criteria for benefits. In this case the 
World Bank Involuntary Resettlement OP 4.12 which is adopted by the Tanzania REDD+ 
strategy can be instructive. Criteria for benefits are: 
(a) those who have formal legal rights to land (including customary and traditional 
rights recognised under the laws of the country); 
(b) those who do not have formal legal rights to land at the time the census begins but 
have a claim to such land or assets--provided that such claims are recognised under 
the laws of the country or become recognised through a process identified in the 
resettlement plan… and 
(c) those who have no recognisable legal right or claim to the land they are 
occupying.155 
Similarly, it would be necessary to disclose what the costs which warrant compensation and 
benefits thereof are.156 Following this third factor, one has to make sure that all persons 
included in all sections above are provided compensation for loss of assets other than land. 
With regards to the compensation relating to land, persons covered under sections (a) and (b) 
above are provided compensation for the land they lose, and other assistance. Persons covered 
                                                 
154 This aspect is discussed in the following section. 
155 The World Bank OP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement. Operational Manual. December, (2001). 
156 Ibid. 
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under section (c) above are provided resettlement assistance in lieu of compensation for the 
land they occupy, and other assistance, as necessary, to achieve the objectives set out in the 
policy. However, persons who encroach on the area after the cut-off date are not entitled to 
compensation or any other form of resettlement assistance. This example of what information 
needs to be disclosed obviously assumes that the causes of forest degradation are only within 
the forestry areas and can be said to take into account type 1 activities only.  
As discussed above, the criteria for disclosing what principles are used to compensate type 2 
and type 3 also need to be taken in to account. The procedural and distribution equity 
principles discussed in chapter 2 can be helpful to disclose what criteria are used. For 
example it is clear from the above adopted policy in Tanzania that the Need Principle, 
Accountability Principle, Egalitarianism Principle and Utilitarianism Principle have not been 
taken into account although they have different implications for the benefits sharing as 
discussed in chapter 2. To this end, a further requirement for information disclosure is 
whether benefit sharing has occurred or not and in what form (e.g. financial or technology). 
The above information should be revealed in connection to what counts from procedural 
equity. For example, actors could explain whether the principle of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) has been obtained or not. Additional information should be whose consent 
was sought and at what stages that information was needed. Is it prior to the beginning of the 
project or at some stage in the implementation of the project? Some authors have indicated 
that the question of “who counts” is typically neglected in FPIC discourse, but it has 
important implications.157 
One might ask whether the said requirements should be mandatory or voluntary. In deciding 
this aspect, relying on some empirical investigations regarding this question can be 
informative. In their study of women and employment, Deakin and McLaughlin cited an 
empirical finding which points to the limitations of an involuntary approach in persuading 
private sector firms to conduct pay reviews. 158  Similarly, Gunningham has argued that 
voluntary audits are unlikely to be adequate where businesses are not willing to comply 
voluntarily for a number of reasons including lack of sufficient incentives. In these 
                                                 
157 Mahanty S. and McDermott C.L., How does “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (FPIC) impact social 
equity? Lessons from mining and forestry and their implications for REDD+. (2013) 35 Land Use Policy 406-
416 at 413. These authors recommended that a legal framework for regulating land may help to determine who 
participates in FPIC processes. 
158 Deakin S. and  McLaughlin C., The regulation of Women’s Pay from Individual Rights to Reflexive Law? In 
Scott J.L. et.al., (eds) Women and Employment: Changing Lives and New Challenges, (2008) at 322. 
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circumstances, a mandatory approach is expected to achieve much more than its voluntary 
counterpart.159 Although, there are incentives proposed above it is possible that businesses or 
other REDD+ implementers might still be able to avoid information disclosure if it is 
voluntary unless there are credible losses to them if they refuse to disclose information. To 
devise a regulatory approach to address this aspect is likely to be complex partly because it 
requires additional administrative oversight. Therefore making information disclosure 
mandatory should be considered as a viable option here. It should be emphasised that this 
provision does not amount to committing business to any specific outcome. Rather it would 
oblige them to undertake a regular evaluation practice and to disclose the results. 
The mandatory requirement raises a question of how actors and regulators would know that 
certain actions or lack thereof constitute violations. Accordingly, the answer lies not in the 
definition of what action or lack thereof is a wrong-doing. Instead, the fact that the 
distribution of costs and benefits are likely to exclude certain groups of people means there is 
always a room for improvement. The principles in chapter 2 can provide guidance. Under the 
REDD+ mechanism, for instance, once a specific timeframe for information disclosure has 
been reached, information relating to the distribution of costs and benefits must be disclosed 
and concerns of the affected parties must be addressed with justifications as to how the said 
principles have been used for guidance. For this reason the regulatory instrument can specify 
that it will not seek punitive measures if disclosed information exposes some negative 
practices. In fact the information disclosure should disclose both negative and positive 
aspects. What is then required is the provision to compel information disclosers to rectify 
their negative aspects following their disclosure. Hence a timeframe should be set according 
to appropriate laws and practices. The failure to do so exposes the company to government 
agency enforcement and civil penalties. This can be backed up by an aggressive citizen suit 
provision that awards a certain amount of the penalties to any person who brings a successful 
suit against a business for failing to provide information. 
8.6.2.2  Determining the Information Discloser and Periodicity 
The question of who needs to disclose is related to the question of who needs to compensate. 
For instance type 3 activities involve general policies in a sense that some sectorial and 
macro-economic policies and planning laws have a direct bearing on deforestation and 
                                                 
159 Gunningham  N., Thinking about Regulatory Mix: Regulating Occupational Health and Safety, Futures 
Markets and Environmental Law. In Grabosky P. and Braithwaite J. eds., Business Regulation and Australia's 
Future, (1993) at 143. 
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degradation in a broad way. In this way it is not expected that the private actor who is 
implementing REDD+ needs to compensate the state for a policy shift. One way is to allocate 
compensation to the state from the international fund sources. The requirement is then for a 
state to disclose policy change information and compensation received thereof. 
In chapter 7, in the cases of Tanzania and Indonesia, it occurs that the implementer or the 
finance distributer is the state where the finance is received via the fund-based financing 
arrangements at the international level. In this case the state or an agency of state will need to 
disclose such information. The second option is that if the market becomes a source of 
finance even if it is complementary to the state fund, then the private sector would be obliged 
to disclose that information. The timing of disclosing such information can be informed by 
the principle of FPIC discussed above. In attempting to define what is meant by prior, some 
have argued that the “informed consent must be sought first as a precondition before 
implementing any activity on the ground. It is an advanced authorization from affected 
indigenous peoples’ communities before the commencement of any activities or project.”160 
A question that might arise here is whether FPIC should be only prior to the beginning of the 
project or also at some stage in the implementation of the project. Certainly, the timing and 
the frequency of consultations shape both the scope and extent to which costs and benefits 
can be evaluated and communicated among parties involved.161 
An example of a timeframe recommended in the extractive sector can be instructive in the 
distribution of costs and benefits in cases where REDD+ is implemented in the areas 
occupied by indigenous and local communities. 162  As such, it is recommended that the 
timeframe for the conduct of FPIC processes should take into account the cultural practices of 
the community in question.163 Research has shown that this may be quick or may take a long 
time, however, the crucial aspect before that is that parties must reach consensus after having 
a complete understanding of the information.164 Therefore, a timetable should be agreed upon 
in consultations with the community, and not set by the law.165 This recommendation is 
                                                 
160 Training Manual on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in REDD+ for Indigenous Peoples. Asia 
Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) (2012) at 60. 
161 See section 8.6.2.3 below.  
162 Doyle C. and  Cariño J., Making Free Prior & Informed Consent a Reality Indigenous Peoples and the 
Extractive Sector. (2013) at 21. Available: 
http://www.socialimpactassessment.com/documents/Consortium+FPIC+report+-+May+2103+-
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consistent with the objectives of the reflexive law discussed above. Thus a provision in the 
reflexive law should require a REDD+ implementer to provide information on the timeframe 
agreed by the parties and frequency of information prior to the implementation of REDD+ 
activities.  
8.6.2.3   Challenges of Devising Effective Disclosure Regulation 
Information disclosure has its limitations. The use of informational tools is premised on the 
assumption that people understand and respond to information in a rational way, and in a way 
intended by the provider of the information. 166  However, these premises are not always 
valid.167 In some cases, people may make their choices on emotional grounds.168 Also, people 
are not always rational and do not always make their decisions on the basis of information 
only.169 In addition, information may affect different groups of people in a society differently. 
Those with less education and access to a wider variety of sources of information may find it 
more difficult to understand and process such information.170 Nor do people necessarily seek 
out all of the available information. Their time may be limited, or they may be stressed, 
distracted or overloaded, uninterested or intimidated by the information provider and the 
complexity of the information or they may lack confidence in their own ability to weigh the 
information.171 Extensive empirical evidence regarding the mandated procedural requirement 
in forest management in Laos reveals that participatory protected area management places a 
substantial time burden on communities with respondents indicating little to no understanding 
of or impact on the process. 172  This may be explained by the fact that “environmental 
problems are inherently complex and are often characterized by significant uncertainties.”173 
The questions then emerge: what yardstick should the regulators use to ensure that they 
compel the regulated to disclose acceptable levels of information? What level of threshold 
should be used to assign punitive measures? These questions are not very easy to answer 
fully. However, answers to them depends on a requirement that the regulated entities be 
                                                 
166 Freiberg A., The Tools of Regulation, (2010) at 176. See also, Stewart R., New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation? (2001-2002) 29 Capital University Law Review 21-182 at 141. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid Freiberg at 176 citing Hadden S.G., Read the Label: Reducing Risk by Providing Information, (1986). 
169 Ibid. 
170  Ibid. See also Ben-Shahar O. and  Schneider C.E., More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure. (2014). 
171 Freiberg A., The Tools of Regulation. (2010) at 176-7 citing multiple authors. 
172 Cited in Suiseeya K.R.M., A Retreat from Justice in Global Forest Governance: REDD+ and the “Do No 
Harm” Principle. A paper presented at the 3rd Annual UCSB Environmental Politics Conference UC Santa 
Barbara June 5, (2015) at 10. 
173 Stewart R., New Generation of Environmental Regulation? (2001-2002) 29 Capital University Law Review 
21-182 at 141. 
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required to assess those who may have been left out and indicate how they have attempted to 
improve the situation by utilising information communication over time based on the 
principles discussed in chapter 2. This is another component of reflexive law as discussed 
below. 
8.6.3   Communication-Based Regulation 
 
Reflexive law also seeks to boost self-reflection of the actors’ actions by enhancing 
communication between stakeholders and the businesses that affect them.174 For instance, the 
government might oblige investors to reach out to and meet with communities to establish 
that it has given due consideration to their input concerning environmental conservation. In 
this way government officials become what the author terms the “structural engineers of 
communicative systems.”175 It is generally expected that when stakeholders are well-informed 
they will be more eager to communicate with business actors and more persuasive to make 
their case. This aspect then links communication-based regulation to information-based 
regulation.176 This requirement can be incorporated in the reflexive law for REDD+ to oblige 
the REDD+ implementer to communicate with the communities and take their inputs 
regarding distribution of costs and benefits into account. 
8.6.4   Decentred Experimentalism 
 
The concept of “decentred experimentalism” is based on experiments in decentred 
participatory decision-making under the overall coordinating supervision of an actor such as 
an agency of government.177 As such it has been observed that “locally-based private or 
quasi-public groups” have demonstrated greater flexibility and effectiveness in managing 
environmental conservation than would have been achievable through formal government 
approaches.178 This is because the rules and approaches by self-regulatory agencies are less 
formalised compared to those of public regulatory regimes.179 
 
                                                 
174 Hirsch D.D., Green business and the importance of reflexive law: what Michael Porter didn’t say. (2010) 
62:4 Administrative Law Review at 1113 citing Teubner. 
175 Ibid at 1114. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Gaines S.E., Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development. (2002-2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal 1 at 14-15. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Schepel H., The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating 
Markets International Studies in the Theory of Private Law. (2005) at 30. 
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Given the complexity of technical issues in REDD+ it would be helpful to allow 
organisations such as described in chapter 4 to assist in inter alia MRV of costs and benefits 
distribution. Schepel reminds us that self-regulatory agencies usually possess a higher degree 
of expertise and technical knowhow and innovatory possibilities in some areas compared to 
government agencies. 180  Thus, allowing such actors to take part in regulation allows 
information costs for the formulation and interpretation of standards to be lower compared to 
the alternative.181 By the same token, monitoring and enforcement costs of the government 
can also be reduced, because such costs are shifted to such agencies, given that such 
interaction is fostered by mutual trust.182 The case study of Indonesia illustrates how the 
above requirement can be attained. For instance the most advanced project (the Rimba Raya 
project) in terms of implementation in Indonesia (at the time of writing), has gained 
certification from two self-regulatory agencies. These are the Verified Carbon Standard 
(VCS) and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards (CCBS).183These agencies 
are overseen by a partnership from government, business and nonprofit actors.184 
8.7  Conclusion 
 
Countries will need to consider a wide variety of issues before they can identify their optimal 
(and feasible) legal framework to give effect to REDD+. As such countries differ 
dramatically in their institutional structures, resource endowments, and their levels of 
industrialisation. Like many other issues their policymakers will invariably consider the 
regulatory framework for REDD+ in intensely political environments. A policy-making 
process which supports and encourages the consideration of alternative regulatory 
frameworks is essential if countries are to make informed decisions concerning the options 
available to give effect to REDD+. It is imperative that such policy-makers are encouraged to 
consider (earlier rather than later), in the legal regulatory making process, the merits and 
demerits of the options available. To achieve this objective, this chapter has advocated for a 
reflexive law which is a departure from the regulatory approaches that have been envisaged in 
the legal regulatory frameworks for REDD+ in Tanzania and Indonesia discussed in chapters 
6 and 7. Reflexive law can overcome the problems (such as rent-seeking behaviour) by 




183 McGregor A. et.al., Beyond carbon, more than forest? REDD+ governmentality in Indonesia. (2015) 47, 
Environment and Planning138–155 at 145. 
184 See chapter 4 for more details. 
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increasing the prospect of exposure through the requirement for public disclosure. However, 
such requirement also has some limitations.185 Thus reflexive law is an alternative that can be
explored further to assess how it can be strengthened. Additionally, a number of impediments 
are likely to stand in the way of realising such a regulatory framework. As explained above, 
reflexive law requires a paradigm shift from “hard law” and litigation-based approaches to a 
variety of self-regulatory systems.  
185 It is has been discussed elsewhere that “disclosure does not necessarily reduce corruption”. Arguments for 
this are not repeated here and the reader is directed elsewhere. Gilbert M.D. and Aiken B.F., Disclosure and 
Corruption. 14 Election Law Journal (2015) 148. Also see Mol P.J., The Future of Transparency: Power, Pitfalls 
and Promises. 10:3 Global Environmental Politics, (2010) 132-143. Dingwerth K. and Eichinger M., Tamed 
Transparency: How Information Disclosure under the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower. 10:3 Global 
Environmental Politics, (2010) 74-96. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
9.1 Overview 
The research underlying this thesis was undertaken during 2013 to 2015, a period during 
which the legal and policy frameworks in Tanzania and Indonesia for REDD+ were being 
developed. The approach taken in this study focused on the international and the domestic 
dimensions of climate change. At the international level, the study was broadly concerned 
with describing and discussing the emerging REDD+ governance approaches focusing on 
institutional considerations, legal issues, and finance as well as potential additional benefits. 
In light of these findings, the study focused on discussing the optimal and feasible model 
legislative framework sufficient to give effect to REDD+ specifically in the two case study 
countries and generally. 
To achieve the overall objective, chapter 2 developed the framework which entails concepts 
and principles (sustainable development, CBDR, equity, environmental-effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness) and how rights relate to them. Chapter 3 discussed the place of REDD+ in 
the post-Kyoto regime. It has argued that the place of a REDD+ mechanism must be 
considered within the broader framework of a “bottom-up approach” whereby each country 
determines its own level of ambition. This means that the future global regime appears to be 
one of self-regulation. Thus, developing countries face different sets of compliance questions, 
many arising out of REDD+ projects undertaken in the context of reporting on forest carbon 
stock changes in national communications. The compliance requirements are not new per se, 
but in the context of REDD+ these issues will be the basis for which incentives will flow once 
verified. In order to comply with these procedural requirements in line with positive 
incentives requirements, a wide set of legal and institutional approaches may have to be 
undertaken by developing countries. These include inter alia conventional matters of 
improving forest conservation protection and assessment and new ways of looking at property 
ownership, land use, forest management and forest inventories and social and environmental 
impact. To this end, the legal nature of REDD+ is only procedural in nature. With such 
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observations, chapter 4 argued that REDD+ should be seen as a self-regulating governance 
system with potential challenges and prospects for realising the 3Es outcomes. From the 
foregoing analysis, chapter 5 discussed the issue of carbon rights with the object of 
identifying the property nature of carbon rights and did so with a view to suggesting a self-
regulatory system for the governance of REDD+. The chapter concluded with two potential 
options for a self-regulatory system. The first is that when the source of funding is from 
private actors, then the private sector will acquire significant power and compel the host 
country to adopt a conception of carbon rights which favour the private actors’ interests. The 
advantage of this option is the possibility of securing substantial funding for REDD+ from the 
private sector.  
The second aspect is that when the source of funding is from public finance, then host states 
can take ownership of REDD+. As such, government institutions are less compelled to adopt 
a particular type of carbon rights conceptualisation. This approach may also be associated 
with limited financing particularly in the long term. This means a tradeoff approach has to be 
adopted as discussed in section 9.2.4 below. The chapter was not set to resolve the debate on 
land tenure or carbon rights. Instead it discussed such issues with the view to identifying the 
optimal (and feasible) model legislative framework sufficient to implement REDD+. 
Chapter 6 considered forest governance in Tanzania and Indonesia respectively. The research 
was broadly concerned with (a) describing governance models for distribution of power 
which in turn affects how benefits are distributed. The chapter also described the enforcement 
mechanism. Chapter 7 explored the distribution of benefits and costs, and regulatory nuts and 
bolts discussed or envisaged in the regulatory frameworks for REDD+ in each country under 
the study. This was done against the conceptual framework set out in chapter 2 with the view 
to judging whether such regulatory framework can be said to be an optimal and feasible 
model legislative framework sufficient to implement REDD+ in developing countries. It 
concluded that the overall implementation of REDD+ is based on the command and control 
approach with limited decentred approach. Thus such regulatory framework was deemed 
insufficient to govern REDD+ implementation. In light of this conclusion, chapter 8 
discussed how the inadequacy of the command and control approach can be addressed by a 
reflexive approach. Due to the complexity of the subject in question and the ongoing 
development of REDD+ regulatory frameworks in Tanzania and Indonesia, there is a lack of 
finality in this thesis. Nevertheless the preliminary finding and assessment is made in this 
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chapter. Thus, the following discussion presents recommendations and conclusions regarding 
the optimal and feasible model legislative framework sufficient to implement REDD+. This is 
done against the background assessments of the preceding chapters. 
9.2  Towards a Reflexive Regulatory Framework to give Effect to REDD+ 
 
The basic architecture for the optimal and feasible model legislative framework sufficient to 
implement REDD+ should comprise provisions regulating issues, such as scope, substantive, 
procedural and contextual guiding principles, concepts or terminology, the legal nature, 
sources of positive incentives and institutional arrangements. 
9.2.1   The goals and scope of a REDD+ mechanism 
 
The goals of a REDD+ mechanism should include inter alia: 
 Ensuring equitable distribution of costs and benefits; 
 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; 
 Protecting biodiversity; and 
 Respecting the rights of indigenous peoples and vulnerable communities.  
The scope of a REDD+ mechanism should include inter alia: 
 Direct and indirect sources of deforestation and degradation instead of focusing 
predominantly on the direct sources. Although the countries under this study have 
indicated indirect causes of deforestation and degradation in their regulatory approach, 
they have not yet established the extent to which these factors are included in defining 
the scope of REDD+ activities as well as how they affect the distribution of costs and 
benefits. 
9.2.2   Definitions 
 
There is a need to define certain terms, particularly “carbon rights” and “carbon credits” in 
order to avoid ambiguity. However, given the variety of complicated new legal and technical 
concepts and methodologies that are required to implement the REDD+ mechanism, 
“administrative procedures and workloads could be reduced by employing universal 
definitions and standards, ideally tied to internationally-agreed definitions and indices.”1 For 
example, given the potential dangers and advantages brought by the types of climate finance 
                                                 
1 Costenbader J. (ed)., Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and Implementation at the National Level. IUCN, 
Gland, Switzerland (2009) at 104. 
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as established in chapter 5, and the advantages of separate property rights to sequester carbon 
(chapter 6, sections 6.2.3.4 and 6.3.3.4),  this thesis agrees with Costenbader that:   
[…] it may be more efficient for countries to adopt a generally accepted definition of 
carbon rights such as ownership interest [separate from property rights over the 
physical resources] in order to facilitate carbon investments, rather than persisting in 
using unworkable definitions of carbon rights in terms of land or forest ownership. To 
ensure harmony across national legal systems, however, carbon ownership interests 
then should be recognized under other sectors of law according to the same 
definition.2 
However, to achieve the above general definition both public and private sector actors must 
satisfy tests of representativeness, accessibility and negotiation that are to be devised in light 
of some set of democratic ideals. Actors should have a choice of formal or informal 
negotiations and agreements and should be seen as an ongoing process, and be legally 
guaranteed. 
9.2.3  The Legal Nature 
 
The discussion regarding the legal nature of REDD+ in chapter 3 established that REDD+ 
must be seen within the overall international climate change regime where REDD+ is 
incorporated within the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). In this context, the 
legal obligation for the host country includes inter alia reporting on forest carbon stock 
changes and to provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building 
support needed and received. This is a possible basis for which to expect benefits to flow to 
developing countries both from public and private sectors. In this sense the legal nature of 
REDD+ at a domestic level should only be procedural in nature. This is to say that reflexive 
law should not compel the actors to achieve the goals of REDD+ at a domestic level but 
rather compel them to follow the procedural aspects related to achieving the goals of REDD+ 
as discussed in the relevant sections in chapter 8. 
 
9.2.4  Determining the Sources of Positive Incentives 
 
The funding instruments (National REDD+ Funds)3 advocated in the case studies should be 
used to attract private investment through the “public-private partnership” (PPP) model. If 
PPP is well designed, it could leverage additional funding as well as other positive incentives 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3As already discussed in chapter 7 the sources of such funding  are initially expected to come from a bi-or 
multilateral fund. 
Chapter 9: Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
 
-268 -  
 
that may be adequate for addressing other competing land uses that prevent the achieving of 
REDD+ objectives.4 In such a set-up, the investment risks are reduced because they are 
shared between the public and the private investors.5 This implies that the government can 
retain some sovereignty rights and be able to influence how carbon rights may be defined. In 
this case, carbon rights should run with land and/or resource tenure. The second type of 
positive incentives relates to private engagement in “corporate social responsibility”. This 
type can be categorised as a demonstrative business model, considering that the objective is 
not conducted for profitability purposes.6 The third business model constitutes the “main 
investor” as the private company. In this case the project is fully financed and owned by one 
or more private companies, which implement the project from its inception with support from 
a private consultancy company.7 Lastly, the discussions of sections 4.3.1 and 7.4.1 point to 
the “governments” as the source of the fourth type of positive incentives. These incentives 
relate to sectorial and macro-economic policies and planning laws. Within these categories, a 
further discussion is needed to decide the beneficiaries, benefits and eligibility criteria 
thereof. 
9.2.5  Determining Beneficiaries, Benefits and Eligibility Criteria 
 
The positive incentives for those who contribute to emission reductions are likely to be most 
effective when they are based on the principles of equity discussed in chapter 2 and “set at a 
level that motivates participation beyond merely offsetting participants' opportunity costs.”8 
The point of departure should take into account the following elements discussed below. 
9.2.5.1  Community as Beneficiaries 
 
The decision to ascertain the beneficiaries within the community should be informed by the 
object of regulation discussed in section 4.3.1 of chapter 4. Thus, positive incentives for the 
community should be those who reside within the forests areas, and those outside the forests 
                                                 
4 It is noted that “there is no substantial experience of establishing PPP systems in most developing countries.” 
Chang M. et. al., International experience of Public-Private Partnerships for urban environmental infrastructure, 
and its application to China. 4:2 International Review for Environmental Strategies, (2003) 223-248. Thus, more 
research is necessary to assess how the PPP model can assist developing countries to finance and manage the 
REDD+ mechanism. 
5 Møller L.R., “Emerging Lessons from Financing REDD+ Projects” A brochure presents the key results from 
the forthcoming publication “Translating lessons learnt from financing forest projects into national REDD-plus 
strategy development and implementation”. UNEP DTU Partnership. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Lofts K., REDD+ Benefit Distribution in Viet Nam. The Centre for International Sustainable Development 
Law (CISDL) Working Paper No 1 (2015) at 8-9. 
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areas. The positive incentives to be granted to the community should include inter alia: land 
tenure and resource tenure; development of cooperatives, farmer organisations, business 
associations, scientific organisations; removal of resource-use distorting subsidies, taxes on 
environmental and social externalities; increased public investment in rural infrastructure and 
public goods; increased access to credit for small-scale farmers; and financial payments to 
farmers for carbon sequestration. 
Criteria 
The criteria for community involvement should be the principles discussed in chapter 2. It is 
expected that these principles are to be applied in a reflexive manner as they are dependent on 
the context in which they are applied. The context depends on the socio-economic situation of 
a particular society, the threats to the deforestation and degradation as well as particular 
culture. The REDD+ investors (i.e. private sectors and governments) are expected to work out 
how these principles are to be applied on the ground, capture how that information is 
implemented and subject it to the public as referred to under the institutions and 
administrative aspects below. 
 
9.2.5.2  Private Actors as Beneficiaries 
 
The provision for available positive incentives and criteria thereof should vary according to 
the types of private actors. For this reason, it is important to classify beneficiaries by 
reiterating the type of private actors discussed above. These are private actors within the 
“PPP” model, “corporate social responsibility” model and “main investor” model. 
The Positive Incentives for Private Actors in the “PPP” and “Main Investors” Models 
The benefits to be granted to private actors in the “PPP” and “main investors” business 
models (see section 9.2.4) should be carbon rights and tax incentives (where necessary and 
possible). However, the said benefits needs to be differentiated because the private actors in a 
PPP model face different risks compared to the private actors in the “main investors” model 
as indicated above. The extent to which such positive incentives are afforded within these 
models is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Criteria 
Within the “PPP” and “main investors” models, the accountability principle should find 
application in this aspect. The participation of private actors in REDD+ should be made 
conditional on the investment in the access and use of clean and green technology i.e. 
technology transfer. This is not an inconceivable idea.9 It is also expected that access to some 
technology such as energy will reduce pressure from utilising forest resources and will also 
not depend on land tenure for individuals to access the benefits.10 This raises the question of 
the type of technology needed. Usually companies that invest in developing countries are 
offered tax allowance incentives.11 However, these incentives target only the manufacturing 
industry and entail the strict allocation of points based on criteria, resulting in preferential 
status being assigned to a project.12 The criteria for “the points are allocated based on the 
contribution that the project makes to employment, small, medium and micro enterprises, and 
energy efficiency, among other things.” 13  This approach should be extended to REDD+ 
investment. The objective is to avoid or minimise potential perils of carbon rights and 
investments as discussed in chapter 5 and maximise the potential gains for the community 
and the host country. This will provide a safety net for the host state and communities. At the 
same time, reflexive law should provide a legal duty for a private actor to establish an in-
company cost and distribution system and be required to undertake information disclosure as 
discussed in chapter 8. This legal duty should not be extended to business models that aim to 
undertake “corporate social responsibility”. This is because actors who are aiming to engage 
in social responsibility are not motivated to maximise their benefits within that particular 
jurisdiction. For this reason, they should also not be offered tax allowance incentives. 
 
                                                 
9 A recent report jointly released by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank about the 
“Lighting Africa Program” indicates that Africa was set to become the world’s largest market for clean off-grid 
lamps, with up to 140 million people having access to better lighting by 2015. Walter B., IFC-World Bank 
Report: 140 million in Africa Could Access Clean Lighting by 2015. Available: 
http://ifcext.ifc.org/IFCExt/Pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/03BFD7EF6A604D0785257BD4002D468F 
[accessed 17 September 2015]. 
10 As discussed in chapter 5, land tenure is one of the complex issues to resolve in order to get carbon rights 
which in turn is seen as a first step towards accessing REDD+ incentives. Thus it is argued that technology 
transfer can reach or benefit both those who have land tenure and those that do not have. Under this case, it is 
seen as a quicker way of benefiting the local people since land tenure usually takes a very long time to resolve.   
11 Samuel C., The Dark Side of Foreign Direct Investment: A South African Perspective. Occasional Paper No 
167, Economic Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (2013) at 15. 
12 Ibid at 16. 
13 Ibid. 
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9.2.5.3  Public Actors as Beneficiaries 
 
The case study of Indonesia in chapter 6 is instructive in this aspect. The national strategy 
indicates that regional governments can receive positive incentives as a result of their efforts 
and performance in developing conditions that enable emissions reduction in their areas 
through both strategic activities and/or the formulation of supportive policies.14 
The Positive Incentives for the Public Actors 
In providing positive incentives to the public actors, it must be made clear whether such 
positive incentives as payments are to be made to the national government and or local 
governments in the form of taxes or royalties. A further consideration should be “whether the 
national government will be eligible to receive a portion of credits from REDD+ activities to 
be channeled into other climate change related activities.”15 
Criteria 
The criteria for positive incentives should include inter alia the administrative aspects such as 
for managing the national registry and/or addressing national emissions reduction, 
development of favourable sectoral and macro policies and planning laws which are essential 
or complements to meet the objectives of REDD+. 
9.2.6  Institutions and Administrative Aspects 
 
The administrative aspect should be reflexive by following the discussion in chapter 8. The 
housing of reflexive law for REDD+ should also be determined. The roles of the government 
and its agencies should also be determined. The determination of these aspects is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
9.2.7  Compliance and Enforcement 
 
The question of compliance and enforcement must distinguish who is the subject of such 
approach. In this case, one can distinguish between public actors, private actors and 
communities. However, with all these actors the main approach to be undertaken is a self-
                                                 
14 Indonesia REDD+ National Strategy June 2012 at 12. 
15 The REDD Desk. Available: 
http://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/resources/pdf/2010/Background_Analysis_of_REDD_Regulatory_Fram
eworks.pdf [accessed 14 September 2015]. 
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enforced approach. The public sector is already self-enforced and several approaches can be 
undertaken.  
For private and public actors a self-enforcing approach can happen if the following conditions 
for more effective self-regulation are created. Reflexive law for REDD+ should require actors 
to provide information on the distribution of costs and benefits. This provision should be 
followed by the provisions on the scope and contents of disclosed information, information 
disclosure and timeframe, communication-based regulation, and decentred experimentalism. 
These elements are discussed in detail in the previous chapter and are repeated in this section. 
In the event that the state is the implementer of REDD+, it is expected that third parties can 
MRV the information disclosed as discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Regarding the compliance 
and enforcement of the communities, the issue of incentives is the only approach. The way 
such incentives are structured and carried out should be left to the REDD+ implementers 
taking into account the principles discussed in chapter 2.16 
9.3  Concluding remarks 
 
The thesis argues that detailed legal prescription cannot effectively regulate REDD+ 
activities, in a top-down manner. More power should be delegated to groups and associations 
capable of taking self-regulatory measures. Thus the role of the state should be inter alia 
creating the conditions for more effective self-regulation and regulation of self-regulation as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 8. The command and control approach has significant limitations 
in terms of holding responsible the actors for deforestation and degradation. Chapter 4 has 
argued that when attempting to regulate (“target”) groups, one has to consider their interests, 
objectives, and structure. However, these are difficult to define because the causes of 
deforestation and degradation are multidimensional and complex. Consequently, the 
regulatory approach is very diffuse, scattered over several statutes and agency regulations. 
                                                 
16 A “self-enforcement contract” can be cited here as an example of how investors can structure and carry out 
this incentive approach. Salas argued that because third-party enforcement is imperfect, the buyer must offer a 
contract through which he provides additional incentives for the seller to avoid deforestation and forest 
degradation. A contract is self-enforceable if the parties find cooperation to be the optimal strategy. The buyer 
pays p as a fixed payment regardless of what the seller's performance is, and the contingent payment takes the 
form of a bonus that the buyer promises to pay as long as the seller does not shirk. Because enforcement is 
imperfect after the seller accepts a contract yp, parties may renege without a formal penalty. Then, since both 
parties can deviate from the contract, the contingent payment must be sufficient to ensure a self-enforcing 
contract. Salas C.P., Designing Contracts for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. 
Selected Paper No. 11305 prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 
AAEA, CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, (2010) at 19 and 21. 
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Thus it is even harder to hold all major actors (especially indirect causes of deforestation and 
degradation) responsible for the breach of the forestry legal framework because in some cases 
the breach of such law can be a result of authorisation by different statutes as part of the 
developmental approaches structured in the national economy. It has also been discussed that 
governments have been lacking the capacity to enforce the command and control approach 
and this problem will continue in REDD+ implementation if the command and control 
approach is employed exclusively as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. To address this problem, 
REDD+ must be implemented in the context of the overall strategy to reduce carbon 
emissions from all sectors (the “low carbon economy” strategy) rather than focusing on just 
the forestry sector. This is one of the main reasons that one has to consider another form of 
regulation such as reflexive law. This shift in approach does not imply that the government 
thereafter simply stands on the sideline. On the contrary the state should inter alia create 
conditions for effective self-regulation to take place. 
9.4  Contribution of the thesis 
9.4.1  Contribution to Climate Change Governance Scholarship 
 
In climate change governance, it is indicated that equity issues (both at the domestic and 
international levels) have always been among the most difficult for governments and other 
actors to address.17 The discussion of the corpus of statutes  in chapter 6 demonstrated that the 
governance of forest resources in Tanzania and Indonesia relies predominantly on the 
command and control. This thesis departed from this approach by discussing reflexive law. In 
doing so, it contributes to our understanding of a governance model which takes a reflexive 
approach. The thesis was able to get to the core of the governance arrangements and conclude 
that, in order to realise the 3Es outcomes, the regulatory approach needed should enroll the 
relevant actors in a reflexive architecture and subject such parties to mechanisms of public 
responsibility. In this quest the researcher did not prioritise the state and state agencies as the 
actors in deciding how costs and benefits should be determined. Instead it argues that that 
should be left to the contracting parties themselves. In this regard, efforts by the state should 
be directed to devising a mechanism that can facilitate the realisation of such outcomes. 
 
                                                 
17  Meadowcroft J., Climate change governance. A paper contributing to the 2010 World Bank World 
Development Report. The World Bank (2009) at 4 
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9.4.2  Contribution to Foreign Direct Investment Scholarship 
 
The core issue under FDI discussed in chapter 5 is the potential perils that might arise in 
REDD+ implementation. Tienhaara has argued that in a new area of FDI like forest carbon, 
where the use of model contracts have yet to be developed and legislation is limited, the 
content of contracts is likely to be largely determined in the course of negotiations.18 The 
author has discussed potential dangers that can be brought by FDI. This thesis extended such 
view by looking at how FDI can compel the particular form of conceptualisation of carbon 
rights in a way that advances the interests of investors at the expense of the host communities, 
or interests of investors at the expense of the state and communities. Such awareness has 
become helpful in identifying elements for creating some safety net in the recommendations 
of the regulatory framework for REDD+ as seen above, instead of forest authorities 
speculating “how much foreign companies might profit from carbon trading, or how long 
they plan to keep plantation land out of other uses to ensure that carbon continues to be stored 
on it.”19As seen above it is recommended that a Public-Private Partnership for REDD+ 
investment should be conditional on investment in the access to and use of clean and green 
technology amongst other things. This is a useful caveat to avoid potential perils as it is hard 
to realise how foreign companies might profit from REDD+ investment.  
9.4.3  Contribution to the REDD+ Debate 
Literature on developing legal frameworks for the REDD+ mechanism recommends that host 
countries should define “applicable conditions and setting up of benefit-sharing mechanisms, 
as well as monitoring of compliance.” 20  This thesis extends this recommendation by 
suggesting the reflexive law as a convincing tool for achieve the 3Es outcomes through 
communicative instruments that allow for monitoring, compliance and enforcement. 
Accordingly, reflexive law differs from the previous approaches such as command and 
control, and Participatory Forest Management because its objectives, structure, and approach 
of achieving the 3Es outcomes has a reflexive aspect of subjecting contracting parties to 
mechanisms of public responsibility. 
                                                 
18 Tienhaara K., The Potential Perils of Forest Carbon Contracts for Developing Countries: Cases from Africa. 
(2012) 39:2, The Journal of Peasant Studies 551-572 at 557.   
19 Ibid.   
20 Costenbader J. (ed)., Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and Implementation at the National Level. IUCN, 
Gland, Switzerland (2009) at 107. 
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A further contribution to the REDD+ literature relates to the definition of theh REDD+ 
mechanism. When one is dealing with the question of choice of regulatory framework, 
chapter 4 argued that it should be defined as a self-regulatory system. Following the insights 
of the scholars of governance, this thesis articulated not only a broad understanding of 
REDD+ but also of the broad range of new actors, their interests and structure that are 
involved in contributing to the implementation of its activities. As discussed in chapter 4, this 
way of conceptualising has helped to unpack inter alia the self-regulatory nature of the 
REDD+ mechanism and, thus, by arguing that REDD+ should be viewed as a self-regulatory 
system, we begin to gain a new and clear understanding of the conditions of possibility of a 
form of governance that can be harnessed to provide a new type of regulation which holds the 
potential for the realisation of the 3Es outcomes.  
9.5  Questions for Further Research 
 
A question might arise about what could stand in the way of realising the reflexive law for 
REDD+. The most powerful potential objection to the proposed approach is that the very idea 
of ensuring self-regulation in the REDD+ mechanism is fundamentally flawed because it is 
grounded on an inherently unsound suggestion that self-regulatory actors under a reflexive 
law model can be trustworthy in regulating the distribution of costs and benefits. This is 
because such actors may be in a position to generate high profit by avoiding balancing the 
3Es outcomes.  Thus, it is difficult to counter these criticisms, as they raise the most 
fundamental and practical concerns about the future of the REDD+ regulatory framework. It 
is entirely possible that none of the regulatory design measures discussed in this thesis would 
make a new model of self-regulation in the forestry sector more feasible in practice. 
Nonetheless, it is equally true that, without engaging non-state actors in the regulatory 
process in a way such as discussed in reflexive law, any efforts to devise an optimal (and 
feasible) model of regulation for REDD+ in light of the complexities brought about by such 
mechanism will most likely be unsuccessful in Tanzania and Indonesia, at least in the short 
term. Chapter 8 has identified some emerging elements of reflexive law. Thus future 
researchers may need to examine why a comprehensive type of reflexive regulation has not 
already been made in the context of forestry regulation. Put differently, what are some of the 
impediments to using alternatives to traditional regulation? And how can they be addressed? 
Some have pointed out that there is every reason to argue whether reflexive law is at all 
possible and advisable in the absence of substantial involvement of the state and its 
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agencies.21 Thus, the question that emerges is in what role and to what extent can the state 
and its agencies take part in creating the conditions for more effective self-regulation for 
REDD+? What types of powers will the state and its agencies have in respect of monitoring 
and enforcement of self-regulation systems? 
 
                                                 
21 Aalders M. and Wilthagen T., Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of 
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